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
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
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


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
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
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
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a new life



'Do you not hear the entrance of a new theme?'

Do you not hear the asserting cry of the newborn,

see myriad men rise to work;

to build, to wield the power of the sun?

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
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
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
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
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For him a spade is not yet a spade.

The telegraph wires hum a strange tune, the
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And imitating father is a new kind of play.

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
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
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future**

Under the furrowed brow, his aging eyes see
his child grow to manhood. He gives his all: care
and protection, knowledge culled from experience.
And prepares him to meet the future.

Soon the youth will learn from life.
Soon will come the struggle to achieve.
Soon he will be part of the striving . . .

The striving and effort for a better world.
A world that offers a little more—
a little less of the care, a little more of the joy.

Today, as in the past, our products help to make homes
cleaner, healthier, happier. But today we are also working for . . .
Tomorrow, when the evergrowing urge for better living
will demand still greater efforts. And we shall be
ready with wider service, new ideas, new products . . .

Today and Tomorrow... Hindustan Lever serves the home.

The Journal of the United Service Institution of India

Vol. LXXXIX

JANUARY-MARCH, 1959

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EDITORIAL

DEFENCE LABORATORIES

A chain of laboratories is being set up in the country under the Research and Development Organisation of the Defence Ministry. This is yet another step forward towards achieving self-sufficiency in defence material and in keeping with the radical reorganisation of defence science brought about by the present Defence Minister nearly a year and a half ago. These defence research laboratories will cover activities like ballistics, communications, explosives and psychological research. Personnel research, which was hitherto limited to selection of officers, is now being extended to include selection of technical trades in the Army and the Navy. Other research projects will concern fuel and multi-fuel engines, substitutes for imported materials, high-altitude flying and bio-medical aspect of atomic and other radiations. In the aeronautical field, besides the increased tempo in design and development and indigenous production of aeronautical stores and equipment, environmental studies will also be given the necessary emphasis. To encourage outstanding work, incentives will be provided in the form of merit promotions and advance increments to scientists and engineers working in the Organisation. The terms and conditions of service in the Defence Science Service are also being revised to include senior posts carrying salaries from Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 2,500 per mensem. In the West, great emphasis is being laid on research and development work. Indeed, it is said that the total expenditure on research and development in

the U.S.A., for instance, is comparable in size to India's Five-Year Plan outlay. In India, a good beginning has already been made, though the task before these laboratories is no doubt formidable. It is hoped that these laboratories will bring together scientists and soldiers which is necessary for bringing about an integration of scientific and military thinking in defence matters. Finally, it is hoped that these laboratories will encourage universities and national institutions to undertake research in this very important field so that the Defence Services could be assured of the backing of the Nation's scientific activity.

MULTI-LINGUAL SCHOOLS

The three Services Headquarters are now working on a contributory education scheme to give some financial assistance to service officers for the education of their children. When this scheme materialises, it will go a long way to help overcome the present financial difficulties of our officers. It is, however, to be hoped that this is only a beginning and that some further measures would be adopted to solve this difficult problem. The children of Service officers often suffer from the handicap of occasional breaks in their schooling necessitated by frequent moves of officers and their inability to leave children in boarding schools. Again a move from North to South and *vice-versa* involves other difficulties of language and changes in syllabus. What is, therefore, needed is a chain of schools throughout the country with adequate boarding facilities, at key centres for the education of the children of serving officers. These schools will essentially have to be multi-lingual and cater for a common syllabus, so that there is no break in continuity of education. The fees both for day scholars and boarders would need to be worked out on a sliding scale in proportion to the emoluments of officers. To ensure a healthy competitive atmosphere in these schools, a certain number of seats could be filled up by open competitive admission. These are, of course, stray thoughts which need to be worked out in detail. But the time has come when we must, as a self-help measure, explore the possibility of establishing multi-lingual schools with a common syllabus at key centres in the country to relieve Service officers of this constant worry. Apart from solving a very big problem, these institutions may, in course of time, well become a great unifying force in the country.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DEFENCE SERVICES IN INDIA*

Lecture IV

PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY

By DR. W. T. V. ADISESHIAH, M.A., Ph.D.,

INTRODUCTION

IT has been said, with some justification, that the morale of a unit reflects the personality of its commander. During World War II, a morale study, carried out by psychologists of the U.S. Navy, on two naval squadrons operating in the Pacific theatre, revealed clearly and conclusively that the squadron in which morale was poor and combat efficiency low had a commander whose relations with his men left a great deal to be desired. On the other hand, in the other squadron which had an excellent combat record and high morale, the commander and his men formed a closely knit military community. It has therefore been maintained that combat efficiency depends on the strength of human motivation, on healthy interpersonal relationships, and above all on the existence of a common interest into which the attitude and aspirations of individuals are intimately interwoven.

PROBLEMS OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

Motivation is perhaps the most important problem in psychology; yet it is the most difficult one, because of its complexity. In a wide sense, motivation is the problem of determining the forces which impel or incite living organisms to action. A motive may be defined as "*a complex state within an organism that directs behaviour toward a goal or incentive.*" Without entering into the intricacies of psychological theory, we may classify motives into physiological drives and social motives. A physiological drive grows out of some need, and is connected with the homeostatic regulatory mechanisms of the body. Everyone, for instance, feels the need for food, water, pain avoidance, sexual gratification and the like. Social motives, on the other hand, are learned in the relationships with other people. In the olden days, when everyone spoke of instincts, this tendency was referred to as the gregarious instinct. Today we call it social motivation because it is not just an inborn tendency, but rather it develops out of social life. Under this head would come the need for social approval, the need for recognition, the need to be needed, and so forth.

Physiological Drives: Since many of the complex patterns of human behaviour stem from basic human needs, it is common for people

* Last of the series of lectures delivered at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington.

to connect what they do with some need or other. "*Pet ke waste karte hain* (we do this for the sake of food) — is a common way of stating why things are done as they are in this country. Social workers have found that even prostitutes believe this to be the motivating factor of their profession. It is common knowledge that a prostitute seeks money for the satisfactions she offers. As such, her sexual drive is presumably secondary to other drives. Thus the question of the relative strength of the various drives arises. In a recent experiment carried out in order to measure the relative strengths of physiological drives, rats were placed in the entrance chamber of an obstruction box, which opened into an obstruction compartment. The obstruction was a grid floor, so wired that the animal standing on it or crossing it would receive an electric shock. On the other side of the grid was an incentive chamber, containing a goal object or incentive. For instance, a hungry animal was put into the entrance chamber, and food was put into the incentive chamber. Each time the animal crossed the obstruction, in order to get food, it received a shock. As soon as the food was reached, the animal was returned to the entrance. The object of this experiment was to see how many times the animal would suffer a shock to get the goal object. The results of this experiment are shown in the table below.

Drive	Crossings	Incentive
Maternal	22.4	Offspring of female
Thirst	20.4	Water
Hunger	18.2	Food
Sex (males)	13.8	Receptive member of opposite sex
Sex (females)	13.8	Receptive member of opposite sex
Exploratory	6.0	Blocks, sawdust etc.
Control Group	3.8	Nothing

Relative Strength of Drives

In the above table, it will be noticed that the maternal drive is the strongest. Mammalian mothers are highly motivated to retrieve and protect their babies. An interesting finding is that the sex drive does not seem to rank with hunger and thirst in strength. The exploratory drive is the weakest, as might be expected. Studies of those who have spent long periods in prisoner of war camps and concentration camps during World War II indicate that prisoners who were fairly well fed reported only minor concern about the lack of a mate, while those who were starved reported that in fact the sex drive seemed to disappear, and was consequently of no concern.

Social Motives: Whereas physiological drives arise out of needs which are felt within the organism, social motives arise out of the needs

felt by individuals when they are in groups. The strength of particular social motives would naturally depend on the pattern of the society in which one lives. In western societies, for instance, the motive to excel one's fellows is very strong and powerful. Among the tribals of New Guinea, and to some extent even in the rural areas in this country, people are motivated not to excel and not to compete with their fellows. Nevertheless, certain social motives are commonly found in all mankind. Most of us are motivated to do things which will bring us recognition from other members of the group. We desire social acceptance and approval, since that gives us a feeling of security. Another important social motive is the desire to be needed by others. We wish to feel that the group actually needs us and knows that it needs us. A painful frustration comes to those who feel that, were they never to return to the group, no one would ever miss them.

Human Value Systems: Social motives are based on human value systems. A number of people cannot live together in harmony, unless they reach some agreement concerning what is to be respected, what is to be despised, and where everything else comes in between. This does not mean that each individual in the group must value everything exactly as everyone else does, but that everyone must agree in general to a fundamental system of values. At the same time, there can be individual preferences regarding the particular values emphasized. Some may value learning more than others, some religion, some manual labour, and so on. Social motives generally carry with them some scale of values, without which peaceful cooperation will not be possible. Another important factor is the compromise of individual differences. The accepted practice in civilized societies is that when there is some difference between two persons, and for that matter an incompatibility between two systems of thought in the same person, the differences should be reconciled by the achievement of a compromise, failing which, conflict becomes acute, and on the social plane it might even lead to war. It is therefore appropriate in this connection to quote from the famous preamble of the charter of UNESCO: "*Since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the foundations of peace must be laid.*"

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN CONFLICT

Conflict of Motives: At any given time, a person may be faced with a conflict of motives. In such a predicament, there will be two goal objectives and two motives competing for mastery. The necessity for making a choice will arise, because both motives cannot be operative at the same time. There are three different ways in which motives may conflict:

- (a) "*Approach-Approach*" Conflict: When a person has two or more desirable but mutually exclusive goals, he is temporarily torn between them.

Such would be the plight of the young subaltern, whose prospects of marriage with an attractive young girl are offset by his commanding officer's willingness to give him a promotion, provided he remains a bachelor. Usually, the choice is made after a little vacillation, but the period of indecision will depend more or less on the extent to which the two alternatives appear equal.

- (b) *"Avoidance-Avoidance" Conflict:* Given a choice between two unattractive alternatives, there is usually a strong tendency to escape the dilemma by doing something else. Where there is no way out, the conflict will lead to considerable vacillation, but eventually what appears to be lesser of the two evils will in all probability be accepted. Thus, a naval rating who does not want to work in the engine room of a ship, might be told by the Captain that he will be posted to a shore establishment where he does not want to go. In the face of these two disagreeable alternatives, the rating would naturally show considerable wavering and either he will have to choose the less distasteful alternative or leave the choice to the Captain.
- (c) *"Approach-Avoidance" Conflict:* Many incentives are at once desirable and undesirable, both positive and negative. The attitude toward a goal at once wanted and not wanted, liked and disliked, is called an ambivalent attitude. This is best illustrated in the attitude of many aircraft pilots towards flying. They enjoy flying, but at the same time they fear the risks it entails. In the case of the married pilot, the ambivalence is even more pronounced, because the wife usually contributes a good deal more to the negative elements of the attitude. That is probably one reason why young operational pilots are not encouraged to acquire wives.

Gradients of Approach and Avoidance: It is common knowledge that the pull of a magnet upon a piece of iron increases greatly as the distance between the iron and the magnet is shortened. It has been found that hungry rats, running towards their food, run even faster as they get closer to it. Conversely, when some danger appears remote a person does not exhibit any strong avoidance reaction, but when it is close at hand, the impulse to escape is strong and powerful. In everyday human living, the practical consequences of conflicts of the approach-avoidance type are very great. Because of differences in gradients, a person is sometimes drawn back into an old conflict situation by his own tendencies. He follows the pull, because at a distance the positive aspects seem more inviting than the forbidding character of the negative ones. The approach tendencies draw the individual back into the zone where the avoidance tendencies begin to mount. Everyone knows of married couples who carry on steady, break up, make up again, only to break up once more. Away from each other, their mutual attraction takes precedence because negative feelings are reduced. Close to each other, the negative feelings set them apart. Much

the same holds true of colleagues in an office, and also of officers serving in a unit. For a while they hit it off very well, and then the break comes. When they are separated, they again try to gravitate towards each other, but the preponderance of the negative aspects might make a permanent association impossible.

Resolving and Avoiding Conflicts: It is simple common sense that a knowledge of conflicts, what they are, what causes them, and how they operate, can help a person to deal with them. Unresolved conflicts pave the way to human miseries. It would therefore be useful in this connection, to remember a few points regarding the right and wrong ways of avoiding conflicts. There are two ways by which some people try to avoid conflicts—relativism and doubt thinking. Both these ways are undesirable, because they lead to inconsistent behaviour, which is the most fertile source of conflict. Relativism is the attitude of mind in which one does not feel constrained to accept or practice any scale of values, not even value for oneself. With such an attitude of mind, one will inevitably get involved in conflicts both within oneself and others. In such a person, cynicism, negativism and many other behavioural inconsistencies will develop, making him obnoxious to other people. He will soon find that he cannot cope with the problems in his life. Drugs and narcotics will only worsen his mental condition. Double thinking occurs when people try to avoid conflicts by relegating the conflicting motives to different 'logic tight' compartments. This again leads to inconsistent behaviour. It is often desirable to face up to the conflict, to allow cool dispassionate thinking to work on it, so that in the battle between ideas and feelings, what is good will survive, and what is bad will fade away. In the last analysis, it is not who is right, but what is right that really matters.

There are several wholesome ways to avoid conflicts, and a few of these may be mentioned:

First, there is the need for a clearly defined aim or purpose in life. If one were to ask a man on the road where he was going, and the man merely replied: "I don't know", one would suspect that something was wrong with him. Yet there are many who drift through life, without the least idea of their eventual goal. In military occupations, and even more so in military operations, the aim has to be clearly formulated, so that all participants may know what is to be done. Commitment to a larger life purpose is even more important in the case of every person who seeks the satisfactions which accrue from what one has set out to achieve.

Secondly, much conflict can be avoided by the person who has a definite code of principles by which he lives. When an issue involving right or wrong confronts such a person, he does not have to swing between the pros and cons of the issue, not being sure whether he will or will not reach a satis-

factory conclusion. He merely responds with "yes" or "no", and the people who know him well know exactly where they stand in relation to him, what to expect from him. He leaves no one in any doubt, because he is himself not in doubt regarding his fundamental principles.

Thirdly, it is necessary to have the courage to make a decision and stick to it. If subsequent developments indicate that the decision was wrong, it is necessary also to have the courage to put right what has gone wrong. If decisions are not made, the difficulties pile up until they become a burden too hard to bear. If decisions are made, the difficulties are disposed of one by one. The person who sits on the fence is not respected by his friends or his enemies. He is not a unified or integrated person, because he is divided against himself.

Fourthly, it is necessary to be flexible without being fickle, consistent without being rigid, courageous without being foolhardy. The practice of agreeing with everything and never committing oneself to something which is firmly believed to be just and fair, is a common weakness even in many great people. A person who agrees with one point of view with one lot of people, and who later agrees also with the opposite point of view with another lot of people, is merely storing trouble for himself, because he is running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. At some stage in the future, the hare will outrun him, and the hounds will chase him. Consistency, then, is the product of an integrated personality, and attempts to be consistent should result in a better personality, and less conflict.

Common Causes of Frustration: Frustration is the blocking or thwarting of one's needs. Perhaps the most familiar example of frustration, commonly encountered by service officers, is the situation in which some proposal or scheme for the betterment of conditions, put up in the most reasonable way, meets with an audit objection. The dead weight of frustration is experienced by everyone, in fact, though some wail over it more than others. A few examples of frustrating circumstances may be considered in this connection. Here is one, which has quite frequently been voiced: *"We are asked to do some work which we are told is a priority job, and must be done well, but before we would get started on it we are made to wait for an indefinite time."* There can be no doubt that when men are keyed up to press on with a job of work, it is frustrating for them to be made to wait. Yet this sort of thing is very common in the experience of aircraft pilots. Before they go out on a sortie, they have to spend sometime waiting for the transport to pick them up, then a little more time making sure that the technical personnel have done their routine check up of the aircraft, then some time, waiting in the crew room to receive their briefing, then perhaps waiting at the store for the issue of their parachutes and safety equipment, and perhaps another little hold up somewhere on the way, to get hold of last minute instructions from the squadron commander. By the

time the aircrew has settled in the aircraft and ready to take off, there is a feeling of weariness which is worse than the fatigue of flying. Let us take another type of complaint: *"I have slogged all these long years, and never once have I been ticked off or reprimanded. Yet, when my promotion fell due, I was overlooked, and a junior officer placed above me."* A grievance of this sort can be very demoralising. It may be well for the Commanding Officer to say in an apologetic tone: *"My boy, I don't know anything about this. As you know I have only just taken charge. Put up your case, and we will fight it up."* Somewhere in the administrative ladder, possibly at the levels of an LDC at the Record Office, a reason for the supersession is produced, and that silences everyone. Nevertheless the man who feels frustrated continues to feel even more frustrated. There are many other types of frustrating situations, but let us consider one more. Here is a complaint, probably a type which is rather common: *"I was asked to draw up a plan for improving the training programme of the unit. I spent many hours, preparing the programme with great care, giving thought to every little detail. I gave a copy of this to the C.O. a few days ahead of the unit conference, so that he could get any idea of what I had put down. At the conference, Major so-and-so, who everybody knows, does not like me, tore my scheme to bits merely out of spite. The old man merely listened to him and I have now been asked to draw up another programme, which will appeal to the fancy of that wretched Major. I could not care less."* This type of frustration is very common nowadays, and a lot of mental energy is wasted, because papers which are meant to be read are not read. Points of view which are meant to be discussed are not discussed. Facts which are meant to be faced are not faced. The result is that everyone passes on responsibility to everyone else and the man who has to hold the baby is left in the lurch. Civilian administrations appear to be particularly notorious for this sort of thing.

Effects of Frustration: The psychological effects of frustration would differ according to the kinds of frustration experienced, and the mental disposition of the person experiencing the frustration. Speaking generally, frustration leads to the following psychological effects:

- (a) *Aggression:* Children can be noticed to thump their parents when they feel frustrated. Frustration often leads to aggression against the individual or object that is the source of frustration. It usually finds expression in some kind of direct attack, but where a direct attack is not possible, the aggressive tendency may find a concealed or substitute expression. Even the Hunger strike technique can be one of the outlets of frustration. The man who is bawled at by his boss at the office returns home and belabours his wife. Have you ever kicked an innocent chair?
- (b) *Apathy:* One baffling feature of human behaviour is the tendency for similar situations to lead to diametrically opposite behaviour by different

individuals. While a common response to frustration is active aggression, another response is the opposite—apathy or indifference, inactivity or inattentiveness. The man merely says yes, but does not move a fingertip. This is a very common dodge with frustrated administrators.

- (c) *Stereotypy*: A third expression of frustration is the tendency to blind, repetitive, fixative behaviour. The frustrated card player for instance, who continually gets a poor hand, reacts to his frustration by playing a mechanical game, to the disgust of his partner. The frustrated soldier likewise carries out his duties mechanically, so that he would not put himself in the wrong, but would not move even the smallest brain muscle to get anything of his own effort into the job.
- (d) *Regression*: Fourthly, frustration sometimes makes people resort to primitive modes of behaviour, or childish reactions. The frustrated child clings on to his mother, as if he were an infant, or he makes faces, as if he were a monkey. Similar patterns of behaviour occur in grown ups as well when they are frustrated.

Frustration Tolerance: Individuals differ in their ability to stand up to frustrations, but naturally, those who can stand up to frustrations maintain their interest in their work and their zest for life. The US Navy have summed up the psychology of frustration tolerance in the following "seven ways to cultivate a Mental Attitude", which is worth repeating here:

- First, *let's fill our minds with thoughts of peace courage, health and hope, for our life is what our thoughts make it.*
- Second, *let's never get even with our enemies—never waste a minute thinking about the chap you don't like.*
- Third, *instead of worrying about ingratitude, let's expect it. The only way to find happiness is to give for the joy of giving.*
- Fourth, *count your blessings—not your troubles.*
- Fifth, *let's not imitate others. Envy is ignorance and imitation is suicide.*
- Sixth, *when fate hands us a lemon, let's try to make lemonade.*
- Seventh, *let's forget our own unhappiness by trying to create a little happiness for others. When one is good to others one is best to oneself.*

This review of psychology and psychological techniques which are being applied to the Defence Services of this country has been brief and sketchy. Admittedly, the techniques of psychological testing have yet to be developed so that they would prove more reliable and more useful than they are today. To those who doubt the usefulness of psychological methods because of their very real immaturity, one might perhaps recall the answer which Faraday gave to a lady who saw a small dynamo which he had invented. "This is a very nice little thing, Mr. Faraday", the lady said, "but of what use is it?". "Madam", replied the scientist, "of what use is a baby?". (Concluded)

THE GEOPOLITICS OF ARAB NATIONALISM

By DR. CLOVIS MAKSOUD

THIS morning's talk, namely the geo-politics of the Arab World will seek to introduce the whole problem of defence that the Arabs, by their world position and their cycle of international associations, face. To begin with, the geo-political aspect of the Arab Nation as such will perhaps be a better introduction to the problems of defence in the area than actually at the outset dealing with the practical problems of defence. Hence, there is a certain theoretical touch to what I might have to say on the subject of defence in the area this morning. The Arab Nation—and that is distinct from the term 'Arab World' because the term 'Arab World' means a loose association while 'Arab Nation' means, in fact the organic unity of the Arab as a whole and the aspiration of the aspects to become one national entity—includes the area from Morocco to Iraq and South to the Arabian Peninsula. In this area there are certain places which are still under direct colonial rule and, therefore, the objectives of the Arab nationalist movement is to liberate these colonial pockets from foreign rule. On the other hand there are places where real independence—to distinguish it from legalistic independence—has not been achieved, that is, the popular aspiration for a policy of non-alignment with either of the blocs has not been fulfilled because certain ruling groups within the Arab society have imposed commitments which are not based on popular consent. The objective of Arab nationalism in international affairs is to realise the policy of positive neutrality. This latter becomes inextricably an integrated part of the Arab nationalist movement. Positive neutrality is a policy of non-identity with the permanent interests of either the Soviet or the Western blocs. We can feel political affinity at times with one bloc or the other but this intermittent affinity must be distinguished from continuity of identical interest. Hence the geo-political aspect of Arab nationalism.

The term geo-politics means the political impact of the location of an area on power relationships. No doubt the significance and importance of an area is determined by where the centres of power exist. Centres of power are those countries which can generate military, strategic, economic and financial power on a global scale. In the past World War II period, power shifted from a polio-centric into fundamentally two centered situations. Now, this shift to the Soviet Union and to the United States, did not exclude the fact that there are also subsidiary centres of power such as Britain and France, Czechoslovakia and China which may in one form or another integrate into the over-all defence system of the two main

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centres. Such a condition which the Arabs faced since 1945 coincided with an Arab determination for national liberation and national unity. Thus, Arab nationalism had to face this basic situation of power. Now, what happened. We were neither centres of power or subsidiary powers; on the one hand we were a disunited nation, fragmented against our will. On the other, although we do have some economic power, viz., oil, our economic power is not fully controlled by the Arab nation itself. So, where does the capacity of the Arabs lie to act as a generator of power, which is neither in the two above mentioned categories, in order that we can achieve the objectives of our nationalism.

What develops in terms of geo-politics in the Arab world is a form of derivative power. Derivative power is a major landmark of our geo-politics today; otherwise, power itself in military capacity, economic potential, or demographic potential. China is a generator of power in a subsidiary way because of its demographic power and potentially because of its military and economic power. England is a subsidiary power not so much because of its demography but because it lives on the momentum of being a previous generator of power and continues to possess certain coherent institutions which enable it to exercise a degree of influence in the world which might not be as much useful as it used to but still constitutes an important factor in the international set-up. As to a weakened nation like ourselves, we have a location, (i.e. the Arab nation is situated in a very strategic area) and we have the oil which is an important source of power (maybe not for a very long time) but at least for the next generation. Now, these two sources of power are disrupted and cannot readily realize in themselves a role of power. So, what exercise of power in terms of geo-politics do the Arabs have. They have what I called "*the derivative power.*" Derivative power emanates from the evolution of the dichotomous concentration of power with more or less an equal military capacity, and from the basic contradiction of the absolute interests between these two centres of powers which leads to the fundamental neutralisation of the primary powers in the world. In other words, the more these centres of power proximate equality of power between themselves, the more is the capacity of the two big powers to neutralise each other, hence their incapacity to exercise fully what they possess in terms of primary generation of power in the world. In this respect, the Arabs and others have the capacity to derive from this neutralisation, a form of power by default. This is the first meaning of derivative power. The second meaning which develops is that the deterrent capacity which a power bloc can exercise on the other end the mutuality of this deterrent capacity becomes an asset if the derivative power is properly exercised by diplomatic channels. Yugoslavia between 1949-55 sustained its independence not because of the internal dynamics of its system alone but because of the deterrent

presence of the West *vis-a-vis* the Soviet power. The latest example of this is the deterrent power of the Soviet bloc when the July 14, 1958 revolution in Iraq took place. What protected the revolution in terms of power, in terms of geo-politics, was not simply the fact that the revolution had popular consent and agreed with the basic objectives and aspirations of the people of Iraq but also the deterrent capacity of the Soviet power as a neutralising power to the Western bloc. Therefore, what happened is that the deterrent when exercised mutually by the two power blocs enables the *derivative power* to ascertain itself conclusively when properly exercised. This is in the final analysis what is meant by positive neutrality. Positive neutrality is the diplomatic expression of *derivative power* by the underdeveloped nations.

Now, the second thing in terms of our Arab geo-politics is to realize that administrative-military control of a country is no more vitally necessary for the big powers in view of the nature of weapons that have been evolved. Long-range strategic bombing, developing into new forms of ICBM do not require direct political control over underdeveloped countries. It is no longer a vital necessity. Because long-range bombing, which is actually the supreme expression of power of big powers and possessed by both the two generators of power in the world, renders it neutralised. To overcome this neutralisation and, therefore, exercise active power, short-range bombing advantages, viz., acquisition of military bases on the peripheries of the territory of one centre of power or another has become the major preoccupation of big power diplomacy. To secure military bases within the medium or short-range bombing facilities on the peripheries of one bloc or another has become the central factor of diplomacy which the Arabs themselves have to face. Hence, it is no longer anti-colonialism by which positive neutrality is expressed although it remains part of the expression but prevention of the Arab area from becoming a place where short or medium-range bombing bases can be installed for one bloc or another. So the whole issue of diplomacy and as a matter of fact that whole meaning of independence for us becomes reduced in the final analysis to prevent one of the generators of power from securing short and medium-range bombing bases in the area. This is the strategic significance of Arab Nationalism. Now, it is this prevention which is faced with a psychological set-back because it is often argued that in the world of today no country can be completely independent, or completely neutral, or can exercise the 'positive' aspect of neutrality. The answer of the Arab nationalist naturally does not comprehend the full theoretical content of positive neutrality but there is a basic popular feeling which the highly theoretical aspect can evoke to make it possible but effective.

Now, the second source for the *derivative power* is besides the

mutual deterrent of both powers the fundamental contradiction that lies within both blocs; namely, the inherent contradiction that lies in the relationships between the primary generators of power and its subsidiary allies such as the contradiction between the Soviet Union and China and between the United States and Britain, and so on. This contradiction is not antagonistic but is a contradiction because of the differences in the priority of interests and the different focuses from which they look at problems. Therefore, the Arab nation derives its primary source of power from the inherent contradiction between the two power blocs and from the inherent contradiction within the power blocs.

Many people would say that we are only depending on contradictions for our power and deriving power from contradictions is to create an international climate in the strategic area of the Arab nation, that is conducive for the exploration of the potential power that exists in our area. The potential power that exists in our area is to enable the demographic power within the area full participation and commitment into society. Hence, the inter-relationship between raising the standards of living, political liberation, unity of the Arab nation and providing the individual Arab a sense of belonging to society in a dynamic form becomes related with the *derivative power*. How does this develop in terms of actual diplomacy? Our central location and our geographic situation in that it connects Africa, Asia and Europe renders the Western powers acquire a vital interest in the oil resources from our country which becomes the primary objective of the Western powers in our area. The Arab position is that the flow of oil should continue and that at no time, except in periods of absolute urgency as when the British, French and Israelis committed their aggression on Egypt, should it be considered a valid policy to destroy the oil resources of the area in order to prevent the Western countries from having it. But if to secure oil from the area also means to secure military bases against the Soviet Union, then our national interest will dictate a change of attitude. The diplomacy of positive neutrality, which is the diplomacy of the Arab nationalist movement is that the derivative relationship which is the expression of *derivative power* should be the basis of our positiveness. If oil is of primary importance and is vital to Western Europe it ought to be secured. But if the securing of oil is interconnected with the securing of short range bombing bases in the area, then a conflict is bound to develop. The Arab diplomatic position is to provide the oil and deny the bases. In this respect, we transform the *derivative power* and give it concrete diplomatic meaning which is derivative relationship, hence, the issue of non-commitment. Non-commitment does not mean indifference, but only non-commitment to the total requirements of one bloc or the other. The Soviet Bloc would like to see the Arabs deny the oil to Europe but we know that our

commercial relations and the logic of international power means that we cannot deny oil to Western Europe for the next 25 years because it is a matter of very vital importance to it. On the other hand, the West which gets our oil cannot render that contingent upon a strategic commitment on our part. Our focus of looking at problems is different from that of London, Paris or Washington and Moscow. As our required priorities are different from those of the Soviet or Western blocs. This difference enables us to exercise the *derivative power* and acquire derivative relationship. In this manner non-commitment becomes partial commitment. Partial commitment to the two blocs means non-commitment on certain matters and some commitment on others; we are committed to the West despite all what the Westerners have done to us, to allow them to secure the oil. We are also partially committed to the Soviet bloc in the sense that we do not allow the West to have any short-range bombing bases within our area against the Soviet bloc. This is the principal meaning of positive neutrality, at least our version of it at this stage of development. Therefore, non-commitment means partial commitment on certain issues which are determined by our national interest and the interest of the world peace.

Why do we not find any permanent identity of interest with either of the two blocs will not be discussed here as it is not within the range of my subject. I shall not discuss here the ideals which each of the blocs claims to be the champion, especially as I am not convinced by the veracity of their claims concerning 'freedom' and 'peace'. Our scepticism towards the moral proclamations that are being made strengthen our position on neutrality. What is essential geo-politically, is that positive neutrality realises two major objectives because of the near equality between the two blocs. Their meeting place develops into a crisis area, i.e., Germany, Viet Nam, Korea and potentially ourselves. Therefore, our diplomacy must extricate us from being a crisis area because whenever a crisis area evolved the 'solution' was the division of the national entity of the area. Korea was a country where the two power blocs met and a crisis area evolved. To relieve the world from the tension of the crisis, the national entity was divided and the same thing happened in Viet Nam. In Germany, the problem continues and as a crisis area, it is always potentially explosive. We, in the Arab nation, are a crisis area. Our commitment to one bloc or the other will intensify this fact. Our disengagement will reduce the area of tension and, therefore, we help in a concurrent reduction of international tension in addition to safeguarding our basic objective. This gives us a further advantage in the sense that we can initiate our diplomatic positions and safeguard our basic interests which are no longer fully dependent on the agreement of two power blocs but on our capacity to initiate situations and alternatives which would make

the two power blocs respect our *derivative power* and, guarantee our capacity for derivative relations. Hence, the whole geo-politics of our area is to make the two power blocs acquire a vested interest in the partial commitment that we have to each one of them. Herein lies, I think, the significance of our position in the world today. How far we will succeed depends largely on the capacity of this new Arab diplomacy to extricate us from the position of crisis and, therefore, potentially explore the result in order to become an investment in the relaxation of international tension and ultimately the whole morality of our position. The morality of our exercise of *derivative power* and its implementation in the derivative relationship lies in that our social revolution has a vested interest in the relaxation of international tension. Only through relaxed international tension can we make our economic and social priorities feasible and realisable. Otherwise, in periods of tension, the more we are rendered insignificant and the priorities of our demands shift. Thus, our vested interest in the international relaxation of tension. In order to coordinate this internationally what is required is that although people who have a similar assessment of the situation might have different approaches because of the immediate issue with which they are confronted we must understand them. In India you are not so much of a crisis area as we the Arabs are although the fundamentals of many of our policies are identical and much of the assessment is more accentuated because of our direct confrontation with the world strategy. However, it is the coordination of what is called the "peace area" countries and strengthening it that makes the geo-politics of Arab area interesting and beneficial for the world. (to be concluded).

HOW TO MINIMISE INTERRUPTIONS TO TRAINING

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL E. A. VAS

THE organisation of training at a battalion level presents numerous problems to a battalion commander. The integration of recruits with trained soldiers; the organisation of officer, JCO and NCO training; a shortage of suitable training areas, ranges and field firing areas; and a lack of adequate time are but a few of the varying factors which make it so difficult to offer stereotyped plans for training.

Of all these variable elements, however, 'time' is considered the most significant single factor affecting training today. Even if all the other variable factors were standardised to obtain the ideal or restricted to achieve the bare minimum, we never seem able to prevent interferences to planned organised training. Far too many avoidable interruptions occur in our training programmes. We must reconsider our views on the planning of the time available for training, and rationalise our systems and doctrines to enable the little time that is available to be used to the maximum advantage. This must be done if we are to improve results and avoid the frustration and inefficiency that inevitably results when training programmes are announced and then cancelled or partially carried out due to interruptions.

The aim of this article is to put forward a suggested system of organising training in a formation, down to the level of battalions, so that the chances of avoidable interruptions in the already limited time available for training, are reduced to a minimum.

TRAINING TIME

If certain standards of efficiency in a battalion are to be maintained, the essential basic priority is that every company commander and specialist commander should get his sub-unit for at least a minimum of two or three months each year, for uninterrupted individual training, to include the firing of annual range classification tables. It is essential that this training be done every year so that each individual trains under his own company, platoon and section commanders. If a sub-unit can be given more time than this, so much the better. But all other training must be considered insignificant if this minimum is not achieved.

If this is agreed to, it would seem logical that the formation directive should contain a categorical allocation of at least six months, not necessarily consecutive, to each infantry battalion for their individual training, during which the unit will not be interrupted or interfered with. This time of six months (hereafter referred to as *Unit Period*) is considered

enough for each battalion to organise its own internal duties and also provide each rifle company and specialist platoon with about two to three months for individual training; and one month for musketry and annual range classification.

We have to make a decision of how much of the twelve months of a given year we intend to allot to the multiple demands of collective training, field firing, individual training, formation exercises, duties and so on. For the reasons already explained in the above paragraph, it is felt that a period of six months is considered the bare minimum that a battalion commander needs for his individual training each year. The remaining six months (hereafter referred to as *Formation Period*) will be available for the other needs of collective training, field firing, formation exercises etc.

This is not an arbitrary division of time. There is no reason why a formation commander may not sometimes decide to allot more than six months to a unit, as *Unit Period*. This is related to the needs of each unit and can be decided by the formation commander concerned. It is well to explain that the acceptance of this figure of six months is not important to the procedures being annunciated. But the decision of how time is being allotted to a unit must be decided before the commencement of each training cycle, and announced as separate *Unit* and *Formation Periods*.

Each formation will issue the next lower formation its *Time and Work Chart*, clearly indicating the *Unit* and *Formation Periods* and any plans they may have for the six months *Formation Period*. Until this *Time and Work Chart* is received, the units cannot prepare their training charts. This now becomes the essence of a formation's training directive.

Brigades, when they receive their higher formation's *Time and Work Chart*, will then be in a position to indicate on their *Time and Work Charts*, each of their units' *Unit Periods*, and their plans for the *Formation Periods*. Thus, the document of first importance, which should emanate from the brigade to units, is a *Time and Work Chart* as suggested in *Appendix A*. It is this chart and not a formidable repetitive list of desirable standards, which everyone knows anyway, which should become the essence of a formation directive.

Once this is issued, Brigade Majors and Staff Officers at all levels, when suddenly asked to detail escorts, guards or sporadic duties, will be in a position to study these charts and detail for such duties, only those formations and units which are not otherwise engaged in their *Unit Period* of training.

There can be no greater hindrance and interference to training than the "unforeseen" formation exercises or duty, which disrupts training plans

and frustrates everyone involved in the change of plan. Such interruptions lower morale rather than achieve the ends desired. This can be avoided by adopting *Time and Work Charts* as suggested. This system has the advantage that no lower formation chart can be prepared till the next higher formation's chart has been received. This will ensure that Staff Officers at all headquarters exercise foresight.

Another advantage of this system is that it meets the multiple demands of collective and individual training, and guards and duties. The twelve months of a training cycle are clearly divided into a six months *Unit (non-interference) Period*, not necessarily consecutive, for the unit to do individual training to include the firing of their annual range classification; and a six month *Formation (interference) Period*, in which the formation and battalion commander plan for such items as formation exercises, field firing and collective training.

There is no reason why future formation training directives should not be single sheet affairs as suggested in *Appendix A*. One more sheet may be attached to include the points that a formation commander may wish to be emphasised during collective and individual training; or details of the demonstrations, tactical exercises, discussions and local courses which the formation desire to run. All these must have to be held during the *Formation Period* and will not be permitted during the *Unit Period*.

BATTALION TIME AND WORK CHART

On receipt of the formation *Time and Work Chart*, as suggested in *Appendix A*, a battalion commander will prepare his *Time and Work Chart* for the six months *Unit Period* which has been allotted to him. He will clearly indicate when each specialist platoon and rifle company will do their tour of battalion guards and duties, individual training, musketry and firing. Given at *Appendix B* is a specimen of a *Time and Work Chart*, which might be prepared by *X Battalion* on receipt of the details outlined in *Appendix A*. This chart becomes the essence of a battalion training instruction.

Battalion commanders will still be faced with problems of preparing block programmes, and outline and detailed syllabi for musketry and individual training. They will also have to plan leave for the men and organise promotion cadres, specialist new-entrant cadres. But all this is considered of second priority, and of little importance if the first priority is not effected. Promotion cadres can be done at any time of the year for small numbers. New-entrant cadres can be organised to coincide with respective specialist platoons' individual training periods. Similarly, officer, JCO and NCO training can be fitted in by any conscientious commanding officer, and are not items which we should attempt to emphasise in our training instructions. This only clutters up the instruction with dates,

and diverts our attention from our first priority. Moreover it is well to remember that the best form of training of officers, JCOs and NCOs, is to give them an opportunity to train their commands. All other officer, JCO and NCO training is relatively unimportant if this is not done.

OFFICERS AND JCOs LEAVE AND DUTIES

Before the New Year commences, battalion commanders will also have to prepare a *Leave and Duty Chart* for their officers as suggested at *Appendix C*. This will include the names of all the officers held on the strength of the unit and the proposed dates of their leave and courses and foreseen duties for the coming year. A similar chart must be prepared for the JCOs.

These charts are an essential prerequisite to the sound organisation and planning of training. If these are not prepared, officers or JCOs may not be present when their companies and platoons are training, or some unfortunate sub-unit commander foregoes his full leave entitlements for the year. Either way this is avoidable and is a factor which will affect stability, morale and the training results achieved. Every effort has been made to relate the officers leaves and duties to their respective company training and duties as outlined in the battalion's *Time and Work Chart* at *Appendix B*. If this is not done, officers and JCOs will have to be pulled out from one company to supervise the training or duty of another company. This is undesirable and results in less effective training.

The benefits of a sub-unit training under their own company, platoon and section commanders require no elaboration. Although this may sometimes be difficult to achieve, a plan designed to partially achieve this, is better than no plan at all. The need for such *Leave and Duty Charts*, if accepted, raises the point of whether it would not be sensible for us to organise our training cycle to commence each year from 1 January and end on 31 December hereafter.

TRAINING CYCLE

Considerable nonsense is talked about training cycles commencing before or after the crops or rain. It does not matter when you commence a training cycle; it is how you allot the twelve months of any given period to the various training demands which is important. This must of course be done bearing in mind the seasonal factor. But whether you start the cycle on 1 January or 1 March or at any other time, you still have only twelve months to play about with, a monsoon season, rotation of crops and the summer; and have to make a plan on how you intend to utilise this time for the multiple demands of duties, collective training, individual training and so on. I have never understood why people confuse this issue of when the training cycle should begin and end, by bringing in such irrelevant factors as the crops and rains.

As we have to plan the leave of officers and JCOs from the start of each year, and if we accept that such a plan is good for training, then it should be logical that we start the training year at the same time, i.e. 1 January. It is for this reason that all the three Charts have been prepared with this cycle in mind. Unless we take this decision, we cannot rationalise the organisation of training. If all planning commences on the same date, then the organisation work is obviously facilitated and overwhelmingly improved—no matter what other advantages may arise from starting the training cycle at any other time.

CONCLUSION

Today the greatest problem of training is one of organising the time available sensibly, rationally and with correct priorities to the multiple and often conflicting demands of individual, collective and other training and routine duties. Unless a certain minimum of individual training is done, all other training would seem pointless. We must get this priority clear in our minds.

This would suggest that the twelve months of the year should be clearly divided into at least six months of *Unit (or non-interference) Period*, during which individual training and annual range classification tables are fired; and a remaining six months of *Formation (or interference) Period*, during which all other training, exercises and duties are done.

There would appear to be no reason for a training cycle of twelve months to commence in the middle of the year. Some say that this is so because the financial year begins then. In fact, as training grants which are allotted, invariably begin to reach units by about January or February each year. This adds force to the argument that it is rational, more efficient and simpler to commence all training plans and leave plans from 1 January and end this cycle on 31 December.

Each formation must issue the next lower formation its *Time and Work Chart*, clearly indicating *Unit and Formation Periods*, and any plans they may have for the six months *Formation Period*. Until this is received, the units cannot prepare their training charts. This now becomes the essence of a formation training directive. It will be imperative that such *Time and Work Charts* for the coming year are initiated by Army Headquarters by about November in the preceding year, else units will not get these through intervening formations in time for them to complete their plans by 1 January.

Battalion commanders, based on their formation's *Time and Work Chart*, will prepare their *Time and Work Charts* for sub-units for the six months *Unit Period*. Officers and JCOs *Leave and Duty Charts* are also

prepared and related to this, so that plans are made for sub-unit commanders to be present whilst their commands are undergoing training.

The present training doctrines and exercises to teach current training procedures, both at the Infantry School and at Staff College, emphasise the aspect of the preparation of such documents as *Block Time-tables*, *Check Sheets*, *Syllabus*, *Programmes* and so on. The charts suggested in this paper, are essential prerequisites which have to be decided before these other documents can be prepared. It is no good having a well-prepared syllabus and programme if it cannot be carried out due to interference. If the suggested procedures are not adopted, interruptions and avoidable interferences will convert the most perfect unit training directive into a worthless scrap of paper. If this is to be avoided, we must radically alter our views on the pattern of training directives and instructions.

The accepted forms of formation and unit training directives and instructions, seem to be out of date, if not difficult to implement. It would be more practical to change their present form and teach the preparation of formation and unit training instructions in the form of *Time and Work Charts* on the lines suggested.

No single factor will prevent frustration, attribute more to the sound planning of training, raise infantry standards and improve the morale of infantry commanders down to all levels, than the implementation of these suggested procedures in our day to day training as a matter of routine. These procedures may also be adopted by the other arms and services, with slight modifications, to their advantage.

INFANTRY BRIGADE TIME AND WORK CHART—1960

Months/Units	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	
X Battalion	IT	IT	FF	D	IT R	IT R	D	IT	CT FE	D	IT	D FE	<u>Legend</u> IT = Individual training. FF = Field firing. CT = Collective training. FE = Formation Exercise. D = Available for brigade and other duties. R = Ranges available for firing annual classification.
Y Battalion	D	D	FF	IT R	IT	IT	IT	D	D CT FE	IT R	IT	R FE	
Z Battalion	IT R	IT R	D FF	IT	D	D	IT R	IT	CT FE	IT	D	IT FE	

Explanatory Notes:

- Each battalion has been given at least six months without any interruptions whatsoever, for individual training. X Battalion has been given Jan., Feb., May, Jun., Aug. and Nov. as their *Unit Period*.
- In any month, one battalion is available for sporadic unforeseen duties.
- March is the field firing period, where each battalion is given the field firing area for 10 days.
- Collective training is related to the crops in the area. This is being done in Sep. It is ideal to carry out Collective training after individual training. But this may not always be possible. Note that no battalion will have completed their individual training by Sep. This cannot be avoided and is better than no plan. A number of years of this system of training will lessen the handicaps arising from this.
- Field firing is best carried out after all have fired their annual range classifications, and before collective training. These are multiple conflicting demands which can never all be met. Here, only Z battalion has commenced their annual range classification before field firing. Once again this handicap is lessened from the second year onwards, if this system is followed over a period of years.

X BATTALION—TIME AND WORK CHART 1960

Sub units/ months	A Coy	B Coy	C Coy	D Coy	Sig Pl	Mor Pl	A tk Pl	Pnr Pl	Int Sec	Sniper Sec	Police Sec	Protec- tive Sec	MT Pl	Mcd Pl
January	IT	IT	D	D	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	D
February	IT	IT	D	D	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	RT	D
May	MF	MF	IT	IT	D	D	D	D	MF	MF	D	D	D	RT
June	D	D	IT	IT	MF	MF	MF	MF	IT	IT	D	D	MF	MF
August	D	D	IT	IT	IT	IT	IT	IT	D	D	IT	IT	RT	RT
November	IT	IT	MF	MF	D	D	D	D	D	D	MF	MF	IT	IT

Legend
 IT = Individual training.
 RT = Refresher Specialist
 Training.
 MF = Musketry and firing
 of annual range
 tables.
 D = Internal duties and
 guards.

U.S.I. JOURNAL

Explanatory notes:

1. This chart has been prepared for only the Unit (non-interference) Period of 6 months and is related to the brigade Time and Work Chart, given at *Appx. A*.
2. X Battalion Commander will also have to organise the duties and training of the sub-units for the remaining six months i.e., *Formation Period*, but as that is of second priority and the events partly outlined for him already in the Brigade Time and Work Chart, these details have not been shown. This chart only contains the unit's first priority training.
3. It is presumed that the men's leave is open throughout the year and that approx 160 men are needed in any one month for internal duties, guards, reliefs or sporadic work parties which always become necessary even in non-interference periods.
4. Every specialist platoon, apart from getting two months for refresher training in their trade, also get one month for musketry training and firing their range classification tables; and also at least one month for limited individual training to include such subjects as drill, basic field craft and weapon training.

X BATTALION'S OFFICERS' LEAVE AND DUTY CHART—1960

Months/Names	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	Jun.	Jul.	Aug.	Sep.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Remarks
Commanding Officer							Leave	Leave					
Second-in-Command	Leave	Leave			Senior Officers Course					Leave	Leave		
Adjutant													
Quarter-Master			Leave	Leave									
A Company Commander	IT	IT		FF	MF	Leave	Leave				IT		
B Company Commander	IT	IT		FF	MF	Leave	Leave				IT		
C Company Commander	Leave	Leave		Intelligence Course				IT			MF		
D Company Commander	Leave	Leave		FF	IT	IT		IT			MF		
Sp Company Commander	RT	RT		FF		MF		Leave				Leave	
Adm Company Commander	RT	RT		FF	RT	IT		RT			Leave	Leave	
Mechanical Transport Officer	RT	RT		FF	Leave	Leave				Physical Training Course			
Spare officer			Leave	Leave					Platoon weapons Course				

Legend

IT = Individual training.
 MF = Musketry and firing.
 FF = Field firing.
 RT = Refresher specialist training.

Explanatory notes:

1. This chart relates to Appx. B.
2. Not more than 30 per cent of the officer strength is sent on leave at one time.
3. No officer is on leave during collective training in Sep.
4. G Company Commander is on a course when his company is doing individual training. This is often unavoidable.
5. Support Company Commander has been given leave in instalments to enable the minimum required officer strength to be present.

THE OFFICERING OF THE ARMED FORCES

BY MAJOR M. R. P. VARMA

EVERY year some 750 young men receive Permanent Regular Commissions in the Army, Navy or Air Force. Casualties excepted, they will serve the country for 24 years and thereafter, become entitled to a monthly pension of approximately Rs. 620/-. A few of them will serve on in higher ranks. The average age of these officers at the time of retirement will be 44 and the minimum annual pension bill on their account will be Rs. 55,80,000/-. Based on a life expectation of 70, there will be eventually, 19,500 retired officers. Hardly any of these will be fit for re-employment in war due to their advanced ages.

Our Services Selection Boards find difficulty in obtaining suitable candidates in the large number (750) required. Technical and Medical Graduates complain that the Armed Forces offer few opportunities of research or specialisation and that it is difficult to keep up with even current developments in their professions. The non-technical officer in the Armoured Corps, Artillery, Infantry, etc finds after a few years of service that peacetime soldiering makes very little demand on his intelligence, energy and leadership; he tends to become bored; in any case, he will probably find himself 'squeezed out' due to a 'promotion block'.

On reaching the age of retirement, above average officers are faced with a dilemma. Because they have served their country well for 24 years they are offered a higher rank. But this entails review for extension every three years with only a nominal increase in pay but a sharp decline in 're-employability' with every year of age. For example: a Wing Commander (or equivalent) aged 44 with 24 years service has earned a pension of Rs. 625/- per month. His pay will be Rs. 1,400/-. If, instead of being retired, he is promoted Group Captain his pay will increase to Rs. 1,550/- but every 3 or 4 years he will be reviewed for the grant of a second tenure, promotion or 'the axe'. By serving on he increases his pension by only Rs. 50/s per month as a Group Captain. With each year of age, his prospects of obtaining remunerative post-retirement employment with a civil firm decline sharply. On the other hand, his contemporary who retires at the age of 44 on a pension of Rs. 625/- will, under presentday conditions, find employment for the next 10-15 years and is likely to earn at least Rs. 500 per month. If he is an above average personality with other qualifications, he may command even Rs. 1,500/- or more: this far exceeds the more optimistic hopes of the Group Captain.

To return to the national viewpoint: we spend a very large sum on the pensions of non-effective retired officers and at the same time lack

a real Reserve of Officers. Yet, we know from our own appreciations and the experience of World War II that one of the first strategic requirements at the outset of a war is for large numbers of young officers with some previous training. At the same time career expectations in higher ranks are so poor, compared to opportunities in private concerns, that only the mediocre and vainglorious—plus a few 'born soldiers'—are likely to serve on in higher ranks.

The remedies for many of the ills of the Armed Forces are usually precluded on account of their enormous cost. In the case under review, we can increase the soundness of our officer structure and at the same time achieve a financial saving. In our country today, state participation in trade, industry, public utilities and most other aspects of national economic life is extensive. Apart from the older services like the Military Engineering Service and the Ordnance Factories, hundreds of young civil officers from all walks of life, covering all avocations and professions, are recruited each year for various State sponsored undertakings like the Indian Airlines; The Merchantile Marine; Irrigation; highly technical projects, steel plants, shipbuilding yards, research institutions, pharmaceutical factories and laboratories; the Life Insurance Corporation of India, The Audit Service; The Forestry Service; The Railways; Harbour and Pilot Services; The State Bank of India, Police, the various Administrative Services of the Centre and States; etc.

These young civil officers should be required to serve for 3 to 5 years in one of the three Defence Services. Their period of service in the Armed Forces would be part of their probation counting for seniority and pension in their own civil cadre. However, confirmation in their own service should depend on their whole hearted performance of duties as Short Service Commissioned Officers in the Army, Navy or Air Force. Thereafter they would become Reserve Officers! thus, an adequate Reserve of young Officers would be created. At the same time fewer Permanent regular Commission Officers will be required: thereby both pensions bills and 'promotion blocks' would be reduced.

There are several other incidental but important advantages to be gained from the policy outlined above. During the 3 to 5 years with the Army, Navy or Air Force these young officers are likely to acquire a better sense of responsibility than is seen generally today, especially in Government employees. Furthermore, better understanding of the real character of the Armed Forces will be promoted and this will eliminate any misconceptions of the workings and procedures followed by the Armed Forces and make for harmonious working in wartime.

The drawback to this proposal is the obvious one that these young, short service officers will neither stay long enough nor be sufficiently keen

to uphold the standard of units. It is for this reason that confirmation in their own services should be made dependent on their satisfactory performance as officers in the Armed Forces. Even so, there will be some fall in the standard of young officers in units but this disadvantage is offset in the wider view by having a useful Reserve of Officers and by reducing the number of 'old sweat' officers in appointments such as Infantry Company or Battalion Commander which require youth above all else.

The recommendations made above do not cover the problem of senior officers. For them, there are several solutions: one is a straight increase in pay and pension. However, a better solution may be that followed by other countries of granting a lump sum Retirement Bounty together with a suitable period of earned leave on full pay. Apart from the necessity of this measure it is justified in recognition of the responsibilities that rest on senior officers of the three fighting Services for the defence of the country.

It may be argued that the civil cadres cannot spare their new entrants at this stage. There is some truth in this and a few exceptions may have to be made. However, the bulk of the deficiencies during the first 3 to 5 year cycle of short service officers can be filled by deputing regular officers as has been done so often in the past to meet temporary deficiencies in various civil cadres.

Bearing in mind the policy of peace followed by our country, the size of our economy and population, we may venture to state that any war in which India is involved is likely to be a big war threatening the very existence of the country as an independent state. Therefore, it will be a total war: a 'Peoples War' requiring mobilisation of manpower and war material on a national scale. In such an emergency there will at once arise a key requirement for a large number of young officers with some immediate grounding in various military duties. Such a Reserve of Officers does not exist at present but should be created as a matter of urgency.

The officer policy for our armed forces was made at a time when it was hoped that the strength of our defence services would be small and the likelihood of war would diminish, if not disappear. These expectations, far from being realised, have been contradicted and the country is committed to a large standing Army, a considerable and growing Air Force and a Navy that requires to be expanded quickly, particularly as regards submarines. No country—least of all our own—can afford the pension's bill that is entailed and a plea is made, therefore, for an urgent reappraisal of officer policy for the armed forces.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

By PLM

TO the near-exclusion of much else the quarter ended March 1959, was dominated by the troubled situation in Tibet culminating in the safe arrival in our midst, of the 14th re-incarnation of Chen-re-zi, the Tibetan God-King. The events leading to the outbreak of an armed rebellion in Lhasa, which had the proportions of a major national uprising throughout the country, and the profound shock which they administered in all parts of the world, most particularly in our own, have reverberated through the tense weeks that followed the first news from the Tibetan capital. Another event of major significance, again on our own borders, has been the royal proclamation of a new constitution for Nepal, and the completion of the general elections for that country's first duly-elected Parliament. In Burma, the old constitution has been suitably amended to enable General Ne Win to continue for another year, in the hope that he would now have adequate time to arrange for "free and fair elections"—before March, 1960. Not much farther away, an important news item from Peking has been the decision of Chairman Mao -Tse-tung to step down from his supreme office in the State. Meanwhile in the West, a general relaxation of international tension around Berlin resulted from the visits of the First Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Anastas Mikoyan, to the United States, and of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, to Moscow. There is a general agreement, as of now, on a meeting of the big four Foreign Ministers on May 11, and competent observers of the international scene are looking forward with near-certainty to the holding of a summit conference sometime this summer.

DEVELOPMENTS IN TIBET

Since the conclusion of the fateful May 23, 1951 agreement between "the representatives of the local government of Tibet" and of the People's Republic of China, the land of the Lama has been exposed to the full impact of Peking's new masters. It will be recalled that the two pivotal provisions of this 17-point treaty stipulated the "centralised handling" of Tibet's external relations by Peking and the setting up of a Military and Administrative Committee as well as of a Military Area Headquarters to ensure the full implementation of its terms. It was evident then, as in fact it became abundantly clear later, that China was to rule Tibet through the organization of its Military Area Command, with its headquarters in Lhasa. The Dalai's Government was duly restored, and no change was envisaged, in the terms of the agreement, in the existing political and social system of Tibet. Thus provision was made that the Lama monasteries were to be protected, that their sources of income were to remain un-effected, nor

was there to be any compulsion on the part of the Central Chinese Government in matters relating to various reforms.

Space forbids more than a bare treatment of the years that elapsed between the "peaceful liberation" of the country, in May 1951, and the national uprising of March, 1959. At the very outset the Chinese started with far-reaching administrative changes which clearly sought to weaken Lhasa's control. Thus in 1952, Peking announced the setting up of three district administrative zones for the whole country—the Central and Western parts under the Dalai Lama, the *Shigatse* area under the Panchen and the eastern region under a "Chamdo Liberation Committee," headed by a Chinese General. There followed a period of intensive construction and integration typical of which were the two major highways, the *Sikang-Tibet* and the *Chinghai-Lhasa*, which, by drastically reducing the distance and providing for quicker media of transport, brought "the motherland" in direct and closer physical contact with Tibet. The country itself was criss-crossed by a network of roads, bridges, strategic stations and air fields. Of special significance in this context, mention may be made of the project, now said to be actively underway, for a direct rail link between *Lanchow* and *Lhasa* itself.

Side by side with this vast building activity came an intensive reforming zeal. Tibetan young men and women, by the hundred, were sent to the mainland for studies and training, *corvee* or the unpaid day's labour was abolished, free and compulsory primary education was decreed and the monks were encouraged to engage in manual labour. The upshot of this massive onslaught on age-old tradition was the birth of a simmering resistance movement which started in the eastern regions of *Kham*, technically part of the province of *Sikang*. It was here that in the summer of 1955-56 vast hordes of organized *Khampas* rose up in arms against Peking's fast-creeping steady, though sure, control over their lives and vocations. The resistance movement was called the *Meemong Tsong*, a name derived from the village councils originally established by the Chinese to "re-educate" the people. Two results of the revolt were readily discernible. In March 1955, the National People's Congress in Peking took a decision to set up a Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet. Charged with the task of bringing true autonomy to the Tibet region of China, this body was formally inaugurated at Lhasa on April 22, 1956. Early in 1957 came another momentous decision: Tibet being not yet ripe for "democratic reforms", these were declared postponed for the period of the Chinese second five-year plan, until 1962.

The PCART, as the Preparatory Committee may, for convenience, be referred to, had all the outward appearance of a Tibetan body; its Chairman was to be the Dalai Lama himself, the Panchen being the first

Vice-Chairman while the head of the Working Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and the Commander of the People's Liberation Army, was to be the second Vice-Chairman. It is significant that the membership of the 51-man Committee, was to have the prior approval of the State Council in Peking.

During the years 1956-58 stress continued to be laid on the need to train party cadres, before Tibet could achieve "full autonomy" and make "rapid social progress", on unity between the *Han* people and the Tibetans, on eliminating "local chauvinism" and exercising "vigilance" against what were described as "imperialists, saboteurs and separatists". Emphasis was also placed on work under the infallible guidance of the Chinese Communist Party and, in particular, of Chairman Mao. In other words, on their own confession it was plain that not far below the surface, there was widespread and continuing Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule, sabotage, demands for real and complete autonomy, and the existence of a strong Tibetan nationalist sentiment.

It was thus evident that in the years that elapsed since the "peaceful liberation", Chinese hold over Tibet and her affairs tightened considerably. Working through the age-old traditional institutions of the country, political no less than social and economic, the present Chinese regime had been far more successful, than any of its predecessors in ruling the roost at Lhasa. Stress was laid, not so much on introducing any radical or far-reaching reforms,—though some were doubtless brought in—but concentrating more on changing the substance, rather than the form of things. This in theory, the Dalai and the Panchen still wielded absolute powers, as they did in days of yore, and yet their lives were far less cloistered now than they used to be. Again, superficially the monks and the monasteries seemed to have remained undisturbed, and yet powerful forces were unleashed to undermine their stagnant and dread monopolistic hold over the land. Again, while Tibet's present masters did not profess to convert the country into a socialist or communist state, but to help her retain her distinct individuality, in practice far-reaching measures were initiated to achieve this objective.

Reference has been made earlier to the *Khampa* uprising in eastern Tibet in 1955-56 and the channeling of Tibetan resistance to alien rule, through the organization of what was called the *Meemang*. Reported Chinese bombings of monasteries and aerial strafing of rebel strongholds in this region accentuated resistance, for it left homeless thousands of people and uprooted them from their peaceful avocations. As 1957 and 1958 progressed the *Khampas*, in close liaison with the *Amdowas* and the *Golokpas* left their ruined, deserted homes and lands and poured like a continuous, never-ending, stream into areas surrounding Lhasa and what

may be roughly called central and southern Tibet. Their disaffection and determined resistance leavened the Tibetan countryside, and in their turn exposed increasingly large re-inforcements of Chinese armed forces, in the very heart of Tibet, to considerable stresses and strains. One would imagine that it was the prevalence of this insecurity and lack of proper governmental functioning which led to the calling off of the Prime Minister's long-planned and oft-postponed visit to Tibet, originally scheduled for the fall of 1957.

While official confirmation was lacking, detailed reports in regard to the *Khampa* rebellion in Tibet, poured in the latter part of 1958 and the first few months of this year. Replying to the debate on the President's address to the current session of Parliament, the Prime Minister referred not so much to a clash of arms, as what he felicitously termed, "a clash of wills" in Tibet. It would, however, seem that violence was in the air and things had reached a near-breaking point. On March 20, New Delhi officially confirmed that there had been large-scale fighting in Lhasa, as a sequel to an invitation to the Dalai Lama by the Chinese Military Area Command. It was revealed that bullets had hit the Indian Consulate General in the holy city, that the Chinese had offered the Consul sanctuary in their own Foreign Bureau, that Tibetan women demonstrators had insisted upon his accompanying them to the Chinese officials for presenting their demands. Reports, which were abundant in the following few days, presented a rather grim picture; of the Dalai Lama having escaped, of large-scale fighting in the streets of Lhasa, of monasteries being strafed with incendiary bombs and of a general confusion in and around the capital. It was, not, however, until a week later, on March 29 to be more exact, that Peking broke its silence and referred to the rebellion as one engineered by the "upper strata reactionary clique" which had placed the Dalai Lama "under duress". It was confirmed that he had escaped from Lhasa, that the People's Liberation Army had succeeded in quelling the revolt, that the Panchen Lama was now in the saddle, in place of the Dalai. Peking proclaimed that the "Local Government of Tibet" had been dissolved, that the Tibetan Army had been disbanded, and Tibetan autonomy, with the agreement of May, 1951, alluded to above, denounced.

Four things were remarkable about the Peking announcements. One, *Kalimpong* in Darjeeling was named as "the commanding centre" of the rebellion. Two, the Dalai Lama was alleged to have written to General Tan, addressing him as "Dear Comrade, Political Commisar, General Tan", and confiding in him, *inter alia*, that he proposed to flee "secretly", to the Chinese Army Command, that the reactionary clique had prevented him hitherto from functioning and that he hoped it would eventually be defeated. Three, the Tibetan Government, its Ministers, its army, and its autonomy now no longer functioned. Four, an unmistakable reference

was made to the displeasure with which Peking viewed any discussion of the Tibetan question in the Indian Parliament.

In contrast to the verbiage that poured forth from elsewhere, Indian reaction to the events in Tibet, was at once, restrained, dignified, and yet in no way lacking in its open and indeed warm sympathy for the victims of "aggression". The Prime Minister stoutly repudiated any insinuations that India had been responsible for brewing up the Tibetan cauldron. He made it clear that while he had no intention to interfere in China's domestic affairs he did, at the same time, feel convinced that Tibetan autonomy was essential and indeed hoped that it would be respected by Peking. He openly cast doubts on the authenticity of the letters alleged to have been written by the Dalai Lama, questioned Peking's motives in calling the rebellion as the outburst of a reactionary Tibetan clique. In the meantime anxiety had mounted up in regard to the whereabouts of the Tibetan pontiff, an anxiety which was not to be fully allayed until the news came that the Dalai Lama had entered Indian territory on March 31 and had been granted political asylum by New Delhi.

NEW CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS IN NEPAL

While Tibet was racked with a mighty convulsion resulting in large-scale violence and blood-shed, the neighbouring kingdom of Nepal registered a major step forward in its peaceful evolution towards a well-administered, viable democracy. On February 12, King Mahendra in a Royal proclamation gave his country a 77-article constitution. Its main features included a bi-cameral legislature—with a 109-member *Pratinidhi Sabha* and a 36-member *Maha Sabha*—a Cabinet with the Prime Minister and "not more than 14 ministers", a *Rashtriya Sabha*, an independent Supreme Court and a Public Service Commission. The constitution defined fundamental rights, laid down the broad structure and principles of administration and provided that in the matter of amending it, the lower house was to have co-equal powers with the upper. The Constitution Amending Bills were to be adopted by a two-third majority of both houses of the legislature although royal assent to such measures, was to be a matter for the King's personal discretion. The executive powers of the monarch were ordinarily to be exercised on the recommendations of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the former, who was to be selected by the King, would normally command a majority in the lower house. While the number of Cabinet Ministers was not to exceed 14, provision was nevertheless made for the appointment of Assistant Ministers.

A few more details may be relevant. Thus the *Pratinidhi Sabha* is to be a completely elected chamber, while half of the members of the *Maha Sabha* are to be nominated by the King. The lower house has over-riding powers over the upper, both in matters of Money Bills as well as ordinary

legislation; with regard to the amendment of the constitution, as we have seen, the two houses are on par. A novel feature is that the Speaker of the *Pratinidhi Sabha* is to be selected from outside the house, a provision designed chiefly to ensure the incumbent's strict impartiality. The *Rashtriya Sabha*, somewhat akin to the British Privy Council, is to comprise as its members all Ministers of the Cabinet ex-officio, as well as former Ministers and such others as are nominated by the King. The Constitution provides for extensive discretionary powers for the monarch, chief among them being the selection of the Prime Minister, the appointment as well as the removal of members of the *Rashtriya Sabha*, authorisation of persons exercising powers during his temporary absence from the State, dismissal of a Prime Minister as well as according of approval to amendments of the constitution.

Hardly a week after the proclamation of the Constitution, on her national day (*Vasant Panchami*), on February, 18, Nepal went to the polls to elect its first *Pratinidhi Sabha*, the phased elections for which were to be completed by April 3. As was abundantly clear by results that came in by the end of March, the Nepali Congress had scored an overwhelming victory, its members comprising nearly two-third of the new lower house.

The elections, however, were a tough affair and it may be useful to look into some of the essential background to this exciting drama. Of the greatest import in this context were the mechanics: organization of free and fair elections, based on adult franchise, in difficult, inaccessible Himalayan terrain. It will be recalled that all the seats were to be single-member constituencies, and were delimited in 1958, that there were about 40,000 polling booths, and that to ensure continuous liaison between Kathmandu and the outlying regions, was a vast and intricate network of radio communications covering all the 33 districts in the country. On the last date of filing of nomination papers, there were 850 candidates in the field, of whom 325 were independents. The electorate totalled 4.5 millions, out of an over-all population of roughly 8 million. Nine parties were in the field chief among them being the *Nepali Congress* of the Koirala brothers, the largely Rana-dominated *Gorkha Parishad*, the *United Democratic Party* of Dr. K. I. Singh, the two *Praja Parishads* of Tanka Prashad Acharya and of Bhadra Kali Misra, the *Communist Party* and the *Nepali National Congress*. It was remarkable that despite the multiplicity of political parties, most of the election manifestos were very much alike, a common feature being emphasis on the institution of a constitutional monarchy.

It may also be of interest to recall here that the first promise for elections was made nearly 8 years ago by King Tribhuvan. After successive postponements—due not least to the lack of political stability and cohesion

in the country—these were initially fixed for October, 1957. It need hardly be emphasised that shortage of trained personnel was one of the major limiting factors. The fact that both Britain and India provided Signals detachments, manned by Gorkha Army Signals as well as supervisory and technical staff, provided by their own respective Corps of Signals, would evidence the need for friendly outside help. This fact was further underlined by the knowledge that the staff of the Election Commission received its first practical training when groups of them watched the last Indian general elections, chiefly in the Kumaon hills where the terrain and the problems were not likely to be very different from those in Nepal itself. A remarkable feature about the conduct of the elections was that these were not marred by any untoward incidents or traces of violence, that the Election Commission kept scrupulously above party-politics and no (political) party of any standing cast any aspersions either on its independence or its integrity.

NE WIN RE-ELECTED

From Tibet and Nepal one may pass to Burma. Here General Ne Win resigned from the Prime Ministership on February 13, on the ground that his Government would not be able to hold the general elections, as it had earlier pledged, in April, 1959. It was evident that the General desired an amendment of the constitution, that is if he were to continue to be saddled with the responsibility of governing the country. It was equally evident that nobody else was either prepared to undertake this task or willing to accept the responsibility that it entailed. Apart from a superficial ripple on the political horizon, the General's resignation, however, did not cause any major upheaval and, without much ado, the constitution was suitably amended to enable him to continue in office for an extended term. He was thus sworn in on February 27, for the second time in 4 months! A word here, may not be out of place about the changed context in which the second swearing-in took place.

A week or so before the General tendered his resignation, the "Clean" AFPFL in general, and U Nu in particular, openly accused the Ne Win Government of suppressing its members. The ex-Prime Minister even threatened a peaceful civil resistance movement, to vindicate his party's resentment. Later, when the resignation was actually announced, U Nu while refusing to recant did, however, concede the General's major premise namely, that conditions for holding elections in the country were patently non-existent. Ne Win had maintained that large quantities of contraband arms and ammunition were still lying about in the country, that peace and order had not been established, that his Government had not yet been able fully to square up with the hoarders and blackmarketers. Despite these grim confessions, the General did, however, sound a note of confidence.

"Let nobody feel dismayed," he declared, "I am still Chief of the General Staff and there will be no letting up on the insurgents, army insurgents as well as economic insurgents."

In the final count both the groups of the AFPFL supported him—the "Clean" for, though it did not fully endorse his policies and had talked of persecution, it would not like to force his hands; the "Stable" because it fully endorsed the General's policies as well as his major thesis that conditions for free and fair elections in the country were conspicuous by their absence. Leaders of the Justice and Arkanese groups also supported the move to amend the constitution. A major departure on this occasion, however, was the unabashed opposition of the extreme-Left orientated NUF. It will be recalled that at the time of his investiture this pro-communist group had abstained, now it was openly hostile to the General's re-assumption of authority and hence any amendment of the constitution that this entailed. On the other hand it demanded the setting up of a coalition Government, comprising the two wings of the AFPFL as well as its own members, the coalition to be charged with the responsibility of keeping the dead line for holding the elections—by April, 1959. For his part, General Ne Win pledged that, "if re-elected", he would hold "free and fair" elections, "as soon as possible". He was convinced, and he made no bones about it, that if he and his followers continued to stay long in power, he feared they all might get corrupted. He was afraid of that. Hence he hoped that conditions would be ripe for holding the elections, early in 1960.

And now for the details. On February 20, a Bill to amend Section 116 of the constitution, so as to enable a non-member of Parliament to be a member of Government for a period beyond the stipulated 6 months, was moved in Parliament by U Kyaw Nyein, leader of the "Stable" AFPFL. On February 25, the measure was passed by a voice vote in the Lower House. The Upper House, the Chamber of Nationalities, adopted the Bill a day later, on February 26; the joint session of the two accepted it by a convincing majority of 304 to 29, with the NUF voting against as a solid bloc. On the morning of February 27, the General was chosen head of a new caretaker government by the Chamber of Deputies; later that day he and his 10-member Cabinet were sworn in by President U Win Maung.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

News from Peking during this quarter were important too. In the period under review here three major developments are worth recording. One, the new targets in industrial and agricultural production, laid at the sixth plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party which met in Wuhan from November 28 to December 10. The Committee recorded its deep appreciation of the growth in the national economy and "of the great victories without precedent" which the country

had achieved. Targets for 1958, it was emphasised, had been more than fully achieved. Thus in steel 5.33 million tons (1957) production went up to 11 millions, in coal from 130 to 270, in machine tools from 28,000 units to 90,000 units, in grain products from 185 to 375 million tons, in cotton from 1.64 to 3.35. These figures, if true, recorded a stupendous achievement listing an over-all increase in output by about 70 per cent, over 1957. The targets laid down for 1959 were even more impressive—in steel 18, in coal 380, in foodgrains 525, in cotton 5 million tons.

Another major announcement at the Central Committee meeting was Chairman Mao's—that he should not be considered for re-election as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic. It may be recalled here that, in terms of the constitution, the newly-elected National People's Congress, scheduled to meet in Peking sometime in mid-April, should elect a new head of State; Mao has already completed his 4-year term. The Committee evidently endorsed the view of its Chairman, as a "positive proposal" in the interests of the country and the people. It was emphasised that by stepping down, Chairman Mao would not only be enabled to concentrate his energy on details of direction, policy and line of the party and the State, but also allowed more time for Marxist-Leninist theoretical work without, at the same time, disturbing his continued leading role in the work of the State.

Another major step towards the rapid industrialisation of China was the news of the conclusion of a new agreement with the Soviet Union for extension of technical co-operation. The agreement which was signed in Moscow between Prime Ministers Chou En-lai and Khrushchev provided *inter alia* that their two countries are to co-operate, for the period 1959-67, in the construction in China of 78 giant industrial enterprises in the metallurgical, chemical, coal, petroleum, machine-building, electrical machinery, radio, building materials, and other industries and power stations. The Soviet Union is to provide research and designing services, based on the most up-to-date scientific and technical achievements, supply equipment, apparatus, and certain specific material. It is also to dispatch experts to the enterprises to assist in the building, assembling, and adjusting of equipment and launching of new plants. Provision was also made for Chinese experts and workers to be trained in production and technical processes in various enterprises in the Soviet Union. The total value of equipment to be thus supplied was to be in the range of 5,000 million roubles, China was to re-pay with exports to the Soviet Union in accordance with the existing Sino-Soviet Trade Agreement.

ANASTAS MIKOYAN VISITS USA

From what may be called a pre-occupation with Asian affairs one might turn, with advantage, to major developments in the West. Here

two chief items were the visits of the Soviet and Western statesmen to Washington and Moscow respectively followed, not immediately though, by the announcement of a general agreement on the big four Foreign Ministers' meeting in Geneva, on May 11. On a lesser plane, the launching of the Russian satellite, the announcement of her Seven Year Plan and the illness of the American Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles made headline news. In Africa a development of crucial significance was the inauguration, for that continent, of a separate UN Economic Commission.

Mr. Anastas Mikoyan, a First Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, arrived in New York on January 4, 1959 on what was described as an "unofficial" visit-cum-holiday to the United States. The fact that his sojourn came in the wake of a major Soviet bid to alter the status of West Berlin and to re-open, rather abruptly but no less forcefully the entire problem of German re-unification, invested the visits with more than its due share of importance. The Soviet Deputy Prime Minister, in the course of his two-week stay, made an extensive tour of the country and climaxed it with detailed talks with President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.

In the course of his travels, unhappily marred by a few ugly demonstrations by understandably over-worked and outraged Hungarian refugees, Mr. Mikoyan made a deep impression, of his knowledge, his tact, and of his remarkable capacity to fire broadsides, if occasion so demanded. Three things emerged from his tour. One, he laid considerable stress on ending the cold war, partly through the resumption of increased trade and commercial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two, he made it clear that while the Soviet proposals on Berlin were not the last word on the subject, he was struck by the absence of any well-thought-out alternative suggested by the Western Powers. In fact, and he drove the point home, he confessed to being impatient with the increasing Western, particularly American, tendency to say *Nacht, Nacht, Nacht*, to every Soviet proposal. Could it not be, he pleaded, that this negative refrain be changed into a positive accent, *Das, Das, Das*. Three, he was convinced that while the American people, and particularly business leaders, were tired of the cold war and all that it stood for, and wanted to get it over, the United States Government wanted that it should continue. Despite detractors, and there were a few, Mr. Mikoyan's visit left a very deep impact on American public opinion and its leaders, both in Government and outside with whom he came into personal contact. There could be little doubt that his visit had helped to relieve tension to a great extent.

BRITISH PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

As if it had been previously planned, and meant as a deliberate counter, not long after Mr. Mikoyan's return home, it was officially announced in London and Moscow that the British Prime Minister,

Mr. Harold Macmillan would fly to the Soviet Union on February 21 on a 10-day "official" visit. There was no doubt that Mr. Macmillan's trip had been previously discussed and fully debated by the Western powers, including the United States, and that it was generally agreed that while it may not do much good, it may help to unfreeze the atmosphere and be generally conducive to talks with the Soviet Union. The British Prime Minister stated at the outset that while he was not going to negotiate—"I have no authority for that,"—he was prepared to search out the hearts and minds of the Russian leaders and "find out to what extent contact with them could be useful." In Moscow—the Prime Minister's itinerary included brief visits to Kiev and Leningrad too—Mr. Macmillan was cordially received and talks between him and the Soviet Prime Minister led to a considerable thawing of, what Mr. Khrushchev aptly called, "the accumulated ice of the cold war". A joint communique issued at the end of the visit revealed that discussions between the two Prime Ministers covered a wide range of topics, that while no negotiations had taken place, a better understanding of the respective attitudes of the two Governments was now available. The Prime Ministers expressed the view that while difference between them should be resolved by negotiations, and not by force, it was imperative that if such negotiations were to succeed each side should make a sincere endeavour to understand the point of view of the other. Later, a British delegation for talks on cultural exchanges and trade matters between the two countries, was scheduled to leave for Moscow.

Mr. Macmillan's visit to the Soviet Union was followed by his trips to Paris, Bonn and Washington and a major concrete achievement was the acceptance, by the Western Powers, of the Soviet proposals for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, on May 11. It was ardently believed that, whatever the outcome of these confabulations between their Deputies, a Summit Conference at the highest level in summer would come off, at long last.

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

For Africa an event of major importance was the setting up of the "Economic Commission for Africa," which held its first session in Addis Ababa from December 29, 1958 to January 6, 1959. Emperor Haile Selassie described the occasion as "an historical significant event for the great African continent," while Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations Secretary General, underlined the fact that the concept of international organisation appeared to him to be uniquely fitted to the problems of economic development in Africa. He expressed the hope that the Commission would be a focal point where the economic needs of the African people will be expressed and action to meet these needs will at once

be initiated and stimulated. The work programme of the Commission included a comprehensive survey of African economic and social conditions. The Commission, it will be recalled, was set up by the U.N. Economic and Social Council in April 1958, in conformity with a resolution of the General Assembly of 1957. The ECA, as it will be known, will be the fourth Regional Economic Commission to be established by the United Nations—the others being for Europe, for Asia and the Far East, and for Latin America.

LAUNCHING OF LUNIK

In the scientific world a development of great import was the launching, on January 2, of a heavy Soviet rocket, the *Lunik*, which by-passing the moon got into orbit around the sun. Here was an achievement of stupendous importance, the "Lunik" being the first man-made planet which was to become a permanent part of the solar system. The planet, which weighed 1 ton and 16 cwt., continued its flight into space for 4 days, and started its orbit around the sun, on January 7. Mr. Khrushchev legitimately claimed that the launching of the Soviet cosmic rocket meant that the Soviet Union was the first in the world "to blaze a trail" from the earth to the moon. He, therefore, concluded that the socialist order, which he championed, stimulated the development of the economy, no less than of science, technology and culture. That the launching of the rocket was of great significance was underlined by the messages of greetings which poured into the Soviet capital from all parts of the globe. Among these was one from the U.S. President who while congratulating the Soviet scientists on their success, conceded that it represented "a great stride forward" in man's achievements into the infinite reaches of space.

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

By CRITERION

TWO different problems of India's external relations and foreign policy created wide interest and a degree of concern in the country during the first quarter of 1959 and as these problems were related with the question of India's security, directly or indirectly, they became the major subjects of discussion in the press, platform and the Parliament. The first was the signing of a new US-Pakistan bilateral pact, guaranteeing the latter against not only communist but also non-communist aggression, which came on the top of a series of border clashes between India and Pakistan. The second was the action of the Chinese Government in crushing a Tibetan revolt and the setting up of a new local Government to facilitate the integration of this distinct region with the rest of China, irrespective of the wishes of the Tibetans with whom India has a historical and cultural link and who inhabit the entire region along our north eastern borders.

U.S. PAKISTAN MILITARY PACT

It was at the end of July, 1958, after the Army in Iraq had overthrown the Government of Nuri-es-Said that the need was felt by the members of the Baghdad Pact to strengthen their mutual links and particularly of their individual links with the major Western Power—the United States of America. One of the resulting developments was the bilateral pact signed between Pakistan and the U.S.A. on 5 March at Ankara. Although the pact was not a new alignment into which Pakistan had entered and not any serious development of which India had no foretaste, it was something more than a reminder that the Government of Pakistan remained aligned with the United States in the military sense, as much as the political. For, it was known long before the pact was signed that the U.S.A. and Pakistan had different ideas about the functions of the alliance, the guarantee against Communists only (as permitted by the laws of the U.S.A.) being considered inadequate by Pakistan in the context of the widely held view there that India and not the communist nations was the major power to be countered. The outcome of this difference of approach was of tremendous importance for India and there was no decisive evidence that the Pakistan view had no impact on the terms of the alliance. This became specially a subject of concern as dignitaries in Karachi, including the Foreign Secretary, insisted on an interpretation of the pact which would make it primarily anti-Indian, much as responsible officials in Washington would deny that the Government of the U.S.A. had gone beyond the laws of their land.

The question of U.S.-Pakistan pact was raised in the Indian Parliament on several occasions, the most important of them being the foreign affairs debate resulting from the demands in the budget for the External Affairs Ministry. Earlier on 13th March the Prime Minister had told the Parliament that the U.S.A. had specifically explained that this agreement cannot be used against India and that there were neither secret clauses of the agreement nor any separate secret supplementary agreement. While India welcomed this assurance given by the U.S. authorities, as the Prime Minister pointed out, aggression was difficult to define and Pakistan authorities had in the past committed aggression and denied it. It was in the context of this past experience and the present threats of war by Pakistan that India found it difficult to ignore Pakistan's interpretation of the agreement as irrelevant.

Members of Parliament of all shades of opinion expressed grave concern at this development in course of their speeches on the External Affairs debate. The Prime Minister in his reply firmly reiterated the Indian view that such a pact and assistance in general tended to increase the intransigence on the other side, thus making the solution of Indo-Pakistan problems more difficult. Loud condemnation and strong protest notes however would not be much help. The Prime Minister had expressed his view of the new pact at his monthly Press Conference in early March when he described this as clear indication that the Baghdad Pact had ceased to exist except in a nominal way. The Pakistan and the U.S. interpretation of the pact did not fit in and it could not be entirely in the power of the aiding country to stop certain consequences.

What lent a degree of urgency to this subject was the rapid deterioration in the situation along the eastern borders where unprovoked attacks were often being made from the other side. The subject of border tension became the topic of an adjournment motion which the Speaker of the Lok Sabha admitted on 12 March. Several members expressed serious concern and apprehension over the increasing border firing by the Pakistan Armed Forces. The Prime Minister reassured the house that security measures would be tightened up along the border.

One of the silver linings in the matter of Indo-Pakistan relations during the period under review was the conclusion of another adhoc agreement, on Canal waters, providing for a larger Indian share from the eastern rivers. There was also the hopeful indication of a final solution of this much-discussed problem.

INDIA AND TIBET

Developments in Tibet were also noted in India with great interest and some concern. It was known for some time that ever since 1956 the Khamps in eastern Tibet were up in arms against China's attempt to

carry out swift reforms and to integrate the region with the rest of China. The Indian approach to this problem was that the clash was an internal affair of China and at any rate, exaggerated stories were being circulated by some pressmen. In the Foreign Affairs debate in the Parliament, Mr. Nehru said, for example, that there were difficulties but the clash was more of wills than of arms. He, however, expressed his surprise in an indirect way that the Chinese had not yet sanctioned Indian plans for rebuilding houses in Tibet washed away by floods last year.

In two days' time from this, the External Affairs Ministry of India came to know of a serious armed conflict in Tibet and announced this news. The Prime Minister made another statement in the Parliament giving some facts of the situation and the new development of the outbreak of violence in Lhasa. The Indian Consul General had been approached by demonstrators to take up their case but he had rightly refused to do so; also, rightly, he had decided not to comply with the Chinese request to leave the Consulate and live in the Foreign Bureau. The Prime Minister concluded his statement by referring to the delicate nature of the problem and the need for not doing anything to worsen the situation. India had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China; but Tibet was a region of China with which India had close links—cultural and religious—for long and the Dalai Lama was held in high reverence in India. India's hope therefore was for an early return of peaceful conditions in Tibet. The first Chinese disclosure came on 28 March when it announced that the revolution in Tibet had been crushed. The Dalai Lama had been 'abducted' and left Lhasa under duress, by the rebels; the 1951 treaty between China and Tibet had been torn up; the Panchen Lama had been installed as the head of the Tibetan Government; and 4000 people had been arrested. Disturbing as this itself was, the naming of Kalimpong in West Bengal as the "Commanding centre of the rebellion"; by the official communique in Peking was the most serious development from India's viewpoint. On the very next day, the charge was categorically refuted by the Ministry of External Affairs and on the 30th March, the Prime Minister made a statement on this subject. The main points of the statement were: Kalimpong was not the centre of rebellion; the Indian Parliament was a sovereign body which could discuss any subject (earlier the Chinese had suggested that this would not be proper); India wanted Tibet to progress in freedom; Tibetan autonomy had been assured by Premier Chou En-lai during his visit to India in 1956; friendly relations with China were important; the question of asylum to Tibetans who would seek it in India would be considered as and when individual cases arose. The circulation of a Peking daily editorial repeating the charge about Kalimpong saw an agitated house in the Lok Sabha put more questions to the Government on 1 April. The Deputy Minister for

External Affairs and the Home Minister who replied to the questions in the absence of the Prime Minister agreed with the sentiments expressed by Members. On 2 April the Prime Minister however, drew the attention of the House to the need for being prepared to face wider and bigger issues; on 3 April he announced that The Dalai Lama had entered India on the 31 March and had been granted asylum and that the Tibetan leader would be respectfully treated in India. On 5 April at a press conference the Prime Minister basically reiterated the Indian position of sympathy for Tibet and enumerated three considerations which should guide Indian policy in regard to Tibet:

- (a) Indian Security;
- (b) friendship with China and
- (c) Tibet's autonomy.

These fundamental facts were repeatedly stressed by Mr. Nehru in subsequent speeches. At Hardwar on 13 April the Indian Prime Minister branded Chinese action in Tibet as armed intervention and on the 14th at Madras he frankly stated that he did not see any other basis for a solution in Tibet except the acceptance of autonomy. Chinese Premier Chou En-lai later stated that such autonomy will be respected and the Dalai Lama, who he said had left under duress, was welcome in Tibet. On the same day the Dalai Lama issued a statement in Tezpur (Assam) in which he refuted the theory of 'duress', blamed China of having ignored Tibet's rights and thanked India for the asylum.

Although the delicate nature of the problem was evident to all in view of the importance of India-China friendship, almost all shades of Indian opinion thought it necessary to express their full sympathy for Tibet and expressed the hope that peace will return to this neighbouring land of India on the basis of its autonomy.

COOPERATIVE FARMING

In the sphere of India's internal affairs, one of the major national controversies which have been in progress in recent years is that over cooperative farming as envisaged by the Congress Party at its last annual Session at Nagpur. The answer for the vast lack of organisation in the most vital sector of Indian Economy—agriculture—was to be a radical programme of reforms in land ownership and cultivation designed to achieve not only a more equitable socio-economic structure in the Indian Villages but also more efficient, organised and productive agriculture. The programme adopted at the Nagpur Session of the Congress in January this year envisaged:

- (1) Ceiling on land holdings
- (2) Introduction of service cooperatives
- (3) Joint cooperative farming, and
- (4) Panchayat control of land above holdings. The ultimate objective was Community ownership and cultivation of land.

Vehement criticism and vigorous support characterised the reactions to this scheme and according to some indications the Congress party itself contained many who doubted its efficacy and desirability. N. G. Ranga, a prominent congressman, K. M. Munshi, a former Cabinet Minister and Charan Singh, a U.P. Minister, were among the prominent critics of joint cooperative farming. Others who expressed serious doubts about this idea included M. R. Masani, C. Rajagopalachari and Jaiprakash Narain. On the other hand, almost all political parties (with the exception of Jana Sangh) agreed with the programme and prominent national leaders spoke in support of the cooperatives. The Prime Minister himself attacked the critics of cooperativisation strongly.

The opponents of Nagpur criticised both cooperative farming and ceiling on holdings. As far the former the basic objections have been stated as follows by the various critics:

- (1) In a Labour surplus country like India, mechanisation of farming itself is not desirable;
- (2) Apart from the magnitude of the administrative task involved, it is not possible to make the peasants voluntarily agree to cooperative joint farming;
- (3) There is no urgent need for labour saving devices in agriculture;
- (4) Management of big farms is a serious problem;
- (5) Cooperativisation may lead to lack of incentives, inefficiency and fall in production;
- (6) Coercion may inevitably be resorted to in order to implement the scheme;
- (7) Cooperative have failed in other countries; and
- (8) Hence what will be better is cooperative better farming or service co-operatives as envisaged at Nagpur for the transition period only.

As for ceilings, it might "drain agriculture of what little talent it has", as Prof. Ranga said, and "it is injustice and tyranny to pass a decree of expropriation on a body of law abiding citizens" as Rajaji maintained. These critics also refuted the idea that cooperatives might help the cause of socialism. "Socialism" said Rajaji, "does not consist in an angry attack on those who in accordance with the laws have acquired a comfortable position."

The Prime Minister, on the other hand, believed that the opposition to cooperation was essentially the opposition of vested interests and that from the morass in which Indian agriculture is today only cooperativisation could be a way out. Cooperative farming was to be distinguished from collective farming and joint farming was the right approach to aim at. A prominent advocate of cooperative farming, K. D. Malviya, deprecated the tendency to draw too much of lessons from outside experiences: What was achieved so far was only a test tube experiment in the hands of those who did not know how to hold a test tube. Another Central Minister, A. P. Jain, drew attention to the unique character of India's social life: "No other subject nation had won her independence

through non-violence"! The Union Finance Minister, M. J. Desai, argued that cooperativisation was the only alternative to communism.

One of the most fundamental arguments for cooperativisation was stressed in the official journal of the Congress party; for India's economic development it was essential to mop up the rural surplus and to canalise it to industries and nothing could serve this better than cooperativisation. In this argument there seemed to be more than ordinary weight; an American economist had commented only last year that India's economy was the greatest functioning anarchy in the world, notwithstanding the debate one often heard of the encroachments made by the public sector.

CENTRAL BUDGET, 1959-60

The Central Budget for 1959-60, presented to the Parliament on 28 February, contained few surprises and was largely in conformity with the new financial policy initiated in the budget of 1957-58. With a total estimated revenue of 757.51 crores and expenditure of 939.18 crores, the net deficiency this year would be 81.67 crores. One special feature on the expenditure side was the cut in the defence budget by 24.19 crores, the figure this year being 242.68 crores. There will be a capital budget for next year of Rs. 420 crores and the total plan outlay in the same period would be Rs. 1,121 crores. The Finance Minister's taxation proposals included the following measures: abolition of wealth tax on companies and combination of the income-tax and super-tax rate of companies, the net incidence of the present taxes on income and excess dividend and wealth, rise in the duty on diesel oil and vaporising oil and low speed diesel oil, on motor tyres, on art silk fabric, on staple fibre and rayon yarn, on khandsari sugar, on cigarettes, increase in wealth tax; reduction of duty on teas grown in certain areas of the country and the rate of export duty. The new measures would cut the deficit by about one fourth.

In his review of the economic situation The Finance Minister ended with a note of hope and optimism. "The economic situation on the whole is better than it was a few months ago; we are seeing the effect of various corrective measures we have taken.... (We need) greater production, greater saving and more restraint in consumption; in other words, greater efforts and more sacrifices by the country for ensuring a better future for the country. I am certain that these efforts and sacrifices would be forthcoming and we could go forward with a stout heart and with confidence in our high destiny."

While most would agree with the Finance Minister on the need for sacrifices and for cheerfully bearing heavier taxation, the question was sometimes raised if much of the Governmental expenditure did not

lead to some waste. *The Hindu* in its editorial on the budget commented, for example, "Eternal vigilance is the price of economic solvency and placed as we are we can never be too careful about the way we spend public money."

THE RAILWAY BUDGET

The Railway Budget presented on 18 February in the *Lok Sabha* by Minister Jagjiwan Ram was more hopeful in outlook, there being an estimated net surplus of Rs. 21.19 crores, as against the current year's estimated surplus of Rs. 13 crores. Goods receipts would be about Rs. 422.03 crores and expenditure Rs. 394.38 crores. The interesting feature of the economics of the Indian Railways is the new consciousness of a threat of competition from the roads to the railways. To quote the Railway Minister: "A development which has come to notice is the diversion of high rated traffic to road transport on routes parallel to the railways, where the railways have enough capacity for more additional traffic." The Minister, however, assured that the matter was receiving attention and necessary readjustments would be made.

THE ANNUAL ECONOMIC SURVEY, 1958-59

The Finance Minister presented along with the budget the Annual economic survey for 1958-59. According to this there has been a sharp decline in agricultural production in 1957-58, the figures being the worst on record since 1953-54. The rate of growth of industrial production also slowed down since 1957. As compared with the 8% increase in 1956, the increase in 1957 was only of 3.5% and in 1958 the increase would be even lower. These factors combined with a slight increase in money supply exerted a pressure on prices and cost of living, the indices of which continued to rise during 1958. As for balance of payments there was a severe strain in the first half of 1958 but thereafter the situation improved and the foreign assets of the Reserve Bank of India which stood at Rs. 178 crores at the end of October 1958 improved to Rs. 206 crores in the middle of 1959. As for employment, the number of applicants on the registers of the employment exchanges rose from 9.2 lakhs at the end of 1957 to 11.2 lakhs by the end of 1958. The rise in the aggregate investment during the year will be smaller than in the previous year mainly due to a fall in the investments by the private sector. Public sector investments, however, continued to grow and the levelling in investment activity in sharp contrast with 1955-56 is largely due to the decline in the other sector—a tendency which is not likely to reverse at an early date. As for the Plan, the outlays in the first three years have been as follows:—

1956-57	..	Rs. 639 crores
57-58	..	" 846 "
58-59	..	" 981 "

In the next two years therefore a total outlay of Rs. 2034 crores will have to be incurred which may mean a further intensification of tax efforts on the one hand and the drive for securing foreign assistance on the other. One hopeful aspect is that while in the First Plan investment in the economy was less than 7% of the national income, in the course of the Second Plan the rate has gone up to about 11%.

PRIVATE SECTOR

The much discussed subject of the status of the private sector in India's industrial programme was again in the limelight in early March, 1959 when the Prime Minister inaugurating in New Delhi on 7 March the thirty second annual session of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry declared that businessmen would be consulted in formulating the third plan. There was a conflict of interest of the various classes in society and it was not possible to ignore it, although too much of stress on class struggle was not desirable. It was the Government's function to remove this conflict with as little pain as possible. Some pain was inevitable in this process, but not to change at all would increase the pain. In course of same conference, the Union Home Minister, Govind Ballabh Pant called upon the private sector to stop thinking in terms of a cold war with the public sector and to extend its hand of cooperation in the common task of building up the country. "I shiver to hear" he said "talks of cold war between the private and the public sectors. We are all engaged in a national endeavour to raise the standard of living of the common man and there is no reason why there should be any conflict between any two sectors of society on this issue." Soon after this conference, the Prime Minister, inaugurating the 19th Annual Conference of the All India Manufacturers Organisation, expressed another view of his on this subject. "I do not like concentration of power. I do not like monopolistic tendencies. I am not against private sector but I am against monopolistic tendencies."

The private sector's view, on the other hand, was evident from some of the resolutions adopted at the meeting of the F.I.C.C.I. as well as from the Chairman's address in which the emphasis was on greater production and industrialisation alone, whoever might do it. One resolution of the federation expressed their whole hearted agreement with the two objectives the Government had set before themselves: raising the standard of living of the people and reducing unemployment.

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

Chances of increased external assistance for India's plan slightly improved during this period. At Washington, five Creditor nations of India—Canada, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and the U.S.A.—met on 16 & 17 March under the auspices of the World Bank "to review the Indian foreign

exchange situation and the developments in India economy." A working paper on Indian economics prepared by the staff of the Bank and commented upon by India Commissioner General for Economic Affairs, B. K. Nehru, was the basis of discussions. According to the World Bank *communiqué*: "The meeting took note of the improvement in the Indian situation since August and in particular in the foreign exchange position. It would appear from the statement and assurances which have been made at the meeting that during the coming year India can reasonably expect to maintain the momentum of its development programme and meet essential maintenance needs of the economy without drawing undue strain upon its essential reserves." The uncertainty about U.S. aid programme was largely to explain the vagueness of the *communiqué* but there was also the consideration that undue hopes should not be roused in India. In any event, the position in regard to aid from the West did not substantially alter either for the better or worse.

In contrast with this was the categorical offer of increased aid made by the Soviet Premier, N. S. Khrushchev in a letter to the Indian Prime Minister, which a goodwill delegation from the U.S.S.R. had brought to New Delhi in March. The contents were disclosed at the end of the Mission's stay in the form of a joint statement which said: "This letter underlines the international significance of the seven year plan of the U.S.S.R. and expresses the conviction that at present there are considerable possibilities for further development of all round cooperation between India and the Soviet Union for the benefit of the people of both the countries and in the interest of permanent peace in the whole world. The letter also conveyed the agreement of the Soviet Union to extend to India assistance in the construction of the oil refinery factory in Barauni and cooperation in the development of the pharmaceutical industry of India."

Earlier in his budget speech, the Finance Minister enumerated the various new agreements for assistance signed and particularly noted the helpful role played by the World Bank. But there was no indication in his speech as to what the future trends in foreign assistance might be.

THE CONGRESS PRESIDENT

In Indian politics, one of the most-discussed events of the quarter was the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as the President of the Indian National Congress. On 26 October, 1958 the A.-I.C.C. had resolved that none should hold the office of the President of any Congress Committee for more than one term at a stretch; the then President, U.N. Dhebar, announced his decision to resign on the eve of the Congress session at Nagpur. After some search for a new President, the party elected Mrs. Gandhi without a contest in early February, 1959. The name of Mrs. Gandhi was originally favoured by four top ranking Congressmen from the four States of South India. The new Congress Working Committee was

announced on 20 February, one of the exclusions being that of Jawaharlal Nehru at his own request. One explanation of Mrs. Gandhi's election was that new blood had to be introduced to check "the drift towards the rightist trend of thought." Although in the few weeks of her Presidentship no major step or reform had been announced, one of the planks of action which Mrs. Gandhi has set before herself is to secure the maximum possible cooperation from ex-Congressmen and from those who agree with Congress programme and ideology as it now stands. From this also followed the plea for inter party cooperation.

INTER-PARTY COOPERATION

In this connection of party cooperation on the basis of the consensus on land policies as it exists after the adoption of the Nagpur programme, some views were expressed in February. The Communist Party of India, which had informally welcomed the Nagpur resolutions immediately after they were passed, issued a formal statement offering cooperation to the Congress and the Government for the implementation of these proposals. They suggested some further steps towards agrarian reform but gave the indication that even on the present basis, they would cooperate from outside, there being no question of an all party Government. A prominent P.S.P. leader and former Congress President, J. B. Kripalani, however, appealed for the formation of a National Government. To this the Prime Minister replied as follows "When I consider Acharya Kripalani's proposal for a National Government, my mind is not quite clear as to what he means and what this thing called National Government is supposed to be or likely to be. He himself in the course of his speech talking about one party, the Praja Socialist Party, said that the P.S.P. has a policy statement, which precludes it from cooperation with the Congress or the Government in the political field. Then again a National Government presumably means a Government representative of various parties. In this house, apart from the majority party there are three or four major groups and a number of Independents who are perhaps not in any group. The opposition may present a solid front as it does sometimes against the Government, but it is well known that the differences between the Government and the opposition groups are deep and wide and possibly it may be even more difficult for them to function together than it is for the present Government to function with any one of these groups or some of them. So all these difficulties arise." In spite of this categorical declaration, however, repeated appeals for cooperation were made by others and the Prime Minister himself and it became apparent that the other parties' understanding of cooperation might be different from the Congress.

News emanated during the quarter of the possibility of formation of a new party to counter the growing leftist tendencies in the country, and particularly in the Congress, as was evident to some from the Nagpur

resolution. Although some of the leading enthusiasts of the party would not call it conservative, there was no doubt that the new party, when formed, would primarily fight for the retention of the *status quo* in several ways. Explaining the functions of such a party, C. Rajagopalachari, India's veteran politician, said in Madras on 13 April, 1959 that it would act as a 'brake' to restrain and give thinking points to the Union Government in order that it might be enabled to frame correct policies. The Central Government, according to this view, was a car with accelerators but no brakes and a "conservative party" should be formed to act as a brake. The party has not yet come into being but in the Parliament several minor groups and unattached members have combined to form a distinct group under the leadership of those who would apparently be the leading lights of India's party of the right.


DEFENCE BUDGET

The Parliament of India expressed during the budget debates its concern for India's defence and security in the face of growing threats. The debate on the demands for the Ministry of Defence which took place in the *Lok Sabha* on 10 April, 1959 was marked by the assurances given by the Defence Minister in the course of his reply that the cut in the Defence budget was entirely done on the initiative of the Ministry and that in effecting this reduction the Ministry had taken into consideration all relevant factors like defence needs in the context of the existing situation and the capacity of the country to bear the cost. In effecting this reduction there was a calculated risk taken, but 'if anybody should be so unwise or unkind and ungenerous as to seriously violate our frontiers, the defence forces of the country would meet the attack to the best of their ability and capacity.

LAW COMMISSION'S REPORT

A subject which created some heated debate in the country and in the Parliament was the Law Commission's report. The 1,300 pages report, presented to the Lok Sabha on 25 February by the Law Minister, was prepared by the Law Commission appointed by the Government of India with M. C. Setalvad as its chairman. The Commission suggested widespread reforms in the Indian legal system but the point in its report which was later the subject of controversy was the "general impression that now and again active influence exerted from the highest quarters has been responsible for some appointments to the Bench." In the Parliament later the Law Minister and the Home Minister refuted the allegation and asserted that executive pressure has not been exerted in the matter of judicial appointments. Several opposition members, however, appeared unconvinced, since the Commission had quoted the Chief Justice of India in this respect.

CHINA



The Long March

THE LONG MARCH

BY MAJOR EDGAR O'BALLANCE

TODAY it is said that the Chinese Red Army, consisting of about 70 army groups, has reached a strength of about 2½ millions, and is still expanding. In view of this it may be of interest to look back to its beginnings when it was struggling for existence under acute pressure from Chiang Kai Shek's Chinese Nationalists. At that time the *1st Red Army Group*, with the headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, was forced to evacuate its base in southern China and seek security in the north-west. This movement, now known as the *Long March* has been held to rank with other famous marches in military history. It began in October 1934, and lasted a year, during which period, crossing rivers and mountain ranges and fighting active opposition all the way, the *1st Red Army Group* covered about 6,000 miles. An account of this fighting migration will certainly be of interest to military students as it indicates the calibre of the Chinese Red Army in its early days.

HISTORY

Shortly after the beginning of the 20th Century, there was a revolution in China, the *Manchu* Dynasty was overthrown and a republican regime established in its place. Later, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, the founder of the *Koumintang* (Nationalist Party), seized power, and under his leadership the Chinese Communist Party collaborated with the *Koumintang*. An agreement was reached between Sun Yat Sen and Soviet Russia, in 1923, and as a result Russian advisors were sent to China to help build up and strengthen the *Koumintang*, and under their influence and guidance the party was welded together and strengthened.

In 1925, Sun Yat Sen died and his followers were divided. However, the right wing of the *Koumintang* rallied under Chiang Kai Shek, who became dominant within the party. In the Spring of 1927, he seized power, and once in the saddle, Chiang turned violently against the Communists. Harsh measures of repression were used and there were massacres of sympathetic peasants that year in some areas, especially in the province of *Hunan*. Chiang's attention was diverted from the Communists by a civil war he had to wage against Feng Yu-Hsiang, the *Christian General*, but in spite of this urgent preoccupation, the *Nanking Government* took active steps against them, and the '*Anti-Red Campaigns*' were launched.

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Chinese Communist Party was formally established in 1921, and although it kept to its own ideologies and policies, it had co-operated

with the *Koumintang* in the struggle against the republic. Many Communists held positions of importance in the *Koumintang*. The founder of the Communist Party, Shao Li Tse, became Chiang's governor at *Shensi*, and Mao Tse Tung was the chairman of the Peasants Committee of the *Koumintang*.

However, when in April 1927, Chiang turned against the Communists, they were the only united opposition he faced. They openly established themselves in parts of the country where the population was sympathetic to its ideals, or where it was strategically possible. They had success in the heavily populated districts of Central and Southern China: elsewhere they went underground when they had to. The Communists bent themselves to the tasks of first of all struggling for an existence and then of expanding their gains. They worked hard and unceasingly, and by 1931, when the First Chinese Soviet Congress was held the Chinese Communist Party was firmly established in spite of oppression.

CHINESE ARMY FORCES

In China at that time there were three distinct types of armed forces, the *Nationalist troops*, the *Local Forces*, and the various *Bandit Armies*. The Nationalist troops were those paid, administered and under the control of the Central Government at *Nanking*. They were the most efficient, best equipped and trained. This central army had some artillery, armoured vehicles and aircraft. The standard of training, fighting ability and discipline was, by European standards, very low.

The *Local Forces* were the semi-private armies of the provincial governors, maintained officially for keeping order within their provinces and as protection against attacks from *Bandit Armies*. These *Local Forces*, for all intents and purposes independent, were of varying efficiency: their fighting ability was not high, although it varied considerably. Mobility was limited. Nominally, they all owed allegiance to the Central Government at *Nanking*, but the loyalty of the provincial governors was always problematic. These governors frequently deflected from the Central Government and punitive measures had occasionally to be undertaken against them. Also, they quarrelled amongst themselves. The size of these *Local Forces* fluctuated, and either a tax was levied to maintain them, or they lived on the land.

The *Bandit Army*, peculiar to China, operated in the border and more inaccessible regions of the country, occasionally existing by plundering or simply living on the country, but frequently by hiring out their swords to one or another of the feuding provincial governors. They were pure mercenaries and often changed from one side to another. Poverty and other economic factors were responsible for this scourge of bandit gangs.

The Central Government was neither strong enough nor firmly enough established to deal with them, and *Nanking* was forced to play the various *Local Forces* and *Bandit armies* off one against the other. Sometimes loyalty or services were bought by subsidies, bribes, threats or punitive actions.

In 1931, Japan invaded *Manchuria* and the army of Chiang Hsueh-Liang, the *Young Marshal*, withdrew into China after only putting up nominal resistance against the invaders, and joined Chiang Kai Shek. By seizing power at *Nanking*, Chiang had gained control of the Nationalist army. About this period or a little afterwards when more troops had been raised in the face of the Japanese threat, it was estimated that there were in China about 2 million troops, all nominally owing allegiance to Chiang Kai Shek. Numbers are difficult to assess exactly and this figure has been disputed, but it will suffice for a guide. Of this figure, only a proportion, perhaps one third, were Central Government troops, under Chiang's direct control, whilst the remainder were mainly *Local Forces* under the several provincial governors. This meant that two thirds of his troops were formed into small independent, un-co-ordinated armies, over which he had but limited control.

BIRTH OF THE RED ARMY

As the Communists established themselves in areas of country, they, of a necessity, had to form units of fighting men for their own self-protection to preserve their independence as the hand of everyone was against them. Four areas where Communism flourished were in the provinces of *Kiangsi*, *Hunan*, *Fukien* and *Hupei*. There were others.

Perhaps one of the first of these "armies" to take form as such was that raised by Mao Tse Tung, in *Hunan*, in the Summer of 1927, which consisted in the first place partly of peasants and partly of soldiers who had been won over to the Communist cause. This body, under Mao, fought a number of engagements with units both of the *Nationalist Army* and the *Local Forces*, and in neither case did it do very well. Poor discipline was the main cause of the failures and the inefficiency of Chiang's troops was the only reason why it was not obliterated. As a result, Mao, with the remnant of his men, was forced to retreat to the mountainous area on the borders of *Kiangsi* and *Hunan*, where he set up his headquarters at a place called *Chingkanshan*. This developed into a base, and various Communist leaders and personalities gathered around him there. During the winter, Mao was joined by two *Bandit armies*, and thus his force was increased and became in fact about 5,000 strong. It was divided into three brigades, and was called the *1st Red Army*. Later, it developed and expanded, and became known as the *1st Red Army Group*.

In May 1928, Mao was joined by General Chu Teh and a number of his troops. Chu Teh was one of the officers of the old Imperial Army who had been drawn to the Communist cause in middle life. He had a command in the *Nationalist Army* until Chiang turned against the Communists. Chu Teh, a natural soldier with great ability, set about organising and training the *1st Red Army*, which quickly grew to a strength of about 20,000. He formed it into ten brigades. The soldiers had only small arms, and not enough to go round, so an arsenal was started, which soon was producing small arms ammunition and grenades. Machine guns and rifles were captured from Chiang's men, mainly the *Local Forces*.

It was at *Chingkanshan* that the firm foundations of the Red Army were laid and certain principles of conducting war and simple rules for the soldiers to obey were evolved. The directions to the soldiers were clear, the chief rules being absolute obedience, no peasant's property to be seized and all property taken from the landlords was to go into a central pool. What are now regarded as the golden rules of guerilla warfare were adopted by the young Red Army. They were maxims which guided it for some years and they contributed much to its successes. These were :—

When the enemy advances — we retreat.

When the enemy halts and encamps — we harass them.

When the enemy seeks to avoid battle — we attack.

When the enemy retreats — we pursue.

The credit for evolving them is now given to Mao, but it is felt that Chu Teh, with his wide, sound military knowledge and experience, must certainly have had a hand in them, whilst I suspect that he may be the true author. He was an unusual product of the old Chinese Imperial Army, being a shrewd strategican and tactician. Chu Teh has some claim to be recognised as the '*Father of the Chinese Red Army*', although Mao had a large hand in organising it.

The *1st Red Army* was only one Communist military formation which developed at this time, each of the other three major Communist areas quickly recruited sizable forces, as did some of the lesser areas. As most of the important personalities, both political and military, gathered round Mao, the policy given out from *Chingkanshan* was echoed by all the others, although they were isolated from each other by distances dangerous with hostile troops. By 1930, each area had a military force of several thousand strong, armed with small arms, and reasonably well trained. They were built on similar lines to Chu Teh's *1st Red Army*, and his principles and instructions were faithfully followed. The next year, Chu Teh was formally appointed the Commander-in-Chief of all the Red Armies, wherever they were, and Mao was appointed the chief political officer.

The Communists struggled fiercely to expand their territory, and took the offensive whenever they could. In 1928, what later became the 2nd Red Army Group, based in Hunan, attacked and captured the walled city of *Changsa*, which it held for ten days, in spite of counter-attacks by Chiang's troops. The Red soldiers only evacuated when the city was shelled by the gunboats of Britain, America and Japan.

During the Summer of 1929, the whole of southern *Kiangsi* fell to the Red soldiers, the *Local Forces* being scattered before them. In the Autumn, Chu Teh turned northwards, overrunning most of the province. During this year (1929), Chiang was engaged in a civil war with deflecting war lords, but in spite of this pre-occupation he moved against the Communists with what forces he could muster. But neither *Nanking* troops nor *Local Forces* met with much success. In 1930, the Red soldiers again attacked *Changsa*, and although it was a failure this time, the year generally was one of solid expansion and gains for them. Chiang clearly saw the danger.

The First Anti-Red Campaign: The events of 1929, during the course of which the Communists had expanded so successfully, especially in *Kiangsi*, caused Chiang to give more serious attention to them. The following year when there were further expansions, he made up his mind to deal with them as soon as possible before they gained in power and territory. With this object in view, Chiang launched a series of campaigns against the four major Communist areas, and the first began on December 30th, 1930. For it he mustered about 100,000 *Nanking* troops, supported by *Local Forces*. The mobility and discipline of the latter were of doubtful quality. The Red Armies at this time had reached a total strength of about 40,000 fighting men, of whom over 20,000 were in *Kiangsi*, Chiang's main objective.

Each of the four major Communist areas were penetrated and against the advances of the *Nanking* troops, the Red Armies fought an avoiding war of manoeuvre, melting before the enemy. As they had plenty of space to move around in, the Red soldiers were able to avoid pitched battles: there were some small engagements, but little else. Chiang's troops found nothing to hit at and the impetus wore down. By January 1931, the campaign faded out.

The Second Anti-Red Campaign: As soon as he was able, Chiang set in motion another campaign against the Communists. More *Nanking* troops were put into the field, supported again by *Local Forces*, and they totalled in all about 200,000. The biggest portion of this force marched against *Kiangsi*, the primary Red base. Again, the Communist areas were penetrated by Chiang's columns, and in defence the Red Armies used

similar avoiding tactics with reasonable success. Using guerilla tactics, the Red soldiers ambushed and attacked isolated detachments of the enemy. This offensive began in May 1931, and like the first one, began to lose itself and run down. It was terminated in June when the Red Armies refused to be drawn into battle.

The Third Anti-Red Campaign: After these two rather abortive attempts to reduce the Red Armies, which achieved nothing, Chiang decided that he must do something effective before it was too late, so the following month (July 1931), mustering over 300,000 men, most of them *Nanking* government troops, he personally took command in the field. The main body he led against the Communist stronghold in *Kiangsi*, where by this time Chu Teh had an armed force of some 30,000 men, the arms being taken from Chiang's soldiers in the previous actions. Again, in defence, Chu Teh carried out a war of manoeuvre, and Chiang with his slow, huge preponderance of force could find nothing to strike at. The Red soldiers took more aggressive action this time and whenever they were able cut off stragglers and small detachments, capturing arms, ammunition and supplies. Chiang could show no better results for his campaigning than the generals who had conducted the other two campaigns for him. By October, the *Nanking* troops were withdrawn, meanwhile, the Communists had enlarged their territory slightly, as the *Local Forces* could seldom contain them.

During 1932, Chiang was busy. *Manchuria* had been occupied the previous year and he was faced with the possibility that the Japanese might continue their advance into China. In early 1932, there was fighting between the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese in *Shanghai*. Mao and Chu Teh took advantage of this, and launched some minor guerilla actions which gained them more territory. They captured more arms and supplies. Also, more of Chiang's soldiers were won over and recruited into the Red Armies. Throughout the year, both *Nanking* troops and *Local Forces* were spasmodically in contact with the Communists, but no major campaign was launched against them.

The Fourth Anti-Red Campaign: More than ever aware of the Communist threat that was growing in his midst, as soon as he was able, which was in the Spring of 1933, Chiang once again made ready to obliterate the Red Armies. He was able to put about 250,000 *Nanking* troops in the field for this purpose. By this time the fighting qualities, discipline and tactics of the Red Armies had improved considerably, and had become adept at cutting off stragglers.

Again, the *Nationalist* columns penetrated the Communist areas, and again were thwarted by avoiding tactics successfully conducted by Chu Teh. The Red soldiers took the offensive whenever possible. Several

units of *Nationalist* troops were scattered. More recruits were gained for the Red Armies. This campaign lasted a little longer, all through the summer, but the ultimate result was the same, except that the *Nationalist* losses were heavier. By October it had run itself out, and Chiang openly admitted that it was a defeat, and was depressed by this failure.

Reorganisation of the Nationalist Army: In spite of these four failures, or perhaps because of them, serious efforts were made to improve Chiang's army. The Western Powers, allergic either to Fascist or Communist ideals, gave help. The Nanking army was strengthened and more equipment was made available. Britain, America, Germany and Italy sold quantities of aircraft, guns, armoured vehicles and other war material to China.

Germany sent General Von Seckt and a large military mission to help direct strategy and re-organise the *Nationalist* Army. His reforms and suggestions made some slight impression and brought some sort of order out of chaos. The standard of training was improved, but it was an uphill task. The Chinese air force was increased and soon had about 400 aircraft. America, German and Italy supplied instructors. It was in the sphere of strategy and tactics that Von Seckt made the largest contribution. He immediately saw that Chiang's strategy of penetrating the Communist areas with cumbersome, vulnerable columns was wrong.

The Fifth Anti-Red Campaign: The result of Von Seckt's appreciation was that the Fifth Campaign was conducted on entirely different lines. His plan was to encircle the Communist areas, blockade them, build defensive lines enclosing them, and then move slowly in, step by step, to crush them to death.

By 1934, Mao and Chu Teh had a total force of about 250,000 troops, of whom about 150,000 were in the *Kiangsi* area, which was still the main centre of resistance, and generally regarded as the centre and mainspring of Chinese Communism. For the campaign Chiang was able to mobilise about 1 million troops in all, of whom about 400,000 were directed against *Kiangsi*, which he gave first priority. Operations were conducted against the Communist centres in *Hunan*, *Anhui* and *Shensi*, on similar lines at the same time, but from now on we are chiefly concerned with what had become the 1st Red Army Group, in *Kiangsi*.

Starting in October 1933, where Chiang had left off, Von Seckt positioned troops around the Communist areas and began to construct a strong defensive belt around them, consisting of machine-gun posts, entrenchments and wire. This stretched for hundreds of miles, and once it was complete, a slow, squeezing movement began. As the *Nationalist* troops pressed inwards, whole areas were laid to waste and populations

were removed wholesale. *Nationalist* troops were able to move about behind this defensive front line in security, and the guerilla tactics of the Red Armies were largely nullified. This first defensive line around the *Kiangsi* base was made secure, and then the *Nationalists* moved forward to establish another one farther inwards.

This campaign of encirclement began in October 1933 lasted for a year. It was slow and unspectacular, but successful. In all, four separate defensive lines were firmly established around the *Kiangsi* base, each more restricting than the other and Chu Teh was compressed more and more. Encompassed as he was, Chu Teh had no opportunity to practice the golden rules of guerilla warfare which had been so successful so far. The area left to the *1st Red Army Group* shrank visibly. In fact, Von Seckt forced the Red soldiers to abandon all attempts to practice guerilla warfare and made them adopt positional warfare. In this the Red Army was very much handicapped and less successful. Chu Teh lacked heavy armament and aircraft to counter the sapping movements of the *Nationalists*. Slowly, the Communists in the *Kiangsi* base were starved and pressed in tighter. Their casualties were very heavy, especially as the *Nationalist* air force kept up incessant bombing. By October 1934, when all four defensive lines around the *Kiangsi* base had been completed, Chiang made ready for the kill.

The Break Out: Soon after Von Seckts encircling tactics had begun, it became obvious to Chu Teh how it would all end, and that the *1st Red Army Group* could not continue indefinitely to hold out against such a great weight of manpower and material. So it was decided that the headquarters of the Communist Party and the *1st Red Army Group* should move to a more remote, but secure, base in the north-west of the country. Once the decision was made Red troops were withdrawn from the northern *Kiangsi* front by night and replaced by partisans, and the main body of the *1st Red Army Group* concentrated in the south of that province. It was about 90,000 strong. There it divided into two separate columns, which marched for three nights, under the cover of darkness, first in a southerly, and then in a westerly, direction.

On the night of October 21st, simultaneous assaults were made by these two columns on the innermost restrictive, defensive belt, in the directions of *Kwatung* and *Hunan*. After a fierce battle, certainly by Chinese standards, the Red soldiers crashed through. Next, the two columns merged and moved towards *Hunan*, when after another desperate fight, the *1st Red Army Group* smashed its way through the second defensive belt around it, on November 2nd. Still moving in a north-westerly direction, and fighting two large scale encounters with *Nanking* troops on the way, both of which were largely indecisive, the *1st Red Army*

Group broke through the third defensive belt, after the bitterest battle fought so far, on November 10th.

Belatedly, realising what was happening, *Nanking* troops and *Local Forces* were moved against it and another two engagements were fought within days. The Red soldiers managed to continue to force their way forward, in spite of heavy losses. The last restricting *Nationalist* defensive belt was hit sharply in the area where the provinces of *Hunan* and *Kwangsi* joined, and after a battle, the *1st Red Army Group* broke through into territory where there was more freedom of movement.

During the five weeks of the *break-out* period, the Red soldiers fought nine large scale battles and many minor ones. Their casualties were heavy. Fortunately for them, Chiang's troops had reacted but slowly, which had given them some advantage but counteracting that to some extent was the fact that the *Nationalist* air force was active throughout.

Across Hunan: Having broken through the *Nationalist* blockading forces, the *1st Red Army Group* continued to move across the province of *Hunan* in the same direction. Chiang's troops moved in pursuit as fast as they could follow, and the way ahead was barred by *Local Forces*. Although the *Local Forces* were not of a very high standard they succeeded in delaying the Communists, and in several instances Chu Teh had to cut his way through them.

The Red soldiers marched in daylight on a set course. The column was many miles in length, and its animal transport straggled out behind. *Nationalist* aircraft was always overhead, causing heavy casualties by bombing and machine-gunning. The fighting strength of the *1st Red Army Group* sank to about 60,000 men. In addition to the soldiers, several thousand partisans and other sympathisers accompanied this migration. The general direction of the march was north-westwards as it was planned to meet up with the *4th Red Army Group*, from *Anhui*, which was executing a break-out through *Nationalist* encirclement about the same time. The defensive lines around the *Anhui* Communist base were not so completely watertight as had been those around *Kiangsi*, but the fighting in that area was fiercer and more bitter. Passions ran deep in this sector, there were massacres, the ground was razed and sections of the population were forcibly removed. However, the *4th Red Army Group* broke out and slowly fought its way across *Hupei* into the province of *Szechuan*.

Across Kweichow: Returning to the *1st Red Army Group*, when it arrived at the borders of *Kweichow*, Chu Teh realised that the tactics would have to be changed. He was overburdened with transport, so he ruthlessly cut down the baggage and reduced it to more manageable proportions. The single, broad, lengthy column, in its rigid, unwavering

advance, was a solid and vulnerable target, which had enabled both the *Nationalist* air force and the *Local Forces* to easily and accurately plot its course. Chu Teh now constantly changed direction, and in addition always had at least one or more light columns on either flank weaving about in an attempt to conceal the true course of the main body. Again as *Nationalist* aircraft never gave the Communists any respite, they were forced to undertake several night marches in an effort to save their vulnerable animal transport.

The *1st Red Army Group* was some four months in the province of *Kweichow*, as the column slowly meandered its way towards the *Yangtse River*. Political agents and cadres were active in visiting all villages they came across, as were recruiting parties for the Red Army. About 20,000 soldiers were enlisted during this period, which brought the strength of the *1st Red Army Group* to about 80,000. Many partisans and resistance cadres were left behind.

Nanking troops were in pursuit, but only caught up with, and came into contact with, the Red soldiers two or three times, when there was some fighting, which resulted in casualties on both sides. *Local Forces* were both numerous and troublesome, and although the Red soldiers did not always win decisively, generally they were more than match for them. Some divisions of *Nanking* troops were sent into the province of *Kweichow* to stiffen the *Local Forces*, but as it was obvious the *1st Red Army Group* had to cross the wide *Yangtse River* at some point, Chiang sent troops to hold the north side of that river. At the same time he dispatched another large force to close in on the Communists from the south. He planned a "hammer and anvil" movement, with the *Yangtse River* as the anvil. About 200,000 *Nationalist* troops took part in this operation.

With only about 80,000 fighting men, Chu Teh realised that he was not strong enough to break through frontally, so he turned off sharply, and began a wide encircling march to the south-west to avoid this trap.

The Yunnan Feint: As a feint to cover this movement, intended to draw off the hammer troops, Chu Teh sent detachments of his men into the province of *Yunnan*, which fanned out southwards. By forced marching they entered the provincial capital. The *Yunnan Local Forces* were in no condition to stop them, or put up any sort of effective delaying action.

Crossing the Yangtse River: As soon as the *Yunnan feint* was in progress, the main body, which also had been marching in the direction of the *Yunnan* capital, swung round and moved westwards, making for the *Yangtse River*, to *Lengkai*, a navigable crossing place. Chiang ordered all boats to be withdrawn to the northern side of the river and then to

be burnt. Like other crossings, this was held by the *Nationalists*, who made their defensive positions on the northern banks. The Communists arrived at the river opposite to the defensive positions at *Lengkai*, and at once made a show of building a bamboo bridge, a project which would take some time. Thinking he had at last got them in a trap, Chiang ordered his "hammer" troops to close in on the Red soldiers from the south.

Under cover of the activity of bridging, a picked Red Army unit made a forced march to the west to the next crossing place, *Chou Ping*, about 85 miles distant. Disguised in *Nationalist* uniforms this unit entered the town on the south bank of the river and took possession of it, capturing the local garrison. All the boats had been withdrawn to the north bank, as ordered by Chiang, but the order to burn them had not been carried out. The Communists persuaded captured villagers to call a boat over, a detachment of Red soldiers piled aboard, crossed the river and took the *Local Forces* troops guarding the village on the north bank by surprise. As soon as this crossing had been achieved, the main body left *Lenghai*, and the leading elements of it soon reached *Chou Ping*, where they commenced to cross. There were only about half-a-dozen boats with a limited capacity available, which slowed this movement down considerably, and it took nine days to transport the whole of the *1st Red Army Group* to the north bank. It was only just completed in time, as *Nanking* troops closed in on them from the south. This time the boats were burnt by the Red soldiers, before they marched off northwards, leaving the thwarted *Nanking* troops impotently on the south bank.

Lolo Country: Once over the Yangtse River, the *1st Red Army Group* entered the territory of the *Lolos*, an independent, aboriginal tribe. The *Lolos* were hostile to the Chinese and lived in the inaccessible forests and mountains along the borders in this area. They had never been conquered completely by the Chinese, nor absorbed by them. Chiang reckoned that it would take some weeks for the Communist to fight their way through this traditionally hostile territory, and thus he would have ample time to prepare another trap for them at the *Tatu River*, the next major river they had to cross in their journey northwards. Almost leisurely, he set his troops in motion and they began to march to the north of the probable crossing places. The forests hid the Red troops from the *Nanking* aircraft, and Chiang lost sight of them and was unable to chart their progress accurately.

As the Red troops advanced towards the *Lolo* country, they occupied the border towns and villages, in many of which, *Lolo* hostages were held against the good behaviour of their fellow tribesmen. These were released, kindly treated, indoctrinated, the difference between Red and *Nationalist* Chinese made clear, and then sent back to their tribes. The Communists

persuaded them that they were no longer enemies, but that the common enemy was *Nationalist* China. Contact was made with the chiefs and a judicious issue of rifles and ammunition, which the *Lolos* greatly desired to fight both the Chinese and other enemies, was made. Cordial relations were established, supplies were sold to the Red soldiers, and guides were provided to take them quickly through the forests. A number of *Lolo* tribesmen joined the Red Army with the intention of fighting with it against the *Nationalist* Chinese at the impending battle of the *Tatu* River. The *Lolos* just wanted to strike a blow at their old enemies.

Battle of the Tatu River: Led by *Lolo* guides, the *1st Red Army Group* emerged suddenly from the forests at the *Tatu* River many days before Chiang expected them. He was taken by surprise and his trap was not ready. *Nanking* troops were marching towards the river but were not hurrying unduly as they estimated they had plenty of time to reach it before Chou Teh's men arrived.

The Communists debouched at a crossing place, *An Jeng Chang* which consisted of a small town on either bank, that on the northern side being guarded by *Local Forces*, whilst that on the south side was not held. When the leading elements of the *1st Red Army Group* arrived at *An Jeng Chang*, a large ferry boat was on the southern side of the river. As in most battles, the element of luck often plays a part. In this instance, the commander of the *Local Forces* on the north bank was visiting the town on the south bank. He and his small escort were quickly captured. The ferry boat was filled with a detachment of about 80 Red soldiers, and it set off across the river. The river was wide and in flood, and it took the boat over two hours to cross, by which time surprise had been lost. The enemy was alerted and was ready waiting.

A machine-gun opened up on the soldiers in the boat when it neared the northern bank, and this was countered by light machine-gun fire from the Communists. The boat drifted and went aground just below the town, and the Red soldiers leapt ashore, firing as they went, managing to get on to some high ground. The enemy defences were in three short lines, one on the river's edge, one on the edge of the town and one on a feature behind it. The river positions were right under the noses of the Red soldiers who had landed, and with light machine-gun fire and grenades the *Local Forces* were quickly cleared out. The second line of defence near the town, was held on to a little longer, but that too gave way when the Red soldiers assaulted. The third defensive line, on the feature, stood firm. Whilst this fighting was in progress, other boats had been obtained, and had gone over to bring reinforcements from the south bank. As soon as more Red soldiers arrived, an assault was launched on the *Local Force's* positions, which was successful, and the *Nationalists* evacuated.

Across the Tatu River: The Tatu River, already in flood, began to rise and crossing became more difficult. It took three days to transport one brigade, of about 2,000 troops, across, and by this time *Nanking* aircraft had discovered the operation and had begun bombing the Red soldiers. The pursuing *Nanking* troops began to close in on *An Jeng Chang* from both north and south. As there was no possibility of getting the whole of the *1st Red Army Group* over before they arrived it was decided to move westwards, and the one brigade moved along the northern bank, whilst the main body marched along the southern one, the uncrossable Tatu River separating them.

Battle of the Suspension Bridge: The next crossing place to the west was *Liu Ting Chaio*, about 120 miles distant, where there was a bridge. This was a particularly vital spot from the point of view of the Communists as there was no other chance of getting across the Tatu River in that area owing to deep gorges and a raging current. The only alternative to *Liu Ting Chaio* for the *1st Red Army Group* was a long, difficult detour through the harsh, unfriendly mountainous fringe of *Eastern Tibet*.

The Red soldiers raced along both banks of the river towards *Liu Ting Chaio*. On the second day's march, the Red Army brigade on the north side of the river came into contact with *Local Forces*, and the resultant skirmishing caused them some delay, although not many casualties were inflicted. The advanced guard of the main body on the south bank, was sent off with instructions to race along to seize the bridge at all costs, before the *Local Forces* were able to reinforce it. As this unit made its way along the south bank, more *Local Forces* appeared on the opposite side of the river and began moving in the direction of the bridge also. By terrific exertions, the Red soldiers gained a lead and increased it, thus reaching the bridge first.

The bridge was an old one of the suspension type, consisting of heavy iron chains strung across the gorge, on to which boards were lashed as a footway. Orders had been given for it to be destroyed, but the local people had been reluctant to do this as in this remote corner of China there would be little chance of it being replaced. It was defended by some *Local Forces* troops, positioned on the north bank, and they had machine-guns covering the bridge itself. The footboards over the iron chains had been removed for practically the whole length of the bridge from the south bank, and the long chains, of which there were over a dozen, swung giddily over the deep gorge. Only a small length of wooden planking remained in position near the north bank, where the *Local Forces* had defensive positions.

On reaching the bridge a force of about 30 volunteers was selected to execute the attack. Under cover of fire from machine-guns the

Communists had set up on the south bank, the Red soldiers swarmed, hand over hand, like monkeys along the separate swinging chains. The *Local Forces* fired at them, but they were difficult targets to hit as they swung in the wind, and only about half-a-dozen were shot and fell down into the river below. The remainder worked their way forward steadily along the swaying chains. As they neared the north bank, the remaining footboards, which were still in position, gave them some protection from the enemy fire.

The *Local Forces* realised that the footboards were masking their guns, and so they set fire to them to prevent this, and to stop the attackers climbing on to them. But they had left it too late, and one by one, as the assaulting Red soldiers got closer they were able to throw grenades at the defenders, some of which landed in the defensive positions near the bridge. Once on the burning footboards, the attackers rushed forward to assault the nearest defended post, which they overran. They then turned the machine-guns on to the *Local Forces* behind it. Other Red volunteers, swarmed along the chains, monkey-like, to reinforce the troops who had gained a tiny foothold on the north bank. There was a short, but fierce, fight around the bridgehead, where the opposition was surprisingly stubborn for *Local Forces* troops. A foothold had been gained, but the Red soldiers were unable to press inland. However, whilst this small battle was in progress, the Red Army brigade, which had crossed the *Tatu River* at *An Jeng Chang*, and which had been held up by contact with *Local Forces*, came into sight, and soon attacked the defenders of the suspension bridge in the flank. This turned the tide of battle and the Communists were able to put the *Local Forces* to flight, and secure the bridgehead. Quickly, the bridge was made passable again, and the *1st Red Army Group* was soon flooding across. It had cleared the most vital and critical obstacle so far, the *Tatu River*.

I am not able to ascertain the precise measurements of the width of the gorge at this point, as reports vary, but gather that it is in the region of 1,000 feet across, and the depth to the river below was also several hundred feet. This then, must be one of the most courageous and spectacular assaults made by the Chinese Red Army, and is a feat of valour that would rank high in the annals of any army. It was a feat of endurance as well as bravery as the attackers swarmed along the wildly swinging iron chains over a gorge hundreds of feet deep and 1,000 feet wide in the face of machine-gun fire.

Over the Mountains: Once across the *Tatu River*, the *1st Red Army Group* moved northwards as quickly as it could, but the terrain encountered was difficult and a number of high mountain ranges barred the way. In crossing these ranges, the Communists lost most of their transport

animals. On the other side of the coin, they had the advantage that no *Local Forces* barred their way, and that they had pretty well shaken off the persuing *Nanking* troops, who lagged unwillingly behind.

Contact with the 4th Red Army Group: After slowly and painfully surmounting the mountain obstacles the *1st Red Army Group* emerged to the north of them into the *Maorhkai* area, which was still in the province of *Szechuan*, where the population was largely sympathetic to the Communists. Here contact was made with patrol elements from the *4th Red Army Group*, which had fought its way across country from *Anhui*, and had halted to rest in the nearby *Sungpan* district. The *4th Red Army Group* had a strength of about 50,000 troops, and this, added to that of the *1st Red Army Group*, which had about 45,000 men left, made a combined fighting force of just under 100,000.

Disagreement: Some distance separated the two army groups and they remained apart. There were a series of conferences between the leaders to determine future action, and differences of opinion arose. Some wanted to continue on north-westwards to the proposed base in *Shensi* province, whilst others wanted to re-establish Communism south of the *Yangtse* River again. The two separate army groups remained in their areas for about two months, but still no agreement for united action could be reached. Meanwhile, *Nationalist* troops had moved closer and succeeded in getting between them. Also, the rivers, of which there were several in between the two Communist camps, began to rise in flood. Therefore, it was decided that each army group should take its own course.

There was some change-over of personnel between the two army groups. Chu Teh, who had been the military leader and a tower of strength on the *Long March* so far, elected to remain with the *4th Red Army Group*, in *Szechuan*. This army group in fact stayed where it was for about a year, and the *2nd Red Army Group*, which was encircled in *Hunan*, broke out to join it. Later, when *Nationalist* pressure became unbearable, Chu Teh then led the two army groups, first of all into *Eastern Tibet* and then northwards to the *1st Red Army Group* in its new base in *Shensi*. Mao and other political leaders, comprising the main core of the Communist Party, continued northwards with the *1st Red Army Group*.

Through Eastern Tibet: The route of the *1st Red Army Group*, which had a strength of about 30,000 when it left the *Maorhkai* area, led first of all through the territory inhabited by the independent *Mantu* tribe, and then into the part of *Eastern Tibet*, which was roamed by the nomadic *Hisifan*. This was really the first time the Communists had to move through country that was completely hostile to them. Previously, the peasants had always been sympathetic to a degree and had given help, especially in the matter of selling supplies. Now the Red soldiers had to push through

mountainous forest in the face of hostile tribesmen, who not being strong enough to stand up to them in open battle, resorted to harrassing tactics. Boulders were rolled down on the Red soldiers when they were in defiles, ambushes were set up in the forests and stragglers were cut off. Whole villages were evacuated and areas of cultivation razed so that the Communists would have no supplies. The *1st Red Army Group* barely had enough to eat on this stage of its march, and suffered accordingly.

This forced the Red troops to change their policy. So far they had always made a point of never taking anything whatever by force from the peasants, but had always robbed the landlords and shared out any surplus. Now they were forced to organise aggressive foraging parties to seize supplies that were urgently and desperately required. Also, guides were abducted and compelled to lead the Red soldiers through the forests. The pursuit by *Nanking* troops dropped off completely in this sector.

The Grasslands: Once through the hostile and barren territories of the *Mantus* and the *Hsifan*, the *1st Red Army Group*, hungry and depleted, debouched from the mountainous forest and jungle into the rolling grasslands to the north of them. Here again difficulties were encountered as the terrain was riddled with swamps and high grass, which made the going tricky and hazardous. The Red soldiers struggled on through this until they reached the borders of the province of *Kansu*, where the terrain became more negotiable.

In Kansu: The *Nationalists* had given up serious pursuit of the *1st Red Army Group* through the wild stretches of border country, and instead Chiang moved as many troops as he could raise to the southern fringe of the province of *Kansu*, to bar its way. In addition to the central government troops, Chiang had *Local Forces*, which included units of Moslem cavalry, which had a fearsome reputation: also, there were *Manchurian* troops available. A number of engagements were fought between the Red soldiers and the troops barring their way, some of which were, like so many Chinese battles, indecisive, whilst others can be regarded as Red victories. Especially against the Moslem horsemen, who did not live up to their reputation, were they successful, and from them the Red soldiers captured enough horses to fit out a newly formed transport train, and to have a surplus for riding.

Arrival in Shensi: The depleted, weary *1st Red Army Group*, under Mao, doggedly forced its way through the opposition northwards, step by step. The end was in sight. The province of *Shensi*, largely sympathetic to Communism, was entered, and contact was made with the *3rd Red Army Group* there on October 20, 1935. The *3rd Red Army Group* had been established in the province since 1933.

The *Long March* had ended: there were only about 20,000 survivors, but it should be remembered that many cadres were dropped off to organise resistance behind the lines en route. The Communist leaders and the hard core of the Red Army had at last reached a more secure base where it was able to re-coup and develop.

A SUMMARY

Facts and figures are always boring, but one or two will be quoted to give an idea of the immensity of the *Long March* and the difficulties involved. The *1st Red Army Group* was on the march for 368 days, of which 235 days were actually spent on the move, covering a distance of about 6,000 miles: accounts vary slightly. It is claimed that the Red soldiers averaged about 24 miles per marching day. This in itself is a splendid marching record, but when the fact that it crossed 18 mountain ranges, 24 large rivers, occupied 62 towns and fought numerous battles and skirmishes, is considered, one begins to appreciate the magnitude of the undertaking.

Personalities: A word about personalities. It is obvious that no one single individual was alone responsible for this feat and that a number of clever, energetic and dedicated men all played their several parts. These are too numerous to mention individually. However, the personality of Mao stands out, and is of interest owing to his position in China today. There seems little doubt that he was one of the most dominant and capable leaders. Today, the credit for practically everything connected with the *Long March* is given to him, for political guidance, for organising the army, and for winning all the battles. But it should be remembered that there were others who did much, who in those far off days were his equals, but are now conveniently forgotten or overlooked. Chou En-lai is the only other political personality who completed the *Long March* I will mention, again owing to his present position in China today. He must also have played an energetic and useful part in this feat.

On the military side there were a number of competent leaders, but during the march itself, especially until the *1st Red Army Group* linked up with the *4th Red Army Group*, the personality of Chu Teh, the elderly, ex-Imperial Chinese Army officer stood out above the others. On the military side he was the outstanding leader, organiser, trainer and successful field commander. He was head and shoulders above the others.

The early Chinese Red Army had a dual system of control of military units, similar to that in the early Russian Soviet Army. Each unit and formation had both a commanding officer and a commissar, of whom the latter was more powerful, as he could countermand the commanding officer's orders. The partnership of Mao and Chu Teh in this respect in

control of the *1st Red Army Group* seemed to be an ideal combination and certainly worked well. It should be noted, however, that Chu Teh and Mao disagreed whilst at *Maorhkai*, and that they separated there, so perhaps the partnership had not been so perfect as it had appeared to be on the surface.

Reasons for Success: There were a number of reasons collectively, why the *Long March* was concluded successfully, and perhaps it is correct to say that no single one alone would have been sufficient. They were chiefly good leadership, a strong central command, central planning, strict discipline and good organisation.

It should be noted that there were in addition several favourable factors existing which helped in some measure. These were the fact that wastage of manpower was replaceable and fresh enlistments were constantly being made en route, some *Lobos*, for example, even accompanying the Red soldiers into the province of *Shensi*. Next, the Communists were able to live off the land, and invariably almost all the route went through territory where provisions could either be seized or bought. Next, the population, with the exceptions of the tribal areas, was far from hostile and generally friendly disposed towards them. In continued actively hostile territory it is doubtful whether the *Long March* could have succeeded as the Red soldiers would have been submerged. Another favourable factor was the enemy, his inefficiency, his disjointed control, his other distractions, his lack of mobility, and more often than not his half-heartedness.

Lessons: The old lessons, so often told in military history were repeated, and the *Long March* simply stressed the need for such essentials as good leadership, central command, energy, initiative, surprise and discipline.

The one other lesson that cries out to be heeded, but is neglected and still disbelieved in many quarters, is that air power alone, no matter how overwhelming, cannot by itself win campaigns and ultimately conquer against the qualities just mentioned. Chiang had over 400 aircraft: the Communists had none. About twenty years or so later, this lesson was again repeated at *Dien Bien Phu*, where the Communists had no aircraft and the French had ample.

Finally, can we take heart from this oft repeated lesson and deduce that in a future war nuclear attacks alone will not defeat a nation if the other essential qualities are present in the defenders?

COCOONING

By BRIGADIER L. S. ANAND

INTRODUCTION

PRESERVATION of equipment, not wanted for use, is a common requirement in various storage depots maintained by the industry as well as Government Departments. The Defence Services are particularly interested in preservation of their fighting equipment. It is no secret that the Army, Navy and Air Force Depots, throughout the country, suffer a considerable financial loss every year due to deterioration of equipment in storage. The Inter Services Stores Preservation Organisation have rendered valuable service in not only revealing the extent of this loss but have also suggested various means of minimising it. It is not certain, however, whether they have revealed all that there is to be revealed or whether they are only 'scratching the surface' of the problem. In the following paragraphs, an attempt has been made to discuss one method of preservation, commonly known as 'Cocooning', with particular reference to its possible uses by the Defence Services.

HISTORICAL

The idea of 'Cocooning', or to use a more generalised term, 'stripable coating' is by no means new. It was first used in America in 1944 when it was felt that, for aircraft to be sent to the various theatres of war, some form of covering was necessary to protect them from corrosion in the salty atmosphere during the voyage. The duration of protection required, was only three to four months. The system, then developed, was rather different to the present system of 'Cocooning' as there was no 'Webbing', and about this, more later. Aircraft coated by this method were sent to Europe and Africa in 1944 and 1945.

In 1945, the United Kingdom became interested in the process as a possible method for maintaining their surplus war equipment in fair condition until it could be disposed of. The American system of war days had to be further developed as protection was now required for two to three years as against a voyage period. The system developed was used for various aero-engines, guns and radio equipment. Later, the American Navy went to the extent of putting complete ships in 'Cocoons'. In 1947, trials were started in Canada to see whether the system was suitable for use in very cold climates. These trials proved the efficacy of the system for temperatures down to -40°F .

Late in 1949, trials were started in India to determine the performance of the system under tropical conditions. These trials were carried

out at the Technical Development Establishment, Jabalpur, when the writer was the Chief Superintendent of Development (Weapons) there. These trials have now lasted for over eight years. The initial guidance and technical advice were provided by a team of experts from the Ministry of Supply in the U.K. This team was headed by Dr. Church, Adviser in Plastics to the Ministry of Supply (Air).

MECHANICS OF COCOONING

Initial Treatment: The various stages in the process 'Cocooning' are shown pictorially in this article. The equipment taken for purposes of illustration is a charging set, but it might well be an aero-engine or a gun or something much bigger. The process starts by taking a suitable-sized metal tray fitted with loops and mounted on wooden skids. The equipment is placed in this tray and is secured to the loops in the tray by copper wire. It is then taped all-round to form small rectangular gaps. All sharp corners are padded, say, with cotton wool, so that they do not pierce through the plastic coating to come later. Figure 1 shows the charging set placed in the tray taped and padded as stated above.

Plastic Compound: This is the most important lacquer used in the process. It consists of a solution of Vinylite resins in a mixture of toluene and acetone. The lacquer also contains a plasticiser, a stabilising agent and a small quantity of mineral oil. The plasticiser is intended to render the plastic film flexible. The stabilising agent retards the deterioration of the lacquer in storage. The mineral oil exudes from the plastic film after spraying, to coat the surface underneath, and to provide additional protection against corrosion. Unfortunately, the Vinylite resins have to be imported and the main source is from the hard-currency areas. One of the principal manufacturers of these resins are the Bakelite Corporation of America, although some plants have been set up in England and Germany.

Webbing: The first spraying process is known as the 'webbing' coat. Before dealing with this process, it would be worthwhile saying a few words about the *webbing* agent. This lacquer is added to the plastic compound, mentioned above, to provide the solution used for *webbing*. The *webbing* agent is a solution of a Saran resin in a mixed acetone and toluene solvent. The solution also contains a stabiliser. The composition is carefully balanced to enable it to give a dry spray of a small *webbing* filament, or a wet spray which dries to a continuous film and develops its strength quickly. Plastic compound alone will web gaps of 3 to 5 inches and with the webbing agent added, gaps up to 15 inches can be bridged. After a day of normal drying, the tensile strength reaches approximately 1,000 lbs per sq in. and ultimately rises to above 1,500 lbs per sq in. This enables the film to withstand a fair amount of ill-treatment. Fig. 2





Fig. 1. **CHARGING SET, 1260 WATT, No. 3**—Equipment secured to loops in tray by copper wires. Taping & padding completed.

Fig. 2. **CHARGING SET, 1260 WATT, No. 3**—Webbing Coat.







Fig. 3. CHARGING SET, 1260
WATT, No. 3—After
cocooning for short term
mask removed from
perspex window.



4. CHARGING
SET, 1260
WATT, No. 3—
Gilsonitecoat
(long term)
Final.

shows the charging set with the 'webbing coat' on. It also shows the pressure container, housing the plastic material.

Plastic Coat: The next stage is to give additional coats of red dye mixed in the plastic coat followed by a layer of aluminium paste and plastic coat. Figure 3 shows the charging set complete up to this stage. The plastic coating is about .04" thick and has a life of 18 months to 2 years.

This figure shows a perspex window fitted by making a rectangular slit. The slit is also used for inserting a desiccant (e.g. bags of silica gel) which absorbs any moisture trapped inside the plastic cover. The slit also shows a meter indicating the level of humidity inside. This tells how effectively the silica-gel is operating inside the enclosed space.

LONG-TERM SYSTEM

The long-term system is required where the equipment is to be preserved for a period of 3 to 5 years or perhaps more. In the long-term system, a coating of bitumen is applied over the plastic skin to protect the layer from the sun's rays and also to cut down the rate of moisture transmission through the film. The bitumen coat is finally covered with an aluminium pigmented lacquer, the main purpose of which is to reduce the effect of the sun on the bitumen. Fig 4 shows the equipment during the final stages with the right-half containing the bitumen coat only and the left-half with the aluminium pigmented lacquer on.

SERVICING AND REPAIR

When the coating has been applied, no further attention should, normally, be necessary beyond a periodic check of the reading on the Humidity Indicator. If, however, the packed equipment is handled for transport purposes, the coating may be accidentally damaged. Any defect, which allows the ingress of water or moisture vapour, must be rectified as soon as possible because the function of the coating is to maintain a moisture-proof barrier round the equipment and if this attribute is lost, the coating is of little value.

The reading on the Humidity Indicator should be checked periodically. If the relative humidity rises above 45%, the package should be inspected and any damage repaired. The old desiccant should be removed and a fresh charge inserted.

STRIPPING THE COAT

One of the principal advantages of this system is that the film does not stick to the equipment, being non-adhesive. If the equipment is to be put into service again, it is only necessary to pierce it with a sharp object

and the whole of the covering can be removed immediately. This is particularly useful for Defence Services, in that it very much minimises the time-lag between de-preservation and putting the equipment to use again, in case of an emergency.

ECONOMICS OF 'COCOONING'

From actual experiments carried out, it is clear that the long-term process can last well over 5 years and in some cases up to 10 years. It is difficult to give precise figures of cost. As a rough guess, it may be stated that a short-term coating for the equipment illustrated, will probably cost about Rs. 150 and a long-term treatment approximately Rs. 200. Naturally, for a gun or a vehicle or for that matter, a battleship, it will cost more depending upon the size. On the other hand, there is the saving of covered accommodation and continuous and expensive maintenance costs. It is apparent that the savings over a period will far outweigh the initial expense.

Unfortunately the resins required for raw material have to be imported and that raises the foreign exchange difficulties which are already taxing the available resources to a breaking point.

The usual starting material for the production of the resins is calcium carbide. To produce carbide economically, it is necessary to have cheap electric power. Until our electric power projects make further headway, it will not be possible to produce carbide at a price which would enable manufacture of resins an economic proposition. The other ingredients do not present any unsurmountable difficulties, although they will also require a certain amount of initial research and development, before indigenous manufacture is established.

CONCLUSION

'Cocooning' is a useful weapon to save defence equipment in storage from deterioration. Its introduction merits serious consideration. The teething troubles are bound to come up but they are not of an unsurmountable nature. If the article helps in making the reader 'cocoon-conscious', the writer's aim has been achieved.

A GREAT CAPTAIN OF WORLD WAR TWO

"LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEORGE S. PATTON Jr."

By BRIGADIER G. I. S. KULLAR

FOR those of us who fought in the 1939-45 War as young officers and are still serving in the post-war armies of the world today, it is an interesting study to sit back during our leisure hours, so to speak, and reflect on the contribution made by great commanders of that War to the art of war generally. A number of personalities emerged from World War II, prominent among them were Rommel, Manstien, Patton, Rokosovsky, Montgomery, Alexander, Slim, Wavell, Bradley, MacArthur and Yamashita. Some of us were fortunate to meet them or serve under them both when their fortunes were high and also when fate was unkind. Most of them very simple men, men of high character and integrity; undaunted in defeat and humble in glory. They were the true captains and leaders of men.

They all fought under varying conditions of war and barring the hero of this article and Bradley, they all fought their battles when their countries were on the crest of the wave and also when their nations faced utter defeat.

These personalities make a galaxy of great names, each one of whom was a giant in his own right. To select one from amongst them as topping the list in the sense of making the greatest contribution to the art of war is by no means an easy task and perhaps an invidious one. My purpose here is to attempt an appraisal of one of them and later if leisure allows and if time can be found from the chores of daily office routine, to say something about the others also.

"In all of us", says Major General Fuller somewhere, "there lurks an enigma, something which neither we nor others understand. We call it personality, a vague word meaning many things—courage, commonsense, quick wit, frankness, determination and many other qualities."

When a personality is strong, it accomplishes something worth accomplishing, and the enigma transforms into a myth, something that flatters the common mind and holds it in awe. Such was the personality of Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr. A shrewd student of military history and war, not only a tank expert, but an outstanding leader of men as well, he had developed mannerisms and idiosyncrasies of the most hard-boiled individual in the American Army. Beneath this hard exterior lay a very kind and feeling heart which few others than his close friends ever penetrated deep enough to see.

Patton conformed to no pattern, which was often the cause of making people fearful of his inability to fit into a team. His bizarre mannerisms and unpredictable actions made him appear difficult to get on with.

Patton had a fighting heart. He was only too willing, when Eisenhower asked him, to step down from the command of a training corps in the United States in order to lead a division into actual battle in North Africa in 1942. He exhibited the same desire for not to be left out of battle when having completed the Sicilian Campaign so successfully as an Army Commander and having had Bradley as a Corps Commander under him in Sicily, he voluntarily accepted the command of an army in Europe under Bradley. He was above such pettiness that would lead to his missing a chance of fighting against the Germans in Western Europe.

To subordinate one's own personal interests for the larger interests of one's country is a trait to be envied. Among the American general officers in Europe, he was the oldest at the time and had the longest experience of war having, *inter alia*, commanded a tank brigade in the first World War. It would have been a pity to have denied that experience to America and the "free world" in the hour of their need. I wonder how many other generals placed in his position would have acted as bravely as Patton did.

The evening before his Gafsa attack he assembled his II Corps staff for a final briefing. "Gentlemen", he said, "*tomorrow we attack. If we are not victorious, let no one come back alive.*" With that he retired to his room to pray.

Contradictions of Patton's character continued to bewilder those who served with him. For while he was profane, he was also reverent; and while he strutted imperiously as a commander, he knelt humbly before his God. And while that last appeal for victory even at the price of death may have sounded jingoistic, it also made apparent to his listeners that to Patton war was a holy crusade. It may as well be added here that without such faith—amounting to religion—in his cause Patton could not have been the Patton he was.

His strictness in matters of discipline put new life into II Corps which was completely demoralised after having suffered a defeat at Kasserine just before Patton took over its command. Patton had ordered that every soldier in the Corps will wear a steel helmet. The Ordnance in his Corps queried if the orders applied to mechanics working on their trucks. Patton gave a short and a sharp answer, "You're goddam right—they're soldiers, aren't they?". Each time a soldier knotted his necktie,

put on his leggings or buckled on his helmet, he was forcibly reminded that Patton had come to command II Corps and that the pre-Kasserine days had ended when they could go about without all these "encumbrances" (and when they could be defeated!)

Patton was probably the most outstanding modern soldier and leader of men, that America has produced, so far as fighting a battle went. And he was certainly one of the greatest, if not the greatest, so far as exploiting a mobile situation forms part of present day warfare. In *Sicily* while he was pushing forward to the centre of the island, with his left flank he threw mobile columns along the west coast. He entered *Palerma* within twelve days of his landings on the southern beaches of the island. His rapid movement on his left flank reduced the enemy ports to just one, that of *Messina*. The huge Italian garrison was completely demoralised and Patton was responsible for permitting Montgomery to move forward to the eastern parts of *Sicily* where he had almost got stuck with his Eighth Army. Patton was capable of recognising an opportunity when it presented itself and making the best use of it. He realised fully well that by attacking and continuing the advance speedily against an enemy once shaken he could achieve the maximum at minimum cost. Speed is easier talked about than achieved; it requires among other things training, fitness, morale and skillful leadership. Patton employed speed relentlessly and thus not only minimised his own losses, but shook the Italian Government so badly that Mussolini came tumbling down in less than a week.

Patton's Third Army played a brilliant part in the European campaign of 44-45. Soon after the *Normandy* landings in 1944, rumours got about that Patton had been out of control. It was said that he should have turned North, and not gone to *Orleans*, or so far towards *Paris*. Going towards *Orleans* was Patton's own idea and the right idea although to the "UnPattonlike" it seemed a wrong idea at the time. By doing this Patton created a "touch line" along the Southern flank of the German line of retreat through *Paris*. Post-war analysis of the NW European campaign shows that Patton's initiative at the time speeded up the whole business enormously. There can be no greater tribute to his generalship than this verdict.

Patton was above all a professional soldier brought up and trained the way a normal officer is. He was well versed in the study of war and knew the art of applying its principles to a particular situation. He was a superb leader of men and it was a great tragedy that his life was cut short tragically in a jeep accident so soon after the war and his experience of war and leadership denied to the post-war American armies and the public.

In conclusion, may I add that it is not possible in the space of a brief article like this to do justice to the appraisal of a great man like Patton. As a great leader he showed once again that strategic mobility can only be achieved by bold action and the taking of risks.

Patton's contribution to the art of war, may not be very great for "the Art" remains basically the same—but the student of that art would find superb application throughout Patton's battles of principles that the art is said to consist of.

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By

Captain S. G. CHAPHEKAR

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IN THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS

By LIEUTENANT (SP) DESMOND WETTERN, RNVR

Early on the morning of 11 November, 1942, the minesweeper H.M.I.S. *Bengal** was escorting the Dutch tanker *Ondina* (a 6,000-ton vessel armed with a single 4-inch gun) on passage from Fremantle to Diego Garcia. Shortly before noon lookouts in the *Bengal* sighted an unidentified ship steaming north-east at high speed and bearing approximately 290 degrees from *Bengal*. *Bengal*'s position at this time was 19 degrees 45' South, 92 degrees 40' East.

The unidentified ship was about eight miles away but aboard *Bengal* no chances were taken and all hands closed up to action stations. At 1150 *Bengal* changed course to 020 from her previous course 110. At the same time engine revolutions were reduced to 135. *Ondina* was ordered to station herself on the starboard beam. By this time it was decided that the strange vessel was almost certainly Japanese.

Four minutes after changing course the *Bengal*'s lookouts sighted a second vessel bearing 310 degrees; this vessel also appeared to be Japanese. At 1155 a rendezvous was signalled to *Ondina* and she was instructed to act independently. A minute later *Bengal* altered course again to 260, her speed was increased to full and the ship's head now pointed at the first vessel sighted.

To warn other shipping and the naval authorities an 'original enemy report' was sent out on the radio and frequent amplifying reports followed. Shortly after noon the first enemy vessel opened fire at an approximate range of 3,500 yards from a position 10 degrees on the *Bengal*'s starboard bow. *Bengal* returned the fire immediately. The second enemy vessel now altered course to intercept; three minutes later she too opened fire. But even at a range only just within that of the *Bengal*'s 12 pounder gun a hit was soon scored aft on the first enemy ship. A large explosion was then seen. It was assumed that her magazine had been hit. *Bengal* maintained her course with constant helm variations to avoid the enemy's shells. Gradually she altered course towards the North. At 1220 she received a hit forward and the provision room was flooded. Ten minutes later the first raider steamed aft of the safety angle of the 12 pounder gun and firing ceased. Course was altered again to 200. *Bengal* then tried to make smoke with smoke floats but these failed to ignite.

At 1241 a second shell struck aft and fire broke out in the officers' baggage room. By 1245 ammunition was running low. There was some damage fore and aft. The tanker, however, had succeeded in opening the range to seven miles. *Bengal*'s captain now decided to break off the action under cover of a smokescreen. The undamaged raider continued to chase and several near misses were scored by her.

Altering course yet again to 230 *Bengal*'s crew saw the *Ondina* hit abaft the bridge and catch fire. After two further alterations in course a large explosion was seen in the first raider which had been burning throughout the action. Nothing more was seen of this ship. The last sighting of the tanker was at 1320 when she was seen steering on course 190. Ten minutes later the *Bengal* ceased making smoke and nothing was now in sight. It was estimated that over 200 rounds had been fired at the

* An Australian-built minesweeper of 733 tons manned by the Royal Indian Navy, under Lieutenant Commander W. J. Wilson, R.I.N.R., and armed with one twelve-pounder gun.

ship. After a further alteration in course, speed was reduced to 170 revolutions.

The preceding paragraphs are based on reports of the action in the *Bengal's* log and they sum up, in typical naval brevity, one of the most gallant actions of World War II.

As soon as the enemy was sighted it was the *Bengal's* intention, again in the words of her log, "...to draw the enemies' fire and act as screen for as long as possible in an effort to let the tanker *Ondina* make her escape". This was achieved most effectively as the *Ondina* was not hit until 56 minutes after the action began. The *Bengal* drew the enemies' fire for 71 minutes. In adopting this course in the face of what must have seemed, and indeed were on paper, overwhelming odds, the *Bengal* followed the example of all those ships of the Royal Navy and Commonwealth navies which had in previous wars faced tremendous odds with little or no apparent chance of success. Indeed she had herself added a glorious page to that comparatively young service, the Royal Indian Navy as it then was.

But meanwhile aboard the *Ondina* things were far from pleasant. Her captain, Horsmann, decided to support the *Bengal* with his solitary 4 inch gun mounted aft. Fire was opened on the first raider* and the senior gunner, Visscher, claimed to have hit the raider aft causing a fire.

On the arrival of the second raider Horsmann wirelessly a full report of the action and then began firing at this raider. However, she kept out of range of the 4 inch gun in the *Ondina* and began to hit the tanker repeatedly. Visscher kept firing till the gun's rifling was practically worn through and the ammunition gave out. But still the enemy remained out of range.

Realising that there was now little he could do Horsmann ordered a white flag to be hoisted. However, this was not apparently seen by the enemy and the raider kept firing. The tanker's bridge received a

* The first raider, which later sank as the result of the damage she received in the action, was the *Hokoku Maru*. Of 10,439 gross tons, she was armed with eight 14 cm. guns and two 13 mm. machine guns, two 53 cm. torpedo tubes and one seaplane. She carried 50 torpedoes. Her engines had a shaft horsepower of 13,000 giving her a speed of 21.1 knots. She and two other ships of her class, the *Atokoku Maru* and *Gokoku Maru* and also the *Shicho Maru* (this last ship was a much smaller vessel) formed the 24th Combat Squadron. The *Hokoku Maru* was commissioned into the Japanese Navy as a merchant cruiser on 20 September, 1941, she was completed just over a year before 1940.

The large number of torpedoes carried were to be used for supplying submarines at sea. She combined the role of raider with submarine supply vessel thus following the practice of German raiders.

In early 1942 Penang Island was occupied by the Japanese forces and submarines were based here for operations in the Indian Ocean. The *Hokoku Maru* was employed extensively at this time as a submarine supply ship and little is known of her raiding activities except that in July or August she captured a tanker and towed it to Penang Island. The convoy system had not been set up in the Indian Ocean at this time and many tankers were to be found sailing independently.

After crossing and re-crossing the Indian Ocean the *Hokoku Maru* went as far south as Australia and as far west as the East African coast. She carried out a raiding operation in the Mozambique Channel in company with four submarines, the I-10, I-16, I-18 and I-20, of the 8th Combat Squadron. Two submarines steamed on either side of the *Hokoku Maru* when carrying out an attack. It is claimed that during this time they sank 20 freighters and tankers (this total included one captured) either by torpedoes or gunfire.

On completion of this patrol the *Hokoku Maru* was transferred to the Pacific to carry out transport duties around the Solomon Islands in August 1942. In October of the same year she returned to the Indian Ocean. It was on 11 November 1942 she sighted *Bengal* and *Ondina*

direct hit and the gallant Captain Horsmann was killed. Chief Officer Rehwinkel gave the order to abandon ship. Two boats got away. The raider now closed until she was only two cable lengths away. She then opened fire with rifles and machine guns. The *Ondina's* Chief Engineer was killed and several others of the crew were wounded. Finally, having torpedoed the tanker, the raider steamed away; no doubt assuming that the tanker would soon sink.

By evening the *Ondina* was still afloat and both lifeboats then went back alongside. The crew climbed back on board and succeeded in extinguishing the fires and correcting the ship's list. By 2130 the main engines had been re-started. Course was then set for Fremantle and six days later a hospital ship took off the wounded at sea. The next morning the gallant tanker docked at Fremantle.

The *Bengal* meanwhile struggled on towards Ceylon with only five rounds of H.A.D.A. fuse remaining. In addition to the damage logged, the degaussing (anti-magnetic mine insulation) gear was partly ineffective, the sounding apparatus was out of action and there was shrapnel damage in various places including the shell plating fore and aft on both sides. In the words of Lt. Cdr. W. J. Wilson, R.I.N.R., commanding officer of the *Bengal*, in his narrative of the action:

".....considering that we received a direct hit and innumerable near misses, it is incredible that no one was even slightly injured. (The hit in the provision room forward was found to have been caused by a piece of shrapnel) Those who took part in this action will never cease to marvel at the result. To think that a small ship, with only one 12 pdr. gun, should engage two raiders, both more than ten times her own size, and each with about 20 times her gun power, and so enable the tanker to escape, sink one raider and then get away herself, is almost miraculous. The R.I.N. should be justly proud of their little 'Bengal Tiger'; she has had her tail twisted and has a few scars but these will soon be healed and the 'Tiger' will soon be roaring again."

It must be remembered that the *Bengal* was a raw ship, she was being delivered to the Royal Indian Navy having been built in an Australian yard. It is pleasant to be able to add that both the *Bengal* and *Ondina* are still afloat today and so far as the author is aware both are with their original owners.

south-west of the Cocos Islands. One appeared to be a tanker of about 10,000 tons gross and the other a small escort vessel. The *Hokoku Maru* soon overhauled these two vessels and signalled them to heave-to. Both slowed down and stopped and then turned to set their course as ordered. (This was when the *Bengal* altered course to 020 degrees). Suddenly there were flashes from their guns (evidently the Japanese thought both ships were firing) as their sterns swung at right angles to the *Hokoku Maru* (the 12 pdr. in the *Bengal*, her only gun of any consequence could not possibly train astern) and a few seconds later the *Hokoku Maru's* mainmast crashed to the deck. She at once returned the fire and the tanker caught fire.

The mainmast in falling had struck the seaplane and had detonated the bombs on the aircraft's racks causing a fire. Immediately below the seaplane hangar was the torpedo stowage compartment and the fire-fighting parties worked desperately to prevent the fire spreading. Below decks parties were working to try and jettison the torpedoes but some had been jammed against a bulkhead by the explosion above. A short while later the torpedoes exploded. The ship was soon sight from stern to stern and order was given to abandon ship. Meanwhile the *Aikoku Maru*, which had been in company, arrived on the scene and, after pursuing the *Bengal* and shelling the *Ondina*, picked up survivors from the *Hokoku Maru*. It was assumed that the tanker had now sunk.

THE 19TH HYDERABAD REGIMENT

BY HURMUZ KAUS

WITH the growth of power of the English East India Company, it became necessary for the authorities to meet their antagonists at many points. In the south, the Army of the Deccan was formed in which were included the battalions of Nizam. Two battalions of the *Russell Brigade* and two of the *Ellichpur Brigade* formed part of the *Third Division* under Sir John Malcolm, commanded by Colonel Patrick Walker and one battalion and the *Reformed Horse* were included in the *Berar Brigade* in the Second or *Hyderabad Division* under Brigadier-General Doveton, commanded by Major Pitman.

The parentage of the 19th Hyderabad Regiment of Pre-1947 Indian Army is in Pre-1903 Hyderabad Contingent. The parentage of the Hyderabad Contingent is in Pre-1854 Nizam's Army and the parentage of the Nizam's Army is in Pre-1826 *Russell, Berar and Ellichpur Brigades*.

THE RUSSELL BRIGADE

The *Russell Brigade*, composed of two battalions of Infantry, one Company of Artillery and one Regiment of Cavalry, was raised in 1812-13 and was placed under the command of Captain Hare of the East India Company's Army. The Brigade was designated "*The Russell Brigade*", in honour of Sir Henry Russell,¹ the British Resident at the Court of the Nizam from 1811 to 1820.

The two battalions of Infantry of the above Brigade which fall within the scope of this article became the 1st and 2nd Regiment of the Nizam's Army in 1826. In the great re-organization of the Nizam's Army in 1854 the designation of the Force was changed to "*Hyderabad Contingent*". In the great re-organisation of the Indian Army under Lord Kitchener, in 1903, the *Hyderabad Contingent* was merged into the Indian Army, when the above 1st and 2nd Infantry became the 94th and 95th *Russell's Infantry* respectively. During the First World War—1914-1918—the 94th and 95th had two battalions each. In 1922, the 94th and 95th became the 1st and 10th battalions, respectively, of the 19th *Hyderabad Regiment*, both retaining the sub-title, "*Russell's*".

1st Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent: The *Russell Brigade* was employed in the *Mahratta* and *Pindari* Wars when the 1st saw active service at the Battle of *Mahiedpur* in 1817 and at the Siege of *Malegaon* and *Nowah* in 1818 and 1819 respectively. In 1829 Nawab Mubariz-ud-Daulah² excited a rebellion in the city of

1. Mr. (afterwards Sir) Henry Russell was the son of Priscilla, daughter of Sir Henry Russell, Second Baronet, and George Brackenburgh, British Consul at Lisbon. His Seat is Swallowfield, Reading, and his Crest shows a demi-lion rampant, bearing a cross-crosslet in dexter paw, which is incorporated in the appointments of the Units named after him. Vide *USI Journal* Vol: LXXXVII, No. 367, for April-June 1957, Page 148, Figs: 2, 3 and 5.

2. Nawab Gaohar Ali Khan,—title Mubariz-ud-Daulah—was a brother of Nawab Nasir-ud-Daulah, the Fourth Nizam of Hyderabad.

Hyderabad which was put down by the 1st Infantry under Captain Glass. In 1854 the 1st, under Captain Orr was engaged to quell the *Rohilla* disturbance in the Nizam's Dominions. The Unit as part of the *Hyderabad Contingent* was composed of 8 Companies,—3 of *Rajputs*, 3 of *Musalmans* and 2 of *Jats*. The Battle-honours of the Unit are,—“*Mahiedpur (1817)*” and “*Nowah (1819)*”.

2nd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent: The 2nd battalion, *Russell Brigade*, was present at the Battle of *Mahiedpur* in 1817 and at the Siege of *Nowah* in 1819. The Unit was engaged in the reduction of *Madhapur* and *Sironcha* Forts in 1823. As a Unit of the Nizam's Army it took part, with its senior corps, in quelling the rebellion of Nawab Mubariz-ud-Daulah in 1829. During the Contingent period the Unit saw active service in Burma in 1886-87. As part of the *Hyderabad Contingent* the Unit was composed of 8 Companies,—3 of *Rajputs*, 3 of *Musalmans* and 2 of *Ahirs*. The Battle-honours of the Units are “*Mahiedpur (1817)*”, “*Nowah (1819)*” and “*Burma (1886-87)*”.

THE BERAR BRIGADE

The battalions of the Nizam under the command of the French free-lance, J. Raymond³ were disbanded in 1798 and men from this Force were absorbed in the Nizam's Army for services in *Berar* and *Aurangabad*. The 1st and 2nd battalions of the *Berar Brigade* became the 3rd and 4th Regiment, respectively, of the Nizam's Army. In the great re-organisation of the Nizam's Army in 1854 they became the 3rd and 4th, Infantry, respectively, of the *Hyderabad Contingent*. In Lord Kitchener's re-organisation of the Indian Army in 1903 the 3rd became the 96th. *Berar Infantry* and the 4th became the 97th *Deccan Infantry*, thus becoming part and parcel of the British-Indian Army. During the First World (1914-1918), the 96th and 97th had two battalions each. In the organisation of the Indian Army in 1922, the 96th and 97th became the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, respectively, of the 19th *Hyderabad Regiment*.

3rd Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent: As part of the *Berar Brigade*, the 1st battalion was present at the Siege of *Nowah* in 1819. During the happenings of 1857-58, the Unit, as part of the *Hyderabad Contingent*, was present at the capture of the Rani of Jhansi and in the defeat of Tantia Tope. In 1860 it was engaged in the pursuit of the *Rohillas* in the wilderness of *Mahor* and *Nirmal* in the Nizam's Dominions. The active service of the Unit was in Burma in 1886-87. During the Contingent Period the Unit was composed of 8 companies,—3 of *Rajputs*, 3 of *Musalmans* and 2 of *Jats*. The Battle-honours of the Unit are, “*Nowah (1819)*”, “*Central India (1857-58)*” and “*Burma (1886-87)*”.

4th Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent: The 2nd battalion, *Berar Brigade*, saw active service at the Battle of *Nagpur* in 1817. In 1854, as a Unit of the *Hyderabad*

3. Joachim Raymond was a French military adventurer and free-lance who entered the service of the Second Nizam, Nawab Meer Nizam Ali Khan (1762-1803). He raised Foot Regiments and established Gun-foundries for his Master. His Force was disbanded by Sir John Malcolm and the Colours of the Units were sent to the then Governor-General, who in his turn sent them to England as a proof of wiping out French influence at the Court of the Nizam.

Contingent, it was employed against *Rohillas* in the Nizam's Dominions. During Contingent period the Unit was composed of 8 Companies,—3 of *Rajputs*, 3 of *Musalmans* and 2 of *Jats*. The Battle-honour of the Unit is "*Nagpur (1817)*".

THE ELLICHPUR BRIGADE

The Ellichpur Brigade, under Nawab Salabath Khan,⁴ Nizam's Deputy in *Berar*, had two Infantry battalions, known as the 1st and the 2nd battalions, *Ellichpur Brigade*. In 1826 they were taken over as the 7th and 8th Regiment, respectively, of the Nizam's Army. During the re-organisation of the Nizam's Forces in 1854, they became the 5th and 6th Infantry, respectively, of the *Hyderabad Contingent*. In Lord Kitchener's re-organisation of the Indian Army in 1903, they were, like the above four Units, merged into the Indian Army,—the 5th becoming the 98th Infantry, and the 6th becoming the 99th *Deccan Infantry*. During the First World War they had two battalions each. In the organisation of the Indian Army in 1922 they became the 4th and 5th battalions, respectively, of the 19th *Hyderabad Regiment*.

5th Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent: In 1849, the 7th Regiment, Nizam's Army,—later the 5th Infantry, *Hyderabad Contingent*,—was employed in driving away the *Rohillas* from the Nizam's Dominions. The Unit served during the 1857-58 Campaigns in *Malwa* and *Central India*. From 1900 to 1902 it formed part of the China Expeditionary Force. During the Contingent period the Unit was composed of 8 Companies,—3 of *Rajputs*, 3 of *Musalmans* and 2 of *Ahirs*. The Battle-honours of the Unit are, "*Central India (1857-58)*" and "*China (1900)*".

6th Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent: As part of the Nizam's Army, the 8th Regiment,—later 6th Infantry, *Hyderabad Contingent*,—was employed in 1841-42 in putting down various rebellions and insurrections in *Berar* and in the Nizam's Dominions, and was later engaged against the *Rohillas* in 1849-50. The Unit in the Contingent period was composed of 8 Companies,—3 of *Rajputs*, 3 of *Musalmans* and 2 of *Jats*. Since the Unit did not take part in a major operation no Battle-honour was awarded.

GENERAL

The full-dress uniform of the Force was red with green facings with white clothing for hot weather. *Khaki* was introduced in 1838. The arms were,—Flint-lock Muskets until 1840 and Percussion Muskets until 1847. Victoria pattern Muskets were issued in 1872 to be replaced by 1853-pattern Muzzel-loading rifles in 1878. During 1881-83, Snider rifles were used which were replaced by Martine-Henri rifles a decade later. From 1902 the battalions were armed with Lee-Enfield rifles.

4. Nawab Salabat Khan was the Nizam's Deputy at *Berar* with *Ellichpur* as his Headquarters. For further details about the Nawabs of *Ellichpur*, Vide *USI Journal* Vol: LXXXVII, No. 367, for April-June 1957, pages 148-150.

The accompanying Statement shows the evolution of the Foot Regiments of the Force from the formation of the three Brigades in early 19th century to the Transfer of Power in the middle of the 20th century,—a period of about one and one-third century. (see page 86).

Awards: The awards of the Force range from the Army of India Medal (1799-1826) to the Bronze Star of 1914-18. So far as my knowledge goes no V.C. was won by any member of the Force.

Service: The Force served four Nizams,⁵—Sikandar Jha (1803-29), Nasir-ud-Daulah (1829-57), Afzal-ud-Daulah (1857-69) and Meer Mahboob Ali Khan (1869-1911), and eight British monarchs from George III to George VI.

There are several Musalman and Hindu families in Hyderabad who claim descent from the Indian Officers of the Contingent. The predecessors of Nawab Sir Afsur-ul-Mulk, one time Commander-in-Chief of H.E.H. The Nizam's Regular Forces belonged to the mounted regiments of the *Hyderabad Contingent*.

Two Parsi brothers, Viccaji and Pestonji were the Paymasters of the Contingent Force, and some of the old Parsi families of Hyderabad with the surnames, 'Viccaji', 'Pestonji' and 'Taraporewalla' are the descendents of the above two brothers. The Residence and Banking House of Viccaji on the old Residency Road, is now known as '*Partapgir-ki-Kothi*', after its present owner Raja Pratapgir. The residence and Banking House of Pestonji, on Abid Road, is known as '*Mohsin-ul-Mulk-ki-Kothi*' after Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk who purchased the property later. Pestonji was granted royal sanction to establish a mint and coin money in silver only, and these coins were known as '*Pestonshahi Sikka*'.

SERVICES DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR—1914-1920

1st Bn./19th Hyderabad Regiment:

Persian Gulf until 1916, from where they went to quell the rebellion of Arabs and Kurds in Mesopotamia.

2nd Bn./19th Hyderabad Regiment:

Engaged for the duration of the War in *Persian Gulf* and on *Tigris Line*.

3rd Bn./19th Hyderabad Regiment:

Services in *Palestine* and in the Third Afghan War (1919).

4th Bn./19th Hyderabad Regiment:

Engaged in various operations in *East Africa* and in *East Persia* from 1914 to 1920.

5th Bn./19th Hyderabad Regiment:

Services and Garrison duties in *India*.

10th Bn./19th Hyderabad Regiment:

Guarded the *Persian Oil Fields* until 1915. Services in *Mesopotamia* and the *North-western Frontiers of India* until 1918. From 1918 to 1920, formed part of the XVth Division and saw services in *Salonika* and on the *Black Sea Coast*.

5. The dynasty of the Nizams of Hyderabad, known as the Asaf Jahs, consists of ten rulers of whom the second, third and fourth are considered as usurpers and did not assume the title Asaf Jah. Their haphazard rule cover a period of about fourteen years from the death of the Founder of the dynasty in 1748 to the accession of the Second Asaf Jah in 1762. The present Nizam, His Exalted Highness Nawab Sir Meer Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, is the tenth of the line and the Seventh Asaf Jah.

STATEMENT SHOWING THE PARENTAGE OF THE 19TH HYDERABAD REGIMENT.

Pre-1826.	1826.	1854.	1903.	1914—18	1922.
I. RUSSELL BRIGADE.					
1st. Bn : Russell Brigade.	1st. Regiment, Nizam's Army.	1st. Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.	94th. Russell's Infantry.	1st and 2nd Bn. 94th. Russell's Infantry.	1st. Bn : 19th. Hyderabad Regi- ment. (Russell's)
2nd. Bn : Russell Brigade.	2nd. Regiment, Nizam's Army.	2nd. Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.	95th. Russell's Infantry.	1st and 2nd Bn : 95th. Russell's Infantry.	10th Bn : 19th Hyderabad Regi- ment. (Russell's)
II. BERAR BRIGADE.					
1st. Bn : Berar Infantry.	3rd. Regiment, Nizam's Army.	3rd. Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.	96th. Berar Infantry.	1st. Bn : 96th Berar Infantry. 2nd Bn. 96th Infantry	2nd. Bn : 19th Hyderabad Regiment.
2nd Bn : Berar Infantry.	4th Regiment, Nizam's Army.	4th. Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.	97th. Deccan Infantry.	1st and 2nd Bn : 97th. Deccan Infantry.	3rd. Bn : 19th. Hyderabad Regiment.
III. ELlichPUR BRIGADE.					
1st. Bn. Ellichpur Brigade.	7th. Regiment, Nizam's Army.	5th. Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.	98th Infantry.	1st and 2nd Bn : 98th. Infantry.	4th. Bn : 19th. Hyderabad Regiment.
2nd. Bn : Ellichpur Brigade.	8th. Regiment, Nizam's Army.	6th. Infantry, Hyderabad Contingent.	99th. Deccan Infantry.	1st and 2nd. Bn : 99th. Deccan Infantry.	5th. Bn : 19th Hyderabad Regiment.

BOOK REVIEWS

GENERAL

The Story of Land Warfare by Paul Kendall (Hamish Hamilton Ltd., London 1957). 194 pages. Price 12/6d.

In *the Story of Land Warfare* the author traces the history of war on land from the dawn of history to the present day. Though small, the book covers the main battles fought by the famous commanders of the past.

The scope of the book is primarily limited to the European history and therefore the claims of the seven great Captains of the past (Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Frederick the Great and Napoleon) cannot be disputed in Europe. But if it had embraced other continents of the world then the list of the great Captains may have to be enlarged.

While tracing the history of warfare, the author has dealt with some important battles in detail and these have also been well illustrated by sketches, maps and diagrams. A point of interest is that starting 5,000 years ago personal leadership has been accepted as the dominant factor and of prime necessity in the battlefield even of the future. History confirms the adequacy of and necessity for some age old principles of war which are valid even by future standards. The author rightly says: "*Though in the course of history methods of war-making have greatly changed, the basic principles of strategy and tactics have remained the same from Alexander the Great to General Montgomery.*"

The book is well arranged chronologically, is brief and to the point, illustrated where necessary and has the right emphasis on some important battles which "*most decisively changed the course of nations and the fate of man.*"

It is a handy history of warfare and students of military history could well get some idea of the evolution and nature of war from earliest times to the present day. The style of the author is lucid and simple. The get up and printing of the book is good. All students of military history should greatly benefit by reading this book.

B.N.M.

On War by Raymond Aron (Secker & Warburg, 1958). 126 pages. Price 16s.

In a previous book, entitled *A Century of Total War* (1954), Mr. Aron dealt with sociological aspects of warfare during the last century, and analysed with characteristic insight the chain of events from the First to the Second World War with particular emphasis on the effects of the advance of science and technology on the nature of war. He expounded the process whereby the consequent re-alignment of power and the division of the world into its present bi-polar structure had been brought about.

In the present volume, written two years ago but now brought up to date by the inclusion of a new chapter on the development of the Sputnik, he has

continued with his analysis. He reaches the conclusion that because men are not capable of conducting politics without violence, wars are an inevitable part of the historical process. He asserts that though disarmament between the two power blocs is not possible, future wars need not be total wars, if only nations would continue to maintain, as a matter of policy, the necessary instruments of conducting conventional war also. He is thus an opponent of the "New Look" theory, and believes that nations who have taken the decision of passing "the point of no return" (to use F.M. Montgomery's phrase) are by their very policy ensuring the inevitability of mutual nuclear destruction.

This is also of course, the current intellectual viewpoint on the Continent. Britain and the U.S.A., whose Governments have accepted the "no-return" policy and remodelled their armed forces accordingly, forcefully condemn this illusory attitude of the "middle bloc", asserting that only the inevitability of destruction can hold the nuclear aggressor's hand. In this attitude, they stand isolated; and even then there are many Americans and Britons who do not contribute to their theory.

The subject chosen by Mr. Aron is thus topical and vital in its import. Those who have been interested in this philosophical tussle between the East, the West and the Continental schools of thought will find this book well worth reading. Mr. Aron is a brilliant sociologist at the Sorbonne University of Paris, and has already contributed some important books on the military aspects of international relations. His "*thought for the day*"—that "*States will succeed in outlawing modern weapons only when they exclude the hypothesis of a big war, and not vice versa*"—is even now being tested against the background of the present East-West talks on possibilities of nuclear disarmament.

D.K.P.

Defence and Security in the Indian Ocean Area by a Study Group of the I.C.W.A. (Asia Publishing House, 1958). 208 pages. Price Rs. 11.50.

This book incorporates the greater part of an Indian data paper submitted by the Indian Council of World Affairs to the Twelfth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held in Japan in 1954, to which have been subsequently added the portions relating to military and security aspects. The title of the book is, therefore, misleading. It is not, primarily, a work of defence research in the context of current world affairs.

"*The Indian Ocean,*" writes General Cariappa in his introduction, "*once the 'Vital Lake' for the very existence of the British Empire, is now a very 'important zone' for the security of the many countries bordering it.*" However, none of the nations who border it can be called a world military power. Many of them have chosen to attach themselves to Western Powers, thereby gaining a small measure of reflected military standing. The mainspring of defence potential in each case, therefore, is the West. In this context, the usefulness of a book which goes clockwise (or anti-clockwise) round the arch of the Indian Ocean assessing the military might of these nations is limited, and entirely academic.

As an economic work, some of the labour undertaken by the study group might possibly be of use in future research. But few serious military students will spend their time totting up, in a series of permutations and combinations, the armed might of various groups or coalitions of nations. In any big war in the Indian Ocean, apart from purely restricted encounters between neighbours, the war potential of the West or the East will pale into insignificance anything that the Asian nations can produce.

D.K.P.

The Battle of France, 1940 by Colonel A. Goutard. Translated by Captain A. R. P. Burgess. (Frederick Muller Ltd. London), 1958; 280 pages, 10 maps. Price 25s.

The sudden and total collapse of the French army before the Nazi blitzkrieg in 1940 left people bewildered and stunned. Then the international press and the public came to believe that the debacle was inevitable and inherent in the French body-politic, that corrupt politicians and ease-loving citizens had made modern France incapable of the doggedness and heroism demanded by war. This book is a refutation of that charge. Colonel Goutard has tried to prove that the defeat was by no means inevitable, that the French nation could still fight Germany on even terms, and that the outmoded strategic doctrine of the French High Command was alone responsible for what happened, a conclusion commended by Liddell Hart in his Foreword to the book.

German rearmament before the war is said to have stolen a march over the Allies. But at the outbreak of war, Germany had a field army of 2,758,000 men (of which only 1,800,000 were trained) plus 996,000 men in the interior of the country, while France mobilised an army of 2,776,000 men (each man of which had completed at least one year's training) plus 2,224,000 men in the interior. The Germans made better use of the 8 months' of Phoney War, but even in May 1940 the opposing armies were equal in numbers, particularly when the 10 divisions of British Expeditionary Force and 22 divisions of the Belgian Army are taken into account. The number of German tanks involved was between 2,200 to 2,800; French tanks numbered between 2,283 to 3,000, and some of them (the B tanks) were superior to any German tank in existence then. Germany had about 3,000 planes, France had only about 1,200, plus a few hundred R.A.F. planes available for the ground battles. Even this weakness in the air is traced to Petain's earlier declaration, "*Direct air support in battle is an illusion.*" But the basic weakness was the dispersal of most of the French armour in single battalions allotted to the various corps and armies, and the linear concept of defence held by the senior French generals.

The author shows that the famous panzer break-through in the Ardennes sector was a gambler's throw, and succeeded simply because of the complete surprise and slow reactions of the French command. At the crossing of the Meuse, the German infantry in the beach-heads was unsupported by armour or artillery, and could have been easily crushed by even a minor counter-attack. A little

later, the 'panzer corridor' could have been blocked behind the spearheads by counter-attacks from the north and the south. The one or two sporadic and unco-ordinated counter-attacks, such as at Arras, succeeded beyond hope, and caused grave anxiety and misgivings to the Germans. But no major, planned counter-attack took place, because the French High Command wanted first to 'contain' the panzer's infiltration, and because the divisional commanders were too slow in their reactions. Every attempted counter-stroke was 24 hours too late.

Coming to 'the miracle of Dunkirk', Colonel Goutard maintains that Hitler and Rundstedt really saved Britain by halting Guderian when the panzers were only 12 miles from Dunkirk and the road lay open on 23rd and 24th May. The verdict given in the British official history, that the evacuation beach-head was saved by the Royal Air Force, is discounted. So also is the abuse heaped on King Leopold for the Belgian surrender, which really could not be postponed.

The rest of the tragic story is soon told. The remnants of the French army, fighting doggedly against decisive numerical superiority, were driven from the Somme and ordered to surrender instead of evacuating to North Africa.

The style is lucid, and the complex operations along a vast front are described with clarity without sacrificing relevant details. The author has largely vindicated the French soldier: he has also made a significant contribution to our better appreciation of 'the blitzkrieg'.

S.N.P.

The Battle of Ardennes by Robert E. Merriam. (Souvenir Press, London), 1958; 223 pages, maps and illustrations. Price 21s.

This detailed study of the last German attack in the west (in December 1944) carries undeniable authority. As a member of the historical section of the US War Department, the author was present in the theatre throughout the battle, and made full use of his official permit to roam about the battlegrounds, attend important conferences and interview commanders and men. After the war, he interrogated the German commanders concerned, and had occasion to study patiently the vast amount of documentary material collected in the historical section. No wonder Mr. Merriam is able to discuss the controversial subject with great confidence, and to expose the many myths that have grown up around the episode.

The German attack hit the Allied war leaders with complete surprise, and the author bears witness to the efficacy of the Nazi cover plan and 'security' measures. The immediate shattering of the smug complacency behind the Allied lines, and the utter panic that replaced it, have lessons for democracies; the dogged determination of the men and the quick reactions of the commanders that succeeded the surprise and the panic have equally vital lessons for dictatorships. Hitler's blind persistence even after the attack had lost all hope of success should be another lesson for all war leaders. But the familiar argument, that the offensive itself was folly, is difficult to accept when no one is able to suggest what else

could have saved Germany from defeat. The book, however, brings out once again how vast and carefully laid plans are affected decisively by the unforeseeable reactions of unknown individuals at a crucial moment and a crucial place. If a handful of engineers had not fought off Peiper's tanks at *Trois Ponts*, if the panzers had pushed on west instead of turning north-west, if *St. Vith* had fallen earlier, the story would have been different. So it has been in war, and so it will always be.

The author has described the confused fighting and bewilderingly rapid movements with clarity and in detail. He has also padded in some personal impressions and rambling descriptions of the localities. The style is rather casual and the grammar distinctly American, as in the sentence, "*Remember that General Bradley met with Eisenhower on December 16 to discuss that very problem*". Incidentally, Eisenhower's famous "*Crusade in Europe*" seems to have been renamed "*Story of the War*"—the cold war 'exigencies of the situation' certainly demanded a downgrading of the 'crusade'!

S.N.P.

The Battle for the Rhineland by R. W. Thompson (Hutchinson & Co., London), 1958.
241 pages. Price 21s.

Several books have been published since World War II dealing with the campaign in North West Europe generally or with some of the more glamorous phases of it e.g. *Operation Overlord*, the Ardennes Counter-offensive. There is one phase of campaign, however, about which no cogent narrative or intelligent analysis has so far been available to the student of military history—the operations in the Rhineland from October 1944 to March 1945.

R. W. Thompson, who also wrote '*Cry Korea*' and '*The Eighty Five Days*' has in this book attempted a detailed survey of this very phase of the campaign. Starting with a review of the overall situation in the Autumn of 1944, the book goes on to show how the original plans for the Rhineland battles ended in a stalemate and how after a long winter of attrition the same plans were eventually put into action in February-March 1945 culminating in the destruction of the German armies West of Rhine. The progress and effects of the Ardennes interlude are also briefly and clearly analysed.

Strategically, the author's case is that the situation of the German armies in August 1944 after the defeat in France was such that a powerful thrust in the North as advocated by Montgomery might have ended the war quickly. When this opportunity was lost, even by September with the remarkable recovery of the German forces and Hitler's personal assumption of command, it was too late for such a quick solution. When Montgomery failed in the *Arnhem* venture and got involved in the *Scheldt* operations to open *Antwerp*, it was clear that it would not be possible to clear the *Rhineland* and close up to the *Rhine* before the winter. The situation was further worsened by Bradley's not appreciating the importance of the *Roer Dams* for progress in that area and by his dissipating the available

administrative resources in Patton's operations in the *Saar*, on an axis divergent from what had been accepted as the axis of importance—in the North. Eventually after the *Ardennes* battles when Montgomery was given the 9th US Army under command and Eisenhower enforced the 'priorities' laid down in the plan, operations 'Veritable' and 'Grenade' were fought through and the *Rhine* was reached. Even here, the author wryly points out, the British-Canadian forces repeated their Normandy achievement by drawing away the German reserves and by holding the 'hinge' allowing the American armour to make rapid progress once it was let loose.

Tactically, the main actions are well and fully described and the book has a wealth of important detail not generally known. This reviewer, for one, did not know that a place called *Schmidt* existed nor that it was the key to the German defences holding the Roer Dams. The description of the 'Veritable' and 'Grenade' operations fought against fanatical resistance under appalling conditions of ground and weather, is vivid and graphic. The book has five good maps, although it is a pity that some of the places which figure constantly in the narrative and where bitter fighting took place are not shown on the maps.

This book is a useful addition to any military library.

N.R.

Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War by Robert H. Ahrenfeldt, with a foreword by Dr. J. R. Rees. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London), 1958. 312 pages. Price 35sh.

The psychiatrist is a sorely misunderstood individual—unpopular with the common soldier, who taunts him as a 'trick cyclist', and despised by the common man, who regards him as a 'pseudo scientist'. Yet, someone, whose views carried weight with the 'brass hats' at Whitehall during the early years of World War II, did succeed in providing a place for psychiatrists in Wartime Britain's Army Medical Services. It certainly wasn't Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who made the most damaging references to the psychiatrist in his personal minute to the Lord President of the Council. "*I am sure,*" said Churchill, "*it would be sensible to restrict as much as possible of the work of these gentlemen, who are capable of doing an immense amount of harm with what may easily degenerate into charlatanism. The tightest hand should be kept over them, and they should not be allowed to quarter themselves in large numbers upon the Fighting Services at the public expense.*" Exactly what incited Britain's wartime Prime Minister to denounce the psychiatrist in such vehement terms is not known, but experience of the stresses and strains encountered in the vast and varied theatres of military operations made it abundantly clear that medical coverage for the fighting man was incomplete without psychiatry.

Although the normal place of work for the psychiatrist is the mental hospital or the mental health clinic, the emergencies of wartime imposed on British psychiatrists a much heavier burden. They were in demand, first of all at the Services

Selection Boards, where their advice was sought at the stage when officers and other ranks went through their psychological screening. Their most important function was to tell, from amongst those young men and women who came up before the War Office Selection Boards, those who had a predisposition to break down under stress. The value of this came out in a study undertaken by the British psychiatrist, Dr. J. C. Penton, who found that the tendency to desertion in 1944-45 was around 50 per cent in the lower half of the intelligence rating scale, as against 35 per cent of a control group of non-delinquents. The control of military delinquency posed some of the toughest problems which the British Army had to face in different theatres of War. From the considerable number of disciplinary cases examined by Army psychiatrists, military delinquents came to be classified in five groups—young delinquent soldiers, habitual bad characters, psychopathic and neurotic personalities, dullards, and psychotics. Specific measures for the disposal and treatment of each of these groups were developed.

The second important wartime function of psychiatrists in the British army was forward psychiatry. Experience showed that each theatre of war posed psychiatric problems peculiar to itself. In the Middle East, for instance, separation from home, life in the flat barren wilderness, scarcity of food and water, and rarity of action were stressful. The battles of the Normandy Bridge-head, on the other hand, went on without remission in the green fields and copses, with scarcity of sleep and continued carnage. Operations in the jungles of Burma put British troops to yet another group of ordeals—the silence of the jungle, the fear of being seen without seeing, the difficulty of sleeping with a calm mind, and long separation from home. Hence, the local organisation of psychiatric services in forward areas had to vary with the requirements specific to a given theatre of War.

It is just impossible to discuss in a few words the many problems of morale which Army psychiatrists had to tackle. An interesting example of the factors influencing morale is provided by a comparison between two consecutive campaigns on the India-Burma front. According to the command psychiatrist to Eastern Command, India, nearly the whole of the 14th Indian Division was for practical purposes a psychiatric casualty after the Wingate expedition of 1943. The typical signs of poor morale were men balking at river crossings, panicking and bolting at the threat of ambush, lack of purpose, defective leadership, and neglect of the sick and wounded. In 1944, on the other hand, men arrived in an orderly fashion, retaining confidence in their leaders and looking on the jungle with less fear. *"It is the attitude of mind that determines whether you go under or survive,"* remarks a psychiatrist, *"the jungle itself is neutral."*

An outstanding difference between the two World Wars as regards the commonest form of psychiatric breakdown was that in the second World War, men who broke down under stress tended to develop straight forward anxiety states, rather than hysterical conversion symptoms which were so frequent in

World War I. This, at any rate, was the opinion of Brigadier J. H. Rees, who remarks that *"all of us are nicely balanced between courage and cowardice, and we find ourselves anxiety controlled, expressing itself only through the autonomic nervous system; yet then must for many come a time when courage, however well cultivated and maintained, fails to operate."* This view, though psychologically correct and reasonable, cannot be fully understood by one who does not actually live through the ordeal of battle in a theatre of war. It might be this fact which possibly explains why Britain's wartime Prime Minister failed to appreciate the efforts of the British Army psychiatrist. Churchill firmly declared that the British war effort was calculated to secure the defeat and unconditional surrender of the enemy. Not an inch of ground was to be yielded; not a single step back, taken. The man who returned from the fighting front, disabled by wounds on his body deserved every sympathy, but one who was sent back, shattered in mind, deserved none. On the other hand, the psychiatrist who certified him to be mentally and emotionally unfit to fight must take the lion's share of the opprobrium. Such might have been the line of thought which prompted Churchill to denounce the psychiatrist. Yet, it must not be forgotten that every emotionally disabled soldier on the fighting line was a more serious drag on his comrades in arms than ten physical casualties. Eventually, at the level of casualty clearing stations, "Exhaustion Centres" were set up, and it was possible to send between 70 and 56 per cent of the cases back to fighting within a week. Not more than 5 per cent of these broke down again in the course of the same battle.

Experience in the First World War demonstrated that prisoners of war showed, after their release, evidence of psychological instability and difficulty in readjustment to the normal life of the community. In 1943, the question of rehabilitating repatriated prisoners of war received consideration, and an experimental scheme, formulated. During the repatriation period, many showed a *"Prisoner of War mentality"*, characterized by restlessness, irritability, disrespect for authority, irresponsibility, and even dishonesty. Repatriates from Japanese camps showed certain apparent differences in their psychological reactions as compared to those from Europe. In 1945, the War Office organised reorientation courses lasting for six months, and twenty civilian resettlement units were organised in the U.K., where men learned about post war civilian life, and received the benefit of specialist advice. Although, on a rough guess, nearly a quarter of those who went through this training failed to make good, the vast majority of them settled down to legitimate occupations in 'Civie Street'.

While this book may be of interest to Medical and other officers in the Armed Forces, and particularly to those who served in the Second World War, it does not contain any details of technical interest to practising psychiatrists and professional psychologists. As a document containing historical details regarding the useful application of psychiatry during World War II, it is certainly invaluable.

ARMY

The Tanks by B. H. Liddell Hart, (Carrell & Co., London) Vol. I & II, 462, 555 pages. Price 70sh. each.

In the welter of regimental histories, some interesting and some frankly dull, that have appeared in the last few years; Captain Liddell Hart's history of the Royal Tank Regiment is outstanding. Published in two massive volumes, the first one deals with armoured developments in the British Army from its conception in World War I to the beginning of World War II. The second volume deals exclusively with World War II. What makes the work stand out however, is that it is no humdrum chronicle of facts and figures. It is a scholarly analysis by a military thinker, of the birth pangs of this new arm and the vicissitudes and heart-breaks it went through to survive and triumph.

Of all people, it was Engels who commented on a military paradox. He maintained that in no other sphere of development, was scientific progress so rapid and the need for technical re-valuation so constant. Yet, in no other sphere were the ruling minds quite so stubbornly resistant to change. No progressive soldier doubts the truth of Engel's analysis though sometimes he is unaware that it is largely the high cost of change that breeds this inflexibility. The apathy, indifference and even hostility that confronted the pioneers of British armoured thought were immense. Nevertheless, it was through the perseverance of such devoted men as Generals Fuller, Hobart, Pile, Broad and Martel, that the techniques of this vital arm were hammered out, only to have the Germans make the most effective use of them at the beginning of World War II. It took three years and the backing of American industry to regain the lead lost in the thirties. One sometimes wonders whether the unknown inventors of the stirrup and the wheel, were prophets without honour in their own country.

Another reason which makes the story one which Captain Liddell Hart is particularly qualified to write, is the author's own association with the development of armour. Though it is never stressed in the narrative, it is well known among the select few, the distinguished part he himself played. This close association with the growth aspect lends particular interest to the first volume. As regards the second volume, interest continues because of the author's close research into World War II, research which adds new material and an original analysis especially with regard to the Western Desert and Normandy.

To say that this history is a must for all military libraries, borders on being an understatement. One also hopes that once in such libraries, the volumes will not remain purely as decoration. Folks other than the armoured corps alone, would be well advised to drop their own regimental histories for the time being and read something about an arm which, if not Queen of the Battlefield, is at least the senior Prince Consort.

NAVY

Admiralty Brief by Edward Terrell, O.B.E., Q.C., (ex-Captain R.N.V.R.). (George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd.). 240 pages. Price 21sh.

This book narrates in a very pleasant style the trials and tribulation of a body of scientifically minded personnel called upon during the last war and given commissions in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve for the purpose of dealing with certain problems connected with the defence of allied convoys against enemy, air and submarine attacks. The teething troubles and the red tape this organisation had to face during the period 1940 till the achievement of ultimate victory by the allies are also brought forward very humourously in this publication.

The earlier chapters of this book mainly deal with as to how the idea of the Plastic Armour was conceived by the author and how eventually after successful tests, arrangements were made for the fitting up of this armour in all allied merchant ships and certain vehicles used by the Army and the Air Force. The details regarding experiments carried out by the Admiralty for the elimination of funnel smoke from both coal and oil burning ships, Captain Terrell's visits to the United States and Canada in this connection and his achievements in the production of suitable documentary films on the Oerlikon gun etc. are elucidated in the later chapters.

This book time and again emphasises the difficulties experienced in the acceptance of an idea or the production of a new equipment even in times of great national emergency owing to inter-ministry, inter-service and inter-departmental rivalries. The study of this book in view of the above, will be of good value to all personnel connected with such organisations employed in work of national importance.

N.

AIR

Air War Against Japan, 1943-1945 by George Odgers (Volume II of Series 2 (Air) of "Australia in the War of 1939-1945"). Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1957. 533 pages. Price 25sh.

The Second World War was a war between coalitions. The most successfully organized coalition won the war. After the war ended, the members of the victorious coalition have, naturally, tended to look back on it more from an individual national point of view than from the perspective of the original coalition. Each has spared no pains to record in the greatest detail the operations and achievements of its own forces in the form of official and semi-official histories. The most gigantic output in this field has inevitably been from the United States of America. Other nations, including India, have obeyed a similar urge to a necessarily more limited degree. Australia's effort consists of 22 volumes of official chronicle. The book under review is one of nine which had been published by 1957.

George Odgers' story is of course incomplete without the previous volume which deals with the Royal Australian Air Force from 1939 to 1942. The affairs, problems and vicissitudes of the RAAF before 1943, particularly during the dark days of 1942, would give point and meaning to the story of the last three years of the war. That earlier volume is still awaited. Nevertheless, what we have before us is valuable for itself. Like all official histories, it describes in minute and meticulous detail the activities of individual squadrons and aircrew of the RAAF. To this extent it possesses a very limited interest for non-Australians. But underlying this mass of detail is a fair and constructive presentation of wider issues, such as higher direction and planning, joint command, control and organization, the strategic situations and compulsions that materialized during each phase of the campaign in the Southwest Pacific, the dispositions and needs of Allied ground and naval forces, and the relation of that campaign to the bigger complex of Allied global strategy. Of special interest to the Indian Air Force is the story of how the RAAF was organized, equipped and handled as a very junior partner in a war combination where the U.S.A. exercised overriding authority. A force of little more than 48 squadrons was, in the words of the epilogue to the book, "directed by an American air corps general who kept his own Fifth Air Force concentrated and used the Australian squadrons on his flanks...and on anti-submarine operations around the Australian coast." The problems of getting aircraft and manpower, in a situation where the Casablanca directive, the small Australian population and American preoccupations militated against making Australian air power really effective, were solved admirably in a way which merits study by other air forces which are today faced with similar problems in a different context.

In a world inundated with books about the last war, some books inevitably emerge as classics. The book under review is by no means a classic. But it is well done in its chosen field, and is useful for that essential activity in all constructive historical study, namely, looking at past events from as many different points of view as possible.

P.T.C.S.

Three Steps to Victory by Sir Robert Watson-Watt. (Odhams Press, London), 1957. 480 pages. Price 30s.

At last the full authentic story, told by the one man with complete authority to tell it. It is a grand story, entirely absorbing, incomparably rich, vitally significant; a unique heart-warming story; a story which every one who ventures to engage in affairs of state would do well to read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest.

We servicemen of the present generation are the inheritors and the exponents of the doctrine that air power dominates any meaningful waging of war. Airmen think of air power as an independent instrument of war which can be wielded without reference to the operations of armies or navies; soldiers and

sailors prefer to regard it as really ancillary to the requirements and objectives of the senior services. Whichever philosophy is adopted, there is no doubt whatever that without radar there can be no air power. Radar, in fact, is a categorical imperative for all three services. The man best fitted to write its history is he who brought it into being and made it the effective technique which it became in the Second World War.

Sir Robert Watson-Watt's narrative is an autobiography and yet very much more than just that. In the first sentences of his foreword: "This book began as the autobiography of one whom I believe to be a very human being. It has relentlessly forced itself toward the shape of a biography... of a system... I of I a group of technological devices which became useful only when human beings were so deployed as to make, of the inanimate devices and their animate users, a vitally integrated operational-technical system. In fact, the autobiography is primarily a background, an accompaniment, to the biographical composition. Perhaps no other man's life-story offers so completely integral a unity between the man and his achievement.

The "three steps to victory" were the Instantaneous Visual Radio Direction Finder; Radar; and Operational Research (now a varied and specialized science called Operations Research). There was another "half-step", namely, VHF R/T, without which the use of radar in air defence would have been futile. Any one of these "steps" would have been enough to make a man's reputation; to have been responsible for all three-and-a-half is an achievement of almost unequalled magnitude.

It would be futile to attempt a summary of a story which sweeps from 1892 to 1951 with a force, pace, and scope which leave one enthralled, an assembly of detail that is simply astonishing in its variety and minuteness, and a style that is intensely individual, sometimes bewildering, but always irresistible. A string of quotations from sources as varied as the Bible, Milton, Doenitz and the Duke of Wellington set the tone of the book. The author's ancestry, birth and academic career are described in a manner at once startlingly original and extremely effective. Without unnecessary delay he launches out on the radar saga, and once he gets going to saga unfolds majestically. There are diversions, reminiscences, switchbacks, forward leaps, but the main theme never gets out of control. The wealth of technical data, figures, calculations and quotations belie the author's confession in one place that he has a poor memory. He does not suffer from false modesty or from unjustifiable conceit; for example, he classes himself as a much better experimental physicist, but a much worse theoretical physicist, than E. V. Appleton and his colleagues. He is outspoken but never vindictive in his criticisms. Even Churchill, whom he reveres as his master, comes in for stricture now and then. His gift for lucid exposition is quite unrivalled in this reviewer's experience, and the appendix to the book, which is a reprint of his original paper on radiolocation, must, together with its "translation" into plain language in Chapter 16, be made compulsory reading

for all staff officers. Another admirable chapter is on "The Natural History of the Boffin", which is as good a definition of the nature of Operations Research which can be found anywhere. Many such jewels are strewn throughout the book. Of special importance is the account of the laboriously-contrived but ultimately successful marriage between the scientists, the service staff and the civil service luminaries which produced the very varied brood of radar devices that helped win the last war. And, at the end, is the sad and almost sordid story of how Watson-Watt and his associates were driven to squeeze from the Royal Commission on Awards the monetary prizes for their inventions as substitutes for the less tangible but more satisfying forms of recognition they would have preferred.

No service officer who claims any professional competence or any capacity for original and imaginative thinking can afford not to read this extraordinarily fascinating and rewarding book.

P.T.C.S.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

South-East Asia Among the World Powers by Amry Vandenbosh and Richard A. Butwell (University of Kentucky Press, Lexington), 1958, 360 pages. Price \$6.

South of 'Communist' China and east of 'Neutralist' India lies South-east Asia—"yet another theatre in the world-wide conflict between communism and democracy." It is chiefly, if not indeed entirely, in this context that the two authors have set themselves the task of presenting an up-to-date ("with supplementary material on recent developments to mid-1958") though by no means a very exhaustive survey of this region. Apart from drawing on their own published writings, which in the case of Professor Vandenbosh are relatively better-known, the authors claim the additional advantage of having travelled recently in South-east Asia. And what is the end-product?

The plan of the work is rather simple. The first chapter, mainly introductory in nature, essays to examine what is called the "*contemporary power vacuum*" in this area against the background of its strategic significance, its relationship with the Western bloc of nations as well as the Eastern world of Red China, with the Russian Colossus lurking in the not-too-distant background. The fact that the region is a power vacuum "of rather sizeable proportions" has varied ramifications: stability has been lost and yielded place to turmoil, there has been relentless (population) pressure from adjacent lands—China and India, a continuing division of the area into a multiplicity of small political units, its chronic economic inadequacy. This broad survey is followed by individual chapters on Indonesia, '*the restless insular empire*', the Philippines, '*the showcase of Western democracy*', Indo-China, '*the gateway to South-east Asia*', Thailand, '*diplomatic and political phenomenon*', Malaya, '*a problem in nation-building*', and Burma, '*a land of contradictions*'. There is a penultimate chapter on the international relations of South-east Asia and a final one on American policy in this region.

However sound and logical it may sound in theory, this breakdown does offer a good deal of scope for overlapping and avoidable repetition. This is particularly so in the first and the last two chapters where the area (1,165,000 square miles) and the population (170 millions) figures alone are repeated at least half a dozen times, nearly every time there is talk of S-EATO's import, of the Free World stake, and the threats, both direct and indirect, posed by the Communist bloc of nations. It would appear to this reviewer that these three chapters could very conveniently be compressed into one, or at best two, for the facts, the chief line of argument, the broad scope of reference and the conclusions drawn seem to cover very much the same ground. Two instances, rather typical, may be cited:

"The economic backwardness of South-east Asia was one of the conditions which made western domination of the area possible. . . . South-east Asia's continued dangerous reliance on foreign purchases of its products and its crying need for capital to effect a change in this situation both afford excellent opportunities for the extension of foreign control over these countries. It may well be that South-east Asia does not possess sufficient economic strength for independent political survival—except at the sufferance of the big Powers or because of rivalries among these powers. . . ." (p. 25).

Towards the fag-end we read again in a somewhat similar strain,

"A politically low-pressure area historically . . . South-east Asia today would seem to have a major task before it if it is to avoid falling once more under foreign control. A power vacuum as a consequence of the withdrawal of the western colonial powers, the region seems unable to invoke at the present time the sort of unity which might prevent outside interference. It ignores closer regional collaboration preferring to seek the protection of bigger Powers—which may well prove to be the key to its survival as an area of independent states, but which also could be the beginning of a new era of external domination." (p. 282).

A book of this nature suffers from some serious limitations. Being topical and written with a marked abundance of journalistic clichés and well worn-out phrases,* rather than scholarly precision, it has an unfortunate tendency to date very soon. For obvious reasons developments in a rapidly changing, an extremely dynamic situation, lead to a process of continuous flux in the juxtaposition of forces and hence in thinking, in presentation and, inevitably, in the conclusion drawn. Another very unhappy tendency is the synoptic, almost summary treatment of the historical evolution of the various countries in the region. Thus in the chapter on Thailand, or for that matter Indo-China, the subject-matter prior to the 20th century is dismissed in a page or two. This detracts from the general usefulness of the work and takes away the historical perspective so essential to a proper understanding. Another equally regrettable feature is that of resorting to lengthy quotations from the speeches or writings of various persons, some undoubtedly important, others not quite so. Thus while one could accept a few words of direct citation from President Roxas of the Philippines or Sukarno of Indonesia, abstracts

* There are some odd expressions, "orthodox Islamism" (p. 46), "nutritional density per square miles of cultivated rice land" (p. 287), to mention only two, picked at random.

from the reports of Everett Case of Colgate University or Raymond Fosdick of the Rockefeller Foundation or even Ambassador Mukarto Notowidigdo (or Indonesia) addressing a New York Chamber of Commerce jar and are not always quite germane to the subject-matter. In the final analysis they leave the impression that the authors have not properly assimilated or digested their material, that the work has the imprint of a hurried composition.

Two helpful things, and it is pleasant to record them, are that the book reads well for the interest is sustained for most part and that there is a useful, though select, bibliography at the end.

P.L.M.

The Far East by Fred Greene. (Rinehart & Co. Inc., New York), pages 589. Price \$8.

The Far East is one of the most crucially important regions of the world today—it is likely to be even more so in the quarter of a century ahead. This importance derives largely from the fact that one of the world's great powers, potentially, perhaps, the greatest, lies in this part of the globe. Not that as compared to China, Japan or India, or for that matter Indonesia, are of less moment. But perhaps the two most significant facts about China are its huge population mass and the breath-taking speed at which economic development in that country is proceeding. For the China of 650 millions in an emergent power, developing at an unparalleled pace. In a decade it may have the strength to prosecute its own policy within the existing international system; in another two, depending on U.S. and Soviet progress, it may be able to upset the system altogether.

Another major fact that lends import to this region is the great industrial and technical advance which Japan has registered despite her serious debacle in World War II, and since the rapid strides India has taken in the industrial field. There could be little doubt that within the next decade New Delhi will rank as one of the world's great powers and, along with Japan, compare in stature to Great Britain and France, if not indeed to the other two giants.

A crucial question that is of historic significance in any discussion of the Far East is the varying response which China and Japan gave to the great industrial and cultural impact of the West in the 19th century. Thus whereas the Japanese, since Commodore Parry's opening, took increasingly to Western ways of thought, organization, scientific and technical advancement, the Middle Kingdom seemed to shut itself in after the Opium Wars and the disasters which followed in its wake—the unequal treaties, the extra-territorial rights, the *Tai'ping* rebellion, the *Boxer uprising* and the Revolution of 1911. It was this divergence in the reaction which these two great nations of the east offered to the Western onslaught, that the story of the first half of the 20th century should be studied. The history of the lesser countries, to a very large extent, may be regarded as variations on this basic theme.

In the volume under review here, it is difficult to be struck by anything out of the normal, or routine hash, which an average textbook on the Far East would offer. The study begins with two introductory chapters giving an outline of the political and economic setting to what is called Asia and then plunges headlong into an individual treatment of the different countries. A major lacunae, perhaps inevitable in a work of this nature, is the brief capsule-like sum-up of large areas, or long-term historical phenomena. The result is that things appear to be slightly out of focus and there is a vague, somewhat misleading generalisation, of which two instances may be mentioned here as typical.

"Yet, even with competing groups overlapping authorities, and a wide degrees of autonomy, it is a serious misreading of Asian politics to describe it as a breeding-ground for democratic pluralism. There was no idea of popular responsibility, rooted in individual initiative and decision-making." (Page 8).

"The Indian struggle for freedom after 1900 proved to be one of the most spectacular mass movements of political nationalism." (Page 343).

There are also some rather unhappy mis-statements of fact. Thus in a map of India (page 377) Karnataka takes the place of what should be the State of Mysore, Sikkim is not shown while Bhutan appears as if it were on the same footing (vis-a-vis New Delhi) as Nepal, which it evidently is not. Again, the term 'Federal District' for Delhi, as for Andaman and Nicobar islands is likely to be somewhat misleading. For, unlike the Federal District of Columbia, the Centrally administered areas (there are 6 of them viz., Delhi Andamans and Nicobar islands, Manipur, Tripura, Himachal Pradesh and Laccadive, Minicoy and Amin-divi islands) are represented in the Union Parliament in New Delhi. Again, the Front-end-paper map of 'East Asia in 1957' shows Hankow; actually, the three cities of Hankow, Wuchan and Hanyang were merged into one, the new steel centre of Wuhan in that very year. On page 486 it is D.G.E. (and not D.G.C.) Hall. A bibliography for Ceylon is offered on page 411; there is, however, no treatment as such of this country except a bare mention of its name on pages 33 and 547 of the text.

But such criticisms as these are descriptive, not censorious. What the reviewer regards as of major emphasis is an unhappy tendency for a multiplicity of books of this nature. Considering that some excellent textbooks on the Far East by well-known authorities—G. F. Hudson, Harold M. Vinacke and K. S. Latourette,* to mention only a few—exist, one is often left wondering why more printing presses should be busy producing works which are, at best, second rate. For, the only saving grace about the volume under review is what the author claims to be a slight novelty in its treatment viz., instead of following a close chronological pattern, Professor Greene considers each country in its turn. Would

* G. F. Hudson, *The Far East in World Politics*, 2nd Edn. (Oxford, 1939).

Harold M. Vinacke, *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, 5th Edn. (New York, 1950).

K. S. Latourette, *A Short History of the Far East*, Rev. Edition (New York, 1951).

that alone, one may ask, be an adequate argument for bringing out a new (text) book on this area?

P.L.M.

The Double Patriots—A Study Of Japanese Nationalism by Richard Storry. (Chatto and Windus, London), 1957. 335 pages. Price 25s.

The book is a treatment of Japanese nationalism and jingoism between 1931 and 1941 but is concerned almost entirely with the ideas, events and tendencies in the political rather than the economic field. The two principal sources for the preparation of this book are the Transcript and Exhibits of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and the *Saionji-Harada* Memoirs.

The roots of this ultra nationalism of the Japanese were loyalty to the Imperial Throne, belief in a heavenly ordained mission to acquire an empire overseas and the idea that individual Japanese had a capacity for intuitive virtue. These three elements constituted the essential national character or *Kokutai* which was fundamental and permanent. This chauvinism exhibited itself in numerous extremist organisations which erupted after 1920 owing to the failure of the Versailles Conference, to secure the inclusion of racial equality clause in the League Covenant, the termination by Great Britain of her Alliance with Japan, the Nine Power Treaty and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. By 1936 there were nearly 750 nationalist associations. Some of these were, the *Dai Nippon Kokusinkai*, the *Dai Nippon Seigidan*, the *Kinno Remmei*, the *Roninkai*, the *Kokuhonsha* etc. An outstanding figure in this ultra nationalist movement was *Kita Ikki*. Terrorist cliques were also formed within these associations but till 1931 military participation in nationalist terrorist activities seemed no more than a transient symptom of discontent of a few socially dissatisfied and economically harassed junior officers.

The Manchurian Incident, and the assassinations of 1932 were the work of young army officers of ultra nationalist views and so was the China Incident 1937 and the Axis-Japan alliance 1940. The extremely important and interesting plans for the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere were drafted in 1940. The emphasis throughout the nationalist movement, with a probable exception was on foreign rather than on domestic affairs although the latter sometimes provided the initial impetus behind particular manifestations of the movement. There are valuable Appendices on some Societies and their Leading Personalities, Plans for the New Order in East Asia and the South Seas, and a chart of leading Nationalist Societies.

K.G.

Islam And The Arabs by Rom Landan. (George Allen and Unwin, London), 299 pages. Price 30sh.

Dr. Rom Landan's book is one which can be unreservedly recommended to those who, having some background knowledge of the Arabs and Islam, wish to acquire a sound, if not detailed knowledge of these subjects. The title is a little

misleading for it does not deal, as may be supposed with the impact of Islam on the Arabs or vice versa, but is actually two separate books, one dealing with the history of the Arab peoples of West Asia and North Africa and the other separately with Islamic culture under such headings as *Literature, The Arts, Philosophy* and so on.

The historical section on the Arabs while adequate lacks the sweep of either Hitti's *Short History of the Arabs* or Edward Atiyah's Penguin volume on *The Arabs*. It is a clear, straightforward account which is particularly useful because of the attention paid to the Arabs of North Africa, whom writers on Arab history tend to overlook. Here Dr. Landan gives much more space to Moroccan events which greatly outweigh those in Tunisia and Algeria but one must expect this because of Landan's long devotion to Morocco and the cause of Moroccan independence.

The second section, on Islamic culture, is better done than the historical part and gives concise but comprehensive surveys of various aspects of that culture: something which has not often been attempted on a small canvas which makes this successful effort doubly useful. The chapters on *The Sharia* and *The Sciences* are especially good.

As a work meant for students Dr. Landan gives at the end of each chapter such things as chronological tables, a selected bibliography and a summing up of the contents of the chapter. There is also a compendious bibliography at the end of the volume. These make the volume useful as a reference book in addition to its being a brief but scholarly exposition of its dual subject.

The Use Of Force In International Relations by Dr. A. Appadorai. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay), 124 pages. Price 5.75 nP.

The Great Powers by Max Beloff. (George Allen and Unwin, London), 240 pages. Price 20s.

A perusal of these two books both by Professors—raises the question: should Professors reprint their lectures and occasional essays in book form? In the case of Dr. Appadorai the answer would be 'no', in the case of Dr. Beloff 'perhaps'. For what such books tend to lack is a clear and consistent pattern of thought or line of argument. This deficiency is the more surprising and disappointing in the case of Dr. Appadorai's book since it embodies 3 lectures delivered to Calcutta University which were part of a single exposition and which try to provide an answer to the urgent and easily understandable question. Is peace possible in world today? Unfortunately, despite this clear intellectual objective Dr. Appadorai gets so bogged down in a bewildering profession of quotations and references to authorities that it is nearly impossible to follow the development of the argument or to discover whether the learned Doctor has any opinions of his own to offer. As a matter of fact he does, and has some far-reaching proposals to make, as one discovers on reading the summary of his book which he obligingly offers in its final four pages.

Perhaps these should have been printed as the first four pages in which they would have served as a map through the tangled undergrowth of Dr. Appadorai's compendious reading.

Dr. Beloff is much more a master of his material; for though he, too, has recourse to quotation and footnote the scheme of his book and the pattern of his ideas are reasonably clear. He makes his three points with a modicum of lucidity: that History,—the study of the past,—has its limitations as a key to understanding the present and future. That federalism as a form of political organisation is useful but probably over-rated, and that U.S. foreign policy is hampered by its devotion to ideas—such as anti-colonialism (As a defender of colonialism Dr. Beloff by now must be something of an intellectual freak).

But what makes Dr. Beloff's book really interesting is the study it offers in the conflict between personal prejudice and scholarly detachment and objectivity. Even from his introduction it is clear that Dr. Beloff is an enthusiastic Zionist Jew and in many of his essays he emerges as an unrepentant apologist for the government of Israel. He goes so far as to write of "the alleged Israeli 'aggression' on Egypt", ignoring a rear-unanimous note of the General Assembly condemning it as aggression. A good deal of his sourness with recent U.S. Foreign Policy is due to his belief that the U.S.A. let Israel down on the Suez crisis. It is astonishing and alarming that politics-racial partisanship of the Zionist brand can so completely cloud the judgement and the conscience of a scholar of international standing like Dr. Beloff. Thus his book serves as a warning and an abject lesson of what should not happen to Professors rather than as a source of ideas on the subjects actually dealt with.

The Commonwealth in the World by J. D. B. Miller, (Gerald Duckworth and Co.), 308 pages. Price 25s.

Though the author explains that his book is about the Commonwealth of Nations in the world of sovereign states, the theme as it develops concerns mainly the sovereign members of the Commonwealth among the nations of the world. Tracing the development of the Commonwealth idea from the Imperial Conference of 1907 when the Dominions were provided with a common platform, Prof. Miller traverses the successive stages from the Balfour Declaration and the Statutes of Westminster down to the Prime Ministers' Conference in 1948 when the age-old adjective, British, increasingly anomalous with the advent of the new Dominions, was tacitly dropped and the final communique referred merely to "the Commonwealth". A further stage was reached in the following year when the Prime Ministers decided that it would be possible for India to become a republic and still remain in the Commonwealth. The author then briefly outlines the different attitudes adopted by each of the Commonwealth countries in the sphere of external relations. His examination only emphasises the difficulty of classifying these attitudes into any set pattern. Thus while it is generally true that the former colonies of settlement have gone into the anti-communist bloc and the former colonies of administration into the neutral zone, Pakistan and Malaya do not con-

form to the latter grouping. Similarly, most of the countries in the former group are in military alliance with the USA, but South Africa forms an exception. Two Asian members, India and Ceylon have accepted economic aid from both blocs.

Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the Commonwealth is a reality though one which eludes definition. If membership of the Sterling Area and the benefits of the Colombo Plan are cited as advantages, then these are also open to countries outside the Commonwealth such as Burma. Prof. Miller indeed makes the somewhat subtle point that to the extent that there is any kind of direction and control of the Sterling Area, the only possible source is the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which thus confers a special advantage on member countries. But whether this advantage amounts to very much in actual practice must remain doubtful. Prof. Miller's opinion that Commonwealth membership has provided a wider platform and greater authority to Mr. Nehru to speak to the free world will certainly not be shared by many detached observers. On the other hand, the author admits that India's contacts with China were of use to Britain and the Commonwealth at a crucial time. Again, while the author rightly emphasizes the importance of the machinery of consultation which the Commonwealth offers, he admits that the machinery broke down in the case of the Suez incident. Nor can it be said that the connecting Commonwealth link derives from adherence to democratic ideals and the rule of law, for Pakistan constitutes an obvious exception. Perphas the only true link, as the author himself has pointed out, is the fact that the forces which shape opinion and wield power in all these countries are derived from a British-educated elite, by the survivors of the independence movements and their followers. How much of the Commonwealth idea will remain when these have disappeared from the scene must now remain largely a matter of conjecture.

K.

INDIA

Pilot Project—India by Mayor Albert & Others. (Oxford University Press), 1959, 365 pages. Price Rs. 20|-.

About the Etawah project, the subject of this book, it is said in the preface: "*What the Tennessee Valley Authority is to the integrated exploitation of the world's great water sheds, thus the Etawah project has fast become to the movement for revitalizing the ways of life of the world's peasantry*". With this description many may not agree, but the great importance of this rural development project in U.P. conducted by a group of Americans was not to be ignored. To some extent, our entire community projects programme was based on the experiences at *Etawah* as also on the earlier experiments like the one in *Gurgaon* in British days.

This is a narrative of the *Etawah* project which may be useful in different ways to the different people—Sociologists, economists, administrators and public men. By and large, however, this detailed account of the practical experiences of rural development work in a State of India will be considered indispensable by those who are concerned with this subject more directly in the Governments of

undeveloped countries. One specially important chapter of the book relates to "inner democratisation" dealing with the problems of inculcating a sense of participation among the lowest of the workers. From this interesting lessons can be drawn. One of the first such lesson is, as the authors have mentioned, that "we tend to honour it as a theory. We do not always do as well in practice as we should."

The book is largely based on notes and correspondence and memoranda on the various problems faced at *Etawah* and sometimes may appear discursive to readers habituated with more direct and methodical treatment of details. This, however, does not detract one from the total impact the book creates that rural development work to be meaningful in a country like ours "*must include provisions for fundamental awakening and alerting.*" Whether such awakening can be brought about without total reorganisation of the village social structure is a question which has not been even probed at *Etawah*; the accumulated experience of India's Government, however, seem to point to the urgency of this as is evident from the recent resolve to cooperative agriculture.

S.G.

Party Politics in India by Myron Weiner. (Princeton University), 319 pages. Price \$5.00.

Objective studies of Indian politics are few; studies in political behaviour are even fewer. In fact, Myron Weiner's is the first attempt, in a way, to analyse the bases of party rivalries in India and the causes of the development of a multi-party system largely concentrating on the public life of West Bengal, where multiplicity of parties is at its worst form, the American scholar has attempted some generalisations about Indian politics, which would not be easily brushed aside as irrelevant by those having intimate knowledge of other areas. The factors which are typically West Bengali have not been allowed—it must be said to Myron Weiner's credit—to cloud his vision.

The multiplicity of parties in India and sometimes the creation and maintenance of insignificant groups with ambitious plans for power are not explicable by the usually cited reason of the electoral system; the Indian system of the simple majority and single ballot is known to be helping the growth of two party politics. Yet in the first Indian Parliament elected by direct adult franchise there were representative of twenty three parties, in the State Assemblies fifty parties had one or more members. There are many parties who did not have any representative but the parties did not liquidate themselves for that reason. In analysing the causes, Prof. Weiner has therefore looked for certain basic sociological factors. One of the conclusions is that the recruitment to party membership itself contains seeds of party splits and rifts and of factional politics. All Indian parties recruit largely from the urban middle classes, of this class, one characteristic is that they face a breakdown of the traditional order and have a party or a faction appear to be a substitute for the joint family. The emotional need which parties satisfy necessitates their separate existence even when ideological differences are not very serious. This also leads to factionalism in parties

and splits among ideologically like-minded groups.

There are ideological divergences also which sometimes prove insuperable; for example, between the secular and non-secular groups in Indian politics, between those who believe in parliamentary democracy and those who do not—there is no meeting ground. But the splits among the Indian socialists, for example, or the existence of dozens of Marxist parties in West Bengal have to be explained differently and Weiner is not probably wide off the mark when he draws attention to the very fundamental factors of leadership, recruitment etc.

In suggesting specific remedies for the situation, Weiner has entered a much more controversial grounds, particularly in pinning his hopes on the emergence of a system in which the Congress and the Socialists would be the two major parties in which many other small parties would merge. If there are two parties in India whose programmes are identical and between whom the lines are thin, they are the Congress and the Socialists (i.e. the two or three groups in which they function; in fact, the movement of the Congress towards the left has made Indian Socialism largely redundant. The point which Weiner, has not, perhaps, given its due weight is that in a country where the socio-economic problems are so great and tasks so vast, the appeal of a relatively extremist group cannot be easily ended. The Indian electorate for a long time to come may not like the British or the American, confine its choice between two parties with largely similar policies.

One hopeful aspect of this problem which the Professor does not seem to have emphasized sufficiently is that as the country gets more and more experienced with the Democratic ways, the small insignificant group may tend to lose its identity in politics. Of the list of parties represented in the *Lok Sabha* given on page 225, at least four have ceased to exist. The present trend in the *Lok Sabha* is also of merger and not split; even the Independents want to sit in blocs.

In studying Indian party politics two entirely different factors have to be gone into: One is the base of party rivalries and the nature of party politics. This Weiner has done remarkably well and at the point of time in which he wrote his thesis certainly the factors he mentioned were of great importance. But another factor is the economic challenge which India faces and the impact it may have on politics in India. Weiner has not even touched this in brief. Parties do not function in vacuum and important as the party members and their ways are for their functioning, ultimately those for whose mind they struggle—the people of India—have a more decisive impact. A political education of the ordinary voter grows, so does his ability to choose and when he comes to exercise his choice, he will be less kind to parties which serve no ends. In a backward country, as ours, there are two stages before the electorate grows to be fully conscious; the first is of political apathy and the second of impatience. The middle class domination of politics from which follows the present multiplicity is largely a feature of the first stage. Probably we are getting into the second.

SERVICES NOTES

GENERAL

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

A Conference on Operational Research, inaugurated by Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Minister of Defence, was held, at the National Physical Laboratory under the auspices of the Research and Development Organisation of the Defence Ministry on March 19, 20 and 21. Sixteen papers covering diverse fields like production and inventory control, efficiency of different weapons, human physiology and psychology under abnormal conditions, and storage and packing of equipment, both for defence and non-military organisations, were discussed.

NEW RESEARCH CENTRE

The Government of India have decided to open a research centre for isotopic medical research in the Defence Science Laboratory at Delhi. The clinical part will be carried out at the Armed Forces Medical College, Poona. Some work in the use of radio-active Vitamin B¹² has already been done in collaboration with the National Chemical Laboratory, Poona.

UN EMERGENCY FORCE

Soldiers of the U.N. Emergency Force serving on the Egypt-Israel border have contributed £811 (Egyptian) to the UNRWA for the benefit of Palestine refugee children. The money was collected on a voluntary basis during the Christmas and New Year celebrations.

NATIONAL CADET CORPS

The 14th meeting of the Central Advisory Committee of the N.C.C. held on March 30 reviewed the progress of the National Cadet Corps organisation. The total strength of the Corps was 1,92,253 at the end of 1958 of which officers alone comprised 5,000. In the Senior Division three technical units—one armoured, one engineer and one E.M.E.—were added during the year while the conversion of two existing engineering platoons in the Roorkee University into an engineer battalion was sanctioned. Two more naval units were also raised during the year, one each in Madhya Pradesh and Punjab. There was a large expansion of the Junior Division in several States, the total increase being 203 Army Wing troops, 29 Naval Wing troops and 23 Air Wing troops. According to the report on the progress of the N.C.C., while expansion totalling 1.21 lakhs cadets was proposed by the States for the year 1958-59 there was an increase of only 47,160 cadets up to December 31, 1958.

An N.C.C. Rally was held at the I.A.F. Sports Ground, Safdar-jang, on January 27. The Prime Minister took the salute at the ceremonial parade. Six foreign cadets from the U.K., Ceylon and Ghana had been invited by the Government of India to attend the Republic Day celebrations and participate in the Rally.

ARMY

ARMY DAY PARADE

For the first time, the Prime Minister reviewed the Army Day Parade on the morning of January 15, 1959. The Parade comprised about 2,500 officers and men from all parts of the country and from all arms and services of the Army.

POSTINGS AND PROMOTIONS

The following postings have been approved:

Major-General D. Som Dutt to be DCGS, Major-General Moti Sagar to be DMT, Brigadier Harbaksh Singh to be GOC of an Infantry Division with acting rank of Major-General, Major-General U. C. Dubey to be GOC, U.P. Area vice Major-General Jai Singh and Major-General P. N. Kirpal, GOC, Bombay Area, to be Chief of Indian Military Mission, Nepal.

Major-General E. Habibullah has taken over as Deputy GOC of the Malayan Federation Army.

The undermentioned officers have been promoted to the rank of Major-Generals:

Brigadier A. S. Pathania, MVC, Brigadier H. C. Badhawar, Brigadier P. C. Gupta, MC, Brigadier M. S. Pathania, Brigadier D. C. Misra, MC, Brigadier C. G. Bewoor and Brigadier R. S. Paintal.

Brigadier B. D. Kapur, Chief Controller, Research and Development Organisation, Ministry of Defence, has been promoted to the acting rank of Major-General in his present appointment.

PERMANENT COMMISSIONS IN A.M.C.

As many as 225 medical officers, including women medical officers holding short-service regular commissions, are to be granted permanent regular commission as a result of a recent decision of the Government of India.

ORDNANCE OFFICERS CONFERENCE

The annual senior Ordnance Corps Officers' Conference was held from January 19 to 24, 1959. The conference reviewed the progress made recently in the production and procurement of defence stores. Lieut.-General L. P. Sen, addressing the conference, laid emphasis on the need for greater indigenous production of defence stores and equipment in view of the acute shortage of foreign exchange.

MEDICAL CORPS REUNION

The Army Medical Corps celebrated its first reunion at the Corps Training Centre in Lucknow in the first week of March. Over 300 pensioners, including 50 retired officers from all over the country, took part in the four-day reunion. Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Drummond, Director-General of Medical Services, War Office, and Brigadier Dame Monica Johnson, Director of the Military Nursing Services in the U.K., attended as special invitees.

ARMY ENGINEERS CELEBRATE CORPS DAY

The Corps of Engineers celebrated its 11th annual Corps Day on January 28, 1959. Greetings were exchanged between the units and formations of the Corps of Engineers of the Indian Army and the Engineer-in-Chief, War Office, London, the Royal Canadian Engineers, the Royal Australian Engineers and the Royal New Zealand Engineers.

NAVY

ESCORT FOR MARSHAL TITO

The Hunt-class Destroyer Squadron, comprising *Godavari*, *Gomati* and *Ganga*, had the proud privilege to escort the Yugoslav President, Marshal Tito when he arrived in Madras on January 13, 1959, by his Yacht the *Galeb*.

The accompanying Yugoslav ships and their companies were given warm reception.

HONORARY COMMISSIONED RANKS

On the occasion of the Republic Day, 1959, the following Chief Petty Officers, who were on the retired list, were granted the honorary rank of commissioned officers:

Ahmed Ibrahim	Chief Petty Officer O.No. 1991
Sk. Mohd Jamaluddin	Chief Petty Officer O.No. 2143 [Cook (S)]
Mohd Bawa	Chief Petty Officer O.No. 2005

As a special case, Senior Commissioned Engineer Officer Abdul Rasak, who is still on the active list, has been granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant.

DEPUTY NAVAL CHIEF UPGRADED

With the appointment of the Dy. Chief of the Naval Staff being raised to the rank of Rear-Admiral, Commodore A. K. Chatterji was granted the Acting Rank of Rear-Admiral w.e.f. March 6, 1959.

BRITISH MINISTER OF SUPPLY

Mr. Aubrey Jones, British Minister of Supply, visited the various technical schools of INS *Venduruthy* and *Garuda* at Cochin on March 29. Later, the Minister and his party were given a reception at the Naval Base.

AIR FORCE

26TH ANNIVERSARY

The Indian Air Force celebrated its twenty-sixth anniversary on April 1, 1959. Completion of the first phase of its re-equipment programme and satisfactory headway in the second phase of stabilisation and strengthening of its newly-acquired all-jet structure have been the main features of the progressive growth of the Air Force during the last year.

PRESIDENT VISITS PALAM

The President, Dr. Rajendra Prasad formally inspected the Air Force Station at Palam on February 10, 1959. Dr. Rajendra Prasad spent over an hour going round an impressive static display of different types of equipment and aircraft used by the Air Force. The President also visited some of the welfare centres run by the Station for its airmen, civilian employees and their families, including the children's school.

FIRST 4-SEATER AIRCRAFT

A multi-purpose light-communication aircraft which happens to be the first four-seater aeroplane to be built in India, has been designed, developed and built at the Research and Development Centre of the IAF Maintenance Command at Kanpur. Its chief designer is Air Commodore, now Air Vice-Marshal Harjinder Singh, who also successfully test-flew it.

Air Force technicians have also been able to recondition a large number of war-time condemned and rejected auto-refuellers (Bowzers) at Avadi. This has saved several lakhs of rupees in foreign exchange.

AIR COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

A five-day conference of the Air Force Commanders was held at Air Headquarters from February 24, 1959. Matters relating to organisation and administration, training and maintenance were discussed at the Conference.

AERO-MEDICAL SOCIETY

The sixth annual session of the IAF Aero-Medical Society was held in Delhi on February 21. The Society was formed six years ago. Though relatively a new branch of science, aviation medicine has taken deep roots in the country and many scientists have offered to help the Society in solving the problems related to high-altitude and high-speed flying. Prof. J. B. S. Haldane, who addressed the meeting, laid great stress on the necessity of the scientists exposing his own person to all physiological risks in carrying out experiments and in solving problems.

IAF OFFICER FOR GHANA

The services of Air Commodore Kanwar Jaswant Singh have been loaned to the Government of Ghana. The Commodore was last Air Officer Commanding of the Training Command in Bangalore.

U.K. AIR CHIEF IN DELHI

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Dermot A. Boyle, Britain's Chief of the Air Staff, on a 20,000-mile inspection tour of RAF units overseas, stayed for one day in the Capital.

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KASHMIR HOUSE,
NEW DELHI.**

CORRESPONDENCE

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To the Editor of the U.S.I. Journal

SHOULDER BELT PLATE WITH THREE BATTLE HONOURS

Sir,—Please refer to the letter from Major B. S. Oberoi published in your Correspondence column in the October-December 1958 issue No. 373 of your Journal.

Meeanee tops the list of Battle Honours won by the *Scinde Horse*. I do not find any reason for omitting it save that the name of the *Sinde Irregular Horse* was not given on p. 116 of MacMunn's "*Vignettes from Indian Wars*". I, therefore, thank Major Oberoi for correcting me and request him kindly to accept my apologies for my oversight.

Recently I got a bi-metal waist plate of *Sinde Irregular Horse* (stampage opposite) whereon six Battle-Honours are found but the only date given is February 17, 1843, which is of *Meeanee*. This goes to prove the importance of this date in



the *Scinde Horse* which, as Major Oberoi says, is celebrated to this day.

16-3-992, Malakpate,
Hyderabad-2.
January 9, 1959.

M. ASHRAF.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF INDIAN NAVAL EXPANSION

Sir,—May I offer some comments on the article on *Strategic Concepts of Indian Naval Expansion* which appeared in the July-September 58 issue of your Journal. In his eagerness to state the case for the Aircraft Carrier the author appears to have very much overstated it. The Carrier has been credited with a speed of 30 knots. *Janes Fighting Ships* for the year 1957-58, however, gives the speed of this class of Carrier as 25 knots. The author has used a speed of 24 (approx.) as the cruising speed of the Carrier in war. This speed will have to come down to 18-20 knots, as War Ships cannot maintain maximum speed for more than a few hours at a stretch. The mobility of the Carrier will be restricted accordingly.

One of the roles that the Navy have been assigned by the author is to assist the Army and Air Force in combined amphibious warfare. A Combined Operation launched across the sea is perhaps the most complicated of the Operations required to be performed in war. This type of operation requires thorough planning during conception to ensure that the three Services are allocated their tasks and understand their implications, followed by a high degree of coordination and cooperation between the Services during execution. All this can only be achieved if these problems are constantly under review in a school established for this type of warfare. We have no such school.

The author has also stated that "all sorts of the most modern aircraft" can be operated from the Carrier. It is a well known fact that because Carrier based planes have to have a strengthened under carriage and other aids for landing on and being catapulted they always find themselves at a disadvantage in speed and manoeuvrability to shore based aircraft. Further, those of us who have served in Carriers know too well that both the number and types of aircraft carried is severely limited. In the type of aircraft Carrier purchased for the Navy the war complement of aircraft will be of the order of thirty six to forty aircraft. This, of course, limits the types of aircraft to be used to three or four. Firstly, strike aircraft for attacks on ships and shore targets. Secondly a light, fast and manoeuvrable aircraft to form the first line of defence of the fleet against air attack. Thirdly, an anti Submarine cum Reconnaissance Aircraft. Should Helicopters be used for Anti-Submarine duties the A/S effectiveness will increase at the cost of reconnaissance which is extremely important as the Command must have at their disposal the most up to date situation. It will be difficult to reduce the numbers of strike and air defence aircraft without sacrificing the very object (to act offensively) for which the Carrier exists.

Due to Carrier based aircraft being inferior in performance to shore based aircraft, Admirals in command of Carriers Task Forces would be well advised to withdraw out of range of shore based aircraft immediately on completion of strikes on land targets.

What has been stated above does not of course detract from the value of having a Carrier. Indeed, the Carrier is as essential to the fleet today as the battleship was in the First World War. However, it is essential that its capabilities be evenly assessed and a balanced view presented or we shall be in danger of losing the Carrier very early in a war.

INS Venduruthy,
Cochin-4.
February 6, 1959.

R. KAUL
Lieutenant, Indian Navy.

THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD MARSHAL MONTGOMERY

Sir,—I have read Colonel Palit's article on "Field Marshal Montgomery's Memoirs" published in your last issue. I entirely agree with him when he writes that the Field Marshal "*have had an aversion against the Indian Army*". In support I will only state the treatment meted out to Fourth Indian Division you have mentioned in the editorial. Firstly, after the battle of Al Alemain this "most experienced" Division was withdrawn from offensive operations on 7 November 1942 and "*entrusted with the salvage of the battlefield*".¹ Brigadier H. K. Dimoline, the Division's Commander Royal Artillery who had not served with Indian troops previously is quoted in the history of the Division to have, at that occasion, written thus:

*"The Army Commander's intention is, I think, to employ Fourth Indian Division in the same manner as the rest of the Indian units in Palestine, Cyprus and Egypt, i.e., as garrison troops, useful fatigue parties for salvage, and as police. It is humiliating that Indian troops should be so regarded and so treated by their Army Commander".*²

General Toker, the Division Commander, felt strongly about this treatment and wrote to his Corps Commander, General Horrocks that "*every one in this Division is feeling most apprehensive as to its future. We know that this theatre of war—the Mediterranean—is becoming a theatre of United Kingdom and American armies. We feel that there is a good chance that we may thus be relegated to some peaceful theatre of war and we feel most strongly that this Division does not deserve such a fate*".³

General Horrocks though forwarded this letter to the Army Commander with very encouraging comments, his staff at 30 Corps HQ advised General Toker that high level decisions militated against the operational employment of his Division" and that this Division was about to be split up once more. General Toker could not accept this decision and "asked to be relieved of his Command"⁴ when "the Army Commander invited him to tea and ended all uncertainties". I am sure there could not be a better proof of the Field Marshal's aversion against Indian troops.

Headquarters Poona Sub Area,
Poona-1.

MAJOR GULCHARAN SINGH.

1. Fourth Indian Division, Page 198.

2. Ibid Page 200

3. Ibid Page 201.

4. Ibid Page 206.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

USI REVISION COURSES FOR 1959

Part 'D' Revision Course

31 students attended Part 'D' two months Revision Course organised at the premises of the Institution during March and April 1959. The next Revision Course for Part 'D' will be held from 17 August to 17 October. The following subjects will be covered :

(a) *Tactics*, (b) *Administration & Morale*, (c) *Military History* —

(N.W. Europe Campaign),

(d) *Current Affairs*, (e) *Military Law*.

Instructions will be in the form of lectures, discussions and correction of compulsory written work. Programme of work will be as under :

<i>Tactics</i>		<i>Other subjects</i>	
<i>Mondays, Tuesdays,</i>	} 1315-1415 hrs	<i>Wednesdays</i>	} 1415-1730 hrs.
<i>Thursdays & Fridays.</i>		<i>Saturdays</i>	

Detailed programme will be issued on 17 August, 1959.

The Course is open to members of the Institution only. A nominal fee of Rs. 15 per subject will be charged. The fees for the whole Course (five subjects) will be Rs. 50 only. Members desirous of attending the Course should send their particulars with the required fees in advance to reach the Secretary before 13 August, 1959.

Staff College Entrance Examination Revision Course

22 officers attended the Staff College Entrance Course during 1958. The next Revision Course will be held from 2nd November to 31st December. The Course will comprise six subjects, *Tactics A*, *Tactics B*, *Administration and Morale*, *Military History* and *Military Law*. Details regarding programme and fees will be published in the next issue of the Journal.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

Although the Institute's year 1959 is now three months old, I regret to say that there are still many members who have not yet paid their subscription which was due on the 1st January last. Could I therefore request all members who have not yet paid their subscription for the current year, to let me have their remittance by return of post.

MEMBERSHIP RECRUITMENT

During 1958, 374 new members joined the Institution as compared to 1957—307. This shows a healthy increase—there is, however, still much work ahead. To accomplish this, we need the active co-operation of all old members in the three Services. Would you, therefore, assist us to strengthen the Institution by enrolling your brother officers as members of the Institution.

NEW MEMBERS

From 1st January to 31st March 1959 the following members joined the Institution :

AGARWAL, 2|Lieut G.N., 20 *Lancers*.

AHLUWALIA, Captain G.S., *A.S.C.*

BAGCHI, Captain O., *The Punjab Regiment*.

BAHADUR, Captain J.

BALA, 2|Lieut. G.S., *The Guards*.

BALARAM, Captain K., *Signals (Life)*.

BALI, 2|Lieut. Y.C., 5 *Gorkha Rifles (FF)*.

BHATTIA, Major M.G., *Artillery*.

BHULLAR, Captain P.S., *The Guards*.

BOKIL, Captain N.K.

CARIAPPA, Flying Officer K.C., *I.A.F.*

CHAKRAVARTI, Captain S.

CHANDA, Flight|Lieut. R.K., *I.A.F.*

CHINYOY, Captain F.P., *E.M.E.*

CHIPPADA, Major S., *Signals*.

DAVID, Captain S.D., *The Assam Regiment*.

DUKE, Major M.A., *E.M.E.*

GORE, 2|Lieut. Y.G., *Signals*.

GOVINDASWAMY, 2|Lieut. C., *E.M.E.*

GURDIP SINGH, Major, *The Sikh Regiment*.

HARCHARAN SINGH, Captain, *E.M.E.*

HARCHARAN SINGH, Captain, *Signals*.

HARINDER PAL SINGH BAJWA, Captain.

JABAR JANG SINGH, Captain, *Artillery*.

KANDHARI, Captain K.

KARIR, 2|Lieut S.C., *Artillery*.

KRISHNAMURTHY, Lieut. E.S., *E.M.S.*

KHANNA, 2|Lieut. R.K., *The Kumaon Regiment*.

KHATTAR, Captain P.P., *A.S.C.*

KOCHHAR, Major S.S.

KUMAR, Lieut. M.M., *Engineers*.

KURAL, 2|Lieut. S.C., *Artillery*.

LABOUCHARDIERE, Captain L.R.

MAIR, 2|Lieut. S.K., *Signals*.

MAJUMDAR, Lieut.-Colonel B.N., *A.S.C.*

MALHOTRA, 2|Lieut. A.K., *A.O.C.*

MATHUR, 2|Lieut. R.G., *The Maratha Light Infantry*.

MATHUR, Captain S., *The Deccan Horse*.

NAJHAWAN, 2|Lieut. D.J., *The Sikh Regiment*.

PARAB, 2|Lieut. G., *The Maratha Light Infantry*.

PREM RATTAN, Captain, *Artillery*.

RAI, Major R.S., *The Garhwal Rifles*.

RAMAN, Lieut. P.N.S., *Engineers*.

RAJ, Captain D.A.S., *A.S.C.*

RAO, Captain M.J.

RASTOGI, Captain S.C., *Engineers*.

SAKATTAR SINGH, Captain, *A.O.C.*

SALDHANA, Major E.A., *Signals*.

SAPRA, Captain J.K., *E.M.E.*

SAXEANA, 2|Lieut. P.N., *The Rajput Regiment*.

SHARMA, Major P.D., *E.M.E.*

SINGHAL, 2|Lieut. V., *Engineers*.

SHIV SINGH, Major, *Artillery*.

SHRIKENT, Captain S.P.S., 9 *Gorkha Rifles*.

SHUKLA, 2|Lieut. P.N., *A.O.C.*

SOM NATH, Captain, *Engineers (Life)*.

SUNDARAM, Captain I.S.

SURAT SINGH, Captain.

TANDON, Captain K.S.

TAPSALL, Flight|Lieut. J., *I.A.F.*

UBEROI, 2|Lieut. P.S., *A.E.C.*

UBEROI, Major S.S., *Engineers*.

UPASANI, Captain B.P., *Signals*.

VARMA, Major B.D., *A.M.C. (Life)*.

VERMA, 2|Lieut. S.C., 3 *Para Battalion*.

VIRENDRA SINGH, Major, 16 *Light Cavalry*.

WHIG, Major C.L., *The Rajputana Rifles*.

SUBSCRIBING MEMBERS

Four Officers Messes and institutions were enrolled as subscribing members during this period.

LIBRARY

The Library is only open to members, who are requested to look on books as not transferable to their friends.

Books are only issued on loan to members who are resident in India.

A member may not have on loan, at any one time, more than three books. Papers, magazines and works catalogued under the headings of "Works of Reference", "Not to be taken out", may not be removed from the Institution.

Applications for books from members at outstations are dealt with as early as possible and books are sent post free by registered parcel post. They must be returned, carefully packed, by registered parcel post within two months of the date of issue or immediately on recall. If a book is not returned within fourteen days of the date of recall, it must be paid for, if so required by the Executive Committee. Lost and defaced books shall be replaced at the cost of the members to whom they were issued. In the case of lost or defaced books that are out of print, the value will be fixed by the Executive Committee and the members will be required to pay the cost so fixed.

OLD BOOKS AND TROPHIES

The Institution is in possession of a collection of old and rare books presented by members from time to time, and while such books are not available for circulation, they can be seen by members visiting Delhi.

The Secretary will be glad to acknowledge the gift of books, trophies, medals, etc. presented to the Institution.

BACK NUMBERS OF USI JOURNAL

The Institution has recently received enquiries for the following back numbers of the Journal. The Secretary would gratefully receive these issues from members who can spare them.

January-March 1957

April-June 1958

ADDRESSES

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses or if possible give a permanent address which will always find them e.g. Bank.

ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY

JANUARY-MARCH 1959

Title	Author	Year of Pub.
A Bunch of old Letters	Nehru, Jawahar Lal	1958
Admiralty Brief	Terrell, Edward	1958
Central Intelligence and National Security	Ransom, H.H.	1958
Constitution of India	Anand, C.L.	1957
Defence and Security in Indian Ocean Area	Indian Council of World Affairs	1958
Egypt	Little, Tom.	1958
Forty years in the Wilderness	Philby, St. John G.	n.d.
From the back Street of Bengal	Llewellyn, Bernard.	1955
Indian Economy since Independence	Venkatsubbiah, H.	1958
Islam and the Arabs	Landan, Ram	1958
National Communism and Soviet Strategy	Tomasic, D.A.	1957
Nuri As-Said	Birdwood, L.	1959
On War	Raymond, Aros	1958
Party Politics in India	Weiner, M.	1957
Pilot Project India	Mayor, A. and others	1959
Psychiatry in the British Army	Ahrenfeldt, R.H.	1958
Red Carpet to China	Croft, Michael	1958
Royal Australian Navy 1939-42	Gill, G.H.	1957
Ruins in the Sky	Fawcett, Brian	1958
South East Asia among the World Powers	Vandenlesch, A. and Butwell, R.A.	1958
The battle of the Ardennes	Merriam, R.E.	1958
The battle of France 1940	Goutord, A.	1958
The Commonwealth in the World	Miller, J.D.B.	1958
The Far east	Greene, F.	1957
The failure of Atomic Strategy	Miksche, F.O.	1959
The Great Invasion	Cottrell, Leonard.	1958
The Great Powers	Beloff, Max	1959
The History of the 1st King George V Own Gurkha Rifles	Bellers, E.V.R. (Brig)	1956
The Land of Midian	Philby, H.S.J.	1957
The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912	Powell, R.L.	1955
The Russian Revolution	Moorehead, Alan,	1958
The Soviet Navy	Saunders, N.G.	1958
The Story of land Warfare	Kendell, Paul	1957
The Tanks. (Vol I & II)	Hart, B.H.L.	1959
The use of force in International relations	Appadorai, A.	1958
Through Forest & Veldt	Ker, D.I.	1958
Whitaker's Almanack	Whitaker, Joseph	1958



AIMS OF THE NATIONAL CADET CORPS

1. To develop character, comradeship, the ideal of Service and capacity for leadership in young men and women.
2. To provide Service training to young men and women so as to stimulate interest in the defence of the country.
3. To build up reserve of potential officers to enable the Armed force to expand rapidly in a national emergency.

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EDITORIAL

WEST ASIA

In the preceding and the present issue of 'The Journal,' we have reprinted the summarised text of three lectures on West Asia by Dr. Clovis Maksoud, which aroused much interest when they were delivered earlier this year. Unfortunately, they have lost some of their interest in being compressed and reduced to print. Despite Dr. Maksoud's involved literary style, we can discern the interplay of two basic ideas in his exposition: the concept of what he terms *derivative power* and the policy of *positive neutrality*. The Arabs, says Dr. Maksoud, derive such power as they have from the fact that the two world-powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., hold each other in check and are themselves held in check by differences of opinion between them and their less powerful allies. This mutual cancelling-out gives even weak, uncommitted, countries freedom of choice and power to balance and play-off one against the other. Arab *positive neutrality* is given a very specific definition and content by Dr. Maksoud; it consists precisely in the Arabs selling their oil to the West, which the East would like them to withhold, while, at the same time, refusing to the West bases for short-range planes against the East. By injecting the latter purely military consideration into Arab *positive neutrality*, Dr. Maksoud, we think, is venturing on rather shaky ground and, by doing so, does somewhat less than justice to the policy which he seeks to defend. Surely the development of I.C.B.M.s and I.R.B.M.s, missile-equipped submarines, and the completely mobile U.S. Sixth Fleet have greatly reduced the need by the Western Powers for short-range airplane bases in West Asia. This, however, is relatively a matter of detail. What is more significant is Dr. Maksoud's belief that *positive*

neutrality is linked to *derivative power* and to the playing-off which this implies. We should like to believe that the *positive neutrality* of the Arabs does not wholly consist of this rather negative attitude, which smacks of bargaining in the international bazaar. Should it not rather be the expression of an inherent independence of outlook which, while not ignoring the two major contestants, is not based on a mere careful balancing of their conflicting claims. It is noteworthy that our Prime Minister has frequently repudiated the verbal usage *positive neutrality* in favour of *uncommitted* and has suggested that there is a difference between the two. If *positive neutrality* in West Asia is only what Dr. Maksoud says it is—which would make it only a new expression for age-old expediency—then it is just as well that there should be a difference, and a preference on the part of others for a policy produced by making up one's own mind on each international issue rather than on a delicate weighing of the opinions of the power blocs. Dr. Maksoud is a nationalist Arab intellectual of the younger generation. Apart from the ideas in these lectures, with which one may or may not agree, we commend them to our readers as attempts by such a person to think through and to come to grips with some of the basic international problems of West Asia.

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY

We commend to our readers the study of a thought-provoking 1958 Gold Medal essay by Brigadier B.S. Bhagat (winner of the competition for the fourth time). Although the suggestions made will need a detailed examination, it is definitely a pointer to the rethinking required in our defence set-up. A reorganisation to meet the changed roles of our Defence Services has become imperative if the effectiveness of our defence is to be ensured with economy. The suggestions regarding the formation of Central Intelligence, Defence Production and Procurement Organisations are not new to our readers nor is the need to have radical changes in the top defence control of the country. Unification of the Services and streamlining of administrative organisations have been the subject of special studies among the Western nations during the post-war period. We have a definite need for such a study also in this country. The writer has brought home the need for keeping our forces informed of the effects of nuclear warfare, although as our national policy we may not be concerned with nuclear weapons. In a defensive role, we cannot over-emphasise the need for such a study. The progress of science and technology, with its evolution of new weapons, continues to affect the concept of warfare. It is the duty of every professional soldier to keep himself up to date in such concepts.

TERRITORIAL WARFARE*

(A Yugoslav View of Partisan Warfare)

By H.E. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DUSAN KVEDAR
Ambassador of Yugoslavia in India

THE last world war taught military experts an important lesson about the nature and scope of resistance movements in occupied countries. Up to that time, countries threatened by aggression had prepared to defend their territories by offering frontal resistance along their national borders. Taking advantage of superior strength, a mighty aggressor often smashed this kind of resistance in one country after another. Motorized columns quickly penetrated the frontiers, drove wedges deep into the interior, cut off entire regions, and encircled parts of the defending forces. Thereupon, isolated commanders surrendered, and entire units put down their arms or were annihilated. When the army had fallen to pieces, the enemy completed the occupation of the country with relative ease, often aided by an official policy of surrender brought about by fifth columns, treachery in government circles, defeatism among military leaders and personnel, and political antagonisms of various kinds. Thus it was that Poland, Denmark and Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, Yugoslavia and Greece, were taken over one after another. Only a few units succeeded in withdrawing behind the allied lines to continue the struggle outside the national territories. Most of the occupied nations, depressed and demoralised, accepted conquest as inescapable.

As the war continued on a worldwide scale, however, the occupied nations emerged from their bewilderment. Gradually they became aware that defeat at their frontiers need not mean the end of the war; slowly they resumed active resistance. In many countries, however, this movement did not gather momentum until the very end of the war, and was restricted mainly to economic sabotage. Since such resistance movements avoided open clashes with the enemy's armed forces and did not utilise their large reserves of manpower, they had little strategic significance.

The political reasons noted above which made resistance ineffective were compounded by an almost inconceivable lack of understanding by allied army leaders of the military value of continued combat in the enemy-occupied nations. The initial mistake was the voluntary surrender of trained armies, with their commanders, weapons, and equipment. No attempt had been made before the war to lay the foundations for a continuing war of liberation against the invader, and new armed forces had to be improvised within the occupied countries at the cost of great suffering.

Is this lesson of World War II understood today, when again there is a danger of war? At present, of course, it would be senseless for those

* Lecture delivered to members of the United Service Institution, on 2nd June 1959. General K. S. Thimayya, D.S.O., Chief of the Army Staff, in the chair.

countries which have strong armies of their own—to plan to abandon frontal resistance and to hand over their territory and their administrative and industrial centres without fighting. Such nations have every reason for attempting to repel aggression at their border areas and planning a counteroffensive that will crush the enemy on his own soil.

The fact is, however, that many countries in the world do not as yet possess the human and material resources required to make this the only possible concept of defense. In many cases the concept of a frontal defense at all costs could have fatal results and might create situations like those existing in 1939, 1940 and 1941. Such suicidal undertakings would undoubtedly provoke world-wide admiration; but they would do a disservice to their own country. The nations thus denying one of the major lessons of World War II would lose their armies, their military organisation, their weapons, and their morale. To admit that a country might be occupied does not imply pessimism or defeatism. As a rule, it would not be difficult for a big power to gather the forces it considers necessary to occupy a small country. In facing that possibility realistically and courageously, each threatened country must decide what concept of defense it should adopt, and what kind of war it should prepare to wage in order to avoid surrender if a superior enemy penetrates the country.

Surrender is an act of national disgrace which demoralises the people and paves the way to collaboration with the enemy and to various forms of treason. By surrendering the nation loses something much more important than territory—it loses its army and, thereby, the means for regaining its liberty and its territory. The Liberation War in Yugoslavia showed unequivocally that manpower is fundamental to victory and should be valued above territory. No territory can be maintained if the army is lost; any territory can be regained if the army remains. The collapse of frontal defense need not, therefore, be followed by surrender, but only by a change from classical *frontal war* to mobile *territorial war*. Present-day armies must envisage waging both types of warfare. Only thus can each country prevent the rout of its army in the event that *frontal warfare* on its territory becomes hopeless.

Since history has thus far provided no example of a transition from *frontal* to *territorial warfare*, many military theorists may view these ideas skeptically. But there cannot be a precedent for every event that takes place. It is essential in this connection that history has shown us examples of truly *territorial wars*, even though these did not develop by a direct transition from *frontal war*. In its final years, the Liberation War in Yugoslavia became a genuine, *territorial war* on a large scale. The Yugoslav War was not limited to economic sabotage and small-scale guerilla activities alone. It showed that an occupied nation can wage a real *territorial war* with large-size regular units and achieve the country's final liberation with its own forces. Since it demonstrated the usefulness

of this type of warfare, both for the nation being attacked and for the strategy of the allied coalition in general, let us now examine its characteristics in rough outline.

A REGULAR WAR

In the first place, the Yugoslav experience shows that under present conditions the resistance movement against the occupation should no longer be merely a *small-scale war* (although it includes the typical activities of a small-scale guerilla war), but should be a genuine *large-scale war*. It cannot be referred to simply as a *partisan war*, because this name designates by and large the actions of small units, usually carried out in support of a regular national or allied front. By *territorial war* in the modern sense we mean an autonomous war or, at least, a war which is an important part of the general coalition war.

A modern *territorial war* is a regular war. During the last war, for example, all Yugoslav units, from the smallest to the largest, were directed from one centre and conducted their operations in accordance with the principles of *regular warfare*. The operations of larger regular units were the dominating element, and would be so from the very beginning for armies switching from *frontal* to *territorial warfare*. In an army formed after the occupation has taken place, as was the case with the Yugoslav Liberation Army, they appeared only in the later stages, but at last they became the dominating element. Part of this process took place in our army in 1942 and it was completed in 1943.

To enable the larger regular units in Yugoslavia to survive and operate, it was essential to co-ordinate their actions with those of the small—also regular—local partisan detachments and sabotage groups operating throughout the countryside, along lines of communication, and in the towns. An army waging a *territorial war*, therefore, should consist of two parts: large regular units to carry out bigger operations, and many partisan and diversionary groups for auxiliary actions. While the larger units engage the main mobile forces of the enemy, the small partisan detachments scatter the enemy and pin him down over the entire territory, making it impossible for him to concentrate his forces. Even at the end of 1944, when our army had switched in the main theatres of operation from *territorial* to *frontal warfare* and had 51 divisions at its disposal we still had 107 large partisan detachments and countless small diversionary groups. They proved very useful.

Modern *territorial warfare* should thus be characterised by the fact that it is waged by large regular units. These units—brigades, divisions, and army corps—may be formed in the course of the war itself, as they were in Yugoslavia; or, if an army switched directly from *frontal* to *territorial warfare*, they would be the same units that existed previously,

although lighter and more mobile. The operations carried out by these units are no less important than those at the front. They should not merely be skirmishes between partisan groups and enemy patrols. A large number of divisions may participate on both sides. In respect of armaments, in Yugoslavia, both sides used artillery, tanks and planes.

Our experience proved beyond question that even when most of a country's populated centres and communications are in enemy hands, units as large as divisions and corps can not only exist and operate, but also fight and win more easily than smaller ones can in such warfare. Nor is this experience contradicted by the fact that our wartime divisions were somewhat smaller than normal (3,000 to 5,000 men, or less; in the last year of the war from 8,000 to 10,000 men). Had we had more supplies, the units could have been even larger and their victories greater.

The term *territorial war* is in our opinion appropriate for this special form of regular war, since it implies that the warfare is waged over the entire territory of the country, and not merely along a more or less unbroken frontline. This, of course, determines only the basic strategical and tactical conception of the military aspect of the war. Its political aspect is manifest in the aim of liberation. In regard to this aspect, one can speak of a *liberation war*. Every *liberation war* is, however, not necessarily *territorial*. It can also be a *small-scale war* based upon *guerrilla warfare*. A *liberation war* will be a regular *territorial war* only if it is waged mainly by large regular units.

AN MOBILE WAR

Rigid and clearly-defined fronts are not inherent in *territorial war*, although such fronts may appear in the course of it in certain flexible, modified forms. This is especially so during the final phase, when the enemy is being expelled from the country. As a rule, however, free manoeuvring is characteristic of, and inherent in, *territorial warfare*. That is: The large units operate for a while in one area, and then in another, while the smaller detachments cover the entire territory with their guerrilla activities. Whenever large regular units appear, liberated territories are formed; these may often be abandoned, to be formed again somewhere else. At times, all the forces on both sides are in movement and in action. Then the liberated areas practically disappear for a time: but almost all the "occupied" areas likewise disappear. The two armies find themselves enmeshed in a huge no man's land, but with all movements on both sides more or less directed according to plan from one centre. Such, approximately, was the way the fighting looked during the main enemy offensive operations in Yugoslavia.

AN ORGANISED WAR

A *territorial war* should be an organised war directed according to

plan. In general outline, the command is centralised, although in detail it leaves much more independence and initiative to the subordinate commanders than is the case in *frontal warfare*. The single and centralised command gives regular *territorial warfare* its strength and advantage over the irregular "*small-scale*" war.

In *territorial war*, discipline must be as firm as it is in *frontal war*—or even firmer. But, it is based less on formal regulations and coercion than on a profound consciousness of duty on the part of officers and soldiers, attained only by tireless indoctrination. The more disciplined the unit and the better organised its activities, the greater its effectiveness and the smaller its hardships and losses. All tendencies toward arbitrary action, anarchy and looting must be firmly checked since they lower the prestige of the army in the eyes of the people, and reduce the prospects of success in battle. In this respect, we in Yugoslavia were uncompromising.

Territorial war is not, and must not be, a disorganised affair run by irresponsible armed groups fighting on their own. That form of resistance requires sacrifices out of all proportion to enemy losses. But if no organised insurgent army exists, and the people themselves spontaneously take up arms to protect themselves from the occupation forces, thus beginning an insurrection, then the organising of regular units should be begun as soon as possible, otherwise, the spontaneous uprising will fail.

A PEOPLE'S WAR

The decisive role of morale is not so obvious anywhere as it is in a *liberation war*. How otherwise could one explain the victory of the Yugoslav Liberation Army, which fought under exceptionally trying circumstances against an enemy enjoying great material superiority? In the world of today, only a country which has solved its basic social and communal problems to the satisfaction of the people—or, at least, shows that it is in process of solving these problems in the course of the war—can find sufficient moral strength to fight in this way. A *liberation movement* must mobilise and activate the people; its army must win the day-by-day support of the population, especially of the villagers, for without them neither a large *territorial war* nor a *small-scale partisan war* can be fought successfully. A *territorial war* is a people's war. In such a war it is rather difficult to use coercive measures.

In his work *On War* (Volume 6, Chapter 26), Clausewitz called *Liberation Wars* against invaders *People's Wars* and objected to those who opposed such wars because they allegedly offer as great a threat to the domestic regime as to the foreign enemy. Such views are shared even today by some persons in the ruling classes of various countries. The *liberation movements* in the last war however showed that no social class or political group has reason to fear for its position provided it is

resolute in the struggle against the invader. The masses of the people will in any case rise up against the occupation and, indeed, nothing can prevent them from doing so. That is why those who remain aloof are the ones who will lose their influence and position and those who would strike bargains with the enemy are the ones who will be destroyed with him.

The struggle against the fifth column is of exceptional military importance in a *liberation war*. Without a fifth column, the invader is blind and powerless. The problem cannot be solved merely by dealing a heavy blow at enemy agents at the outset. The logic of the occupation itself will always create new types of fifth columns. Even people who seemed to be perfectly reliable in peacetime can turn out to be faint-hearted and opportunistic. There are always speculators and egoists in every country who put their private and vested interests above the interests of the nation, working for the enemy at first, perhaps, as neutrals, then as petty collaborationists, and, finally, as traitors and spies. It is not a long road from the weakling's first tacit acceptance of the inevitability of the occupation to the moment when the invader puts a rifle into his hands to use against his own people. The fifth column cannot be defeated merely by military action which seeks to annihilate it physically; that action must be backed by a persevering and intelligent political struggle which aims to destroy it ideologically and morally. Even in a pre-war period, such political action ought to be a rather important part of the preparation for *territorial war*.

SACRIFICES

A *territorial war* is always characterized by violence, terror, and reprisals on the part of the invader. It claims its victims not only in the fighting ranks, but also among the civilian population. In this respect it does not differ from a classical *frontal war*, with its nuclear bombs, guided missiles, and chemical and biological weapons. Civilian losses are today an inevitable accompaniment of every type of war.

There are no guaranteed methods for preventing casualties at the front or in the rear in any type of contemporary warfare. The Yugoslav experience showed, however, that in *territorial war* there are reliable ways of reducing the number of casualties. The best way to protect the adult male population from reprisals is to draft these men into military units or, at least, to arm them as Home Guards for local self-defense. The active participation of women, and, especially, young people in the military units actually guards them from danger rather than exposing them. Furthermore we learned that the surest method of preventing the enemy from unlawfully shooting prisoners was for us to hold enemy prisoners. And the most efficient method for preventing reprisals against woman, children, and old people was to spread the uprising all over the country. If everyone is to blame for the insurrection, then this actually means that

it becomes more difficult for the enemy to pin the blame on any specific person. When the enemy realises that the slaughter of hostages only increases the resistance of the population and spreads the insurrection to other areas, he begins to question its usefulness.

DENSITY OF FORCES

In envisaging the possibility of *territorial resistance*, it is necessary to assess realistically the capacity of the invader to control the so called "occupied" territories. Our experience in Yugoslavia demonstrated that wherever we maintained large units, the invader required at least a reinforced battalion to man one garrison. Smaller garrisons, and especially small police stations, were marked out for certain annihilation. In this way the density of the occupation forces in a given area was always in proportion to the strength of our army. Where only small partisan detachments were operating, the enemy was able to keep many small garrisons, making it easier for him to control the area. Where larger units of our army were operating (especially when they were armed with heavy weapons, artillery, tanks), the enemy was forced to reduce the number of garrisons but to increase their size. This allowed our units greater freedom in maneuvering, helped us liberate territory, and thus increased the security of the population.

One enemy battalion to one garrison is approximately the key for calculating the forces the enemy would have to maintain if obliged to wage a *territorial war*. Nine enemy garrisons would require one whole enemy division! And just imagine the number of cities and industrial centers, towns and large villages requiring garrisons there are in every country! There would be hundreds. Would the enemy be able to devote so many divisions to the occupation of such a country? Obviously not very easily, for there would probably be other countries waging the same kind of *territorial warfare*, there would also be a regular front somewhere, and finally there would be difficulties with his own dissatisfied population, all requiring more and more divisions. The result would be that in every country fighting a modern *territorial war*, there would be large free territories, free towns, and even cities. In this way the *resistance movement* could carry out all kinds of operations, large and small, organise its intelligence and communications, and supply its army.

On the other hand, a nation which surrenders and capitulates can be held with the aid of a few policemen and domestic agents, especially if its government administration enters the service of the aggressor. Under modern conditions of *territorial resistance*, therefore, occupation is a relative matter. Actually, an entire national territory can never be occupied. The greater part of the population and large parts of the national territory will always remain free if the people and their army want it so.

The operational base of a *territorial war* is not in the towns but in the countryside, that is, in open areas that no occupation, no matter how dense, could control. The existence of such areas made it possible for Yugoslavia to transform the original partisan army, consisting of 92 detachments with a total of 80,000 fighting men in 1941, into a large regular army totalling 53 divisions with 800,000 fighting men in 1945. But the aforementioned countryside is only a kind of rear for the units, whose operations must be directed mainly against towns with large enemy garrisons. Armed groups within the towns themselves can be only of auxiliary though sometimes significant importance.

SIZE OF AREA

Yugoslavia's relatively large area (approximately 97,660 square miles) gave our units great possibilities for concentration and dispersal, permitting the transfer of troops from one area to another for surprise offensives and flexible withdrawals. Would *territorial war* be impracticable in countries of smaller size? A more detailed study of our experience indicates that similar maneuvering is entirely possible even in smaller areas. The Yugoslav province of Slovenia covers approximately 7,600 square miles, or about half the area of Switzerland. This province was during the occupation in a specially unfavourable position since parts of it had been annexed directly to the *Third Reich* and other parts to Italy. The enemy was very sensitive about what went on there. Moreover, some of the main lines of enemy communication crossed the province. That is why the Slovene units had particularly difficult tasks to carry out. Throughout the war, in spite of hard-hitting enemy offensives using large numbers of troops (almost 100,000 Italians, for example, took part in the Third enemy offensive in Slovenia), the Slovene units were never compelled to abandon their operational territory and withdraw to other parts of Yugoslavia. When they sometimes crossed over into neighbouring Croatia, it was to help the Croat units to carry out certain large-scale operations, after which they again returned to Slovenia. The Slovene commanders never felt that the narrow limits of their province did not provide sufficient maneuvering space for fighting or means of subsistence.

Apart from that, in case of emergency, the military units of one country could always withdraw to the territory of a neighbouring country waging a similar kind of *territorial war* against the same enemy. Often during the last war, for instance, the Italian Garibaldi-Nattisone Partisan Division, which operated in north-eastern Italy, was given shelter by our Slovene units, and in the same way Bulgarian partisan units often sought refuge in eastern Serbia.

TERRAIN

One often hears that mountainous terrain is essential for success in *territorial war*. The facts do not bear out this thesis. In the first place,

Yugoslavia is not predominantly mountainous, since 55 per cent of her area is less than 1,600 feet above sea level and a further 27 per cent lies at an elevation of between 1,600 and 3,300 feet—a total of 82 per cent of rolling terrain suitable for maneuvering. There is another 14 per cent of moderately mountainous land (3,300 to 5,000 feet in altitude) which, from the military point of view, is not essentially different. Steep mountains (5,000 to 6,500 feet) cover only 3.3 per cent of the area, with really high mountains (above 6,500 feet) accounting for the remaining one half of one per cent. Our partisans thus fought on terrain all but a fraction of which is suitable not only for operations by infantry units with modern weapons but also for actions by motorised troops, tanks, and all sorts of artillery, as well as for the establishment of air bases. Our experience never gave us reason to believe that it is easier to wage partisan or *territorial war* in the mountains than on intermediate terrain. On the contrary, our fighting men always considered high mountains an uncomfortable and difficult battlefield and avoided them whenever possible. Furthermore, in the mountains, where there was no enemy, the partisans had nothing to do and no one to fight. Their function was to fight and they could do that only where the enemy could be found, that is, on the plains and at lower altitudes.

POPULATION

There is also a belief in some countries that it would be very difficult to conduct a *territorial war* there because of the density of population, the proximity of settlements to one another, and the well-developed network of roads. Extreme density of population on almost absolutely flat areas certainly hampers large-scale operations. Yugoslavia has 223 inhabitants per square mile, with one part less densely and another more heavily populated. Operations were carried out in both, but especially in the more densely populated areas. Again the experience in Slovenia where I was Commander-in-Chief is instructive. In Slovenia, with 183 inhabitants per square mile, all kinds of operations were carried out by my units which by 1943 had grown to 2 army corps consisting of 6 divisions, 3 independent brigades, and approximately 15 partisan detachments of several hundred fighters each—a total of from 35,000 to 40,000 fighting men. The density of the population never was an obstacle to these operations. On the contrary, our units always strove to penetrate the rich and densely populated areas, where the enemy usually put up the strongest defense but where living and fighting conditions were better: food more plentiful, equipment easier to get, recruits more numerous, care of the wounded easier, and organisation of communications and intelligence simpler.

In Slovenia it is difficult to find a point more than 15 to 25 miles from an automobile road. The roads were useful to the enemy but they were often useful to us, too. When we wanted to prevent the enemy from

using them, we had means at our disposal to do so. A concrete example: six parallel automobile roads link the Eastern and Western Slovenia through a gap 30 to 50 miles wide between the *Sava* River and the *Kamnik* Mountains—that is, one road to each 5 to 8 miles. No point on this terrain is more than 5 to 8 miles from the nearest road. The entire region is heavily populated. The *Kamnik-Zasavje* Detachment, usually numbering 200 fighters, fought in this area from 1942 until the end of the war in 1945, operating as a whole and never breaking up into smaller units. It constantly attacked lines of communication and convoys. It withstood at least two to three enemy drives a month. Yet the enemy never succeeded in driving it out of this region.

These and many other similar examples taken from actual practice should be convincing evidence that *territorial war* can be waged in any country with a similar network of roads.

STANDARD OF LIVING

Was the relative backwardness of prewar Yugoslavia responsible for success in this specific type of war? In the first place, it might be noted that a relatively low standard of living does not in itself cause a *liberation movement* to develop. If this were so, it would be hard to understand why the Bulgarians or Rumanians—whose standard of living did not differ much from that in many Yugoslav provinces—did not develop any important resistance movements against the Germans, although they had as many reasons to do so as we had.

In pre-war Yugoslavia all the provinces had not reached the same level of development. There was for instance no essential difference between the standard of living in Slovenia and the other countries of Central and Western Europe. And yet, the Slovenes fought no less well than the other peoples of Yugoslavia, whose standard of living was lower. Explanations for the will to fight in men must be sought elsewhere than in criteria of "civilisation" or "backwardness". In our opinion, any nation could fight a *territorial war* in the future, regardless of its state of development, provided it possessed a high degree of national consciousness and devotion to freedom and independence.

WEAPONS NEEDED

What kinds of weapons are needed for *territorial warfare*? The three basic requirements would be suitability:

- First, for manoeuvring and extreme mobility.
- Second, for hard and rapid blows, and
- Third, for fighting at close range.

Therefore, these are needed:

- First, light weapons, easy to carry;
- Second, weapons of high destructive power, capable of strong and sudden concentration of fire;
- Third, weapons of somewhat less than ordinary range.

It is quite incorrect that forces in a *territorial war*, including partisan units carrying out auxiliary actions in the enemy rear, should be armed merely with light infantry weapons. Certain new armaments developed during and after the last war will greatly facilitate the waging of *territorial war* in the future—among them are *anti-tank rocket launchers*, *recoilless guns*, and *infrared sights for firing at night*. They will help solve some of the important problems which have to be faced in territorial actions, namely:

- (a) anti-tank fighting,
- (b) destruction of fortified points and
- (c) effective firing during night operations.

AIR FORCE ROLE

Special attention must be drawn to the important role of the air force in this type of war. In essence, modern airborne troops employ methods typical of *territorial war*. In the last war, with a few exceptions, the possibilities of using airborne troops were not fully utilised. One reason was probably that they were overburdened by various requirements arising from the principles upon which *frontal warfare* is waged, and hence were not flexible enough for use in *territorial operations*.

The opportunities for using them—especially in one's own occupied country, or in a friendly country—are much more extensive than is usually believed. If they adopt the appropriate tactics, the length of their survival in the enemy rear need not be limited. This was proved by Yugoslav divisions which operated for years in the thick of enemy forces. Even smaller airborne units such as battalions and regiments can accomplish a great deal if they use the right tactics and are armed with appropriate weapons.

Transport aviation adds greatly to the mobility of land units in *territorial warfare*. In the future, some *territorial land forces*, besides carrying out marches and infiltration, may be able to make use of air transport in their maneuvers. The possibilities of surprise through the rapid transfer of the main effort from one area to another will thereby be greatly increased. Transport also plays an important role in evacuating the wounded and sick who are a particular burden on the land forces in *territorial warfare*. In the course of the Fourth enemy offensive against our main forces in *Bosnia and Hercegovina*, for instance, Yugoslav units were compelled to carry with them 4,000 wounded and sick (mainly typhus cases), which greatly hampered the operations against 11 German and Italian divisions. On another occasion, when the allied air forces evacuated several thousand wounded to southern Italy at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, the burden on our units was greatly relieved and their fighting morale was heightened.

Combat aviation is very important for carrying out tasks, such as attacking fortified positions and defending one's own forces from attack

by superior enemy concentrations. Difficulties in using artillery and tanks—ever-existent due to the very nature of *territorial war*—can be lessened through the close co-operation of air forces.

Aviation is useful for liaison work between various commands, and renders possible more frequent personal contact between commanders. It also can be an important source of supply, especially as regards materials which are difficult to capture from the enemy.

For these reasons every country which seriously considers the possibility of engaging in *territorial war* must build up its aviation, and particularly its transport aviation. In this connection, the great usefulness of helicopters must be emphasised. They open up new prospects, especially with regard to supplies and evacuation. The problem of airfields for transport aviation should not cause too much concern. If the transport aviation cannot temporarily be based on one's own territory, it can be based on neighbouring allied territory. Units on "occupied" territory will always be able, with a little resourcefulness, to set up makeshift airfields as we used to do (although disappointingly few planes came to land on them).

SUPPLY

Some foreign armies which are today considering the possibility of *territorial war* on home ground always have misgivings about being able to supply their units, especially with ammunition. This is certainly a difficult problem, but our experience has shown that there is a remedy for it also.

There was no continuity between the prewar Yugoslav Army and the new Liberation Army. The latter was formed on a completely new basis.

At the very beginning, the weapons and ammunition which had been hidden, both by our underground organisations and by individuals acting on their own initiative when the old army disintegrated, proved to be extremely valuable. The quantity was small, but enough with which to begin. That is why we think that the weapons and ammunition, already in the possession of a regular army at the time of transition from frontal to *territorial warfare*, are likely to be sufficient at the beginning. If a *territorial war* is planned in advance, there will have been ample opportunity to prepare reserves of material and to store them away in hiding places for months and even years of war. In this connection, it must be kept in mind that less ammunition is used, and less should be used, in a *territorial war* than in a *frontal war*; troops should think twice before firing a round or a shell.

In Yugoslavia we built up an army of 300,000 armed men before receiving from the allies a single rifle or a single round of ammunition. We

armed them exclusively with weapons captured from the enemy. Only in the second half of the war did we begin to receive aid from abroad, but this was never sufficient to cover our needs. War booty remained our main source of equipment until the end of the war. It is to be hoped that in a possible future war, the liberation armies will receive more aid than in the last war. It would, however, be erroneous to count on this source alone, since it can never be sufficient. The major allies will have the problem of supplying their own armies. Moreover, let us hope that the number of people carrying on large-scale resistance will be larger. And there are bound to be shortages of transport planes and pilots, as well as interference by enemy planes. Liberation movements in a future war must be prepared to rely for the most part upon their own resources.

If the war lasts a long time, it may become necessary to rearm the fighting forces in part. To the extent that there is a shortage of ammunition for their own weapons and calibers, resistance forces will have to adopt enemy weapons and calibers. The "standardising" of armaments will occur in a new form, that is in accordance with enemy calibers. This would be unthinkable in a *frontal war*, but is quite natural in a *territorial war*.

PLANNING

A soldier who received his training during the last war in the school of *partisan warfare* cannot help regarding the present defense conceptions of many countries with certain misgivings. He must, of course, admit the great value of large divisions equipped with modern arms, powerful weapons for fire support, strategic aviation, nuclear bombs and atomic artillery, guided missiles and other up-to-date armaments for resisting the aggressor frontally and disorganising his rear. Along a conventional front in a possible future war similar armaments will no doubt be basic for defense and counteroffensive. But the tendency to underestimate the military importance of resistance by nations which might fall under enemy occupation, and to think of it only as insignificant auxiliary action by guerillas and saboteurs, seems shortsighted. The strategic value of liberation wars seems to have been underestimated in the military planning of many countries; not enough is being done to prepare for organised resistance by nations which, owing to their exposed position, might be occupied, at least temporarily.

A widespread liberation war has immense strategic importance. In the last war, Yugoslavia prevented the dispatch of any of her own quisling units to other fronts, reduced to a minimum the enemy's ability to draw on the country's production for his own needs, and pinned down over 30 enemy divisions, having more than half a million men. At the end of 1944, for instance, the enemy was compelled to put 40 of his divisions with 580,000 men into the field against 51 Yugoslav divisions and 500,000 men.

At the same time, on the Italian front there were only 28 Axis divisions, consisting of 350,000 men, fighting against 24 allied divisions.

At that time, the front in Yugoslavia was the second most important front in the world in the number of men engaged in the fighting on both sides. Only the Soviet-German Front was bigger than ours. It was only later, after the landing in France, that the Anglo-American Front became second in size. A country cannot nourish its fighting qualities solely on the hope that, if occupied, it will be freed from the outside. Such an attitude tends to lull a nation's fighting spirit rather than stimulating it. A threatened nation must be made aware that it can defend itself successfully with its own forces and that it should not expect to be rescued by someone else. It must find strength for the struggle within itself. It must develop reliance on its own possibilities. Only such a nation can withstand aggression, occupation, terror and reprisals, and win back freedom and independence.

A *liberation war* can be improvised, as Norway, France, Italy, Poland and other occupied countries showed in the last war. Even in Yugoslavia, the military organisation had to be set up, by and large, during the war itself. But it was a difficult, long, and painful road, exacting many victims. If the prewar Yugoslav Army had made any real preparations for continuing the war against the invader, our Liberation Movement would have developed under much easier circumstances. Victories could have been won more quickly had we started with a situation similar to the one we had created by 1943, for instance, instead of starting under the conditions of 1941.

The solution to the problem of organising in advance for *territorial warfare* should not be sought in the formation of units of a special type, parallel to big units for *conventional frontal warfare*. In our opinion, the entire army to be used in frontal operations should be trained both for frontal and *territorial war*, since it is impossible to determine in advance which units might be left behind the enemy lines. Formation of special partisan detachments and groups of saboteurs, detailed to specific areas, and with specific missions is, however, justified.

Psychological preparation also plays a very important role. Before the last war, one often heard naive views to the effect that any preparation for resisting the occupation, or even talk about the possibility of failure at the front, would spread defeatism in the army and among the people. The unrealistic appraisal of the ratio of forces and the underestimation of the need to prepare for a *territorial war* were concealed behind talk of the alleged absolute invincibility of the nation and the certainty of smashing the enemy. And this, in fact, was a tacit admission that the failure of *frontal resistance* would mean the end of the struggle and the beginning of capitulation and slavery. But a breakthrough by

the enemy need not mean the end of all fighting, and least of all does it mean the end of the war; it should simply mean a transition from one form of warfare to another. True, this is a much more difficult and sanguinary form, but the better and more complete the preparations for it, the less bloody and difficult it will be. Preparations for *territorial war* in peacetime do not, therefore, spread defeatism in the army and among the people, but open new vistas for saving national honour and independence. Further, they act as a curb on a would-be aggressor and thereby serve the cause of peace. For if an aggressor is sure that by liquidating the frontal resistance of a country, he can destroy all further resistance and compel surrender, he will not hesitate to commit aggression at the convenient time. But if, on the contrary, he is convinced that after occupying the country he will have to fight a terrible, exhausting, and prolonged *territorial war*, over its entire area, he will seriously reconsider the advisability of attacking. *Territorial war* thus represents a tangible and convincing inducement for a would-be aggressor to respect peace and shun war.

ARAB NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

By DR. CLOVIS MAKSOUD

IN yesterday's lecture what I have emphasized as having a bearing on the whole dynamics of the Arab national movement is the neutralizing capacity of both power blocs, which introduces an advantage that allows us to prevent the two power blocs securing in the Arab Nation short range bombing bases. Short range bombing bases can be secured and the paraphernalia of legalistic sovereignty in an independent Arab state may be preserved. In this respect also it has often been argued that Great Britain, for example, has allowed the United States to have medium range bombing bases and has not forfeited its independence. Hence the parallel argument is that if we can secure the elimination of colonialism and the restoration of our equality in the community of nations, then why not, in the interest of preserving certain *fundamental ideals* against the onslaught of communism don't we allow the West short range bases in our territory? Here, Arab nationalism becomes a factor in international politics. When we reduce the whole problem of defence in the Middle East to this we are missing the chance of developing a new thesis in strategic structure and concepts. Not only are we interested in the neutralising capacity of long range bombing but also in lessening the number of short range bases conceived to overcome the conventional superiority of weapons which the Soviet bloc possess. However, even then, the availability of the bases for the Western bloc in many parts of the world secures a neutralising capacity over the overwhelming superiority of conventional weapons that the Soviet Union possess, and a new dimension enters into the picture and that is the dimension of local nuclear warfare known otherwise as the theory of *limited nuclear war*. The theory of limited war remains possible for small nations outside the crisis area. A war between Peru and Bolivia might not envelop the world in an international conflict. It might accentuate some tension to an extent which might prejudice some interests. But in the crisis areas, a war between, for example, East Germany and West Germany might bring in global interests and the necessity to exercise global power. Therefore, in order to avoid a holocaust with nuclear weapons, the theory of *limited nuclear war* has been advanced and the theorists of this new dimension in strategic thinking are becoming more vocal especially in the West.

The strategy of *limited nuclear war* applies almost exclusively to the crisis areas and as we defined crisis areas they are the areas where the peripheries of the two powers can meet or do actually meet. The basic characteristic of a crisis area is its sensitivity to the extent that

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even a minor local incident can develop into a major one. A global interest on this level evolves in so far as a country is a major generator of power and, thence, there are primarily two countries in this category, namely, the Soviet Union and the United States, whose interests are global. On the other hand, there are the subsidiary powers with a pretension of global interests as they play a major role within the global framework of the primary source of power—China, the United Kingdom, and France are obvious examples. In the crisis area, in order to preserve the global nature of the generators of power, it has been argued by the theorists of *limited nuclear war* that the nuclear position and possession of nuclear weapons which is neutralized by the opponents must not remain impotent in the exercise of diplomacy provided it does not become a prelude to disaster.

This probable shift of policy which is very vital and important for people like ourselves, adopting a policy of positive neutrality and its importance lies in that nuclear usage on a limited scale in a crisis area, when agreed upon between the two major powers to preserve their peace and overlordship, can be followed by an attempt to localise the consequences of this local or restrictive usage of nuclear weapons. Now this is fundamentally the Arab nationalist fear that insofar as we remain a crisis area and the two power blocs conceive that our area is organically connected with their global strategic interest, we are subjected to restricted usage of nuclear weapons. This is the new dimension which makes our insistence on non-commitment more vocal and more insistent. It enables us to discover the interconnection between the policy of non-commitment and our nationalist objectives. This insistence has been and remains a factor in international politics and international relations will be conditioned constructively by the capacity of both power blocs to realize that positive neutrality is not a slogan or a temporary policy, but a necessary condition for the success for the Arab nationalist movement. This is where Arab nationalism becomes an important factor in international relations but could be more important when it emerges out of the state of flux into a consolidated status. We are now in that process of exploring the fullness of the potential of Arab nationalism in that it can play a healthy role in international affairs.

In a world which has become sensitive and in the broadening influence of the centres which generate power throughout the world, almost everybody becomes a factor in international relations. In a bi-polar system of power any little breach in this system can influence international relations. Which way international relations are influenced is the issue that should be determined. Herein lies the basic morality of non-alignment and here lies the dynamics of the capacity of a non-committed area to exercise a constructive influence on international politics. Through non-commitment we in fact achieve partial commitment to both blocs

and through partial commitment we deprive each bloc of the elements which enable it to increase international tension. I explained yesterday the inter-relationship between non-commitment and partial commitment and I said that if the Arab nationalist movement can succeed in denying to the West those military bases with short range bombing facilities and allow it the necessary oil which we possess on an equitable basis, then we would be denying the West the instruments by which it can accelerate international tension.

In depriving military bases for the West we have in fact partially committed ourselves to the Soviet Bloc in terms of strategic planning and denial of these bases can help bring to fruition its claims of peaceful aims. But by denying the Soviet Union the power to dictate to us stoppage of oil supply to the West, we have disengaged ourselves definitely from the total requirements of the Soviet global strategy. In this matter, there is partial commitment. Now the ultimate fulfilment of this partial commitment is to secure an international climate which is conducive to set in motion those forces within the two blocs which are able to respond with our position not only in a utilitarian way but in a realistic manner. Therefore, the objective of non-commitment becomes much more important than simply to protect ourselves from alignment to one bloc or another. In terms of geo-politics, we become a variable in world politics. Surely, at the outset, we shall be denounced as 'unreliable' or that we do not think that communism is a threat to basic human values, or that *we do not think that the imperialism is a permanent characteristic of the capitalist West*. The ultimate commitment of positive neutrality is for an international climate conducive for what is primary for us, namely, the social, economic, scientific, industrial rehabilitation of our society and a capacity to build in the Arab nation a rational society which brings us into the 20th Century. Imperialism has denied us the opportunity to belong to the century in which we are.

From here a clearer definition of Arab nationalism evolves. It is not an ideology but a stage of development. When nationalism becomes an ideology or an over-all attitude towards life, it sets in motion a readiness to accept irrational cults and militates against the possibility of developing in society a rational disposition and a healthy attitude. So nationalism to us cannot be exclusively anti-foreign, but simply a rejection of the foreigner's capacity to subdue us. It is, therefore, cognizant that among the very imperialists there are forces that are similar to us and which would probably be enlivened by our success. In Algeria, the nationalist movement, if it is crushed by the Imperialists, will invariably strengthen the totalitarian trend in France. The success of the Algerian liberation movement will enable the forces of progress and rationality within the colonial power itself to ascertain its claims and rights more purposively. Therefore, liberation which is the characteristic of Arab

nationalism renders nationalism a stage in our human development and not as the fulfillment of our human existence. This is the innate progressivism of our nationalism. Arab nationalism thus acquires almost automatically international associations and spontaneous international affinity. With nationalism no longer an exclusive ideology but a stage of development, it provides us the capacity to act more freely and more constructively in the international community. A nation deprived of its capacity to ascertain its initiative and independence cannot inter-act in an authentic manner with the international community. In our international associations, we develop priorities and for this reason you find that our primary association in world politics is the association with the non-committed countries throughout the world, as there is a similarity of approach and an almost identity (except on minor issues) of outlook which develops from a similarity of experience. We might have cultural unity or even religious ties with certain countries but the primacy of our objectives in international association is determined by the degree of commitment to the policy of non-alignment that a country has. This is why there was an enthusiastic reception for the Bandung Conference and the desire to make the spirit that emanated concrete. Into consideration should be taken all the global currents, and to make sure that the solution of the problems within the crisis areas does not lie exclusively in the agreement between the two power blocs as that will invariably prejudice our legitimate national interests. It is true that if we are faced with a choice between relaxing international tension and easing the deadlock between the two power blocs, which parenthetically is the objective of the Arab nationalist movement or sacrificing some of our nationalist objectives, the human in the Arab will choose to sacrifice. What the Arab nationalist movement and the policy of positive neutrality seeks is to regenerate in the world those forces which would make such a choice unnecessary and introduce an atmosphere where the relaxation of tension will be contingent upon the realisation of the national objectives of the Arabs and of the legitimate nationalist objectives in other parts of the world. Arab nationalism therefore seeks to introduce into the international scene a situation where it becomes self-evident for the two power blocs that in order to avoid the disastrous consequences of nuclear warfare they must accommodate the genuine nationalist aspirations instead of rendering their coexistence based on dividing national entities. Again, the question of Indo-China becomes the most obvious example of what I mean.

The policy of positive neutrality seeks to bring about what the Geneva Conference brought out in the Indo-China question, in 1955 namely, the easing of tension but also to avoid the actual solution that emerged. In this case the national entity of Indo-China had been split in order to accommodate for a bi-polar system to continue. A policy of positive neutrality sufficiently strong would have rendered the agreement between the two power blocs possible only through the unity of

Indo-China. The situation is similar in our country, and we are worried, and that is why we strongly advocate positive neutrality. We are worried lest an agreement reached at without our participation might be detrimental to our national interests. In Germany the consecration of its division and the acceptance of its neutrality might be feasible but that is detrimental for its unity. We might, for utilitarian reasons, support this formula in the general interest of world peace but we realize that such a formula is pregnant with an explosive situation in the future.

So, you see, Arab nationalism has to be world conscious and conscious of the various interlocking aspects of the world political situation. The fact that we are situated as we are in an area where the two power blocs meet or can meet articulates our desire to extricate ourselves from this critical position.

This conclusion has not been reached without difficulties. Arab nationalism was not conscious of its global concerns until the whole traditional leadership of Arab nationalism has been removed following the establishment of the State of Israel. The establishment of the State of Israel in the Arab nation meant to the Arab nationalist movement the total bankruptcy of traditional nationalism. 1948, in my judgment, is a major landmark in modern Arab history and insofar as it is so it has removed the sanctity which traditional leaderships enjoyed among our people. Then what we witness from 1948 onwards is a process of erosion in the nationalist leadership. Hence Israel, synchronised very clearly all the forces that militated against Arab nationalism and the social and economic institutions with which the traditional leadership was associated with. Before, we had to fight Israel and not talk about the social evils which confronted us. The traditional leadership argued that all Arabs are "brothers" and utilized these sentimental slogans to cover their vested interests in the disunity of the Arab nation to protect their crowns, tribal systems, privileged positions, and their capacity to exploit in the Arab nation. The masses were committed to these very forces that were exploiting them in the name of 'national unity' and when we failed in Palestine, we broke away from this obsolete leadership.

Another fallacy that has been exploded since 1948 was the tacit psychological imprisonment to the West which this traditionalist leadership imposed upon us. "Let us," it was said, "argue our main problems out and give the West indications that their basic strategic interests will be guaranteed" as we have to accept the division of the world into two power blocs besides not having any other choice. Arab nationalism was strategically committed to the West although politically antagonistic to the West. This is what the Arab nationalist movement since 1948 broke away from culminating in the decision of the Egyptian Government to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. This decision freed the Arabs not only from the psychological prison but from the political and strategic straight-

jacket in which the Arabs found themselves in their struggle against Imperialism. A fluid situation developed and the erosive process continued accelerated by a more decisive alienation of the popular forces from the traditionalist leadership thus rushing its final disintegration. Lack of prior theoretical traditions in the popular movement, due to its links with the traditionalists, led to the infusion of the popular movement with an ideological purposiveness. So we find that after 1948 political captivity to the West had been broken and neutrality became a popular policy long before the Egyptian Government adopted it as an official policy.

The Arabs acted as separate sovereign entities and as long as we were continuing the process, imposed upon us through the introduction of artificial frontiers, there was bound to develop interest in these divisions and a dynamic interest in the disunity of Arab nation. Our nationalism became no longer exclusively anti-imperialist but also an instrument for Arab unity. Furthermore, we realized that national liberation cannot be achieved fully unless the forces of social and economic liberation are set in motion. Interrelated with the Arab nationalist movement were anti-imperialism, Arab unity, and social evolution. Therefore, Arab nationalism developed into a regenerative force in our area.

In 1955, it was not the Czechoslovak arms deal which was so important or the equipment made available to the Egyptian army to face the immediate threat of Israel on the Gaza Strip that was vital, but what was important is that for the first time in official Arab history a Government was willing to act as if international relations to us was a two-way traffic and not one-way traffic. That was of historical significance. It was in this way that the Egyptian Government, whatever its other policies were, was supported by the nationalist forces in the Arab nation, as it was the first government willing to break the strategic psychological imprisonment in which the Arabs found themselves prior to 1955. With this initiative taken, the popular forces in the Arab world found that their policies previously advocated in articles and lectures but never advocated by a Foreign Minister, found response in Egyptian official circles. So, when in recent months Western propaganda sought to show that Egypt was "engineering a coup d'etat" here and there, or that the U.A.R. was trying "to overthrow legally established governments" as in Lebanon, it was not correct. True, there was among the revolutionary group in the Arab world a genuine sympathy to the Egyptian Government's position but not because it was 'Egyptian' but because it was able to express a political trend which the popular movement was committed to. For example, historically speaking, Syrians have more affinity with Iraq but the Iraq of Nuri was repulsive to them. Thus despite the fragmentation of the Arab society, i.e., Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, etc., the Arab mind responds in unison to a correct policy from wherever it emanates geographically. By the same token, we find that despite the very vital

religious factor (87 per cent of the Arabs are Moslems), the Arabs have the dynamic affinity not with the Moslem governments throughout the world but with Burma, India, Indonesia, rather than with the Turkish, Pakistani, and the Iranian Governments. Positive neutrality advocated by the Syrian and Egyptian Governments led to the partial fulfillment of their objective—their unity into the United Arab Republic. It gave impetus in Lebanon, usually a mercantile country, to a revolution which was capable of destroying the wishful thinking of the West—namely, to alienate Lebanon from the Arab polity. In Iraq, the revolution destroyed the edifice of the Baghdad Pact and restored Iraq to the normalcy of its Arab orientation and made it possible for the West to think that imposed military pacts do not consecrate regimes against the people's will. The Iraqi revolution made it possible for a precedent to be set thus shaking the whole validity of a bi-polar system in international relations. More than that, it incapacitated a bloc of reintroducing itself into the area except through overt military aggression i.e., the landing of British troops in Jordan and of American troops in Lebanon, a replica of the aggression that occurred in 1956 on Egypt. It was our exercise of the *derivative power*, and our capacity to mobilize the non-committed, which rendered our neutrality dynamic and positive and enabled us to force the withdrawal of the West from the area without the bloodshed that was expected. Non-commitment is commitment to the cause of peace, to the cause of freedom. Let it be stated that if we wanted to respond as our sentiments would have dictated, to the landing of American troops in Lebanon or to the landing of British troops in Jordan, there would have been at least a satisfaction to our dignity in having fought them. But every genuine policy of non-commitment at periods of crisis generates its wisdom because it realizes its global responsibilities and that the ultimate achievement of its nationalist objectives lies in its capacity of morally isolating world imperialism and of achieving all its objectives in a climate of understanding and international peace.

PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD*

BY DR. CLOVIS MAKSOUD

IN the last two lectures I have, more or less attempted to bring about the basic motivations for the policy of positive neutrality. I take it that the exercise of a policy of neutrality in the Arab nation, weakened by the absence of a demographic potential or very important economic resources besides being disrupted into various legal entities, renders unity a primary objective. When we ask what in fact is the source of our power, as every foreign policy irrespective of its moral considerations requires a backing of the power element in order that it can become effective and bring about the fruits that the nationalist movement requires it to bring about, we answer that the major source of power is the dynamics of the Arab nationalist movement and the fact that its policy of positive neutrality has the consent of the whole popular movement. That in itself is a very important factor. The consent of the people to a foreign policy is essential as it means that it can elicit from the people continuous support. However, the other major source of power in terms of geo-politics, is the *derivative power*, namely, the capacity of the Arab nation to derive power from the major contradictions between the two power blocs in their respective capacity to neutralise each other and deter each other from widening their spheres of influence outside the territory in which they exist; and secondly, it derives power from the inherent contradiction that exists between the relationship between the source of power and its subsidiary allies within the power blocs; these inherent contradictions might not be always antagonistic. This characterises the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, or between the United States and United Kingdom and France. The contradiction between the two power blocs lies in their mutual capacity to neutralise and deter each other. The two blocs' capacity for long-range bombing and whatever advantage in short-range bombing and military bases the United States possesses on the territory of the Soviet periphery is counterbalanced on the other hand by the overwhelming conventional power that the Soviet bloc possesses. Hence in the area where the West probes for military bases to increase its short-range bombing advantage the policy of positive neutrality is to evolve a policy which denies these bases but, at the same time, maintains a form of commitment to the West in that the nationalist movement guarantees the supply of oil to Western Europe as it is vital for its existence. Total commitment to the Soviet policy would have required us to deprive the West of our oil. However, we are partially committed to the Soviet bloc in the sense that we insist on denying the West a strategic advantage which might enable it to acquire a strategic superiority over the Soviet bloc by its utilisation of bases in our country. In this way, we satisfy our partial

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commitment to the Soviet bloc in that we deny the West this strategical advantage but not the oil which a total commitment to the Soviet bloc would have necessitated us to do. Therefore, non-commitment is also partial commitment.

In my second lecture we came to certain conclusions in that the nature of weapons that have developed, the whole capacity of the holocaust that might envelop the whole world as a result of nuclear warfare and the capacity of mutual destruction has more or less introduced the neutralising factor stems from the near-equality in terms of bombardment and the potential losses that might ensue because of their respective capacity of destroying each other. What ensues is that within the area where the two power blocs meet, a crisis area emerges. A crisis area has to face the challenges and answer this vital issue for its existence; shall it commit itself irrevocably to the permanent and continuous interests of one bloc or another becoming a contributory factor to the bi-polarization of power increasing international tension, or shall it acquire the capacity to extricate itself from the bipolar system of power and declare its neutrality and rely for the confirmation of its neutral policy on the fact that none of the two powers, because of their mutual deterrent capacity, will risk breaking its neutrality.

The Arab countries are part of the crisis area due to their very important and exposed strategic position as they connect three continents, through Suez, and because of the potential strategic bases and oil resources. This made it imperative on Arab nationalism to identify itself with the policy of positive neutrality. How to defend this neutrality is the issue and herein lies our problems of defence.

How to defend this neutrality and render it positive so it can introduce a climate of peace conducive for the realisation of our national objectives which include, as I explained in the last lecture, our social and economic objectives as well? How, it will be asked, is the realisation of the basic objectives of the Arab people connected with the relaxation of international tension. I explained previously how it is possible for a situation of tension to militate against the economic-social revolution within the Arab nation and prevent it from unfolding itself and realizing itself. I sought to identify our nationalist objectives in terms of social, economic, as well as our political objectives with the relaxation of international tension and the acquisition of a vested interest in the development of a peaceful settlement between the two power blocs. Now, the problems of defence for a nation like the Arab nation whose global weakness in terms of power is the source of its strength, and whose policy as well as itself are threatened constantly by potential or actual encroachment by one bloc or another, are varied. When I state that the strength of the Arab nation

emanates from its weakness, I am not actually stating a paradox. What I am saying is that because of the dichotomous nature of power relationship the non-generators of power or the non-subsidiary powers acquire an immunity by default. Therefore, what is characteristic for the problem of defence in the Arab nation is its weakness in terms of global power. We are in fact recipients of global interests but we are not the generators of global power. So although we might have international interests in the sense that we are becoming more dynamically interested in international affairs and we realize that the resolution of our major problems are largely contingent upon our capacity to develop international friendship in an ever-increasing cycle of associations, i.e., Afro-Asia, defining our relationship with Latin America, with the United States, and with European and Soviet powers—yet our interests are international and not global. The distinction between international and global in this context is that the term global implies more or less the dominance of the military aspect of our interest over the political. In this respect only two or three powers in the world have real global interests in that they are generators of power—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom with reduced global interest. Our interest in terms of military policy are regional. Our interest in terms of international diplomacy are international. Therefore, our defence in terms of global strategy stems from the basic weakness on the military-global level. If ever we develop a global interest, it is reduced and channelised into diplomatic avenues. Hence, a further source of dynamism for positive neutrality. On the other hand, this does not mean that we do not have basic defense problems on the regional level. We do. Yet the defence problems of the Arabs are of the category of regional and not global problems. In this manner, the military establishment in the Arab nation can become to a very large extent the executive arm of the political and diplomatic interests of the Arab Nation. Perhaps being the executive arm meant in many instances the introduction of the military forces into the political framework. In terms of defence, however, our global position is potentially strong because of our inherent global weakness. That is an essential hypothesis of the Arab nationalist conception of positive neutrality. That is how I should like it to be and I feel that this is the way it is developing.

The second problem is therefore our regional defence. Regional defence is not isolated from global defence, because although there is a recognition of this concept of neutrality and a realisation on the part of the two power blocs of its vitality, the two blocs also realize the futility of stating to the Arabs or perhaps to the other countries of Asia, that neutrality is not possible. This realization has become an integral part in the Arab nationalist development. The big powers are learning, reluctantly it is true, how to accommodate this neutrality and to elicit from it advantages when or if possible. Again, the problem of defence becomes more intricate, more complex in our region. In many instances

the regional priority to the Arab is not the priority of the major power blocs which have interest in the area and a conflict arises. How is this? The major problem of defence for the Arabs is Israel. Although Israel might be a source of trouble in the area and for its stability, it is not as vital a problem for the two blocs as it is to us; herein lies the unevenness of priorities between our conception of what constitutes important defence and the major power blocs' conception.

When we say that the major regional problem of defence for us in the area is Israel and then say that on the global level our military weakness is a source of our strength and argue that in order to defend ourselves properly against Israel we have to increase our military capacity, are we not, in fact, contradicting ourselves? This is a very plausible question which might arise. Perhaps many of the Arab nationalists themselves when thinking of this problem must have thought that they were really introducing into their analysis a basic contradiction. If I state that I want to realise my basic nationalist objectives in the area and that this depends largely on relaxing international tension then I am stating a truism. But in order to relax international tension a *disengagement* policy from the bi-polar system of power must be pursued. In order that a *disengaged* area gives sufficient guarantee to both blocs, it must be de-nuclearized and potentially de-militarized. But when I argue that we must equip our armies with better weapons and train a better officers corps and go further and emphasize the need to unify the leadership of our military services instead of having six or seven separate armies, in a way I am arguing for the militarisation of the area. How is this apparent paradox resolved? Assuming this is one of the intricate problems that face us and perhaps face many other countries in the world, we have to relate our regional interests and our international interests and realise that when we think of demilitarisation of the area and of the *disengagement* of the Arabs from the dichotomous pattern of power relationship we enter into the relative meanings of the term *military*. Now this is, I think, a major development in contemporary international politics. The term 'military establishment' and the term 'military' itself undergo, in contemporary conditions, a qualitative change whereby they do not mean homogeneous monolithic structures in terms of armies alone. In a way the paradox is apparent and not real and means that we must advocate demilitarisation of the area because it should be impossible at least within our lifetime if not more to equip ourselves with the ultimate weapons. Hence, we advocate a process of demilitarisation which means that Arab armies within the foreseeable future should not acquire the ultimate—nuclear—weapon because of its very destructiveness, or be part of a bloc strategy where it is utilized. The ultimate nuclear weapon is an instrument of global policy, namely, the instrument of those who are in a position to generate power. Hence, demilitarisation is a relative concept and not an absolute one. So when we say that we must have military equip-

ment in order to protect our regional national interest such as in the case of the Israeli threat, this does not constitute a contradiction except in the pacifist's view. There is a qualitative difference between the concept of demilitarisation as part of an international policy and militarisation as part of a regional policy which is exclusively regional. Therefore, in terms of policy the position of the Arab nationalist movement as well as of the governments which represent the aspirations of the Arab nationalist movement is to extricate the Arab-Israel conflict from its international implications and reduce it to its proper regional framework. The problem of defence for Israel is to internationalise the problem of Arab-Israeli conflict in order to make our international policy of demilitarisation impotent on a regional level.

In terms of regional interest, and defense of the Arab Nation, our interest is to reduce the regional problems and conflicts to their regional framework although that might not be absolutely possible at all times because those who are in conflict with us make it their deliberate policy to internationalise the conflict in order to render our regional advantage militarily impotent and diplomatically ineffective. This is why Israel has been unable to internationalise totally the conflict and we have been unable to regionalise totally the conflict and why the Israel-Arab conflict remains in a state of flux and a source of trouble in the area. This fluidity renders many observers incapable of determining how the trend of the Arab-Israel conflict might develop. Therefore, the basic problem of the Arab in the regional conflict with Israel is to maintain this conflict into its proper regional framework. Hence, demilitarisation in the nuclear global connotation supplements and feeds militarisation on the regional level. This is why the first act of executing the policy of positive neutrality was the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia as it was primarily motivated by the basic need to meet the challenge which Israel presented to the Arabs.

We come now to the more important aspect of the problem. I mentioned briefly the other day that the basic stimulus for Israel is the affirmation of its distinctive personality and how Zionism seeks to alienate the Jew from everybody else and I explained how Arab nationalism is a rational process, characterised by its will to liberate the Arabs from the shackles of all domination and how this fits into the process of evolution. I explained how a nationalism which seeks to ascertain its distinctive features on the basis of race or religion introduces an irrational phase into existence and arrests the process of human evolution. I concluded then that besides its military-political aspect, the Arab-Israel conflict is an ideological conflict because of fundamental difference in their concept of nationalism. Herein lies the need to understand and examine the nature of the problem of defence for Israel in order to understand better the impact that this has on the Arab position. Because of its limited nationalist objectives, Israel has become indifferent to the problems of global relationships. Its advanced economic and social institutions have been utilized

advantageously when compared with the Arab economic and social situation. The institutional achievement was due primarily to the fact that Israel was a transplanted economy and a transplanted people who for whatever reason they came, came from highly developed centres of the world where they acquired not only technical know-how but also a standard of living which was impossible for Israel to reduce drastically. By the same token they were the recipients of well-organised and determined financial support which far exceeded any amount of aid that the Arab as well as any Asian nations received, notwithstanding that the Israelis are 1½ million and the Arabs are around 70 millions people. This unevenness of treatment and this concentrated attention which Israel received made it very similar to the closed society of the *whites* in Kenya and the *colons* in Algeria. To preserve this superior position and conserve this advantageous status in relationship to the area, Israel became more and more indifferent to the implications of its policy and more willing to identify itself with whoever provided it the guarantee for its continued superiority. Hence, the defence policy of Israel was exclusive and absolute alignment with the Western bloc and the conception of itself as an enclave of the West in the Arab East, and the inevitable delegation of its defence to the Western bloc in the area irrespective of the consequences of such delegation. In order to prevent the Arab-Israel from being confined to its regional framework, it now identifies itself irrevocably with the Western strategic plans in the area introducing a further dimension into the conflict between the Arab nationalist movement and Israel. How are we to arrest this trend which enables the West to render Israel a military basis or a military instrument as it did in 1956, particularly when certain Western powers seek to nourish an operational impetus against the influence of positive neutrality and that of the Arab nationalist movement? The meeting of interests between Israel and the aberrations in the West is a further danger that Israel constitutes to the Arabs. Israel is therefore an enclave of one of the blocs in the midst of the Arab nation and an operational stimulus for potential reintroduction of Western suzerainty over the Arabs. Israel becomes dangerous not only because of the Arab refugees and because it has no right to be established in our midst as Palestine is an integral part of the Arab nation, but because the far-reaching and detrimental implications of its policy to our existence. A Western enclave irrespective of its origins inasmuch as it conceives of its interest in an absolute identification with one bloc or another militates against our positive neutrality and non-commitment and becomes a threat to international peace. This is so, because if an area is non-committed but is infested with enclaves and pockets that serve the operational purposes of one bloc or another, particularly when this serviceability is backed by nuclear weapons, then non-commitment becomes increasingly ineffective and positive neutrality less potent. Therefore, Israel's role in this respect is similar to that of the Iraqi Government when it was in the Baghdad Pact. It is not simply because of the immense injustice the creation of Israel inflicted upon us, although this explains the

strength and momentum of the opposition to it, but what is essential is that there is the possibility of a big power backing it and willing to accept Israeli identification and respond to it in a corresponding identity. The capacity of the enclave in the Arab nation to undermine the foundations of non-alignment and non-commitment is much more overpowering than our capacity to resist especially when the major source of strength for the non-commitment a policy lies in its relative weakness in terms of global weapons. So, when within the area develops an alien enclave capable of relying on global power then it can delay the realisation of our strategic as well as our political and social objectives.

We see that the problem of defence for the Arabs vis-a-vis Israel lies not only in the need to rectify the wrong done to us but in the vigilant protection of the policy of positive neutrality and to consolidate it as a great contribution to the easing of international tension. In terms of global interests, Israel is a secondary issue which could be rendered primary in direct proportion to the readiness that the West shows to accept Israel's identity with it. We come back to the major instrument of policy and this, unfortunately, has utilitarian connotations. We have the oil and the West needs it. So the West, despite its requirements for strategic advantage and strategic enclaves in the area, and despite the fact that Israel presents an ideal enclave and an ideal excuse to return back to the area, it is not willing to respond equally to Israel's desire for total identification. In this manner we keep our partial commitment to the West which is part of our non-commitment policy. This partial commitment will reduce the willingness of the West to consider Israel as an integral part of its own strategic plans in the area. This is why when the tripartite aggression took place against Egypt in 1956, the Arab nationalist movement conceived of this tripartite collusion as an indication that the West had committed itself in an equal manner to Israel's commitment to the West thus explaining the fierceness of its opposition. The United States' stand in 1956 made it possible for partial commitment to remain. We have to understand this because as long as the West is not willing to accept fully Israel's concept of its own defence our partial commitment to the West as part of our non-commitment policy remains. Now, we cannot foresee the future. Yet these are the basic and fundamental premises of our defence position.

Defence and offense are not exclusive in that when we formulate our policy of defence, it is to make more effective our offensive against social inequality, economic backwardness and dislocation, and against obsolete political institutions and to quicken our socialist development. Our offensive against the evils in our Arab society determine our defence policy. Only if we can develop in the Arab nation a progressive and forward looking Arab society can we contribute towards constructive international peace and bring about a new world order free from the tensions that frustrate our move towards true happiness.

(Concluded)

LEADERSHIP AND MAN-MANAGEMENT

BY LIEUT.-GENERAL B. M. KAUL

Leadership is the ability of a Commander to get the best out of the team he leads, under all conditions of service. It is not something which can be acquired. Its talents are inherent, as in the case of artistic pursuits such as painting, music and poetry. In order to lead any group of men successfully, it is necessary to possess profound professional knowledge. Its main requisites are courage, personality, physical fitness, ability to make supreme sacrifices, sincerity and character.

A good leader has an open mind, forgets and forgives, takes in his stride flattery, disloyalty, ingratitude, meanness, cowardice, falsehood and other frailties of human character, without malice. He exhorts the timid, stirs up the fight when it slackens, rallies the troops when broken, displays sound judgment, loves his men and in turn is loved by them and cares for their safety, interest and well being. He is generous, warm-hearted with a soul of fire and a cool head. A good mind can see and judge whereas character leads to resolute execution. If there is perfect equilibrium between mind, courage and character and one is also favoured by circumstances and fortune, he becomes a rare leader.

Another facet of leadership is justice. But Pascal said over three centuries ago that justice without force is impotent and force without justice is tyrannical. Justice must, therefore, be combined with force.

Then, there is the question of whether age affects good leadership. Abundant examples of young and old leaders are available who earned great fame alike. Alexander, Napoleon and Wellington were young leaders. On the other hand, Julius Caesar, Marlborough and Foch became renowned as military leaders at an old age.

The test of a leader comes in a crisis. And the biggest crisis of all is a war. It is a tempest which blows through our lives and challenges every institution of our society. It is in war that we are exposed mercilessly and emerge from it as good or bad leaders of men.

Military profession demands our lives. But what causes us to face death willingly? Is it temptation for promotion or decorations, tradition, discipline, patriotism or visions of glory? Perhaps a little of everything. It is due mostly to personal loyalty, and devotion between individuals. This comes through good man-management.

Leadership and man-management go hand in hand. Relations between commanders and their men are very much like those which exist between a rider and a horse. You must know your horse, its

temperament and its habits. It should be looked after in the stables as if it was worth millions but should be ridden in the field as if it was worth a straw. A horse always knows whether his rider is riding him well or badly. Similarly, a subordinate always knows whether his superior is commanding him well or poorly.

Leaders at all levels should know their men's antecedents, habits, hobbies, weaknesses, qualities, character, private affairs, conditions in their villages and families, and past records. They should give them facilities to earn their trade pay and improve their education so that they may pass their promotion examinations for further advancement. They should keep an eye on their rations, clothing and accommodation, specially married, amenities, leave and medical facilities.

A good leader should always be sympathetic to those under him but specially so when they are in trouble or faced with difficulties. In helping them he should go the whole hog and not indulge in half-hearted lip service. In the latter case, they will soon begin to distinguish between genuine and superficial assistance, and lose faith in his word. He should be impartial and avoid favouritism and not humiliate or belittle them nor be sarcastic. He should refrain from joking at their expense publicly or displaying his sense of humour too often. They should not feel that he is impervious to their interests, or that he imperils their lives in war without giving them a fair chance of survival. He should never make cannon fodder out of them. They expect from him good leadership, adequate weapons and supplies. Let them have guns and butter. In the first World War the Russians had butter but no guns and the Germans had guns but no butter.

He should play games with them, work hard with them, know and respect their religion and join them in their religious and marriage festivities, know and speak their language, pay homage to their dead, and mix with them socially on selected occasions. In other words, he should develop personal relations with them and become a part and parcel of their lives. If he does all this and always set a high example so that they can look up to him, his men will follow him through thick and thin.

Whilst it is necessary to look after his men and do all that is outlined above, on no account should he ever look for cheap popularity or be oversolicitous towards them. He should not allow them to take advantage of him in any way. Some of them will try and run their superiors. They must be put in their place. No doubt should be left in their mind that he is their boss. He need not be apologetic for any orders he gives. There is a tribe of bullies in all armies. There may be others under him who wield influence in various spheres and are connected with important people. This should never sway or worry him. He must remain the boss of his subordinates. Members of these tribes resent

being put in their place. They must be dealt with an iron hand. If this fails to work, they must be removed or punished suitably. They should not be allowed to undermine the position of their boss. Once a leader allows his realm of command to be threatened, he will forfeit the respect of his subordinates and will virtually cease to lead them.

The morale aspect should not be exaggerated in a crisis. Men should be nursed carefully in peace but driven hard in an emergency. There is always time and place for solicitude. They should not be praised unduly, but, of course, encouraged when they deserve any approbation; nor should the necessity of hot meals, full sleep and other amenities be harped upon in situations which do not permit these luxuries. In other words, men should not be pampered nor made into "paper tigers".

Different classes need different treatment. *Sikhs, Gorkhas, Marathas, Madrasis, Jats and Rajputs* have different idiosyncrasies and traits which need to be studied carefully and handled skilfully.

A good leader should not become a slave of rules and regulations. He should depart from them wherever a loophole permits him to do so in the interest of his troops or service. He should not allow them to fetter his leadership. Nor should he become a drain on his juniors' purse or misuse his authority. He must never play about with his juniors' womenfolk, for this is the quickest way of disintegrating his command.

If we rise high up in life, we must search our hearts. In case we really feel we have some frailties of character, we ought to put them right so that we can justify the high rank attained by us, perhaps through favourable circumstances. But on no account must we ever let ourselves have any pangs of conscience in our eminence or it will begin to prick.

Finally, it should be remembered that man is the most important weapon of war. His management is, therefore, a delicate matter and of great consequence.

A leader may succeed for sometime in persuading his superiors that he is a good commander but he will never be able to persuade his subordinates unless he has the real qualities of leadership. There is no known recipe for either leadership or man-management, but fundamentally there are no two opinions on the basic requisites of both.

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY 1958

REORGANISATION OF DEFENCE SERVICES*

BY BRIGADIER B. S. BHAGAT

"With Independence, the Defence problems facing India have considerably altered. From being Defence Forces which were available as an integrated part of an overall force to work anywhere in the world, they have now become a national force designed to defend their own country only with all that this implies. Under the changed circumstances there is obviously a necessity for changing organisations both tactical and logistical. This change also becomes apparent when one considers the increasing capacity of new weapons. Bearing this in mind, what changes should be made in the existing organisation of the Defence Services and in their system of command, control and administration."

INTRODUCTION

THE subject matter of the Essay has specified the main change that independence of the Country has brought about in so far as the roles of the Defence Services of India are concerned. Before, however, we start to examine and recommend the consequential changes that are necessary in the defence organisation of the country, it would help greatly to clarify and crystallize the problem and thus facilitate the task of making recommendations if we first examined broadly the implications of this change, including those brought about by the advent of new weapons, in so far as they effect our Defence Services. This essay is accordingly sub-divided into two main parts:—

PART I — *The implications of Independence and of new weapons on the defence organisation in India.*

PART II — *Changes considered necessary in the defence organisation of the country.*

PART I

THE IMPLICATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE AND OF NEW WEAPONS
ON THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION IN INDIA

Pre-Independence, political control of the Armed Forces in India and responsibility for British Imperial Military Policy both as regards planning and decision rested with the British Cabinet in the United Kingdom. The Governor General in India together with the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor General's Council were, broadly speaking, concerned largely with the implementation of such policy as was laid down by Whitehall. It was therefore only logical and not surprising that the whole of the Armed Forces organisation that existed in India upto that time was shaped and tailored to suit these conditions.

* Written in October 58.

With Independence and the passing over of political control of the Defence Services from Whitehall to the Indian Parliament, the position of course changed radically. The implications which this great change, the consequent partition of the country and the advent of new weapons have had on the defence organisation of India are outlined below under appropriate headings.

IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION OF THE COUNTRY

The role and responsibilities of the Higher Defence Organisation in India altered very considerably with Independence. From being an organisation designed for only limited functions and charged largely for implementation rather than for initiation of policy, it became one with full and complete responsibility for the defence of the country. In particular it had to contend with the following problems:—

- (a) The assuming of political control of the Defence Forces of India by the Minister for Defence and the answering for them to Parliament.
- (b) Formation of defence policy in all its aspects at the national level and particularly its integration with the country's foreign policy.
- (c) The planning and executive action required to give shape and effect to national defence policy. This in turn implied that constant help and all necessary information and data would have to be made available in the future from probably new national organisations dealing with central intelligence, industrial and scientific research and development, manpower planning, and mobilisation of national resources including stockpiling.

Prior to 1946, the Commander-in-Chief in India was not only the head of the Army, but also of the other two Services apart from being the Defence Member in the Viceroy's Executive Council. Shortly before Independence the functions of the Defence Minister were separated from the office of the Commander-in-Chief and taken over by a politician responsible to Parliament. In addition about that time it was also decided as desirable that each of the three Services should become a separate entity with their own individual chiefs of staff and headquarters. This meant the setting up of three separate headquarters and the establishing of new procedures and machinery for the following:—

- (a) day to day working and relationship generally between the individual Services and the Ministries of Defence and Finance.
- (b) Inter-Service planning, coordination and cooperation and the rendering of joint Inter-Service advice to Government on military matters.

The organisation and machinery required to carry out these new responsibilities efficiently was in most cases either non-existent or woefully inadequate. Thus considerable expansion and at times improvisation had to be resorted to. This has been a continuing process during the last ten years, but the right answer in many cases has still not been reached. The changes that are considered necessary to improve matters

in the light of present day conditions will be discussed in Part II of the Essay.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTERED ROLE OF THE DEFENCE SERVICES

Prior to Independence the Armed Forces in India were designed to operate in conjunction and cooperation with British and other Commonwealth forces in the furtherance of British Imperial Policy. Defence of the actual frontiers of India was only one part of their task. This had several important implications of which the main ones were:—

- (a) The Armed Forces of India had to be so organised, equipped and trained as to be readily transportable to any part of the world, and operate in all types of terrain against, if necessary, first class powers. In the later case ofcourse they would almost certainly act in concert with British and other Allied Forces. This was particularly true of the Indian Army.
- (b) The actual defence of India was a relatively simple task as India was an undivided subcontinent with no hostile or even unfriendly powers near her frontiers. In addition undivided India's international land frontiers passed through very difficult terrain in the shape of high mountains and thick jungle which would have made the problems of an invading force exceedingly difficult. The maritime frontiers of India could, for all practical purposes, be considered secure as they were protected by the British Royal Navy.
- (c) The supply of equipment for the Armed Forces of India was not a serious problem as it was largely obtained from Great Britain or if the necessity arose from other Commonwealth Countries and the United States of America.

After Independence and the division of the Indian sub-continent into the two countries of India and Pakistan, the role of the Indian Defence Services, as they could now more appropriately be termed, changed fundamentally and became, for all practical purposes, solely the defence of the country from external aggression. The Government of India publicly declared that it eschewed war completely as an instrument of national policy to settle international disputes and that its defence forces would thenceforth be employed only for the defence of the country. This altered role meant that:—

- (a) There was now no question of India's Defence Services having to go and fight anywhere else save in the close proximity of her new land and sea frontiers.
- (b) The Defence Services of India would, in the future, have to be prepared to fight on their own in the defence of the country. They would also now no longer necessarily be required to fit in with British and Commonwealth Forces. Hence, if found advantageous, they could change their organisation and shape to suit their new particularised role which would be the sole criterion.
- (c) Because of India's very limited financial and industrial resources, it was quite apparent that in the foreseeable future the country, on its own, could only defend herself adequately against second class powers of comparable strength. Against aggression by first class powers India

would have to rely largely on the United Nations and World opinion. Her Defence Forces could therefore be realistically shaped. This was particularly applicable to her Naval and Air Forces.

- (d) As a result of the partition of the Indian sub-continent, Post-Independence India no longer possessed the former advantage of having difficult terrain to help guard her land frontier. The Himalayas in the North certainly remained, but her land frontiers with Pakistan both in the East and West were now, for a considerable portion of their length, artificial and man made. Further and unfortunately the international relations between these two countries became bedevilled right from the very start and have remained so. The last ten years have seen repeated cycles of virulent anti-Indian propaganda being whipped up in Pakistan. There have in fact been numerous occasions when even responsible politicians in Pakistan have openly advocated war against India as the only solution for Pakistan's problems. Of course this may not and probably will not come to pass and one sincerely hopes that wiser counsels will prevail and lasting peace and amity result between these two countries of the once undivided sub-continent. Should this come about it may then become possible for consideration to be given for the joint defence of the Indian sub-continent. Until, however, such an improvement takes place we have to be realistic and face facts that in Pakistan as she is at present we have, to say the least, an unfriendly State on our borders. As such it would be highly irresponsible and even criminal if the Defence Services of India did not take this important factor with all its implications into account when planning for the defence of the country.
- (e) The position with regard to the supply of equipment from abroad for the Defence Services of India has become increasingly difficult since Independence. This is so both from the aspect of actually obtaining it and also of course paying for it from the limited amount of foreign exchange available. This difficulty has become particularly pronounced because of India's unequivocal declaration that she does not intend, either at present or in the future, to join any of the cold war power blocs that currently exist in the world. The answer of course is to step up the indigenous manufacture of defence equipment as much as possible and at the same time attempt, as far as is practicable, to cut down on the use of such equipment as has got to be obtained from abroad. Of course the latter can only be done within certain limits, and this is particularly so in the case of the Air Force and Navy whose very fundamental equipment has still to be procured from foreign sources.

THE IMPACT OF NEW WEAPONS

When we refer to New Weapons in the Post World War II period, we of course have in mind nuclear weapons and guided missiles. These are man's final possession of the perfected means to carry out his own total destruction. Every aspect of military and related political planning has been altered by their invention. The armies of all first class powers are being re-organised to enable them to operate under nuclear conditions. The old basic principle of concentration on the battlefield has now a greatly modified application, and the stress now is on mobility and armoured forces and supply by air. Large formations are going out and will be

replaced by units and small compact formations of all arms capable of acting independently on general directives issued by coordinating headquarters.

In the case of navies and air forces the changes envisaged are even more radical. The only naval craft that are considered usable under nuclear conditions are submarines and nucleated powered ones at that. World War II saw the end of the old Capital ship—Battleship—and now its successor, the Aircraft Carrier, would appear to be on the way out.

In the air the time is already here when manned bomber and fighter aircraft are being replaced by guided missiles. The use of manned military aircraft will, probably in the future, be confined to their employment in tactical airforces in support of land operations, for reconnaissance and for air transportation.

Of course forces organised and equipped with nuclear weapons, particularly the fusion type ones, can only be employed as a 'Nuclear Deterrent' in peace time or in an all out nuclear war. They would not be suitable for small limited wars in which nuclear weapons are not employed. What then? That indeed is the major issue which confronts all the Big Powers of today.

Obviously the solution is to have two types of armed forces—Conventional and Nuclear, the former to be employed for small and limited wars and the latter for all out nuclear ones. The problem, however, which then arises is whether the nations concerned can afford both. Recent events would appear to show that unless they can somehow do so, the Big Powers cannot survive as such.

For us in India this poses no dilemma. We have no nuclear weapons at present nor is it our national policy to have any in the future. Our Defence Forces must therefore continue to be conventional ones and this is in keeping with their present role. This, however, does not mean that we need not concern ourselves with the advent of nuclear weapons. They have in fact a definite effect on our Defence Services both in regard to their present role and organisation, as well as their future thinking and development. It is essential that a very clear concept exists in our Defence Organisation as regards the role and organisation of our conventional Defence Services in this Nuclear Age. The limitations of armed forces equipped with only conventional weapons must be clearly appreciated and any tendency to ascribe to them unduly ambitious roles, and consequently equipping them with large quantities of what are essentially obsolete equipments, would not only be unnecessarily wasteful and thus an economic drain on the country but also probably dangerous to its security. This is particularly applicable to the employment of our naval and air forces. Their roles in the defence of the country must be very clearly appreciated and specified and any tendency to assign them other

roles comparable to what conventional naval and air forces were allotted in say World War II under the then non-nuclear conditions, must be firmly resisted.

As to the future it is obvious that our Defence Services must keep abreast of nuclear military developments as they occur in the World and ensure that due thought is given to how our defence forces should be equipped and organised in the future in order to be able to face up to the problems of the future defence of the country in a fast developing nuclear era.

PART II

CHANGES CONSIDERED NECESSARY IN THE DEFENCE ORGANISATION OF INDIA

Having examined the main implications which independence and partition of the Country and the advent of new weapons have had on the defence of India, we can now go on to suggest the consequential changes that are necessary in the overall Defence Organisation of the Country. These proposed changes have as their basis the following fundamental considerations:—

- (a) *The primary role of the Defence Services of India as it has now become viz the Defence of the Country.*
- (b) *Practicability and efficiency both in war and peace.*
- (c) *Economy.*

It will be appreciated that for obvious reasons recommendations for changes of this kind in an essay of this nature can only be made in the broadest outline. If the principle of such changes is once accepted then it is considered that the details would have to be worked out by expert committees appointed with appropriate terms of reference. In particular the changes considered necessary in the Higher Defence Organisation of India might well form the subject of an examination by a committee similar to the one set up by the British Government in 1904 under the chairmanship of Lord Esher. The report of this Committee laid the foundations of a defence organisation which subsequently was to withstand successfully the test of two world wars and which, with certain modifications, exists even today. The time and conditions would certainly appear ripe for such a Committee to be set up in India now.

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN THE HIGHER DEFENCE ORGANISATION OF INDIA

As has been mentioned in Part I of the essay, the Higher Defence Organisation in India as it exists at present is largely the result of improvisation and small changes made from time to time in an attempt to meet the problems as they have arisen of Post Independence and the Partition of the country. There is little doubt that the right answer has not as yet been reached and the machinery as at present does not meet the requirements satisfactorily. Further, as will be seen later, it is un-

necessarily uneconomical in certain ways and would not, it is certain stand up to the acid test of war.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that unless the Defence Machinery of a country at the top is organised on a sound basis, no amount of striving for efficiency in the Services themselves can produce success in war. An efficient and practicable higher defence organisation is the base on which the whole structure of the defence of a country rests. It is imperative that this base be well constructed.


The wheels of our Defence Organisation in India have in fact been running for the last ten years largely on the momentum of their pre-Independence days. They are now showing signs of slowing down. Rather than make small repairs and give small boosts, it is best to re-cast the bearings afresh on sound and practicable lines so that the wheels take on a fresh lease of life and begin to run smoothly and efficiently again.

A suggested outline organisation for the Higher Defence machinery in India is shown in Chart 1, on page 164. It will be seen that at the top viz the Cabinet, its Defence Committee and the Defence Minister, no departure from the current set up is advocated, but thereafter there are considerable changes which are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The Department of National Mobilisation is an American concept and in that country has proved of very great value in helping to keep up the military preparedness of the nation. Its adoption in India is strongly recommended. It could function either independently under the Defence Committee of the Cabinet or as a part of the Planning Commission. Its main function would be to ensure that the country as a whole was never caught on the wrong foot and that its mobilisation in the event of an emergency could be carried out smoothly and efficiently. In particular it would be the department's business to see that a detailed assessment was available of the total national resources of manpower and material and that their allocation to different users was made in accordance with a carefully worked out priority and scale. Following on from this the Department would also be responsible to ensure that such essential supplies, as are in short supply within the country, were kept stockpiled to the required level. Further, during the present phase of our expanding national economy and the successive five year plans, such an organisation would be of great value in ensuring that defence requirements and considerations are continually kept in mind by the Planning Commission in its deliberations and integrated in its national planning.

A Central Intelligence Organisation is not entirely a new proposition. A Central Intelligence Bureau does exist even at present under the Home Ministry. This, however, covers only a limited field and does not fully meet all the requirements. An enlarged Central Intelligence Organisation with a much wider scope is an urgent necessity in

CHART I



Independent India. Such an organisation should come directly under the Central Cabinet and should cover the requirements not only of the Defence Services but also of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Home Ministry and such other Government Departments as may require its help.

Defence Production and Procurement Organisations are self explanatory. The former organisation has recently been re-organised on a sound basis and the vital necessity for encouraging and increasing indigenous production of defence equipment to the utmost is fully realised. This is particularly so in view of the critical foreign exchange position and the difficulties of procurement from abroad which have already been referred to earlier in the essay.

A Defence Procurement Organisation however does not exist as such and defence procurement is effected through the Ministry of Supply. This has not proved entirely satisfactory and the need for a change is clear and necessary. It is obvious that defence procurement in India must of necessity work very closely with defence production and as such it would be best if both these organisations were placed side by side in the Ministry of Defence itself, ensuring of course at the same time that very close liaison was kept up with the Ministry of Supply. Such a reorganisation would definitely lead to a more efficient and very probably a more economical system of supply of equipment to the Defence Services. It would also ensure closer collaboration between defence production and procurement thus lessening dependence on foreign supply.

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND OF THE DEFENCE SERVICES

One of the major lessons of World War II was the vital need for some kind of integration and unification of the three defence Services. Events since the war like the Korean War, the Suez crisis, the recent West and East Asian crises and in fact the development of nuclear weapons have further reinforced this conclusion. Military thought throughout the world now accepts as a truism that modern war must be fought by all the three Services acting together as one under a single commander and that unless this is done the chances of success will be small. The old idea of separate and individual command of the three Services with inter-service cooperation being affected by three equal and independent service commanders acting in concert has been discarded as impracticable by all the great Powers. The attendant disadvantages of such a system—indecision, lack of cohesiveness, loss of time and in fact all the inherent defects which one normally must expect when there is no central unitary control and direction—preclude completely its retention in the present day when any delay, any indecision concerning defence is more or less certain to prove disastrous.

Britain and the United States have recently carried out changes in their Defence Organisation to conform to this principle. The operational

chain of command which is being adopted in the United States is in fact very similar to the one shown in Chart 1, on page 164.

It will be seen that the operational chain of higher command as advocated in this chart has the Defence Minister as the focal head of the whole of the defence set up. To advise him on all military matters there is recommended a Defence Chief of Staff who would be the highest military authority in the country. An important feature of this proposal is that the Defence Minister will be able to get true and unbiased military and inter-service advice from his Defence Chief of Staff. Under present day conditions this has been found to be practically impossible as understandably and naturally enough inter-service advice from the Chiefs of Individual Services could never be totally unbiased. Lord Montgomery infact says:

*"Today it is impossible for a Head of Government or Minister of Defence to get true and unbiased inter-service advice."**

The Chief of Defence Staff should be in a position to give orders to the individual Chiefs of Staff of the three Services and acting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through the Joint Defence Staff issue directives and instructions to the Commanders of such united inter-service commands as are set up in the country. The organisation and maintenance of the individual service components of these inter service commands would of course be the responsibility of their respective parent services. The exact number of such unified commands in the country and details of the chain of operational command lower down cannot, it will be appreciated, be suitably discussed in an essay of this nature. It is obvious, however, that there would have to be at least three or four such Joint Commands. They would not in all cases necessarily comprise all the three Services but would definitely include at least two; thus Western Command for example would be a joint command of the army and air force under a single commander. Joint Task Formations or Forces would be formed lower down the scale depending on requirements.

The formation of an integrated and efficient joint defence staff is of course an essential part of this chain. This staff would not only be a planning staff but also an executive one and would thus be responsible for giving shape and effect to the orders of the Chief of Defence Staff|Joint Chiefs of Staff. On all operational matters these orders would be issued direct to the Commanders of joint commands and on other subjects to the services concerned.

HIGHER COMMAND OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENCE SERVICES

It will be seen from Chart 1 (page 164) that though the operational command of the three Defence Services is proposed to be unified through

* In his address to the RUSI, reproduced in the USI Journal, January-March 1956, P. 55.

the appointment of the Defence Chief of Staff, the individual command and control of the three Services for all other matters such as organisation, training and administration has been shown as being the responsibility of individual Service Councils. This proposal constitutes a radical change from the existing organisation in India where the three Defence Services, though all under the Defence Minister, are in fact to all intents and purposes subject to a distinct three tier system of control: service, civil secretariat of the Ministry of Defence and Finance. There is at present a definite and statutory distinction between the three Services Headquarters and the Government as represented by the Ministry of Defence. The underlying theme of the new proposal as shown in Chart 1 is to do away with this distinction which is a relic of pre-Independence days and which in the context of present day conditions causes many anomalies and has several undesirable features.

Prior to Independence, as has been mentioned earlier, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was also what might be termed the Defence Minister of India in addition to being the head of the other two Services. As the one person was the head of both—the Department of Defence or as it is now called the Ministry of Defence and the Services—there was no duplication of effort or control. Financial advice was tendered to the Commander-in-Chief by the Financial Adviser and to all intents and purposes Services HQ and Government were one. Any proposals emanating from Services HQ on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief were not and could not obviously be the subject of further scrutiny and approval by secretarial officers of the Defence Department for apart from the fact that there was no need for such a duplication of effort, it would have been tantamount to sitting in judgement on the proposals of the Defence Minister himself. Under such conditions the system worked efficiently and smoothly. The Defence Department Secretariat was a comparatively small organisation and was concerned chiefly with dealings with other Government Departments, statutory problems and budgetary matters. The British authorities had adopted this system in India in preference to the Services Council system which existed even at that time in the U.K., obviously because of the difference in the political and governmental set up which existed in the two countries at that time.

With Independence came major changes in the Defence set up of the country including the appointment of a Defence Minister responsible to the Indian Parliament. These changes and their implications have already been discussed in Part 1 of this essay. The main result of these changes was that for the first time a clear distinction came into existence between the Ministry of Defence and the Headquarters of the three Defence Services. This in turn led to the three tier system of control of the Services to which reference has been made earlier. Under this system proposals of even minor consequence initiated by any of the

Service HQ have first to be cleared with the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defence and then with Finance before they can be implemented. This generally necessitates the frequent passing back and forth of files and obviously involves a very considerable duplication of effort and hence unnecessary expense to the State. Such delay, indecision and expense in a defence organisation are of course undesirable even in peace time, in war they would definitely lead to disaster.

Another anomaly of this system is that often proposals initiated by even comparatively senior service officers are examined and perhaps initially rejected by junior and inexperienced secretariat and finance officials, who with the best will in the world cannot obviously be expected to be as *au fait* with service matters as the service officers themselves.

It is interesting to note that Parliaments' Estimates Committee has given this matter very considerable attention in its recent report to Parliament in September 1958. Excerpts from this report make interesting reading:

(The Committee is critical of the) "...considerable duplicate effort involved in the Services Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence, and the possibility of proposals emanating from a senior level at Services Headquarters being examined by officials in the Ministry who are either junior or lack the necessary expert knowledge".

(The Committee finds an) "...an imbalance in the distribution of responsibilities between the Ministry and the Services Headquarters and also a lack of sufficient delegation of authority and powers to the Services Headquarters which are presided over by officers of the status of the Chiefs of Staff."


The Estimates Committee too in its report goes on to suggest the setting up of Service Councils on the UK pattern as a solution for overcoming the shortcomings of the present system.

The adoption of the Service Council system would mean that the three Services Headquarters—Army, Navy and Air Force—would be abolished as such. In their place would be formed integrated Government Ministries or Sub Ministries for each Service consisting of both Service and Civilian officials. At the head of these organisations would be the Service Councils very similar to the existing Railway Board in India and the proposed Posts and Telegraph Board.

A suggested composition for the Army Council (the other two Services would have similar ones) is shown on page 169. As stated above this Council would be an integral part of the Ministry of Defence (Army) and at its head as chairman would be either the Defence Minister or a Deputy Defence Minister. Thus civil political control over the Defence Services, which is an essential part of any democratic form of

government, will be ensured.

SUGGESTED COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY COUNCIL



Each of the individual members of the Service Councils would be responsible for his own particular department, with the Chief of Staff of each Service coordinating the work of all the Service members of that particular Service Council. In his capacity as a member of the Army Council the Secretary of Defence (Army) would be responsible for his own department which would deal with subjects like civilians in Army Establishments, Military Estates, Parliamentary Questions, Dealings with other Government Ministries and other such matters. The Financial Adviser by virtue of his becoming a member of the Service Council would be jointly responsible for the efficiency of the Service and the Financial Adviser's Department would become an integral part of the Service Ministry concerned.

It is considered that such a system would overcome most of the defects of the present one and would be more efficient both in peace and war apart from being more economical to the State.

Before leaving the subject of the Higher Control of the Defence Services there is one other important matter, implicit in these proposals, which must be clearly realised. This is that the Defence Minister must have the statutory powers given to him by Parliament of making financial re-appropriations between the three Services within the overall Defence Budget. These powers are essential if the Defence Budget is to be used to the best advantage and if the unified system of operational command of all the three Defence Services as outlined earlier is to be effectively exercised.

CHANGES WITHIN THE DEFENCE SERVICES

We now come to the changes considered necessary within the Defence Services themselves. Operational command and control of these has already been discussed earlier and recommendations made that wherever

possible the operational command of the Services should be unified under single commanders. Responsibility, however, for all other matters like organisations, both tactical and logistical and administration would remain that of the Individual Services; and the changes that will be discussed here come under this category. Here again for obvious reasons, as has been mentioned earlier, both the discussion and any recommendations that are made will perforce have to be in general terms only.

The main implications of the altered role of the Defence Services consequent to the Independence of the country, and the effect on them of new weapons were discussed in Part I of the Essay. Obviously any recommendations that we make must be based directly on the conclusions that were arrived at there and hence, even at the risk of re-iteration, it would be useful to summarise them here:

- (a) The only role of India's Defence Services has now become the defence of the country and as such they will no longer be required to fight anywhere else save in the close proximity of her land and sea frontiers. In addition as they are now no more an integral part of British Forces, their organisations can and must be altered to suit their new and only role which must be the sole criterion.
- (b) Because of financial, technical and industrial limitations, India's Defence Services, on their own and with the foreseeable future, can only be expected to defend the country against second class powers. The organisations of the Defence Services therefore should be realistically shaped with this limitation in mind.
- (c) Defence planning in India has now to take into account the division of the Indian sub-continent into the two countries of India and Pakistan and all that this implies.
- (d) The supply of modern equipment from abroad for the Defence Services has in post Independence years become a very difficult problem and is likely to remain so for some time to come.
- (e) The limitations in this nuclear age of armed forces equipped with only conventional weapons has to be clearly appreciated and any tendency to ascribe to them unduly ambitious roles should be firmly resisted.

Of necessity the majority of any changes that are recommended will apply only to the Army as the other two Services did not in fact assume any appreciable proportions till after Independence and as such their present development and organisations have naturally been based on post Independence conditions. The Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force are in fact still in their formative stage and thus any proposals concerning them will be more in the shape of recommendations with regard to their future development rather than suggestions for actual changes in their present organisation and shape.

There is, however, one essential change which concerns, at least to some degree, all the three Services. This is with reference to the over-

all logistical organisation for the Defence Services of India. Hitherto this has been planned on the old Pre-Independence "India Base" concept. By this was envisaged that India, in the event of war, would become the logistical base for all Empire and Commonwealth Forces operating in areas bordering the Indian Ocean and in fact further East. The locations and holdings therefore of the various supply and equipment depots in India were in conformance with this concept. Most of these depots are still in existence and their locations bear little reference to present day conditions. All kinds of reserves of equipment are still being maintained of which a good number are either now not necessary or obsolete and the holding of which obviously involves considerable expense. An early and detailed study of this whole question in the light of conditions now obtaining is very necessary. Admittedly any major changes in the locations of large equipment depots will involve considerable initial expense, but this will have to be accepted in the interests of efficiency. Further there is little doubt that this will be more than made up from the savings that will accrue by doing away with all obsolete and surplus equipment, scaling down reserves and by the reduction in transportation charges resulting from the depots being more conveniently located.

THE INDIAN NAVY AND AIR FORCE

For some time to come it is apparent that the Indian Navy and Air Force will have to be greatly restricted in size. The reasons for this have been discussed earlier viz difficulties in the procurement of their fundamental functional equipment from abroad and the scarcity of foreign exchange in the country. This makes it all the more imperative that the overall organisation and the equipment policy of these two Services, both at present and in the foreseeable future, are very clearly related and geared to their respective present day national roles in war which must be the only criterion. Further any inclinations to extend the compass of these roles in an endeavour to carry out a more ambitious role, and include some of the tasks carried out by British Naval and Air Forces in Pre-Independence days, should be firmly resisted. If this were not done then inevitably the overall organisations and the equipment policy of these two Services would be effected and this in turn would mean that the efficiency and capacity of these Services to carry out their normal specified roles would be impaired.

To illustrate this point let us take a hypothetical case and assume that the National role of the Indian Navy as specified by Government is to defend, in conjunction with the other two Services, the maritime frontiers of India. This obviously would require Naval organisations and ships of certain types with considerable air support from land based aircraft of the Indian Air Force and coast artillery support from the Army. If it were now desired to extend this role to include, shall we say, the

safeguarding of the sea trade routes of India in the Indian Ocean, a completely different aspect appears. This would perforce call for different organisations and types of ships including, because of the distances involved, air support from aircraft carriers. Obviously within the means available both the roles cannot be carried out and in an endeavour to meet the requirements of the larger role the valid interests of the main role might easily be sacrificed or alternatively infructuous expenditure incurred.

This in fact constitutes the main recommendation with regard to the future development of these two Services. In formulating an organisational and equipment policy, the principle discussed above together with the other implications arising out of the Independence of the country and the advent of new weapons, which have been summarised earlier in the Essay, must obviously be invariably and clearly kept in mind.

THE INDIAN ARMY

The Indian Army of all the three Services has been affected the most by Independence and the consequent partition of the country. Its present organisation is more or less the same as it was in Pre-Independence days and hence there are a number of changes that are necessary and can with advantage be effected. With the Army, as in the case of the other two Services, the changes recommended are based primarily on the new national role of the Army, with the other implications, which have been summarised earlier, also playing an important part.

Changes with regard to the command and control of the Army on an unified inter-service basis and in its higher logistical organisation have already been discussed and hence will not be considered here again.

Changes in the tactical organisations of Army divisional formations will be considered first. It is felt that in the light of the conditions which have been discussed earlier, including the advent of new weapons, there is a definite need for introducing the brigade group organisation within divisions. This does not mean that the divisional organisation as such should be done away with. What is recommended is that brigade groups with fixed organisations, including an allotment of armour, should be formed and grouped under divisional headquarters for coordination or, should the necessity arise, for fighting concentrated as a division. This proposal would make the organisations of these formations more functional and hence more efficient as they would be organised and trained in peace time in accordance with their most likely roles in war viz actions at the brigade level. At present the opposite is the case as our present divisional organisations are primarily meant to fight divisional battles and hence would require constant re-grouping in a war under present conditions. Obviously it is more efficient and preferable that changes

in grouping should be from the normal to the exception rather than the reverse.

Army logistical organisations also require careful re-assessment. In the present army order of battle there are included a number of administrative and engineer units which would normally only be required if long lines of communications behind the battle zone had to be maintained. This is very improbable in India under present day conditions and hence their retention is more or less a luxury and increases the tail-teeth ratio of the Army. Admittedly some of these units are very useful when the army is called out in aid of Civil Power or when the civilian workers of essential services walk out on strikes. It is, however, for consideration whether, on a limited budget, it is possible for the army to retain units in its order of battle which would normally only be required in peace time.

The logistical cover within divisions, as at present organised, includes a number of administrative units like ordnance field parks, workshop companies, motor transport companies, medical field ambulances and supply units. These units have been provided on a scale, based on the experience gained in World War II, which is sufficient to enable divisions to operate self-contained in Eastern theatres of war where administrative backing would be poor, and the lines of communication long and indifferent. In the present context these considerations are not applicable and hence a number of these administrative units can either be completely removed or at least allotted on a lower scale. Their functions could be carried out more economically, and even probably more efficiently, by static administrative units of comparable types which would serve all the formations and units located within their allotted areas of responsibility. The advantages of such a reorganisation are obvious. Formations would become more compact, there would be considerable saving in manpower and equipment particularly motor transport, and the teeth-tail ratio of formations would improve. The savings so effected could conceivably be utilised to great advantage by raising additional armour, artillery and infantry units of which more are needed by the Army to carry out its national role effectively.

Another change that is advocated is in the present equipment tables of most of the units of the Indian Army which have been prepared on the basis of Pre-Independence conditions which of course do not apply any more. The result is that in the changed circumstances a certain amount of the equipment held by various units is obviously superfluous both as regards type and quantity. A revision therefore is necessary of these equipment tables, and in future only that equipment should be included in them which it is considered will definitely be required by the units concerned in operations under the conditions now prevailing. Any special equipment required for a particular operation or contingency should

not be included in standard equipment tables but issued, when required, from reserves specially maintained for such a purpose. A scaling down of equipment of this kind, apart of course from effecting considerable economy, will make units more mobile and reduce their requirements of transport. Further such a revision is particularly important in view of the difficulties in the procurement of defence equipment from abroad to which reference has been made earlier.

A new venture which requires very serious consideration is the creation of an army air arm. The idea of course is not new, and already in the armies of some of the Big Powers of the world such forces are in being. Its requirement in the Indian Army does not arise from the conditions brought about by Independence but from the extraordinary developments in aircraft design and performance that have taken place since World War II and which are continuing even now. These developments are making it increasingly evident that the requirements of an airforce and an army are no longer compatible in so far as the characteristics and performances of aircraft are concerned. In fact there is a definite conflict. An air force above all requires speed and a high ceiling in the aircraft it uses. Such aircraft generally require long and elaborate runways. An Army on the other hand requires aircraft capable of being able to land and take off from small and hastily prepared landing grounds, great manoeuvrability, good observation and high load carrying capacity. Experience in modern war has shown that air transport must nowadays be considered just another form of transportation for armies in the field and not something special to be used on rare and unique occasions. It is both natural and understandable that the Air Force, for whom it is a matter of fundamental importance, must of necessity remain principally pre-occupied with the organisation, training, tactics and the aircraft required to fulfil its primary role. Its concern for the requirements of the Army will inevitably take a second place and in fact might often conflict with its main pre-occupation. It is, therefore, recommended that a start be made by introducing an Army Air Arm which would carry out the Army's requirements of reconnaissance, intercommunication, casualty evacuation and transport. Such a proposal should not, for the reasons given above, cause much duplication of effort between the Army and Air Force. In so far as expense is concerned, the savings which should be effected in the Army as a result of the proposed reduction in its administrative tail, particularly transport, should at least go a part of the way to meet the cost of this new venture. Essentially, however, the main merit of this proposal lies in the fact that it would result in greater overall efficiency in both the Army and the Air Force.

CONCLUSION

Independence and the consequent partition of the sub-continent of India have had a number of far reaching implications on the whole of the

Defence Organisation of the Country. In the field of Higher Defence Organisation, it has meant that for the first time political control of the Defence Services and both initiation and execution of National Defence Policy have become the responsibility of the National Government. The Defence Services too have been effected in a significant manner; new and specific national roles, very different to those of Pre-Independence days, have now been assigned to them.


Consequential changes are therefore manifestly necessary. These are required not only in the Defence Services themselves but also in the Organisation for the Higher Direction of Defence. Among the more important in the latter category are the creation of a Defence Chief of Staff, a unified operational chain of command of the Services and the formation of individual Service Councils, thereby integrating the three Service Headquarters with the Ministry of Defence. These changes are very important for it is a truism to say that the Higher Defence Organisation is the very foundation on which the whole edifice of defence of a country rests; it is obviously essential that this foundation is laid truly and firmly.

In the Services there is need for a re-orientation of policy as regards the overall concept and system of logistical support. In so far as the Navy and Air Force are concerned, the only recommendations made are with regard to their future development which must be very closely related and in accordance with their present day national roles. In the Army, which is the most effected of the Services, there is a requirement for a tactical and logistical reorganisation of divisions and brigades on to a more functional basis and for a review of equipment tables generally. There is, in fact, a definite need for an improvement in the overall teeth-tail ratio. It is also recommended that a start be made in the creation of an Army Air Arm.

The implementation of these suggested changes will not be easy. Much opposition and many genuine difficulties will have to be faced. These, however, must be overcome, for it must always be remembered that the issues involved are immensely important—the very security of our Country might be at stake.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-1865) The Theatre of War

MAP 1



AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-1865)

BY 'RAMINOV'

INTRODUCTION

IN the history of the United States of America the Civil War of 1861-65 was an incident—a step in the process of evolution of a new-born pioneer country, consisting of a variety of peoples and interests, into a nation in the modern accepted sense of a State. Militarily, this was the first of modern 'total' wars in which the populations of the contesting countries were directly or indirectly involved, in which large 'citizen' armies, as distinct from the standing armies of earlier wars in Europe, fought for their respective rights and principles. With such large forces directed by Governments duly elected by and representative of the peoples, the modern, and still unsolved, problems of politic-military control of war in democracies were encountered for the first time. Tactically, the then newly-introduced weapons had their inevitable effects on the old-accepted textbook drills of warfare, and success or failure depended on the extent these effects were appreciated, as will be seen later.

For the student of military history studying this campaign there is available a vast and perplexing array of books, reports, biographies and detailed descriptions of several battles. It is difficult for the student, before getting down to a detailed study of the battles, to extract from this vast literature a clear, cogent and general picture of the war as a whole—the causes for the conflict, the effects of geography and politics on strategy, the personalities of the great leaders, the problems faced by them and the way in which these problems were solved.

It is just this broad survey—a background for the detailed study of the campaign—which will be attempted in this article.

CAUSES OF THE WAR

The causes of war were economic, political and racial. It is necessary to understand the background to and the inter-relation of these three factors. In school text-books most of us have read that the cause of the American Civil War was slavery—it was a case of the righteous North under Abraham Lincoln going to war to subdue a rebellious and slave-owning South and to emancipate Negro slaves. In actual fact, the war did not owe its origin to anything so simple as that. Slavery was guaranteed by the Constitution. Some of the Northern States were slave-holding and not all the Southern States would have liked to perpetuate slavery if left to themselves to solve what they considered a domestic problem. While there was a strong 'abolitionist' movement in the North, Lincoln himself realised that extreme measures or coercion would only aggravate an already delicate situation, and in his first inaugural address he adopted a conciliatory tone, giving an assurance that no coercion would be used. Indeed, slavery was not even the major cause of the war—it was a subsidiary one. It was a complicating factor, like adding fuel to fire, that worsened a situation already complex with political and economic distrust.

The population of the Northern States mainly comprised traders and manufacturers, a melting pot of many European races and cultures, more advanced industrially, a highly practical commercial cohesive society. On the other hand, the Southern States were backward, with no industries and communications worth the name. The people of the South, excluding the slaves, were mainly of English

and Scottish stock, and were proud, independent and aristocratic. The people were indolently feudal and cotton was their main source of trade. Except for agricultural products, the South was largely dependent on imports. It was therefore inevitable that the industrialised North would seek to enforce fiscal policies and tariffs to protect their manufactures. These measures, in turn, made the cost of vital imports to the South dearer and their exports cheaper—in fact, an 'adverse balance of trade'. The burden of taxation was heavier on the South, and a situation soon arose when many of the proud planters of the South became greatly indebted to the despised traders of the North.

The original 13 States forming the United States of America came together under the Articles of Confederation of 1778. By these articles, while forming a Union, the member States reserved to themselves all such sovereign powers and rights which they had not specifically delegated to the Union. This arrangement was soon found impracticable and in 1787 the States met again to evolve the *Constitution*, by which federal jurisdiction was introduced and the States guaranteed equal representation in the Senate, irrespective of their size or population.

During the next 60 years, while the nation was growing industrially and economically, bickerings started on the political plane. Due to the controlling power inherent in the principle of 'equal representation', the two main groups of States, i.e. the manufacturing States of the North and the plantation States of the South, began to quarrel over the admission of new States into the Union. Outwardly, the issue was whether slave-holding or non-slave-holding States should come in, but in reality it was a fight for supremacy between the two economic groups—the traders and the planters. Despite compromises, these differences came to a head and the Southern States maintained that constitutionally any or all of them could secede from the Union any time they wished to do so. The Northern States, on the other hand, held the Union of States to be binding and perpetual.

In this bitter political atmosphere the propaganda of the Abolitionists of the North, who wanted emancipation of all slaves and, if necessary, abrogation of the *Constitution* which guaranteed slavery, aggravated the situation as far as the South was concerned. On top of it all, Abraham Lincoln and the Republican (Union) Party won the Presidential Elections of 1860; the die was cast and the Southern States began to secede.

During the period December 1860—February 1861, seven States seceded—South Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Texas. (See Map 1, on page 176.)

In March 1861, Lincoln became the President of the United States—a most critical time when the Union which he was sworn to 'preserve, protect and defend' was breaking apart. The Union, if it was to be maintained, could only be re-established by means of an aggressive war. Yet an unprovoked attack against the Southern Confederacy might easily alienate many people abroad and within the Union itself. On the other hand, the South, having seceded, had everything to gain by peace and not by getting involved in a war. This dilemma was solved by Lincoln, the shrewd politician, in his own way.

The garrison at Fort Sumter in South Carolina was a symbol of the Union for the North. Conversely, to the South it was an intolerable presence of a 'foreign' force in its territory. When the garrison began to run short of supplies, Lincoln shrewdly decided to send an expedition by sea with 'provisions only', and informed the Southern authorities accordingly. The dilemma was now that of the South;

if they allowed the provisioning of the garrison, it might well stay there indefinitely. Otherwise, they must attack the fort and accept the onus of having struck the first blow. They attacked on April 12, 1861, the fort was taken and the Union flag was lowered. Thus, the Civil War began.

THE CONTESTANTS

Before proceeding to study the geography and strategy of the war, let us take a quick look at the two opposing governments and the forces at their disposal. With the fall of Fort Sumter, the state of suspense and uncertainty was over. Both sides were now committed to war, and a sense of unity began to be felt among both the peoples. President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for a period of three months, which was all he could do on his own initiative without the approval of Congress. In protest, the States of Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee and North Carolina seceded from the Union and joined the Southern Confederacy. As the first step in the North's offensive strategy, Lincoln ordered the blockade of all Southern seaports to prevent the import of essential goods from Europe and the export of cotton.

With the secession of 11 Southern States, the Union was left with 23 States with a population of 22,000,000, nearly three times that of the South. The States of Maryland, Delaware, Missouri and Kentucky had their sympathies with the South. Because of their geographical position, Maryland and Delaware were easily held by the North, but in the case of Missouri and Kentucky it required all of Lincoln's statesmanship, plus effective military action, to keep them within the Union.

When Lincoln became President and constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the Union forces, he brought to the task a clear, shrewd mind and much practical commonsense, but no military experience or knowledge to prepare him for the four momentous years of war that lay ahead. His handling of the Fort Sumter question and his decision to enforce a blockade were practical and wise. He has been criticised for not appreciating the strategical issues involved, for encroaching upon the rightful domain of the military commander by himself issuing orders and directives, for delaying efficient conduct of operations by holding 'councils of war' to decide and approve plans, and for his insistence on the protection of Washington at the cost of operations elsewhere. In fairness to him, it must be said that he would not have liked to direct the conduct of operations himself or to hold 'councils of war' if he had a military chief who could advise him correctly on the strategic issues involved and direct the plans made to a successful conclusion.

Before the war, the Regular Army in America was a small one. There were no senior officers with experience of handling large forces. With a divided cabinet and a succession of Generals-in-Chief who only made ambitious plans, Lincoln plodded on with the conduct of the war until he found General Grant and made him General-in-Chief in 1864.

When the Southern States seceded, some of the best officers of the Army resigned their commissions and joined the Confederate Army, among them being Colonel (later General) Robert E. Lee. The majority of troops stayed on with their regiments, and the main problem was to carry out an expansion of the Army with the small number of remaining experienced officers.

In the South, the President of the Confederacy was Jefferson Davis, who had been a regular officer in the Army and had served as Secretary of War in the Union Cabinet. While these qualifications should have made him a better war-time leader than Lincoln, in actual fact he was not. While he ran the

Confederacy with a tight hand, he understood war even less than Lincoln. His constitutional position as C.-in-C. would not allow him to appoint a capable general in overall command of the forces. The very concept of 'State's rights', which caused the secession, was also a handicap to him in imposing taxes, applying conscription, collecting the much-needed supplies for his armies, or forcing the States to use their militias in the common strategic purpose as against their own protection. With the export of cotton declining due to the Northern blockade, the South was not in a sound financial position. Despite tremendous efforts, lack of armaments and other basic industries placed the South in an inferior position with regard to arms, equipment and means of communication.

It was in the fighting qualities of their men that the South had the edge over the North. The polyglot volunteer army of the North, mainly townsmen, often without a clear understanding of the aims for which they fought, were no match for the Southern soldiers, who were countrymen used to outdoor life fighting for their own independence. They were equipped more lightly than their Northern counterparts and were unsurpassed as cavalymen or as semi-guerilla fighters. The bane of the Southern army was straggling while that of the Northern was poor discipline till the last stages of the war.

To understand the battles fought in this campaign, it is necessary to have a clear idea of the organisation and equipment of the two armies. The infantry of each side was organised into regiments (about 1,000 men), brigades (three to four regiments), divisions (three to four brigades) and Corps (three to four divisions). The main weapon was the muzzle-loading rifle. Towards the end of the war, the machine-gun made its appearance in the Northern army. The cavalry was organised into regiments (about 400 horses), brigades and divisions. The Southern trooper was much better horsed, but the Northern cavalry had a breach-loading carbine with a magazine, a very powerful weapon for those days. The guns were mainly muzzle-loading with smooth or rifled bores, and were organised as batteries and battalions attached to divisions as necessary.

Due to the large number of Southern sympathisers in Washington, the fact that most of the operations were fought in the Southern territory, the lax security measures of the North, and the irresponsible way in which the Northern Press publicised plans, the intelligence system of the South was far more effective than that of the North throughout the war.

THEATRE OF WAR

We now come to the strategic issues of the war—what were the aims of the two opposing sides, what was the best way for each side to achieve its aim, if it did not adopt the best way, what were the reasons? A study of the map will reveal some important factors—the size and extent of the theatre of war, the prevailing means of communication, and the relative position of the two capitals, Washington and Richmond. The influence of these factors on the strategy of the war should be clearly understood.

The Confederacy extended westwards from the Atlantic coast across the great navigable Mississippi River to Texas and Louisiana, bounded in the South by the Gulf of Mexico—an area nearly as large as Western Europe. The Mississippi divided the Confederacy east to west, with the main meat-producing areas of Texas to the west of it. The other navigable rivers were the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee running across the centre of the theatre. The theatre of war between the Mississippi and the east coast is divided by the Alleghany Mountains into two distinct parts, the east and the west. It is important to remember this

—the division of the theatre of war into the Eastern Theatre and the Western Theatre. The main means of communication for any major movement of men and supplies overland was the railway system. Running east to west across the Confederacy were the two main lines, from Richmond to Memphis and from Charleston to Vicksburg, with connecting lines running north to south. On the east and south coasts were the main seaports of Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans which were vital to the south for trade with Europe.

The roads of those days were inferior by modern standards and were of three types—metalled, called 'turnpikes' or 'pikes' which could take horsedrawn waggons, fair weather, called 'planks', corduroyed with wooden logs, and un-metalled tracks. The age of the internal-combustion engine had not yet begun.

Washington was the national capital and to move the Northern Government to another city after the start of the war would have been politically undesirable. It, however, lay close to the borders of the hostile South and was itself cut off from the rest of the North by Maryland, which had sympathies for the rebels. To the west, in the mountainous area, lay the fertile Shenandoah Valley providing a covered and 'virtualled' approach from the South towards Washington and Baltimore, and again inhabited by people sympathetic to the South.

The South had no compulsion to have its capital at Richmond in Virginia. Indeed it was first proposed to be located at Montgomery in Alabama, a more central situation for a 'national' capital. It was the influence of the State of Virginia in the Southern Government that decided the location of the capital at Richmond.

Bearing in mind the three factors mentioned earlier—the size of the theatre, the communications and the two capitals—what should have been the correct strategic approach for each of the two opponents?

Basically, the task before the North was one of re-establishing the Union by physically conquering the South and enforcing its will on the Southern peoples. Considering the area to be conquered, it meant offensive action by an aggressive army on a very large scale.

Basically again, the task before the South was to resist such conquest—mainly a defensive role. But strategic defence also required offensive action. The South could have solved the problem by a quick victory before the North could get going with its offensive. This, in the circumstances, was impossible, although early tactical successes made the South unduly optimistic and contemptuous of their opponents' fighting qualities. Again, the South could hope to win foreign recognition and allies which would turn the balance of power in its favour. But England and France, old hands at the international game themselves, were in no hurry to recognize the South or antagonize the North, although they were prepared to sell ships and munitions to the South. Lastly, the South could hold out tenaciously, tire out the North and make the Northern Government weary of war, willing to stop fighting and recognize the *de jure* existence of the South.

To carry out the last-mentioned aim, the South, with the initial handicap of industrial inferiority which could not be completely offset by the fighting fervour of its troops, should have adopted the correct strategic approach. Its strategic strength lay in its very size and lack of communications. Protecting its seaports to ensure communications with Europe and covering the difficult approaches through Virginia east of the Alleghenies with the smallest force necessary, it should have concentrated its main strength in the defensive-offensive role in the

west. In this area it had the best chance of protecting its lateral (east to west) railway communications, and the vital crossings over the Mississippi into the States to the west of it, and by securing the waterways of the Ohio, Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to threaten the very centre of the Union. Conversely, the course open to the North was to secure Washington with the minimum force and concentrate in the west to secure the Mississippi and split the Confederacy, and initiate offensive action against the 'heart of the Confederacy' in the region of Georgia and Alabama.

Such was the correct strategy to be adopted by the two sides. Unfortunately this did not happen. In place of a clear understanding of the problems before them and a strategic approach to meet them, both sides, for the first three years, were obsessed by 'conventional strategic considerations'. The objectives became the capitals of the enemies—the capture of the Richmond for the North and the capture of Washington for the South—not realising that neither was vital to the successful conclusion of the war. This resulted, as far as the South was concerned, in their best General (Lee) and their best army being confined to the politically important but militarily secondary eastern theatre. In the North too this resulted in a series of futile attempts against Richmond, a succession of commanders coming in like lions and going out like lambs after failing in their tasks, and the much criticised 'flapping' of the politicians in Washington about the safety of the capital. The last-mentioned fact should be viewed dispassionately: while detention of any large force near the capital did affect operations elsewhere, the location of Washington, as explained earlier, the moral effect of its loss on the North and the fact that Lincoln and his politicians were seeing their first war at their doorstep should be borne in mind. It would not be uncharitable to say that politicians in a 'democracy' fighting its first major war would not 'flap' any less.

It was only when the war in the west progressed under the direction of General Grant, the Mississippi was secured along its length and Chattanooga was taken that an overall plan of campaign emerged, and under Grant's leadership the war was brought to a successful conclusion.

COURSE OF THE WAR

1861

The course of the Civil War, though the operations in the east and west tended to be unrelated, can best be studied yearwise. It is proposed to survey the operations conducted broadly during each year, with a certain amount of overlapping to ensure continuity.

After the fall of Fort Sumter, the rest of the year 1861 was mainly spent by the two sides in raising their armies and consolidating themselves for the coming struggle, which was to be a long and hard one.

The Northern army, under General Scott, expanded, most of the new volunteers forming new units while the hard core of the original officers remained with their own units. General Scott was now an old man and had four Major-Generals under him in the army—McClellan, Fremont, Banks and Halleck. Several ex-officers had to be recalled to service and some unfortunate 'political' appointments in military command were made.

The Southern army, on the other hand, had the advantage of starting with several good regular officers who had come over after secession and began organising new units with these officers. Senior officers were given due seniority and

rank, the chief among whom were Generals *Cooper*, *Sidney Johnston*, *Lee*, *Joseph Johnston*, and *Beauregard*, *Cooper*, though the senior general remained a non-entity throughout the war, in the shadow of President *Davis*, *Sidney Johnston*, an experienced soldier and a noble person much respected in the South, was killed at Shiloh in April 1862. Of the others who remained in command throughout the war, *Lee** was the most famous.

With the re-organisation of the army set in motion, the North proceeded to consolidate its position. A secessionist movement in Maryland was promptly put down. Washington was fortified. By prompt military action, Missouri was saved from secession. General *McClellan* overran 'neutral' Kentucky and secured the Northern half of West Virginia, essential for strategic movements. A little known brigadier-general called *Grant* at Cairo, forestalled a Southern move against Paducah and occupied it in September, seizing the mouths of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, securing a base for further operations down the Mississippi or into Tennessee. By combined action the Northern Navy and Army captured the Southern seaports of Port Hatteras and Port Royal, to be used as bases for blockade operations. The Northern Navy was being expanded rapidly to make the blockade effective.

The only battle during the period was the 1st Bull Run in the middle of July 1861. The battle was basically a defensive one, the South disposing *Johnston's* force at Harper's Ferry and *Beauregard's* force at Manassas Junction primarily to protect Richmond. The North's original plan, to hold *Beauregard* at Manassas and push back *Johnston* from Harper's Ferry, was also a defensive one to protect Washington. When the uninformed Northern public and their press clamoured for an advance to Richmond, their leaders allowed themselves to reverse the plan. When the new militiamen failed to hold *Johnston* at the Ferry and he slipped away to join *Beauregard*, the Northern ranks broke in panic. Unfortunately, this battle gave the Southern commanders a sense of contempt for the fighting qualities of their opponents, and in Washington confirmed an undue sensitiveness for the safety of the capital.

(To be concluded)

- * *Lee* was a Virginian of aristocratic parentage. From the time he joined the Engineers from West Point in 1829 he had a brilliant career in the army. He rose during the Mexican War from Captain to brevet Colonel. Later, he commanded the famous 2nd Cavalry. *Lee* did not believe in slavery or secession, and yet when the South broke away, his loyalty and love for his native Virginia made him refuse the preferred command of the U.S. Army and go back to Virginia. *Lee* was the idol of South, the best known and most beloved of all Southern leaders, civil and military. He was an earnest religious man of noble character and to him God and duty were one. As a military leader, his handling of the Southern forces throughout the war was marked by his brilliant powers of manoeuvre and his ability to beat, time and time again, a numerically larger force by concentrating at the decisive point. Till 1864, when *Grant* came east, a succession of Union generals were outmanoeuvred and outgeneralled by *Lee*.

It was tragic for the South that he was never given effective responsibilities over the planning and conduct of the war as a whole: it was equally tragic that *Lee's* noble qualities, which raised him above the level of common man, also inhibited him from asserting himself with his Government and political leaders, from interfering with his subordinates when things did not go as he wanted, from enforcing discipline and co-operation even at crucial times, and, last but not the least, from taking firm action to demand administrative resources for his army even when he knew that lack of these was materially affecting the fighting power of his men.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

By PLM

DURING the three months under review here a major pre-occupation in the international field has been the Big Four Foreign Ministers' Conference which, after a 41-day wrangle over the status of Berlin and the inter-related problems of German unification and European security, adjourned to resume again in July. Meantime hopes of a summit conference this summer rose and fell and there was no clear certainty, at the end of June, that the Conference will be convened this year, if at all. Developments nearer home appertained largely to Tibet. Here while the Dalai Lama was quite outspoken and forthright in his criticism of Chinese rule at Lhasa, Peking refrained from a direct assault on the Tibetan Pontiff and concentrated its fire on the now-defunct Local Government, inveighed against Indian expansionists for their alleged interference in China's domestic affairs, pin-pointed obvious contradictions—in Prime Minister Nehru's thinking, stuck faithfully to the earlier version that the Dalai Lama had been abducted and was being held under duress. The quarter also saw Dr. Sukarno, in Djakarta, make a bold bid for restoring the country's revolutionary constitution of 1945, to implement fully, in their present context, his now famous principles of "guided democracy". Meantime in Kathmandu, the new Cabinet of the victorious Nepali Congress was installed and the country's recent democratic constitution formally promulgated. In West Asia, latent Arab-Israeli rivalry was touched off by Cairo's decision to confiscate all Israeli cargoes trying to pass through the Suez Canal, whatever the flags of the ships attempting this task. A major loss to the diplomatic world in general, and the western powers in particular, was the death, in May, of the former U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles.

BIG FOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

Slightly behind schedule, the Big Four Foreign Ministers' Conference duly convened in Geneva on May 13, after preliminary battles over procedural details. These were concerned chiefly with the table around which the Ministers were to deliberate, a major Soviet bid to seat Poland and Czechoslovakia with a view to attaining East-west parity, and the status of the delegations of East and West Germany—the Russian holding out for their recognition as full members of the Conference while the Western Powers, who do not recognise the existence of a separate State in the Soviet zone of Germany, insisted that the Germans should be treated as advisers. It was eventually decided that the two German delegations should sit at separate tables alongside the main table for the Four Powers, and should speak only with the agreement of the Four Foreign Ministers. The final shape of the table was to be round while the issue of representation for Poland and Czechoslovakia was shelved.

The full-dress conference met on May 13. Next day, the U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Christian A. Herter presented what came to be known as the Western 'package' deal. The four-stage Western proposals which had sought to break the deadlock over Germany and remove tension in Europe hinged around:

- (a) in connection with German re-unification, precise security offers, including measures to take effect irrespective of the future alignment of a re-united Germany, and
- (b) a new method of removing the danger of a divided Germany.

In fact, the approach to German re-unification was to be gradual: free all-German elections were to be postponed for 2½ years and, during the transitional

period, a mixed German Commission was to be given special tasks. Berlin was to become a united city during the transitional period, as a pilot scheme for German re-unification; eventually it was to be the capital of a re-united Germany.

The Western plan met with adverse reception from the Soviets. Mr. Gromyko re-iterated his earlier stand that peace treaties should be concluded with the two parts of Germany which, between them, should settle the question of re-unification; meantime the "occupation" of West Berlin should be ended. Actually, on May 15, the Soviet Foreign Minister formally presented his proposals as a Conference document. He repeated that the question of a peace treaty with Germany was urgent, because of Western military preparations and West German re-armament. He stressed the fact that the absence of an all-German Government was no obstacle, that the existence of the two German States was a fact and that re-unification must wait until the Federal German Government adopted a more realistic policy.

Mr. Gromyko's proposals were bitterly assailed by the Western powers. The British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Lloyd, listed two major objections: the first that the proposed Soviet treaty was designed to be concluded with the Federal Republic and the 'so-called' Democratic Republic separately, the second that by its very nature it would have to be, not freely negotiated, but 'imposed'. For these reasons, the British Foreign Secretary made it abundantly clear, the Soviet proposal would be both unjust and not likely to be enduring. Mr. Lloyd endorsed the argument, already put forward by Mr. Herter that on legal grounds, the Allies could sign a peace treaty only with an all-German Government. In later discussions around the Conference table, the American Secretary of State suggested that an appropriate title for the "package" put forward by Mr. Gromyko would be "Soviet Treaty for the Partition of Germany."

In the last week of June, after a brief recess when the Ministers flew to Washington, the Conference completed its nearly six weeks of formal and informal sessions with no visible agreement in sight. Basically, Moscow continued to insist that the Western Powers should get out of Berlin, that the administration of the city should be integrated with that of the rest of the country and, in partial modification of its earlier deadline, suggested a new time-limit—18 months—for compliance. The Western Powers, on their part, insisted on their right to remain in Berlin, pending German unification, and made it abundantly clear that they would not negotiate under any threat of ultimatum or agree to a unilateral modification of the present 4-Power occupation of the former German capital. In other words the two positions remained precisely what they were before the Conference met. In fact, Washington no less than Paris, Bonn and Rome expressed the view that as a result of their 41-day confabulations the Ministers had registered no significant progress. Equally emphatically they asserted that if the Soviet Union were to persist in its bid to add more than two million West Berliners to East Europe, no agreement could be possible. In striking contrast to this viewpoint the British were somewhat less gloomy. Indeed, Mr. Harold Macmillan told the House of Commons that it would be a grave mistake to under-rate the degree of success that had already been registered at the Foreign Ministers' Conference. Moscow was even more optimistic and expressed the view that the Geneva talks had provided a good basis for agreement and that further progress was possible when the Ministers re-convened in July.

For a proper understanding of the German problem and its varied ramifications three important points may be clearly borne in mind. At the outset it should be stressed that the problem of Berlin is an integral part of the problem

of German re-unification and thus of a peace treaty with a united Germany. Again, Berlin, German re-unification and a peace settlement in Central Europe are closely linked with the problem of European security. In other words, the re-unification of Germany was to be consummated in peace and in freedom and in a manner that would satisfy the respective security requirements of the Western Powers, of the Soviet Union and of the East European states.

A second significant fact in this context is that the problem, or rather the problems as they present themselves in 1959 are in no whit different from what they were in 1954-55. Indeed the only major difference may appear to be that, as a result of the intervening developments, some of the nomenclature and terminology have altered. Thus whereas in 1954-55 there was talk of a thinning of armed forces in a zone between the East and the West, today we talk in terms of 'disengagement', of the 'Rapacki' plans and, in the context of German re-unification, of a 'confederation'. Circumstances have no doubt altered and events during the years that have elapsed have made a deep impact on European thinking. Thus the emergence of a Federal German Army as part of NATO and of the Western European Union, the fact that the troops of the Federal Republic are equipped with the means of delivering tactical nuclear weapons—though, hitherto, not the weapons themselves—is bound to have a profound influence on any settlement for the future of Germany. Again, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956-57, the coming into being of the European community and the emergence of the Warsaw pact have altered circumstances without at the same time changing the basic problems.

And finally, it may be instructive to go over, even though in a sketchy outline, the deliberations of the two meetings—in January, 1954 and again in October-November, 1955 of the Big Four Foreign Ministers as well as the Summit meeting, in July, 1955, among the heads of state. Thus it will be recalled that at all these conferences an indisputable fact that emerged was that the re-unification of the two halves of Germany could not indeed be achieved in terms of re-militarisation or demilitarisation of Germany in isolation, but only *pari passu* with progress towards European security and disarmament. Again, it is significant that at the Berlin Conference of January, 1954 no agreement was reached on the question of re-unification of Germany through the holding of free elections, leading to the creation of an all-German Government with which a peace treaty could be concluded—proposals which even today form the essence of the Western "package" deal at Geneva.

Another significant fact that bears a mention is that in 1954-55 the Soviet Union failed in its efforts to bring about a neutralisation of NATO by suggesting that the Eastern Powers should join it en bloc. This, the Russians insisted, would give the Atlantic Alliance a truly defensive character and prevent either part of Germany from joining military groups. Again, throughout 1954 as well as the early months of 1955 Moscow strained every nerve to prevent the re-armament of West Germany and its admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In fact, the later emergence of the Warsaw pact was a direct consequence of this failure and was designed as a counter to the Western alliance.

It may also be noted in this context that even the Summit Conference of the Big Four in July, 1955 failed in its principal objective of lessening tensions by bringing about a re-unification of Germany and thus paving the way to what was euphemistically called "consolidation of peace". In fact, the heads of state had passed the inconvenient baby to their Foreign Ministers instructing them to propose an effective means of its solution by taking account "of the close link between the re-unification of Germany and the problem of European security"

and the fact that a settlement of each of these problems would serve the "interests of consolidating peace". It is also significant that later when in October-November, 1955 the Foreign Ministers convened to implement this directive, no agreement could be negotiated to reconcile their opposing viewpoints. In fact, Mr. Molotov had continued to insist that any security treaty must be a European treaty and include states bordering on Germany and the two halves of Germany and that the creation of an all-German Council was an indispensable preliminary to German re-unification because of the inclusion of a re-militarised Federal Republic in NATO and because of a different social system in the German Democratic Republic. For his Western allies Mr. Dulles had countered by pointing to the reference in the first directive of the heads of State to the re-unification of Germany and to their implied agreement that this be achieved by means of free elections and in conformity with the national interests of the German people. With no meeting-ground in sight the Conference had ended on a sour note.

In May-June, 1959 the problems which beset Mr. Gromyko, the redoubtable Molotov's successor and Mr. Herter, the new American Secretary of State, are in no way fundamentally different from what they were five years earlier. Are we nearer a solution today?

TIBET

In and outside Tibet interest in the quarter surveyed here was at its highest. As we noticed earlier the 14th Dalai Lama had crossed the Indian frontier on March 31 and was granted political asylum. During the tense weeks that followed, until his arrival in the Foothills, interest mounted up around him: the extraordinary nature of his escape, his relations with the Chinese, an account of the rebellion at first-hand. At Tezpur, on April 18, not all the eager curiosity of the news-hungry world was satisfied by the Dalai Lama's statement to the press. Some of the significant points made by the Tibetan pontiff may be briefly summed up:

- (1) *The Tibetan people, being different from the Hans, had always had a strong desire for independence on their part, they had for most part functioned as an independent entity and even when China had exercised suzerainty, the country had remained autonomous and enjoyed complete control of its internal affairs;*
- (2) *The Dalai Lama denied that he was under duress, asserted that the 17-point Agreement, concluded in May, 1951, was forced upon his country, that the Preparatory Committee set up in April, 1956 was a sham, for real power vested in the hands of the Chinese authorities;*
- (3) *The revolt in Kham which started in 1955 spread far, encompassed vast sections of his people and large areas in the country. The Dalai revealed that until the very last minute he strove hard to find a peaceful way out of the situation and that it was only on March 17, when two or three mortar shells were fired in the direction of the Nor-bulingka, his summer palace, that he had decided to leave Lhasa and head for India.*

This forthright declaration embarrassed Peking; in fact, created a veritable flutter. The first reaction was to deny its authenticity—the Dalai had not used the first person, but the third, nor was his statement in consonance with Tibetan usage—and place the blame squarely on Indian officials accompanying him. Subsequently both the Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai and the Panchen Lama repeated at sessions of the National People's Congress, then meeting in Peking, the earlier Chinese version: the rebellion in Tibet had been instigated by a handful

of reactionaries and "had already met with ignominious defeat", the Dalai Lama had been secretly abducted by the rebels and it was hoped would be able to free himself from their stranglehold and return to the embrace of the Great Motherland. As for the future, the Chinese People's Republic stood for the institution of "Regional National Autonomy" in Tibet and the introduction of social reforms after full consultations with the patriotic elements of the upper and middle social strata and the masses of all walks of life. The Panchen took the lead—and his example was to prove rather infectious for other delegates—in launching a bitter diatribe against Indian 'expansionists' whom he openly charged with interfering in China's domestic affairs. Tibet had always been "China's Tibet" and he would never allow any foreigner to interfere in Tibet or "the rest of China". In the last two weeks of April the campaign gained in intensity and the mainland, no less than the People's Congress platform, resounded to a good deal of intemperate language against alleged Indian 'expansionist imperialism', a lackey of the British, which entertained territorial ambitions at its neighbour's expense. Solemn warnings were administered in the name of China's 'sacred territory', of her 600 million people united now, as never hitherto. The *People's Daily* expressed the view that the rebellion, "unleashed by the reactionary clique of the Tibetan upper strata", ran counter not only to the will of the Tibetan people, but also to that of the Dalai Lama and that their so-called "national independence", "full autonomy" or "religious freedom" were mere deceptive trappings.

In India, apart from a stray incident here or there, there were no signs of a mass hysteria. The Prime Minister who had met the Dalai Lama in Mussoorie on April 24 used a language that was visibly restrained and dignified. Speaking in debates in the two houses of Parliament, Mr. Nehru expressed the view that the Chinese were using the language of the cold war "regardless of truth and propriety", a fact that was particularly distressing in a great nation noted for its restraint and polite behaviour. He revealed that during his discussions with Prime Minister Chou En-lai in the winter of 1956-57, he was assured that Peking did not consider Tibet to be a province of China, but an autonomous region, that it was absurd for anybody to think that Peking was going to enforce communism on Tibet and that even such elementary reforms, as were necessary, were likely to be postponed for a considerable time. In return, he had impressed upon Mr. Chou En-lai the necessity of acting in good faith and in cooperating with the Tibetans in maintaining their autonomy. Even now he expressed the hope that the Chinese, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetan people but would win them over to friendly cooperation in accordance with assurances they had given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. He repeated his earlier invitation to the Panchen Lama, or any other Chinese representative, to visit India and confer with the Dalai to help find a way out.

In this war of words, which at times generated considerable heat, the Chinese position remained what it had been. Actually, the resolution on Tibet adopted unanimously by the 2nd National People's Congress on April 28 repeated for the umpteenth time what had been stated earlier, while the Panchen summarily rejected Mr. Nehru's invitation affirming that the "so-called Tibetan question" could be solved only in Tibet. An interesting charge, now made by the Panchen for the first time, was that during his visit to India in 1956-57, Indian officials had shown a certain discrimination against him in arranging receptions and that sometimes his entourage had to sleep on the trains, for his hosts would not provide them with housing! As if it were a fitting climax, the *Peking People's Daily* on May 16 brought out a considered analysis of what it called "The Rebellion in Tibet and Mr. Nehru's Philosophy." The article while asserting

that India and China should certainly not forget "our common interest and fall into the trap of our common enemy", made it plain that Tibet was definitely not a protectorate, nor a buffer but an autonomous region under full Chinese sovereignty, that the rebellion in that country had, "in the main", been quelled and that it was now facing a peaceful revolution of democratic reforms. The paper, after accusing India and Indian elements of interfering in China's domestic affairs, discussed the concrete possibility of establishing in Tibet a Committee for Assam or U.P. The 'Daily' alleged that the Dalai's Tezpur statement was a forgery, that Mr. Nehru had spoken uncharitably of the so-called assurances to India so far, that the Indian Prime Minister had either cast away the views once expressed, or else "he did not really understand the scientific Marxist method which he had thought he had understood." The conclusion was plain: there were obvious contradictions in Mr. Nehru's thinking, though the paper refrained from discussing threadbare how these may be resolved.

The climax, hitherto, of the Tibetan scene was the Dalai Lama's first press conference at Mussoorie on June 20. Briefly averring to the years since the Chinese took over in 1951, the Dalai summed up the misery and the privations to which his land had been exposed more particularly after the recent rebellion and sketched out, in a vague and somewhat hazy manner, the future that awaited his people. Among the important points made by the Tibetan ruler, the following may be listed:

- (1) *The 1951 Agreement had been imposed on Tibet against her will, the Chinese had violated the country's territorial integrity and committed "a flagrant act of aggression";*
- (2) *The Tibetans killed in the fighting since 1956 was actually more than the figure of 65,000 given in a report filed before the International Commission of Jurists, in Geneva;*
- (3) *He had no intention of carrying out a resistance movement from India, although he intended to help his countrymen "by all means of peaceful solution rather than by military force";*
- (4) *Averring to the Panchen's charge of discriminatory treatment, the Dalai remarked that "having no freedom of will" he had to make the statement he did. The Tibetan pontiff also pointed out that the Panchen had been under Chinese influence ever since his boyhood and had never enjoyed any freedom;*
- (5) *He had as yet given no thought to the question of raising the Tibetan issue in the United Nations. Nonetheless he and his government were fully prepared to welcome a peaceful and amicable settlement of the Tibetan question provided such a solution "guarantees the observance of the rights and powers which Tibet enjoyed and exercised without any interference, prior to 1950";*
- (6) *Whenever he was accompanied by his Government "the Tibetan people recognise us as the Government of Tibet." The Dalai made it clear that the present government at Lhasa was nothing but a "deceptive" government with all powers in the hands of China and that both he and the people of Tibet were never prepared to recognise it;*
- (7) *He revealed that he had been in favour, during the past nine years, of introducing several reforms particularly those pertaining to land, and yet these measures "were strongly opposed by the Chinese in spite of popular demand for them";*

- (8) *The Chinese had unleashed in Tibet a reign of terror that had few parallels in history. Forced labour and compulsory exactions, a systematic persecution of the people, plundering and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries and execution of certain leading men in Tibet—these, the Dalai emphasised, are “the glorious achievements of Chinese rule in Tibet.”*

INDONESIA

From the land-locked barren wastes of Tibet to the lush island-archipelago of Indonesia is a far-off cry and yet here too developments of an important character had taken place. It will be recalled that owing to political instability and revolts, actual and potential, in the outer fringes of the island republic, Dr. Sukarno had announced in 1957 his concept of “Democracy with Leadership”, or more familiarly “Guided Democracy”. The basic idea was a part-elected and a part-nominated Government, with functional representation in Parliament. This would eliminate the plethora of parties and factions in the legislature which had led to instability in government. Important elements in the public life of the country as well as the armed forces had lent their unstinted support to the President's plan and for the past nearly two years now the country had been ruled in accordance with these principles:

To carry his ideas a step further the President, in April, 1959, asked the country's 3-year old Constituent Assembly to return to the Revolutionary Constitution of 1945. Earlier, in March, Dr. Sukarno had expressed the view that during the 14 years since Indonesia had proclaimed her independence the country had been facing “destruction, disunity and obstruction” in development because the spirit and soul of “independence, unity and reconstruction” had watered down. The “spirit of 1945”, therefore, must be revived. The Constituent Assembly which since its inception had been bogged down by the well-balanced triangular deadlock between the diehard Muslim-dominated Masjumi, the conservative Nahadutul Ulema, and the nationalist-orientated PNI and had made no progress even with such elementary details as the form and shape of the country's constitution, failed to react favourably to the President's call. At its meetings on May 30 and subsequent days when it met almost daily the Assembly failed to reach the two-third majority vote which was required for approval, and this despite Dr. Djuanda's clear warning on June 1, that events similar to those that had happened in the neighbouring countries might repeat themselves in Indonesia should the Assembly fail to endorse the President's proposals.

The Assembly's failure to muster the requisite majority was followed by a quick succession of events. Actually, on June 2 Lt. General Nasution, in his capacity as Central War Administrator, imposed a blanket ban on all political activities in Indonesia. An explanatory Note spelled out the reasons: with constitutional talks going on in the Consembly, political activities might bring undesirable consequences and thereby seriously hinder maintenance of law and order. Besides, with threats of intimidation being brandished about, existence of ideological differences between organisations might arouse fanaticism. The real reason, however, seemed to lie in the Army Chief's confession that the Constituent Assembly's failure to adopt the President's “guided democracy” scheme, had created tension in the country. “If we do not prevent it”, General Nasution declared, “it may end in disaster.” He, therefore, ordered his troops to stand by at their posts for further instructions and told his regional commanders to adopt strong measures against any groups creating disorder.

The Consembly, however, refused to oblige for the Muslim parties seemed to be firmly united in their opposition to the Revolutionary constitution of 1945. And towards the end of June as Dr. Sukarno returned from his two-month globe-girdling tour, it was widely believed that he would decree the forcible dissolution of the contumacious Assembly and proclaim the 1945 constitution through an executive fiat.

CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION IN NEPAL

From a temporarily distracted Indonesia it is pleasant to turn to a peaceful constitutional evolution in Nepal. We had noticed earlier that the February-March elections had returned the Nepali Congress to power in the state with a landslide majority: 74 in a house of 109. The quarter under review saw the Congress return to power as the Himalayan Kingdom's tenth government since the successful overthrow of the feudal Rana regime in 1950—for most part, during the past eight years, the party had been in opposition to the Governments of the country.

With Mr. B. P. Koirala as Prime Minister, and an eight-member Cabinet with ten Deputy Ministers, King Mahendra swore in Nepal's first fully-elected government at a special durbār at the Royal palace in Kathmandu on May 27. In a policy statement broadcast the following evening, the new Prime Minister reiterated his country's policy of non-alignment with military blocs. Mr. Koirala laid stress on the introduction of land reforms, for the peasants formed the backbone of the nation, and welcomed democratic awakening of the people demonstrated through the recent elections. "Any attempt to create disbelief in this", the Prime Minister warned, "in not merely improper, but will be against the clear thinking of the nation, the King and the people." Later at a Press Conference he revealed that New Delhi had been informed of his country's desire to revise the Indo-Nepal Trade Treaty of 1952, which expires in June, 1960, and that he anticipated no difficulty from the Indian side in changing some of its parts.

Following closely on the heels of the induction of Nepal's first elected Government three of the opposition parties announced the formation of a United Front. The three were Dr. K. I. Singh's United Democratic Party, Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya's own faction of the Praja Parishad and Mr. Ranghnath Sharma's Mahasabha. If they had not joined hands, the three constituents explained, "the role of the main opposition party in the country would have fallen on the reactionary Gorkha Parishad," and this, they felt, was not a healthy sign. Hence their pooling of the political stock-in-trade.

A distinguished visitor to Nepal in June for an all-too-brief three-day stay was the Indian Prime Minister. Mr. Nehru was in the Valley from June 11 to 14 at the invitation of King Mahendra and went through a very busy schedule including a reception by the Nepal-India Friendship Association, a State banquet by the King, a civic reception and an address to the Nepalese Council of World Affairs. It was at this last function that the presiding officer commented the "restraint and dignity", which India had shown over "the distressing events in Tibet", as a lesson in "international behaviour." Later at his news conference on June 14 the Indian Prime Minister revealed that there was concurrence between India and Nepal in their approach to the Tibetan question. Answering persistent queries on the Gandak river project which had agitated some minds in Nepal Mr. Nehru said that if it did not have the approval of Kathmandu "we have an alternative", in any case "the loss will be more for Nepal for thereby she will not get electricity and irrigation without any financial commitment." A joint communique issued by the two Prime Ministers at the end of Mr. Nehru's visit

affirmed their belief that "no country should be dominated by another", that colonial control "in whatever form" should end, that India and Nepal were animated by similar policies and objectives and that there was an identity of views between them. The Prime Minister's three-day sojourn had thus helped to forge closer links with a friendly neighbour.

WEST ASIA

From Nepal we may pass to the troubled West Asian scene. Here what appeared as a crisis with major international undertones was touched off by a Cairo radio announcement on June 4. This was a declaration that the United Arab Republic had decided to confiscate all Israeli cargoes trying to pass through the Suez Canal "whatever the flags flown by the ships attempting the task." The radio claimed that Israel was trying to pierce the Arab blockade by renting ships to transport its merchandise, but that the manoeuvre was not destined to succeed. It was maintained that the Jewish-Arab armistice did not, in effect, eliminate the state of war and thus the closing of the Canal to Israeli goods was in conformity with international conventions. Actually, a day earlier on June 3 the Egyptian authorities had placed in custody the Danish freighter *Inge Toft* at Port Said after her Captain had refused to unload her Israeli cargo; the 2,756-ton freighter had been detained since May 21.

Repercussions were immediate. Mr. David Ben Gurion told the Knesset on June 3 that the action of the UAR authorities over the *Inge Toft* constituted "a threat to Israel and a challenge to the United Nations." For, basic to the entire issue was the right of the UAR to detain a cargo in its passage through what was, in the final analysis, an international artery of commerce. In fact the UN Secretary General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld expressed the hope that a settlement could be worked out through the International Court of Justice. Issues involved were grave and the decade-old Arab-Israeli conflict might have flared up with the least provocation; already, the West Asian powder keg was full to the brim!

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

At 71, on May 24, 1959, Mr. John Foster Dulles died in his sleep in a hospital close to Washington, D.C. A few weeks earlier, on April 15, Mr. Dulles' resignation as United States Secretary of State had been announced while on April 18, the former Under Secretary, Mr. Christian A. Herter, was sworn in to succeed him.

Mr. Dulles' was a sad end to a long and distinguished career which stretched, in the diplomatic world alone, for over forty years. In fact at 19 the young Dulles had attended the second Hague Peace Conference which drew up an international code of war and of neutrals' rights and duties in wartime, at Versailles in 1919 he had advised the U.S. delegation on the legal aspect of reparations. There had hardly been an international conference since, which Mr. Dulles had not attended, irrespective of the fact that the administration in Washington was Democrat or Republican. Since January, 1953 when President Eisenhower was sworn in, Mr. Dulles had remained Secretary of State—a staunch buttress to the Republican administration who later became the West's unquestioned, albeit controversial, spokesman on the international plane. That his policies were seriously debated, both enthusiastically supported as well as uncharitably condemned, was a measure of his international stature. We are too near the man and his time to be able to pass worthwhile judgments. It may suffice to recall that even his Soviet adversaries have called him "a very great statesman, very intelligent...a very strong advocate."

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

BY CRITERION

SEVERAL important developments in the fields of internal and external policies marked the Indian scene during the quarter under review. While the initial weeks saw an intensification of India-China tensions, largely due to a somewhat unprovoked radio and press campaign against India, in the later weeks the grave and delicate nature of the problem of Tibet was underlined by a press statement of the Dalai Lama, which probably was beyond what the Government of India could stand by. The shooting down by Sabre jets of the Pakistan Air Force of an unarmed Canberra of the Indian Air Force came as a sharp contrast with the suggestions for joint defence from Pakistan. With a third neighbour of ours, Nepal, the need for and inevitability of cordial and intimate ties were well brought out by the visit of Prime Minister Nehru. Inside the country there was an apparent intensification of party rivalries. The formation of a new party with conservative outlook to criticise the ruling party from its own angle added one more factor to Indian politics. The mass agitation against the Government of the Communist Party of India in Kerala also added to the growing tensions in India's political set-up. Among other interesting events were the formation of a new party in Andhra and a coalition Government in Orissa and the election successes of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras. In the sphere of economic development and policy, a Congress Party seminar held at Ooty was noted with interest for the ideas it disclosed about the Third Five Year Plan.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

An agitation against the Government of Kerala sponsored by the Opposition Parties which started on 12 June, 1959 brought about a critical situation in this southern most State of India and over-shadowed other developments in the country for some time. The present Government of Kerala came into being in 1957 when after the election results in Kerala had failed to give any clear majority of seats to any party¹, the Communist Party of India mustered the support of five Independents to command a majority in the legislature. Since the General Election there had been one bye-election, in Deviculam, which the ruling party had won. Ever since the Government had come into being, there were charges levelled against it of malpractices, discrimination, failure to maintain law and order, subversion of the spirit of the Constitution and serving party ends with the Governmental apparatus. Such charges were made off and on by leaders of the major Opposition parties—the Congress, the Praja Socialist Party and the Muslim League. Several local parties like the R.S.P. were also agitating against the Government in some form or other. One of the first acts of the new Government was to pass the State Education Bill, establishing firmer State control over educational institutions. The Bill was opposed by various groups, particularly by the leaders of the Christian minority in Kerala. The President of India had referred the Bill to the Supreme Court for opinion and assented to it after

1. Communist—60, Congress—43, PSP—9, Independents—14.

some portions were deleted. A second measure of the Government was the Agrarian Relations Bill, to which opposition was not apparently determined but probably equally stiff in some quarters. All this together led to a decision by the parties in the opposition to launch a mass agitation against the Government, which eventually took the form of closing schools, picketing in public places, Civil disobedience etc. Besides the political parties, the leaders of the agitation included leaders of the Christian and Nair communities, the spotlight being on Octogenarian Mannath Padmanabhan of the Nair Service Society. The opposition case against the Government of the State as stated publicly from time to time could be summed up as follows :

The State Government has been serving the ends of the party in power, by subordinating the administrative machinery. There has been a breakdown of law and order and there is no sense of security in the minds of those who do not belong to the ruling party. The spirit of democracy has thus been undermined in the State and the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution violated. There has been discrimination in favour of the party men and vindictive persecution of members of the opposition parties. There has been interference in the normal functioning of the Civil Service by party men. Violence has been resorted to in dealing with inconvenient political opponents. Attempts have been made to indoctrinate young minds by re-writing of school text books. The conclusion is thus reached that a vicious circle has been created and the Government of Kerala has outlived its mandate and must hence face the electorate.

It is the view of the Government of Kerala that the agitation is engineered by communal and reactionary elements who have lost their privileges as a result of the progressive measures adopted by the State Government. The opposition parties have joined it due to their failure to reconcile with the fact of the communist victory in elections and establishment of the new Government, by law. The agitation is unconstitutional, undemocratic and against the wishes of the majority of people. The charges against the Government are baseless and fabricated to invoke intervention by the Central Government which is controlled by the Congress party. The demand for fresh election in Kerala is nothing but "a discriminating demand which the opposition parties sought to enforce through illegal means."

On an all-India level, the Communist Party of India has vigorously upheld the view point of the State Government. Several distinguished individuals of diverse political beliefs have also condemned the agitation as undemocratic and as one which might set a dangerous precedent of putting a premium on breaking of laws. This view has also been taken by a section of the national press.

As against this, major parties have expressed themselves in favour of a re-election in the State. Mr. D. P. Ghosh of the Jana Sangh, Mr. R. M. Lohia of the Socialist Party, the National Committee of the Praja Socialist Party and the High Command of the Congress have pleaded for fresh polls. In expressing its opinion, the Congress Parliamentary Board had upheld a view earlier express-

ed by Prime Minister Nehru after a fact-finding tour of the State, which Chief Minister Namboodripad had described as helpful.

On the situation in Kerala, the Congress Parliamentary Board adopted its crucial resolution on 19 June, 1959. Viewing the situation from the larger interests of the country and the 'democratic structure to which India is committed' the Board found a deep seated malaise in the public life of Kerala, a vast upsurge of public opinion against the State Government and a persistent demand for a change. A big change over had taken place among the people since the elections and this was a legitimate presumption that the Government no longer enjoyed a confidence of the majority. In such circumstances the democratic and the correct way of meeting the situation was to have general elections.

As the Government of the State refused to abide by this suggestion, a state of uncertainty prevailed after these developments—the opposition pleading for intervention by the Union Government and the Government denying any need or desirability of it. The Communist Party had actually asked for a country wide agitation against such a step.

The points at issue were if it was constitutionally proper and permissible to agitate for the resignation of a Government established by law, if it was desirable for the Centre to intervene in a State where the Government commanded a majority in the legislature and if a situation had really arisen in the State where proper functioning of the Constitution had become impossible. The Indian Constitution does provide for Central intervention in a State where the functioning of the Constitution had become impossible, although such a decision would normally be taken in very exceptional cases in view of the federal character of the Constitution.

THE SWATANTRA PARTY

For the first time in the Indian politics conservatism took shape when on 4 June, 1959 about fifty persons prominent in public life and described as peasant leaders assembled at Madras on 4 June, 1959 under the auspices of the Indian Agricultural Federation. Four days earlier, the Congress Party Seminar at Ooty had reiterated faith in socialism and the immediate programme of cooperationalization, state trading and expansion of the public sector. The "peasant leaders", among whom were C. Rajagopalachari, M. R. Masani, V. P. Menon and N. G. Ranga, adopted during the meeting a manifesto which expressed faith in :

- (a) spiritual values as against the materialistic philosophy of life,
- (b) opposition to policies which dry up all interest 'in land and factory alike',
- (c) agricultural prosperity through the self employed peasant proprietor,
- (d) better supply of materials etc., to the farmer without interfering with his right to ownership, management and cultivation,
- (e) opposition to collective economy of any kind,
- (f) fair price for agricultural products,
- (g) competitive enterprise in industry,

- (h) restriction of State enterprise to heavy industry to supplement private enterprise in that field,
- (i) taxation without curbing incentive,
- (j) opposition to lopsided development of the economy,
- (k) opposition to policies leading to inflation,
- (l) restoration of the original property rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
- (m) opposition to stateism, and
- (n) restriction of State functions to prevention and punishment of unsocial activities.

The Madras conference participants also issued a statement saying: "Social justice and welfare should not be sought to be brought about by violence or State compulsion with all their necessary accompaniments or injustice, expropriation and repudiation of obligations but must be brought into being by the spread of the doctrine of trusteeship advocated by Mahatma Gandhi." It was their belief that instead of legislative sanctions for a socialistic society, there should be cultivated a moral obligation among the wealthy people to hold their wealth as trust.

A clarification of the new party's role was made by the veteran leader C. Rajagopalachari at a public meeting in Madras on 4 June. Announcing that the new party will be called the *Swatantra Party*, Rajaji said that they would "stand for the freedom of man, freedom of the farm and the family as against attacks by totalitarianism on the freedom of everybody. The first task of the party would be to create public opinion against the present policies of the Government of India, so that Mr. Nehru would come down and bow to the pressure of public opinion." Admitting that the primary role of the party would be to oppose, Rajaji said: "when confronted with a tiger, the first thing to do is to make the man shed his fear of the tiger before he is advised on how to tackle it." The veteran Madras leader again elaborated his ideas at a public meeting in Bombay.

While the formation of the party was welcomed by many public leaders on the ground that it might help to clarify certain issues in Indian politics and bring into sharper relief the differences between parties and parties, at a news conference in New Delhi held in the second week of July, Mr. Nehru referred to this party as a political projection of the Forum of Free Enterprise, deprecated its line of reasoning as one tending towards fascism and pointed out the lack of a constructive programme of the new party. Of Rajaji's approach his description was in a single phrase: "solidified anger".

Apart from the criticism by Mr. Nehru, one bad omen for the party has been the wide divergence of opinion between two of its leading members—Rajaji and M. R. Masani—on the issue of Kerala. While the latter was inclined to favour Central intervention in the State, the former publicly deprecated the agitation in the State against the Government established by law. The enthusiasts

of the party are meeting in Bombay on 1 and 2 August to formally launch the new party.

In the shaping of the new political alignments in India, an event of some significance was the formation of the Socialist Democratic Party in Andhra Pradesh. Constituent groups of this new party of one of India's most important States are the dissidents from the Congress who had quit their party earlier in the year, the dissidents of the Socialist Party of India led by P. V. G. Raju and the local Praja Socialist Party. The new party was born out of a two day convention held in Tenali in the second half of June and its objects are stated to be the establishment of a democratic Socialist Society which assured "complete and real" economic and social equality to all people while maintaining and enlarging the freedom of the individual. To achieve this the party would strive for a decentralized democratic State apparatus, a social system free from all kinds of exploitation, a classless and casteless order and fundamental freedom for all peoples. Capitalism and Communism, according to the new party, had both failed to solve the problem of achieving a harmonious and integrated system of society. One of the specific items of policy was opposition to Co-operative Farming by compulsion. While the press reported differences among the members of the new party soon after its formation, the very fact of its coming into being illustrated one of the possible ways in which dissidents from various parties can group themselves on a State level.

A political occurrence of interest during the quarter under review was the decision of the Congress party in Orissa to enter into a coalition with the Ganatantra Parishad—a party of Orissa State with considerable following. Ever since the General Election the Government in Orissa appeared unstable and on one occasion at least the Government was defeated in the Assembly. While this did not lead to any crisis—the Congress party mustered sufficient strength to pull on—the climate of uncertainty was never removed. An obvious solution was a coalition. The Congress agreed to this after a heated debate in the All India Congress Committee Session in New Delhi on 12 May. By the 19th the completion of negotiations was announced and on 22 May a three man Cabinet with Hare Krushna Mehtab continuing as the Chief Minister was sworn in. The Cabinet was expanded in July to include eight more members. Of the eleven Ministers six are from the Congress and five from the Parishad.

From the various political developments during the quarter—the agitation in Kerala, the formation of the Swatantra Party etc.—a few trends might be detected. There has been a degree of re-activation of politics in the country, opposition to proposed reforms has stiffened and become articulate and there is a new tendency of the politics of a State becoming gradually determined by considerations other than those of national politics.

INDIA-CHINA RELATIONS

India-China relations deteriorated in the earlier weeks of this period, as the press and radio in Peking mounted a strong propaganda campaign against India. Major planks of this propaganda were that the Dalai Lama, who had

earlier sought asylum in India, was under duress, that the 'Indian expansionists' were interfering in the internal affairs of China, that Indian Government officials were actively helping anti-China statements of the Tibetan rebels, that Kalimpong was the Commanding Centre of the revolution and that India was pursuing the old British imperial approach in regard to Tibet. The tirade against India sometimes even took the form of somewhat extraordinary charges of discrimination against him by the Panchan Lama and of reflections on India's regard for the Budha and Buddhism.

Making a statement in the Indian Parliament on 27 April on the subject of Tibet, Prime Minister Nehru made an exhaustive presentation of the Indian view and regretted the Chinese attacks on India's bona fides and the levelling of baseless charges against this country. Points from Mr. Nehru's statement are :

- (1) The Dalai Lama had entered Indian territory of his own volition; the asylum to him however was readily granted.
- (2) Tragedy was being enacted in Tibet.
- (3) What was more, language of the cold war was being used against India.
- (4) It was a matter of the deepest regret and surprise to us that charges should be made which were both unbecoming and entirely void of substance.
- (5) India's basic policy would continue to be governed by the three factors of security of the country, friendship with China and sympathy for the people of Tibet.
- (6) It was wrong to deal with a situation like Tibet with military methods.
- (7) It was an over simplification to describe the Tibetan situation as a revolt by upper strata reactionaries.
- (8) India had no desire to interfere in Tibet.
- (9) At the same time she was greatly distressed at Tibet's hapless plight.
- (10) It was India's hope that the Chinese would not use their great strength against Tibetans.

While after this statement the press offensive in China gradually receded, a situation of a new kind emerged by June when the Dalai Lama in a written statement at a press conference virtually repudiated Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, demanded full autonomy and the creation of greater Tibet, by implication claimed to be the head of the Government of Tibet and hinted at the need for raising the issue of Tibet in the United Nations. The Dalai Lama had *inter alia* stated: "The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was thrust upon the people and Government of Tibet by threat of arms.....The consent of the Government was secured under duress." He added "I and my Government are fully prepared to welcome a peaceful and amicable solution of the Tibetan question provided such a solution guarantees the preservation of the right and powers which Tibet has enjoyed and exercised without any interference prior to 1950."

As the Dalai Lama's statement and the views expressed by some Indian public men on this subject might create a misunderstanding, the Government of India clarified through a spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry that the Government of India did not take responsibility for any of these statements. "The Government of India" he said "want to make it clear that they do not recognise any separate Government of Tibet and there is therefore no question of a Tibetan Government under the Dalai Lama functioning in India."

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

An unarmed Canberra of the Indian Air Force carrying a crew of two which crossed into Pakistan due to a navigational error was shot down by Sabre jets of the Pakistan Air Force near Rawalpindi on 11 April. This unwarranted act contrary to international law and custom was described in India as against all standards of civilised behaviour. After shooting down the plane, Pakistan concocted a confession from the crew and sent a note of protest to India, on the basis of their version of the incident. India rejected this version and on 21 April, Defence Minister V. K. K. Menon made a detailed statement in the Lok Sabha on the subject calling the attack "premeditated and wanton." In interrogating the crew, Pakistan had violated the Geneva Convention in this matter. The Defence Minister also revealed that such violations of space by Pakistan Air Force into India had been 'frequent and numerous,' there being as many as 21 violations in the two months ending 26 March, 1959. An official protest note was sent by India on 20 April.

AGREEMENT ON CANAL WATERS

A silver lining in this dark horizon was the possibility of an agreement on one of the major items of dispute viz canal waters. In very guarded terms, the Government of India announced on 9 June in an official communique the possibility of a final solution of the vexing problem of canal waters distribution between India and Pakistan. These possibilities had arisen as a result of the talks conducted by the World Bank team in Delhi and Karachi earlier. The communique stated: "Though there are still several matters to be worked out in detail these discussions have resulted in the formulation of certain general principles which would afford a basis on which it should be possible to move forward towards a settlement of the Indus Basin waters question." The basis of this hope was:

- (a) Pakistan's willingness to replace the waters from the eastern rivers with a system of works for the western rivers;
- (b) India's agreement to pay part of the cost of these works;
- (c) India's agreement to continue with the supply to Pakistan from the eastern rivers for ten years; and
- (d) the World Bank's agreement to finance a project on the Beas.

The big 'if' in the matter however was whether the Bank will be able to persuade friendly Governments to render financial assistance for this purpose. Hopes, however, were expressed that such assistance would be forthcoming.

JOINT DEFENCE

During this period the suggestion for joint defence of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent was revived, when the Pakistan Foreign Minister and their Am-

bassador in Washington talked of this familiar concept. The proposal was once moved by some Indians like the Nawab of Bhopal and Syed Mahmud actually put this forward in one of his speeches in the Indian Parliament. While this was apparently suggested by some in India in order to dissuade Pakistan from joining the MEDO (in late 1952), the leaders of Pakistan vigorously took it up after having decided to align with the Western Power bloc. It would be remembered that many in India including Mahatma Gandhi had opposed the division of the Indian Army in 1947 and Maulana Azad has regretted this development in his account of *"India Wins Freedom"*. The division of the Army was then considered as the most severe and decisive blow to any hope that was left of India-Pakistan cooperation and collaboration and Mahatma Gandhi foresaw a prolonged period of an arms race between the two countries. The new Pakistan proposal, however, is essentially different in as much as joint defence is suggested without a joint approach to foreign policy. As it is, the approaches of India and Pakistan in regard to external affairs are radically different and from this follows a somewhat different assessment of the problems of defence and security of this region. In expressing his views in the Lok Sabha on the latest suggestion, the Indian Prime Minister reiterated his earlier stand in this regard when he posed the question: *"Joint Defence Against Whom?"*

INDIA AND NEPAL

Age old ties between India and Nepal were underlined when Mr. Nehru visited Kathmandu for three days from 11 June, 1959. A glorious reception accorded to the Indian Prime Minister on his arrival was followed by talks with the King and the Prime Minister. Other engagements included a news conference, an address at the Nepal Council of World Affairs, a civic reception and a reception by the Nepal-India Friendship Association. At the news conference Mr. Nehru revealed that there had been "concurrence between India and Nepal in their approach to the Tibetan Question."

The identical approach of the two countries to foreign affairs and the friendly ties between them were stressed in the joint communique issued after the visit. It stated in one place: "The Prime Ministers are further convinced that in the interests of peace as well as national and human progress no country should be dominated by another and colonial control in whatever form should end." It also talked of the need for sharing experiences in planning and for joint endeavours for planning and executing development projects.

THE OOTY SEMINAR

The six day A.I.C.C. Seminar at Ooty was inaugurated on 30 May by Jawahar Lal Nehru, who stressed upon the need for rapid advance: such advance, he said, was no longer a matter of choice but was thrown upon us by the compulsion of events. In course of its deliberations, the Seminar kept this in view when they recommended the figure of Rs. 10,000 crores for the Third Plan. This could be attained, they thought, by public savings and taxation, earnings of public enterprises, private savings and a reasonable measure of external borrowing. Earlier it was stated on 2 June that the Seminar

had accepted an annual six percent increase and 14 percent saving in the national income as the goals for the Third Five Year Plan. The object was to create a "self generating" and "self accelerating economy" and hence there was the need to continue with the Second Plan's emphasis on heavy industrialisation. It was essential to expand what is called the 'Capital Base,' specially in terms of machine building, heavy chemical and electrical industries as well as power. This would not however imply any lack of emphasis on agriculture: the agricultural base had to be strengthened and for this it would be necessary to develop processing and consumer industries in rural areas. Food production would need particular emphasis in the Third Plan.

To the commonly accepted objectives of the Third Plan *viz* a sizeable increase in the level of living of the people, the progressive growth of industries and the reduction of inequalities of income and wealth were now added the two objectives of maximum employment and a minimum of social services.

A press release at the end of the Seminar also discussed other subjects. It said that as the nation had now adopted as its objective the remodelling of society according to the socialist pattern, Socialism in India should have its roots in the spiritual and cultural values and the traditions of the country. Means of production, distribution and exchange should be so arranged as not to involve any exploitation and misdirection of resources. The public sector would have to expand continually; the large-scale industrial ventures in the private sector would have to be regulated and controlled and expansion in this sector ought to be regulated in the light of the aims of a socialist society. One of the specific recommendations made at Ooty was that efforts should be made to make use of the unutilized man-power in the rural areas.

The Seminar also discussed the questions of prices, wages, profits and income. Some kind of price regulation was essential for planning; of food grains in particular, the prices had to be kept stable and necessary action taken for this purpose, such as State trading at the wholesale level and building up of buffer stocks. Some specific fiscal measures considered at the Seminar were: definite maximum of salaries, special taxation on unearned, functionless, speculative and windfall incomes and taxation of increments in urban land values. Positive steps for reducing disparities in income—both urban and rural—would have to be explored.

The Ooty Seminar led to some anxious queries from the country's private sector and at a meeting in New Delhi in July with members of the Committee of the Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Prime Minister reassured the private sector of an important role in the country's economic life. The members were reported to have been satisfied with the talks.

Earlier at a session of the A.I.C.C. in New Delhi the members discussed major problems of economic policy on the basis of the notes prepared by the party secretariat on the Third Plan, Cooperative Farming and Agricultural production. The Note on the Third Plan pleaded for a "wider angle of social justice" and held that socialism must justify itself through superior efficiency for which it would

be necessary to re-organize the entire structure of production, distribution and consumption. Production should be largely of goods of mass consumption and of capital goods, disparities of income should be within socially justifiable limits and trade must increasingly pass to the cooperative sector. A note on cooperatives largely dealt with the lines on which Service Cooperatives ought to be built up; on Joint Cooperative Farming it was stated that the growing impression in the country that this was being shelved for the time being was far from the truth. "If each State Government" the note said "can attempt in one block area an integrated land reforms programme immediately, it would be easier to set up joint co-operative farms."

The growing realization in the western world of the urgency and importance of helping India's economic development was indicated by the proceedings of an India-America Conference in Washington held on 2 and 3 May, 1959. Vice President Nixon set the tune for the discussions by observing that the future of India's economic progress was even more important in the long run than what happened at the East-West meetings in Geneva. He said: "The question which will be answered in the next five or ten years will be this—can a people who need economic progress to satisfy the wants of their greatly increasing populations, achieve it in a climate of freedom or must they pay for progress by giving up freedom." Senator Kennedy making a powerful plea for aid to India said: "Our assistance thus far has been limited to emergency aid. We have not met the requirements essential for long range economic growth...." On India's behalf main speakers were Ambassador M. C. Chagla, H. V. R. Iyengar and Asoka Mehta. The Indian Ambassador echoing Jawaharlal Nehru said: "To my mind there is a much greater crisis (than communism) which confronts the world, and that is the division of this world into developed and underdeveloped countries, into countries which have plenty and which are on the verge of starvation." Mr. Iyengar said: "The basic point in the Indian plan is that for the first time in history the Government of the country is deliberately creating in the minds of men attuned by centuries of tradition to believe in destiny the seeds of revolt and the determination to fight poverty as a disease." Although at a news conference on 5 May, the President of the U.S.A. refused to commit himself in any way on this question of aid to India (he said he was fearful of the adjective "massive" in relation to aid to India), he nevertheless expressed his general sympathy for India's development plans.

An Indian Economic Mission led by the Central Minister for Steel, Mines and Fuel, Sardar Swaran Singh visited the Soviet Union in May (14 to 29). A concrete result of the visit was the signing in Moscow on 29 May of an Agreement for the manufacture of medicine, medicinal preparations and surgical instruments in India. After the signing of the Agreement, India's Minister for Industries, Manubhai Shah said: "The new loan of 80,000,000 roubles to us for the construction of State enterprises for the manufacture of medicines and surgical instruments will play a great role in developing our pharmaceutical industry."

BOOK REVIEWS

GENERAL

The Soldier and the State—The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations by Samuel P. Huntington. (Harvard, 1957). 534 pages. Price \$7.50

One picks up this book—and this almost has to be done with two hands for it is a weighty tome—in the expectation, created by its title and subtitle, of finding in it the answer to the momentous and very contemporary question: why does the unarmed soldier obey the unarmed civilian politician? Unfortunately the answer is not given, nor does the book attempt to enter this vital area of 'civil-military' relations: assuming that the soldier is the servant of the state it tries to show, through historical example and theoretical analysis, the varying types of relationship that could and should exist between the soldier and his civilian masters.

This, for the most part, is done in the first part of the book, 140 pages out of a total of 460; the rest being a very detailed account of the position of the armed forces in the United States from 1789 to the present, which would probably not be of very great interest to the Indian reader. But the comparatively short first section is full of most interesting matter and is very well worth reading. In one chapter here the author makes the point that the ideal type of relationship between the civil and the military is what he calls "objective civilian control" which brings the military under civilian control only for matters of high policy, leaving the military free to develop as a profession somewhat apart from other sectors of life in the state. For Dr. Huntington, an aloof and dedicated professionalism is the best, indeed the only, way to military efficiency and to a stable balance between the two elements in the state.

He has an excellent chapter on "The Military Mind," in which, though in a rather abstract matter, he clearly analyses that 'conservative realism' which he believes to be the essence of the psychology of the soldier. He emphasises that this 'conservative realism' makes the soldier anti-war and pacifist in his outlook, a paradox which is only superficially startling for he has no difficulty in establishing that it is precisely because he knows most about war that the soldier has recourse to it most reluctantly. It is rather the civilian politician who is bellicose and given to sabre-rattling, not the soldier, who has to wield the sabre. This is of particular importance, and of some comfort, to us in India with the rise of military regimes in neighbouring countries.

The author interweaves these two theme—the desirability of non-political military professionalism, and the pacifism of the military professional in a comparative study of the role of the armed forces in Germany and Japan. In the former country the highly professional German General Staff was repeatedly, against its better judgement, dragged into war by the civilian politician. In Japan, military leaders were responsible for the drive to war because they were not professional but insisted on participating fully in political life. A reading

of this section of the book convinces one that the fire-eating Colonel Blimp is not only a joke but a myth.

Dr. Huntington is not very happy with the present state of civil-military relations in his own country for he feels that there is too much intermingling of the two sectors in the United States today; and has a very effective section on 'military influence on American Society.' According to him over-much respect is shown for the military man by the civilian while at the same time the American military man is not prepared to assert his independence of the civil side; there is a confused blurring of positions which results in a General becoming the President and then behaving in a positively anti-military fashion.

The author's language is ponderously polysyllabic but is worth wrestling with because of the intrinsic interest of his ideas on a very important subject.

War at the Top by James Leasor, on the experiences of General Sir Leslie Hollis, K.C.B., K.B.E. (Michael Joseph, London, 1959). 306 pages. Price 21sh.

The professional staff officer is a peculiar breed of animal who has established himself securely in the war business over the last 100 years or so. Active soldiers regard him with feelings ranging from amused tolerance to positive antipathy but consisting essentially of the conviction that he is responsible for vitiating and diluting the effective exercise of command. However valid or invalid this point of view may be, nobody can deny that the staff officer has become, or made himself, indispensable to every commander. When, as in today's warmaking, a War Cabinet or a Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee wields the ultimate command power itself instead of giving it to a Supreme Commander or Commander-in-Chief, the staff officers serving a War Cabinet or COS Committee are supremely important and indispensable.

Great Britain has led the world in the techniques of the higher direction of war, and the pattern set by Sir Maurice Hankey as Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence and to the War Cabinet from 1930 to 1946 has been copied by many countries, including India. General Hollis, selected personally by Hankey in 1939 to be Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and the COS Committee, was associated with all the great decisions of the War. His experiences during the War have been written up by James Leasor, a professional journalist and author.

The book presents the progress of higher strategic planning and direction with reasonable continuity but not in great detail. To this extent it tells little that is new; other books have told the story much more fully and brilliantly. But it does illuminate and enliven its theme with a series of effective character studies of the main personages associated with Allied strategy. Winston Churchill comes in for the lion's share of treatment, being the great lion that he indubitably was. But the others—Beaverbrook, Dill, Alanbrooke, Ismay, Pound, Marshall, King, Mountbatten, Montgomery, Reynaud, Roosevelt, Stalin, Portal, Eisenhower, Winant—are portrayed with perceptiveness and frankness. Hollis is not afraid of expressing uncomplimentary judgements; Montgomery in particular comes in

for some severe criticism as well as high praise. Hollis has evidently kept very copious notes of what happened during the policy-making process and these are quoted liberally. Leason writes well and packs an astonishing wealth of material into a 306 pages book.

The main value of the book is its presentation of the part played by a senior and very capable staff officer in the determination of Allied strategy. If our junior (and senior, for that matter) staff officers could learn their lessons in staff work from Hollis and acquire a fraction of his outlook on the staff profession, incalculable benefits would inevitably be assured in the conduct of our military business.

P.T.C.S.

Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare by Bertrand Russell. (George Allen and Unwin, London). 92 pages. Price 7sh. 6d.

For many years Lord Russell has been in the forefront of the movement against nuclear weapons. In this small book he attempts to spell out the practical steps that can be taken to halt and reverse mankind's funeral march towards a seemingly inevitable nuclear holocaust.

Lord Russell says that the most important step—the first step—should be motivated by sheer common-sense, a realisation that the entire human race is now in danger, not just a single nation or a group of nations. Unfortunately this sort of common sense is, in reality, a most uncommon quality, much of what Lord Russell says about the danger to mankind was said twenty years ago by H. G. Wells but no one obviously, has taken any note of Well's "common sense" solutions for mankind's ills. It is not possible to frighten mankind into doing the right thing, it must want to do it. Recognising this Russell, who is a nationalist and an agnostic, admits that the first step should be what he calls a psychological one, a change of mood and a change of aim. That change will never come merely from man's psychology as a product of mental process: it will come, if it comes at all, from man's heart and from the spirit.

This apart Russell's step by step programme towards nuclear disarmament is modest and reasonable; starting with the cessation of nuclear tests, which now seems within realisation. Then would come a solemn renunciation of war by both blocs and the setting up of a Conciliation Committee to arbitrate disputes. This would consist of 2 Americans, 2 Russians, one West European, one Chinese and 2 neutrals. "The two-neutrals might, perhaps with advantage, be one an Indian and the other a Swede, since this would secure that on the whole, one should lean towards the East and the other towards the West" which shows what the world—famous philosopher thinks of India's independent foreign policy. The final stage in Russell's plan envisages a United Nations military force with soldiers of all nations being mixed in each unit rather than each nation supplying a complete unit.

The alternatives to nuclear war need to be constantly reiterated and Lord Russell does this with force and clarity: but let it not be called *common sense*.

The Campaigns of Wavell, 1939-1943 by Robert Woolcombe. (Cassell, London 1959). 227 pages, Price 21sh.

This is the story of Lord Wavell's campaigns during the Second World War told by Robert Woolcombe in a style characterised by raciness, vigour and power. The late Field Marshal's fourteen campaigns in the Western Desert of North Africa, in British Somaliland, in Eritrea, in Italian Somaliland, in Abyssinia, in Greece, in Crete, in Iraq, in Syria, in Iran, in Malaya, in the Dutch East Indies, in Burma, and in Arakan, are all described in detail. As Wavell himself remarked in his last despatch, *Operations in the India Command*, "some (of these campaigns) have been successful, others have failed." But Mr. Woolcombe has brought out clearly that though success whenever achieved was due largely to Wavell's forethought and daring, failure was due generally to adverse circumstances, lack of resources and other difficulties over which the Commander-in-Chief had no control. His brilliant victories against overwhelming numerical superiority of Italians in North and East Africa on the one hand and his failure to stem the Japanese tide in South-East Asia on the other, are instances which illustrate the point. Wavell's smash through the Italian Camps near Sidi Barani in December 1940, with a small force of the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Division, the pursuit of the large Italian force right up to Agheila—500 miles from the Allied base at Mersa Matruh—and the capture of immense material and astronomical numbers of prisoners of war was due mainly to Wavell's planning, strategy and daring and not merely to the superiority of "I" tanks as it is sometimes believed. He had a shortage of practically all essential equipment, but a belief in taking calculated risks, and surprise and mobility in attack achieved a marvel of military success which surprised the world, and sent a thrill of hope in the Allied camp at a time when bad news was the order of the day from all other fronts. His idea of creating Tobruk as a thorn in the side of Rommel's ambitions of advancing into Egypt was another master stroke of strategy which will ever remain a classic example of "Threat to enemy Communications."

And then came the Japanese in December 1941. The preparedness of the Japanese and their speed on the one hand, and the Allied neglect of South-East Asia and their commitments in Europe in respect of helping Russia on the other, were such that a defeat in this theatre was more or less a foregone conclusion. It speaks volumes for Wavell's reputation at the time and the confidence the Allied leaders reposed in him (in spite of certain differences with Mr. Churchill) that he was offered the ABDA (American, British, Dutch and Australian) Command at the instance of President Roosevelt. And this is what the British official history (*The War Against Japan*, Volume I, p 265) has to say about this offer: "It was an unenviable command, which many a man might well have hesitated to assume, a command which offered little chance of success and seemed likely to end in defeat and even disaster. General Wavell, being the man he was, accepted without demur....." Wavell was thus not

the man to shirk responsibility, though it was his misfortune that he was called to duty wherever the Allied position was the weakest. The same fact is also to his glory and renown, for he never hesitated to answer the call. This is why he has been truly described as the "adversity's general."

Even when there were defeats and disasters, as there were plenty during the short lived ABDA Command and later in Burma, he never lost heart and did whatever he could with what little he had. He believed in the principle of engaging the enemy as closely and as far forward as possible," and this is what helped him in maintaining moral ascendancy in Africa in the earlier stages. It was also in pursuance of the same principle that he brought into existence the Long Range Desert Group (Bagnold's) in Africa and later the Long Range Penetration Groups (Wingate's Chindits) in Burma, both justifying his own dictum that a good general should have, *inter alia*, "a touch of the gambler". While describing the campaigns, the author has given many other instances, both in Africa and South-East Asia where this principle was followed by Wavell to good advantage.

The author has done well in not giving a detailed tactical account of the various campaigns and in confining himself mainly to a study of the wider strategy of his hero, for Wavell seldom personally conducted tactics. As a general and commander-in-chief he rightly left tactics to his subordinates. But it does not mean that this aspect of operations is completely omitted—enough is included to make the campaigns intelligible and comprehensible, the chief object of the author being to bring out the soldierly qualities, generalship and character of Wavell, in which he has admirably succeeded. In addition to describing the campaigns, the book is a sort of part-biography of Wavell, covering four years of his life. In an appendix a brief biographical outline is also given. There are a few maps and an index.

Though the book is satisfactory in most respects, one may point out a little error, committed, it is hoped, unconsciously and not deliberately. The Indian National Congress has been referred to as the Hindu Congress, a name not in keeping with facts, though used before Independence by some British journalists for Anti-Indian propaganda.

P.N.K.

The Japanese Thrust by Lionel Wigmore (being volume IV of series one of "Australia in the War of 1939-45", Canberra, 1957). 715 pages. Price 30sh.

This is a detailed and well-documented account of the operations of the Australian Army during the hectic six months from December 1941—when Japan entered the war against the Allies with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour—to May 1942 by which time she had completely overrun and established her hegemony in the Pacific and over practically the whole of South-East Asia and Burma. Her declared object in these operations was of course the isolation of China and the establishment of what the Japanese statesmen called the "Greater East-Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".

It had been apprehended for some time before the outbreak of war, and even after it, that Japan's policy in China would lead that country sooner or later to a conflict with the United States of America. It was accepted that as a corollary to such a conflict, the danger to Australia and the British Empire in Burma and India would immensely increase. Therefore the United Kingdom and Australia had decided upon a policy of avoiding war with Japan as long as possible. In pursuance of such a policy the United Kingdom had, in October 1939, withdrawn her gunboats from Yangtse Kiang and the West River, and had also decided to withdraw some infantry battalions from Shanghai. Moreover, soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Japan had declared that she would not join Germany. Australia had, therefore, started preparations to send her expeditionary forces to Britain's aid, though her mind was, despite the Japanese declaration, not completely at ease with regard to her own defence. Australia's problem was that while on the one hand she wanted to help Britain as she had done in the war of 1914-18, on the other she had to be prepared to defend her own territories against the potential enemy—Japan. This Australian dilemma becomes easily understandable if one remembers that in the 1914-18 war Japan was an ally of Britain, whereas in 1939 she was a very likely enemy of both the United Kingdom and the United States. However, Australia decided to respond to the call of Britain for help and raised and sent considerable armed forces—army, navy and air—to the western theatre during 1940 and 1941. When in October 1941 the Japanese Premier Prince Konoe, who favoured agreement with America, fell and was succeeded by General Tojo, it was felt that a war with Japan was more or less certain. When it came two months later, the Australian troops were engaged in the west and were consequently not available for the defence of South-East Asian bases. Thus, neither the United Kingdom and Australia, nor the United States of America was prepared for a showdown with Japan either physically or psychologically. This fact to a large extent explains the feeble resistance offered to the progress of Japanese arms during the six months with which the book deals, and the incredibly rapid advance of Japan in the Pacific and in South-East Asia, right up to the north-eastern borders of India—in fact into certain parts of Indian territory as well.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I gives a very clear and cogent exposition of how the ever-increasing pressure of Japanese population and other causes inevitably led Japan on the road to war; the Australian problem of whether to concentrate on the defence of homeland and South-East Asia or to send expeditionary forces to the western theatre; and Australian plans and preparations. Part II gives an equally well-written account of the Japanese conquests in South-East Asia and particularly of the areas where the Australians operated. It is a story of shortages and shortcomings, crumbling resistance, mounting disasters and a series of Allied reverses coming one after the other in quick succession—and yet a story of gallantry and heroism displayed by the common soldier who cheerfully went through the ordeal, with his capacity for endurance often stretched to the limit.

The operations described in this Part do not include Burma, for there were no Australian troops there during this period. The 7th Australian Division which had been serving in the Middle East was proposed to be sent to Burma early in 1942, but the Australian War Council did not agree to the proposal, in spite of the almost frantic appeals of General Wavell and the Pacific War Council in London. The Australian War Council was of the opinion that it would be more desirable to concentrate on the defence of Australia and build up the homeland for a future offensive than to disperse forces. In the event, it proved to be the correct decision, for it is extremely doubtful whether the addition of one division could have made any difference to the course of events in Burma in the first half of 1942.

Part III of the book deals with the Prisoners of War Camps established by the Japanese in the wake of their victories. The Allied prisoners—a very large number indeed—included many Australians (about 22,000) captured at Singapore, in Java, Timor, Ambon and New Britain. The description of conditions in these camps makes very poignant reading, full as it is of the human touch, though one cannot but suspect that the account of the so-called Japanese “brutalities” is at times exaggerated.

The book is profusely illustrated with attractive photographs, has many maps and sketches, appendices and an index, and is an important accession to the literature on the period which may be called the Japanese ‘Finest Hour’.

P.N.K.

The Nine Days of Dunkirk by David Divine (Faber & Faber, London, 1959). 308 pages; 9 maps. Price 21sh.

The modern world is impatient of miracles, and now the Dunkirk episode is robbed of its wonder in the cold light of critical reasoning and historical research. With the help of the massive Government records, official histories and personal memoirs of the war now available to the student, Mr. Divine has given a day to day, almost hour to hour, account of what really happened at Dunkirk, and why. He has minced no words in assessing the roles of the principal participants in those stirring events, but if his comments are acid and hard-hitting, they are obviously made with sincere conviction and much plausibility.

Of the story of Dunkirk, even the bald figures are impressive. In the disastrous fighting that ended with the evacuation, the British Expeditionary Force suffered 68,111 casualties; lost 2,472 guns, 63,879 vehicles and half a million tons of stores and ammunition. But nearly 200,000 British and 140,000 French and Belgian troops were brought out from the jaws of the Panzers to form the core of the new Allied armies, and the Nazis were given a foretaste of British doggedness and successful perseverance in an ‘impossible’ task.

Reviewing in detail the actions and attitudes of the main participants, British, French, Belgian and German, in those three terrible weeks of the Blitzkrieg, the author names Lord Gort, Admiral Ramsay and Mr. Churchill

"the three men of Dunkirk". He acquits King Leopold of the charge that the Belgian surrender surprised the French and British commanders and made an evacuation inevitable. Records show that Weygand and Gort were repeatedly informed of the approaching collapse of the Belgian resistance, and that the full scale evacuation of British forces from Dunkirk had started 24 hours before Leopold's surrender. The author's remarks about German commanders are also generally valid and convincing, though he has not brought out clearly the vital incontrovertible fact that the B.E.F. could never have been saved if Runstedt and Hitler had not halted Guderian's panzers on 23rd May when the road to Dunkirk lay open before them. He gives Gamelin and Weygand all that they probably deserve, and is scathing in his criticism of the strategic thinking, tactical handling and general fitness for modern war of the French army.

Lord Gort is now set up as the hero of the fighting retreat and the deliverance of Dunkirk. This appears at least as far from the truth as the earlier wholesale condemnations of that courageous but mediocre officer, and may well represent the other swing of the pendulum. But when Gamelin is held responsible for the state of the French army because he had been its chief for many years of peace, it is difficult to absolve Gort from all responsibility for the wrong doctrines and significant weaknesses of the British army, whose Chief of Imperial General Staff Gort had been made in 1937 over the heads of many officers senior to him. Again, it is surprising that Mr. Devine justifies Gort's repeated failures to launch an attack towards the south when clearly the only safety for his force lay in re-establishing contact with the French armies on the Somme and when the French Commander-in-Chief as well as the British Government repeatedly urged him to do so. Weygand's plan for a counter-attack with eight divisions was quite unrealistic; but the significant effect on the Germans of even the small counter-attack at Arras shows that an effort by three or four divisions (which surely could be found from B.E.F. and French First Army) would have completely upset the German plan and might have changed the course of the war. Gort, however, thought in terms of an evacuation from as early as 19th May—As things turned out, his decisions saved the personnel, though not the valuable equipment of the B.E.F. But the result was due to many unlikely developments, and Gort's actions must be judged by the probable outcome, about which his own opinion even on 26 May was "that a great part of the B.E.F. and its equipment will inevitably be lost even in best circumstances."

The real heroes of Dunkirk were the staunch soldiers fighting stubbornly against terrible odds, and the equally staunch sailors, (naval and civilian) running voluntarily again and again into the inferno at the beaches and docks. The detailed planning and co-ordination that went into it, and which Mr. Devine clearly brings out, show the stuff of which miracles are made.

It is a vehement and controversial, but well argued and sincere, account of a critical phase of the Second World War.

War in the West—Allied Campaign in Western Europe, 1944-45 by Capt. S. G. Chaphekar (1958). 157 pages. Price Rs. 7.

It is an admirable guide book for those who cannot understand the complexities of the allied campaign in Western Europe, 1944-45. All important aspects of the campaign have been well described—planning, battle of the Beach-head, the break-out, campaign in Brittany and dash to the Seine, the Arnhem Stroke, the clearing of the Scheldt, the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, and the Advance to the Elbe. The book contains a short list of useful books on the subject. The book will be useful to the officers preparing for the various promotion|staff college entrance examinations.

The Civil War—A Soldier's View by Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, edited by Jay Luvaas, (The University of Chicago Press. 1958). 323 pages. Price \$6.00.

Colonel Henderson's name is well-known to students of military history. He is an authority on the American Civil War. Herein lies the importance of this book. It contains detailed studies of some of the important battles of the Civil War. It is difficult to imagine a better analysis of the problems facing the Commanders in the Civil War. The detailed tactical studies of battles are invaluable. Colonel Henderson knew how to distil the wisdom and experience of the ages in a few sentences. His pithy sayings have almost become proverbs. "How often in military history has success been achieved by a movement over ground deemed impossible, and therefore, left unwatched?" (p.110). "What would Waterloo have been had Napoleon been allowed to retire unmolested?" Thus in one sentence Colonel Henderson sums up his impressions about the faulty strategy pursued by General Lee when he allowed the Federal Army to escape after the battle of Fredericksburg.

It is one of those rare books which have to be diligently studied so as to grasp the lessons and significance of important battles.

D.P.

Men Fighting—Battle Stories edited by John North (Faber & Faber, London). 240 pages. Price 18sh.

This collection of stories is of absorbing interest for it is a record of the experiences felt by the soldiers and expressed vividly and with rare charm. By far the most important story is that which concerns Gavin, the Company Commander. Here is a brilliant and lovable sketch of a Company Commander—that is almost an ideal to be striven after. How Gavin fought his battle is thus described: "There were no heroic charges. There was no Death or Glory, not in this war, and at the end of it no decoration after Gavin's name. It was not even very spectacular. But he bestrode A Company, his influence and example standing out like a rock. Here vising a platoon. There at a vantage point, with raised binoculars. Next with another platoon—and heaven help the man not alert at his post; and then somewhere else, calmly directing a smoke screen from the Company Headquarters mortar." (p. 187).

The story of the Anzio breakout is very interesting and graphic. "All the while immense explosions ripped up the enemy lines. An ammunition dump was hit and we saw great billowing flames of scarlet and orange. It was like walking into a roaring furnace." (p. 147).

The Chindwin crossing gives an insight into the feeling of the soldier as he encounters the real dangers of war. Two British soldiers in a dingy were overtaken by a boat full of Japanese soldiers. This is how one of the soldiers felt: "For a moment I couldn't speak. My throat was parched, dry, and no sound would come from it. Slowly I gained control and after a bit sat up, motioning Peter to do the same." (p. 165). It is these realistic touches which make the stories so interesting.

D.P.

ARMY

The History of the 1st King George V's Own Gurkha Rifles Volume II, 1920-1947
by Brigadier E. V. R. Bellers (1956). 358 pages. Price 21sh.

It is an excellent regimentary history and deals with various activities of the 1st King George V's Own Gurkha Rifles. Waziristan proved to be a valuable training ground. Then came the severe ordeal of the disastrous operations in Malaya. Later on, battalions of the regiment took part in the operations in Arakan, Central Front in Burma, Kohima and Ukhrul. There are stirring episodes of the operations on the Irrawaddy and beyond. The concluding chapter brings the story up-to-date. The book is well written and deserves an honoured place in the literature of regimental histories.

NAVY

The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times by David W. Waters (Hells & Carter, London, 1958). 696 pages. Price 84sh.

It is a well-known fact that from times immemorial, the art of Navigation has been contributing greatly towards the development of civilization throughout the world. In this book an exhaustive study is made as to how this valuable art progressed in England during the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods. The author in dealing with the development of the art of Navigation brings forward in a simple but graphical manner the phases through which this art developed, from mere simple pilotage, through navigation by limited astronomical observations to Arithmetical and Logarithmical navigation towards the end of the 16th century. The book is written in two parts, the first one dealing with contributions made by certain European countries towards the compilation of Navigational data and towards the development of Navigational instruments and charts and the second one dealing with the achievements in this field by England during the 15th and the 16th centuries.

Till about the middle of the 16th century the English nation in general lacked interest in maritime affairs and her sailors did not possess much knowledge in the art of Navigation. This lethargy was mainly due to the limited scope England had of trading her merchandise abroad owing to increased com-

petition from certain continental countries. This sad state of affairs received rejuvenation during the early period of Queen Elizabeth's reign. The country needed a more aggressive maritime policy for its very existence. The power of Spain had to be curbed. These factors were appreciated by the Government, and Parliament passed appropriate acts laying down the country's maritime policy. Once a start was made in this direction, steady progress was made by England in the production of Navigational publications and the development of Navigational instruments. New methods and theories brought forward by mathematicians and sailors were also introduced into the existing system after proper trial. Thus England in a space of about seventy years from being ignorant of the art of Navigation, almost entirely through their own efforts largely transferred this art into a science by the time of the death of Captain John Smith.

This book which narrates graphically the problems of Navigation during the Elizabethan Era, undoubtedly will be a source of inspiration to all seafaring nations who are at present faced with the added problems of intensive deep sea navigation.

K.P.N.

Hunting the Bismark by C. S. Forester. (Michael Joseph, London, 1959). 109 pages. Price 12sh. 6d.

"Hunting the Bismark" is the story about Bismark, the most modern battle ship of the German Navy, which was commissioned in 1941 to destroy the British Convoys in the Atlantic. It was a general belief among the Germans that this was the most powerful ship and no force of the British Fleet could match her. But within six days of her sailing from Gdynia she was trapped by the British forces and later sunk. In the pursuit of "Bismark," the British Navy also sustained the loss of a number of ships and personnel.

C. S. Forester has presented the search for Bismark and later her sinking in a very interesting narrative. He takes the readers to the different fields of operations. At one time a reader is in the War Room at the Admiralty and at another in the Operations Room of either the Bismark or one of the ships of the British Fleet. The encounters of the British Fleet with Bismark, sinking of the ships of the Royal Navy and later action with Bismark, have been recorded by the author in a very dramatic way.

Although a number of books have been written on this operation, this author has told this story in such a concise and clear manner that even to a reader without a naval background it makes a very interesting reading. The charts giving the position of the Royal Naval Ships and Bismark at various stages makes the understanding of the operation easy.

It is considered that the book will be of immense value to all those who intend to make the Navy a career.

R.P.K.

Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942 by G. Hermon Gill—**Australian War Memorial**, 686 pages. Price 30sh.

Ever since the Australian Navy was formed, Australia accepted in principle the theory that the indivisibility of the seas demanded, as far as possible, an undivided Naval Control. This greatly widened the scope of its War History. Australian ships formed part of British and later Allied Naval Forces in widely separated areas. Hence this book is an attempt made to preserve a just proportion in depicting the part of the Australian Navy in relation to the whole. The object of the book has been (i) to discuss and determine the influence of sea power on the progress and outcome of the War (ii) the way that power was wielded by the respective participants; and (iii) the contribution made by Australia through the Australian Navy.

The author, an officer in the British Merchant Service during the First World War, was mobilised when war broke out in 1939 and spent most of the war in the Naval Intelligence Division, Navy Office, Melbourne. Finally he conducted himself on historical research to Naval Headquarters, Colombo, Alexandria, the Admiralty and the United States of America. All available sources of information from the records of the Australian War Cabinet down to the war diaries and letters of proceedings of ships and establishments have been drawn upon.

This book has been written for the general reader rather than for the naval expert, so that technicalities, excepting those widely and readily understood, have been avoided. For example, courses and bearings have been given in compass points instead of in degrees, time groups like 1730 have been avoided in preference to 5.30 p.m.

The chronological order in every chapter narrative has been strictly adhered to. The maps, though small, are quite explanatory. The photographs are clear, neat and attractive. The narratives are absent from the tedious and voluminous statistical reports and tabular structures which usually bulge the aft portion of any similar war book. On the other hand the foot notes are many. They follow the star-studded numerals on many pages characteristic of a Reference Bible. Except for a stray mention or two of the Royal Indian Naval ships which also took part in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf Operations of World War II, there have been no better references about them. The book affords pleasant reading. The war interest is carried through and maintained with the same tempo. The volume as a whole is a fitting contribution to the General War Series Publications by a Navy which contributed not a little to the success of the War.

D.J.E.C.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

National Communism and Soviet Strategy by D. A. Tomasic. (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1957). 222 pages. Price \$4.50.

Titotism—Pattern for International Communism by C. A. McVicker. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., London, 1957). 332 pages. Price 36sh.

Both the books deal with 'Titotism' and cover almost comparable ground.

In the former study stress is laid on Titoism more in terms of Soviet strategy and less on its political and historical implications. In the opinion of the author 'Titoism' ante-dates Tito. He says, "Titoism is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it confined exclusively to Tito's Yugoslavia". If by Titoism is meant "revolts against Russia's dominance", he regards developments in Outer Mongolia in 1924 and 1930-32, and the long fight waged by the Chinese Communist party for the recognition of the specific features of its revolution, as precursors of Titoism. Where the earlier differences smouldered underneath, the conflict with Tito in 1948 spilled over into the open. But in the opinion of the author Titoism represents not only revolts against Russian hegemony but also "attempts to rationalise the relations among Communist rulers and their subjects... a new method of solidification within the communist system and promotion of its expansion". To that extent Titoism has become an instrument of communist world strategy. The author argues that Soviet Russia is prepared to suffer Titoism because it serves her present strategic needs in which the Soviet world is thought of a consisting of a kernel and a protective ring made up in part of Communist States of Eastern Europe and in part of friendly independent states, still further afield, and as a sort of open ground in front of the outworks, the Soviet Government wants a ring of neutral states. Yugoslavia—the exponent of Titoism—falls into place in the system. The author feels that if this experiment fails, that will mark the beginning of communism's failure as a unified world movement. Based on a study of the official publications and materials printed in the Government and party press of the communist countries, the book is a useful study on Titoism.

The second book regards Titoism as the pattern for different roads to socialism branching off from the Russian highway. The present volume, unlike the first, traces the origin of Titoism from Tito's break with the Cominform in 1948 and is concerned more about the philosophy of Titoism, its social and economic contents. The author thinks that the essence of Titoism is the maintenance of the Socio-economic contents of Marxism within a liberal political framework. The scaffolding has been provided by reforms in planning, budgeting and taxation, workers' participation in industrial management and its decentralisation, the refusal to harness the peasantry as a 'colony' for rapid industrialisation and the consequent slowing down of the pace of collectivization. The constitutional reforms of 1953 consecrated the gains of the Yugoslav revolution. Despite these innovations, the author sums up Titoism in practice has meant only "benevolent totalitarianism". The arrest of Djilas, the non-existence of political parties other than the League of Yugoslav Communists, are pointers in this direction. The absence of a short bibliography and the unnecessary bulk detract from the merit of an otherwise useful study.

B.

Aden by Sir Tom Hickinbotham. (Constable & Co., London, 1958). 242 pages. Price 21sh.

Sir Tom Hickinbotham has written an interesting factual account of the

Aden Colony and the Protectorate. The author had intimate contact with the Colony having served there in various capacities and retiring as its governor. He has combined personal recollections with factual information and this has made the book an interesting reading. There are vivid pen portraits of some leading personalities and an intimate description of the working of Port Trust and the Legislative Council in the early days. A glimpse of the life and problems of the Protectorates is given by the author when he describes his experiences during his visits to the different Sultanates and Amirates. Any book on Aden would have been incomplete without discussing its relations with Yemen and the author has rightly given space to that question providing adequate background information. The idea of a Federation of various Sultanates within the protectorate was put forward when he was the governor and he describes the proposals and the reasons that led to its being given up. The Federation was finally formed in 1959 but the book does not come up to that period. In a chapter on various communities in the Colony the author has significantly pointed out the lack of interest on the part of the Europeans in the local people. He has described the various political parties and constitutional developments in the Colony but has made no attempt to assess the nature and strength of Arab nationalism in the area. Further at one place in the early part the author has departed from his standard of giving a balanced account by introducing complimentary references about India. To contend that Britain made Aden a Crown Colony at the request of the Arabs who did not want it to remain with India is to take away emphasis from the fact that Britain herself would not have liked it to remain with India. Moreover to hold India responsible for the neglect of the Colony is to forget that India herself was under British rule at that time. Otherwise the book on the whole provides in a readable form sufficient information to the reader regarding the area and its problems.

D.

Nuri-as-Said by Lord Birdwood. (Cassell & Co., London, 1959). 306 pages. Price 30sh.

Lord Birdwood has written a factual and sympathetic account of the life of Nuri-as-Said who dominated Iraq's political life for nearly three decades. The author, while piecing together various bits of Nuri's life has devoted a large part of the book to the events through which he lived. Nearly half of the book narrates the events of the Arab revolt during the first world war and its aftermath—a period during which Nuri was very much in the background. The political history of the country and the frequent rise and fall of Iraq's Cabinets reflecting the unsuitable political life of the country are faithfully recorded. We find Nuri appearing on the political stage every now and then to become fourteen times the Prime Minister of the country. We get glimpses of him as a skilled politician, a keen anti-communist, a firm believer in alliance with the west and interested in the economic development of Iran and strengthening of its armed forces. In an exclusive chapter on his character the author dwells on his endearing qualities—his keen sense of humour and lack of pomposity, his generosity and his hospitality. The later part of the book deals with his ideas of Arab

unity, the Baghdad Pact and his relations with Egypt. The book concludes with the story of the July revolution that brought about the overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in Iraq and his career to a violent end.

The author admits that he is not an Arabist but claims advantage for his study as written by an independent spectator of the Middle East. Actually he has failed to produce a penetrating or a critical study and the picture of Nuri painted by him is one as an uncritical admirer of his would like to see him. The author claims that Nuri's feeling towards Britain were motivated by loyalty to Arabs rather than sentiment for Britain and has made no attempt to assess Nuri's contribution against the background of the aspirations of the Arab people. The author states that Nuri worked for Arab unity with selfless endeavour but the Baghdad pact, of which he was one of the architects, could hardly be considered a move towards promotion of Arab unity. One cannot share the author's view that history would have followed a different course had Nuri understood and exploited the spoken word. To attribute Nasser's popularity to effective propaganda is to wrongly assess the growth and strength of Arab nationalism. In fact his policy of close alliance with Britain failed to appreciate the anti-west current of Arab nationalism and left Nuri little to say to his people to be acceptable to them and to make him loved by them. The manner of his death revealed his complete isolation from the Iraqi people and is a sad commentary on his policies that failed to reflect their hopes and aspirations.

D.

The Birth of Dilemma by Philip Mason. (Oxford University Press, London, 1958). 366 pages. Price 30sh.

This first publication of the Institute of Race Relations, written by its Director, deals with the black inhabitants of Southern Rhodesia and the relationship that developed between them and the white settlers who conquered them. The book falls into three parts. In the first part the author uses the records of missionaries, hunter, traders and anthropologists to give a balanced picture of the people of the area, their organizations and achievements before the Europeans came on the scene. The second part is the account of the occupation of Mashonaland by the British South African Company and the consequent settlement of the area by white people. The tragic story of Lobengula King of the Matabele who tried in vain to save his Kingdom is told with sympathy and objectivity. The third part brings out the conflicting practices and ideals that grew and determined the relationship between the white settlers and the black inhabitants. As the author points out every conquerer is faced with a dilemma—to maintain his position by force and make certain of hatred in the end, or aim from the start at an equality which involves an immediate sacrifice of power. The dilemma has remained unresolved to this day. The book does not cover the history of Southern Rhodesia upto the present day but its analysis of the forces that have determined the relations between the black and white people provides an excellent background to the understanding of the present problems of Central Africa. And as the author rightly points out the outcome of conflict

between dark and fair in Rhodesia would greatly influence the future of the African continent.

D.

The Background to Current Affairs by D. W. Crowley. (Macmillan, London, 1959). 370 pages. Price 21sh.

The major aim Dr. Crowley sets himself in this sizeable—370 paged—volume is, to use his own words, “to identify and explain the main historical forces operating in the contemporary world and to clarify the assumptions behind the conflicting policies of the powers.” It is an ambitious aim, one that is far more easy to state than to realise. That it is laudable and meets a pressing, continuous demand among an ever-increasing clientele goes without saying. For the specialist apart, even an intelligent study of the daily newspaper pre-supposes a good working-knowledge of the essential background to this extremely complicated world of ours and its far more varied and complicated problems.

Apart from the introductory and the concluding chapters, the book falls into two main parts dealing with Internationalism, and Nationalism in the Post-War World. The first embraces the Commonwealth, the United Nations, Communism and its chief foil, NATO and two of our most pressing problems today: Germany, the “No man’s Land”, and the European movement as a concrete expression of “Supra-nationalism.” The second part falls under five main heads: Communist China and her neighbours, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, South-East Asia and the Middle East. The treatment is thorough without being burdened by distracting foot-notes or statistical data. It is at the same time a workman-like arrangements and while comprehensive is not designed to be filling.

Two major lacunae—and both could be easily remedied—may be listed. One is an over-stress on Britain and her national, international stature; in fact, the introductory chapter is entitled “Britain and the post-war World.” That even to-day London plays an important role both on the diplomatic and the commercial planes goes without saying but surely one of the outstanding phenomena of the post-war world has been a bi-polarisation of power with the two giants, the USA and the USSR emerging unchallenged. It would have lent a better perspective to the narrative if more space were devoted to these countries and their problems—national and international—maybe not to the exclusion of Britain, but perhaps in addition to it. Secondly while political pre-occupation is probably inevitable, a larger use of maps and attention to the socio-economic forces that operate should make it a much more useful work.

P. L. M.

An Atlas of World Affairs by Andrew Boyd. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1957). 159 pages. Price 15sh.

Following in the wake of the pioneer work of Mr. J. F. Horrabin in his pre-war “Atlas of Current Affairs”, to which the author pays a well-deserved tribute, Mr. Boyd has set himself the task of putting across in simple, readily intelligible form the complexities of our extremely complicated and ever-chang-

ing world. There follow 140 pages of maps with an accompanying text that is at once straight and direct. The subject matter ranges all the way from People, Power and Atomic Geography to Cyprus and the Balkan Allies, Ethiopia and the Somalis, Thawing Canada's North, Caribbean Patchwork and Antarctic Rivalry.

Inevitably perhaps a work of this nature becomes out of date even before it reaches the printing presses. Thus some of our major pre-occupations to-day: Berlin and a German Peace Settlement, Iraq vis-a-vis the United Arab Republic and Jordan, the Canal Waters Dispute between India and Pakistan, need to be better illustrated and explained. The strength of such works as the one under review lies in the fact that they set out the essential background even though they cannot anticipate man's ever-active penchant for quarrels over politics, race and language nor yet his endless arguments over frontiers, cities—and canals! Mr. Boyd's discharges an onerous, and one may add thankless, task rather well.

P. L. M.

Speech Is Of Time by R. G. Menzies (Cassell). 246 pages. Price 18sh.

It is very rarely that a politician is able to impart more than ephemeral interest to his utterances. His speech, as Mr. Menzies recognises in the title he has given to his book, is of time and its value fades with time. If some of the speeches and writings collected in the present volume are of more durable interest, it is mainly because they deal with stirring times, with the war years and later with the Suez crisis. During both periods the Australian Prime Minister played a leading part, as a member of Mr. Churchill's War Cabinet and as the spokesman of the eighteen nations which tried to negotiate a settlement of the Suez problem with President Nasser. This book however throws no new light on that episode beyond providing a consecutive narrative which may be of some use to students of history.

But it also emphasizes the mutability of political judgments. Whether or not Mr. Menzies still adheres to the view that the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was justified there must be very few left who would now support that stand. It would be unreasonable to expect a politician to have the gift of second sight, but it must be obvious to the Australian Prime Minister that some of the doubts he felt about the utility of a UN force to keep the peace between Egypt and Israel have now been dispelled by events and that his general assessment of the capacity of the UN to act promptly and effectively has to be revised. At the same time, his defence of Britain's decision to intervene in Egypt without consulting or informing other Commonwealth members cannot very well be squared with his plea in an earlier speech for effective consultation among Commonwealth Governments. Admitting that speed was necessary in reaching a decision, it has yet to be proved that consultation, despite all modern communication facilities, would have entailed undue delay. However, these points are now mainly of academic interest except for the obvious moral that judgments on institutions which are still in process of growth cannot have any finality.

Membership of the War Cabinet brought the author into close association with Mr. Churchill of whom he writes with affection and respect. The intimate glimpses of Mr. Churchill at work and in conference with his colleagues are among the most interesting pieces in this book. There is almost a photographic quality in the description of Britain's war-time leader entering the Cabinet room in Downing Street, casting his eyes around the table and opening the proceedings with the words: "Gentlemen, we have the signal honour of being responsible for our country at a time of deadly danger and of bad news. We will proceed with the business." Or again take a scene at Chequers on a week-end night in the Spring of 1941 when Mr. Churchill and General De Gaulle were having important consultations. They paced up and down the central hall "delivering homilies at each other" until, by about 2 o'clock in the morning the General very sensibly decided to go to bed. One wishes there were more of these deftly drawn pen pictures.

K.

INDIA

The Springing Tiger by Hugh Toye. (Cassell & Co. Ltd., London, 1959). 238 pages. Price 25sh.

In one of its references to Subhas Chandra Bose, the *Keesings Contemporary Archives* of the early Forties describes him as the Indian 'traitor'. Mr. Hugh Toye has given the sub-title to his book: "A Study of a Revolutionary." This apparent difference in approach could hardly be the result of Toye's un-British ways. He has been a British Intelligence Officer for long. It could be that the lapse of a decade and a half had restored to Britain's men of learning their traditional objectivity, which was understandably affected by the events of the early years of the Second War. The remarkable detachment with which Toye views this Indian leader's life and activities, however cannot be explained except as his own individual quality. For, throughout this book the tone is one of not only conceding to Bose his due but also of viewing him with sympathy. There are some lapses like the implied formulation at the end that Bose was suffering from racial prejudices (he had an Austrian wife any way), but by and large Toye keeps up his objectivity even while dealing with subjects which could raise deep emotional problems for many.

One weakness of Mr. Toye's study is the disproportionate emphasis laid on the later part of Bose's eventful career. Although a full chapter has been given on his role as the "rebel President" of the Congress, one who would depend on this for understanding Bose's place in Indian history, may fail to appreciate the significance of his role in 1938-39—those crucial years when the Indian National Movement was struggling to transform itself into a more militant and popular upsurge than hitherto. Bose had then served as the symbol of the new urges and aspirations. Without a very clear cut ideological or philosophical base, Bose nevertheless stood for a modernised socialistic State in this country. That he himself chose to give up this role as a rebel Congress President to form another party might be an indication of his rashness. So might have been his

earlier decision to leave the I.C.S. and later decision to go abroad to utilise the war for achieving the goal of India's freedom. It is on the basis of such rashness of some individuals however that others, in every country, shine in greatness. With all the obvious deficiencies Bose's career of that period was as important as his later role. Toye, however, seems to deal with that in so far as his later acts followed from this earlier life.

Toye's account of the formation of the I.N.A. and Bose's role stresses upon two or three crucial aspects: one, that Bose had no fancy for the Axis as such; he was looking towards Russia also throughout. Two, that he had a deep understanding of the need to bring the I.N.A. into the limelight in order to forestall a full fledged Japanese occupation of India. Also one thing Toye has stressed is that Bose's ways and approach to politics and political problems were unorthodox. A public man who had often to defy laws in India, Bose transformed himself with ease as a military leader who inspired thousands of soldiers in the battle field and took it upon himself to deal the final blow to the Empire of Britain through its own apparatus of defence and security. What might have partly led to Bose's carrying politics beyond the politicians was his belief that, as Toye puts it, "until the people had some idea of why they were voting, until some degree of responsibility had been induced in the press, no administration could hope to govern save as the British had done, by benevolent autocracy.....the ills were too deep, rooted in too many vested interests (P.180)". It may be easy to conclude from this that Bose was a Fascist; to quote Toye again: "Bose's belief in an authoritarian government had grown up in the West, but his model was the Turkish regime of Mustapha Kemal who seemed to have faced the same problems of social adaptation that confronted India, and not the Nazi or Fascist caricatures. Bose saw a strong congress government settling down to the accomplishment of a great social and industrial revolution in India and then handing over, after perhaps twenty years, to the processes of democracy." A study of such controversial a figure as Subhas Chandra Bose could hardly be above controversy or critical comments. The success of Toye is that he does not provoke anyone much anywhere in this very well-written book.

S.G.

Cochin Saga by Sir Robert Bristow (Cassell). 264 pages. Price 30sh.

The author briefly recapitulates his early days as a harbour engineer at the British Admiralty and has many interesting things to say about the early history of Cochin, about the political changes in India during the twenties and thirties, about Sri Aurobindo's philosophy, intimations from the spirit world and numerous other topics, all this is only a backdrop to his main theme, the building of Cochin harbour. He was nearly forty when he came from Britain to take charge of the project and for the next twenty years was engaged in completing it. It comes almost as a shock to learn that the cost of the whole project, including the cost of the dredging plant, new bridges, wharf, railway connections etc. was estimated in 1920 at just over Rs. 2 crores. Equally unreal seem the various problems of conflict of jurisdiction between the Govern-

ment of Cochin State and the Governments of India and the Madras Presidency. We have travelled a long way since then. However when war came in 1939, Willingdon Island had risen and had been provided with an airfield, the naval works on Venduruthy had been completed and the harbour was in commission.

K.

1. **Life and Letters of Sir Jadunath Sarkar**, edited by H. R. Gupta (Published by the Department of History, Panjab University, Hoshiarpur) 371 pages.
2. **Sir Jadunath Sarkar Commemoration Volume**. Essays presented to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Chief Editor: H. R. Gupta (Published by the Department of History, Panjab University, 1958) 371 pages.

Dr. Hari Ram Gupta deserves to be congratulated on having brought out Sir Jadunath Sarkar Commemoration Volume. By a curious irony of fate Sir Jadunath Sarkar died shortly after the Commemoration Volume was presented to him by his distinguished pupil—Dr. Hari Ram Gupta. The volume contains much interesting information about the life and achievement of Sir Jadunath—the greatest historian that India has ever produced. Sir Jadunath took twenty-five years to complete his monumental work—*History of Aurangzeb*—in 1924. Another monumental work—*Fall of Mughal Empire*—was completed in 1954. Whereas the *History of Aurangzeb* laid the foundation of his greatness as a historian, it is really the *Fall of the Mughal Empire* which has immortalized his name. In these volumes he shows a greater mastery over historical narrative, and a higher literary workmanship. Other books which have made his name famous are—*Shivaji, India through the Ages, History of Bengal, Mughal Administration*, etc. On account of his charm of style and vigorous portraiture of men and things, Sir Jadunath has been compared to Macaulay. While on account of his vast learning, the excellence of his English, and his power of drawing a magnificent background for his tragic canvass of the *Fall of the Mughal Empire* he has been compared to Gibbon. Whether he was a Gibbon or Macaulay or not he was certainly the greatest historian of modern India.

This volume is, therefore, of great significance for it tells us in details about the career and achievements of Sir Jadunath Sarkar. Dr. K. R. Qanungo's essay on *Jadunath Sarkar as a Historian* is of absorbing interest. The Sarkar—Sardesai correspondence gives as a deep insight into the minds of two of India's greatest historians. There is a separate volume containing essays on different aspects of Indian History. Some of these essays throw interesting light on the problems of Indian History. The Commemoration Volume is indeed a fitting tribute to the greatest historian of India.

D.P.

SERVICES NOTES

GENERAL

VEHICLES PROJECT

THE quarter under review saw the inauguration of the military truck manufacture project undertaken by the Gun Carriage Factory, Jabalpur. It was in the record time of less than six months that the first Indian-made truck rolled out of the assembly line towards the end of June last. From the time negotiations were completed with the M. A. N. of Germany for the production of trucks with indigenous components up to the inaugural ceremony by the Prime Minister, the project was completed to schedule both in regard to time and ratio of indigenous to imported content.

While christening the new truck, Shaktiman (the powerful one), Shri Nehru declared it symbolised the determination of the Indian people to enter the industrial age with confidence, adding that it was another step on the way to economic and military self-sufficiency. While plans for the establishment of bulk production of these trucks are going according to plans, the manufacture of indigenous components for these vehicles from 30 per cent. initially to gradual increase to 90 per cent. within five years is also progressing satisfactorily.

TRACTOR MANUFACTURE

Another notable undertaking of the Defence Ministry was the manufacture of tractors in this country which would meet the requirements not only of the Defence Services but also of other Ministries. The Ordnance Factories have already been given orders for tractors for the Dandakaranya and Rajasthan Canal Projects.

The Ordnance Factories and connected defence industries are to-day turning out a large variety of stores—arms and ammunition of different types, other defence equipments, aircraft, minor sea-craft and trucks and tractors. The Ordnance Factories, fruitfully utilizing their surplus capacity, have also developed and produced a wide range of civilian goods for sale in the open market. These measures, designed to step up defence production in all directions, have not only brought about marked reduction in our foreign imports, resulting in the conservation of foreign exchange, but also a sizeable saving in the defence budget, totalling about Rs. 35 crores in the current year.

DEFENCE BUDGET

It has been possible to scale down the level of the defence budget of the year 1959-60 by about Rs. 35.46 crores compared to the sanctioned budget of 1958-59, i.e. a reduction from Rs. 278.14 to 242.68 crores. Though the bulk of the reduction is under Air Force expenditure (Rs. 28.75 crores), the overall reduction is attributable to a conscious effort on the part of all the authorities and Services to achieve economy and reduce defence expenditure. It may also be mentioned that there has been an increase in the standing charges of pay and allowances and pensions by about Rs. 10 crores. The reduction of about Rs. 35.46 crores in the defence budget is the net figure after taking into account the above increases in the standing charges. There has also been an increase in the cost of stores purchased owing to general increase in the level of prices.

While in certain cases, the re-equipment programme of the Services had to be slowed down, the defence scientists and the technical authorities have, under

consideration, several plans to utilise the existing equipment to the minimum extent by adaptation or by stepping up the repair programme.

It may be stated that the size of the defence expenditure incurred cannot in any way be considered high if we take into account our 9,300 mile-long land frontier and the 3,535 mile-long coast-line with an area of 12.67 lakh square miles. On a per capita basis, the defence expenditure works out roughly from Rs. 7 to 8 per head in the ensuing financial year.

DEFENCE ELECTRONICS CONVENTION

Under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence, Government of India, an Electronics Convention has been organised on an all India basis at Bangalore in the month of September. The primary aims of this convention are:

- (a) to create a national awareness in the problems relating to Defence Electronics;
- (b) to take stock of the electronics potential in the country with a view to early achievement of self-sufficiency; and
- (c) to examine the Defence Research and Development facilities in the country which could be brought to bear on the problems of defence electronics.

This convention will provide a very useful form for meeting and mutually discussing the problems of self-sufficiency in the Armed Forces in respect of electronics equipment and instrumentation. Delegates to this convention will be primarily from the three Services of the Armed Forces, the Defence Research and Development Organisation, Defence Production Department, Defence Training Institutions and other organisations/establishments of the Defence Ministry. Industries such as Bharat Electronics Ltd., Indian Telephone Industries and so on are also expected to participate. An electronic exhibition is also being organised of a fortnight's duration from 28 September to coincide with the convention.

CADET CORPS

For the first time this year, four special training camps were organised at Ootacamund, Darjeeling, Gulmarg and Manali. The training consisted of instructions in military subjects, toughening up in hill climbing and long-range patrolling in the hills.

AUXILIARY AIR FORCE

The first batch of aircrew and technician trainees of the No. 52 (Bombay) and the No. 55 (Bengal) Auxiliary Air Squadrons completed their two-year training. The pilots and technicians are the "pioneers" so far as the development of India's "citizens air force" is concerned.

TERRITORIAL ARMY

The Central Advisory Committee for the T. A. and L. S. S., which met in Delhi early in April, recommended the reorganisation of the L. S. S. scheme by increasing the duration of training. At present, the period of training is 30 days in the year. The L. S. S. has, during the last four years, organised 848 camps and trained 3,75,210 volunteers. Nearly 3,000 persons trained under the L. S. S. so far

had joined the Armed Forces. Another important recommendation of the Committee was that private concerns should be requested to pay to their employees the difference between the civil and military pay and allowances for the period of their duty with the Territorial Army and also to protect their prospects in their civil career.

ARMY

PROMOTIONS AND POSTINGS

Lieut.-General P. N. Thapar, G.O.C.-in-C., Southern Command, took charge as G.O.C.-in-C., Western Command, vice Lieut.-General Kalwant Singh who retired with effect from May 15, 1959. Lieut.-General J. N. Chaudhuri took over as G.O.C.-in-C., Southern Command, vice Lieut.-General Thapar.

Maj.-General P. P. Kumaramangalam, D.S.O., has been promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General and appointed Adjutant-General, Army HQ, in place of Lieut.-General Kanwar Bahadur Singh, who will become Commandant of the National Defence College.

Maj.-General B. M. Kaul has been promoted to the rank of Lieut.-General and appointed Quarter-Master-General, Army HQ, in place of Lieut.-General Daulet Singh, who will now command a Corps.

Brigadier K. P. Candeth and Brigadier P. C. Gupta have been given the acting rank of Maj.-General. Maj.-General S. H. F. J. Manekshaw will be Commandant of the Defence Services Staff College vice Maj.-General Kumaramangalam.

NEW ASHOKA CHAKRA AWARDS

Forty personnel of the Army and Air Force were awarded the insignia of Ashoka Chakra (Class II and III) for gallantry in the Naga Hills by the President at an investiture ceremony in Delhi on April 9. Among the recipients were eight Army and three Air Force officers, six J.C.Os. and the remaining other Ranks.

Eight of the awards were posthumous. The names of officers who received Ashoka Chakra, Class II, were Lieut.-Colonel Jaswant Singh, Major D. S. Pratap, Sq. Leader N. B. Menon and Captain Harbans Singh.

MOUNTAINEERING ASSOCIATION

An Army Mountaineering Association has been started with headquarters at Delhi with a view to co-ordinating the activities of mountaineering parties sponsored by different arms and Services of the Army. The Association, which will work under the direction of General K. S. Thimayya, Chief of the Army Staff, and other senior officers at Army HQ, will encourage mountaineering by providing advice and assistance to those wishing to take to this sport.

NAVY

OFFICERS' CONFERENCE

A conference of senior Naval officers was held at Naval HQ on May 5 under the presidentship of Vice-Admiral R. D. Katari, Chief of the Naval Staff. The subjects discussed were the sea-training requirements of the training schools, welfare of naval personnel, building of suitable married accommodation and economy in all spheres of naval activities.

NANDAKOT CONQUERED

A seven-member naval mountaineering expedition, led by Senior Commissioned Instructor Officer M. S. Kohli, successfully climbed the 22,510-feet-high

Nandakot peak on May 25. Both the Defence Minister and the Chief of the Naval Staff congratulated the team on their success. Messrs. Kohli and K. P. Sharma were promoted to the acting rank of Instructor Lt. and Chief Yeoman of Signals respectively in recognition of their achievement. The other members of the expedition were Surgeon Lt. Y. C. Sharma, Senior Commissioned Instructor Officer A. S. Pabreja, Yeoman of Signals K. P. Sharma and Sick Berth Assistant B. B. Ambastha and two Sherpas.

AIR FORCE

PROMOTIONS AND POSTINGS

Air Commodore Harjinder Singh, Air Officer Commanding, Maintenance Command, has been promoted to the rank of Air Vice-Marshal.

Wing Commander V. M. Radhakrishnan has been appointed Commandant of the Air Force Flying College, Jodhpur, in the rank of Gp. Captain. He was a cadet in the same College 18 years ago.

Air Commodore Ranjan Dutt, Director of Policy and Plans at Air HQ, has been appointed Air Officer Commanding, Training Command. He succeeds Air Commodore Kanwar Jaswant Singh, whose services have been loaned to the Ghana Government.

Gp. Captain H. N. Chatterjee took over as Director of Policy and Plans in the rank of Air Commodore.

Gp. Captain H. Moolgavkar has been appointed Air Adviser to the High Commissioner for India in the United Kingdom. He takes over from Gp. Captain V. Srihari.

FLOOD RELIEF

L.A.F. helicopters based at Borjhar, Gauhati, flew regular sorties in the North Kamrup belt of flood-ravaged Assam during the last week of June. They air-dropped and delivered food and medicine to the marooned villagers in the area.

AIR CHIEF'S VISIT TO INDONESIA

Air Marshal S. Mukerjee, Chief of the Air Staff, made a week's tour of Indonesia at the invitation of the Government of Indonesia. This visit was in reciprocation of a similar visit to India by the Indonesian Air Chief in 1949. The Air Marshal visited the various Air Force establishments in that country. He also visited Malaya, Singapore and Burma.

AERONAUTICAL CENTRE

The Defence Minister laid the foundation-stone of an Aeronautical Test Laboratory at the Air Force Station, Kanpur, on May 3, 1959. An Aeronautical Development Centre has already been functioning at the Base Repair Depot of the Maintenance Command not only to bolster up the existing facilities for major overhaul and repairs of jet aero-engines but also to provide facilities for modifications to step up the overall efficiency of aircraft and equipment.

CORRESPONDENCE

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To the Editor of the U.S.I. Journal

HOW TO MINIMISE INTERRUPTIONS TO TRAINING

Sir,—I was very interested to read Lieut.-Colonel Vas's article entitled "How To Minimise Interruptions To Training", published in the Journal of January-March, 1959.

The author raises a controversial point whilst discussing training cycles. The advantages of having a training cycle which commences with individual training and ends with collective training are obvious. It is equally apparent that one would like to finish annual range classifications before field firing. The colonel is to be congratulated for putting across his plans for training by deliberately choosing examples which violated both these desirable necessities. I would have been disappointed if he had tried to sell his ideas by making a nice fool-proof training work-chart which is never possible in practice.

It is clear that collective training is best done when the crops permit this. Thus, our present cycle starts in June, to enable individual training to terminate in April and May: our collective training months. However, an important point that often seems to be overlooked is that the specific aim of collective training is to train the officers, JCOs and NCOs, more than the men themselves. Does it therefore really make all that difference if we start a training cycle on 1 January, have collective training in April-May, and end in December?

Surely not! On the contrary, apart from facilitating leave plans and providing each commander an opportunity to train his command, as pointed out by the author, some other decided advantages are offered by such a cycle. Officers, JCOs and NCOs, could now spot individual weaknesses in their command which can be emphasised in the remaining period of the individual training cycle. After all, collective training, whenever this may be held, will always be preceded by ten months of individual training, even though a portion of this may 'belong' to the previous years cycle. It is not important that a training cycle must end with collective training. It is only important that collective training be planned when the crops permit the large scale movement of troops. These two factors are not connected.

The author, in fact, has made two quite unconnected recommendations: firstly, the division of the training cycle into deliberate Unit and Formation periods; and secondly, commencing this cycle from 1 January. The first recommendation aims at utilising the time available efficiently; the second suggestion helps planning so that commanders at all levels are present to train their men.

I sincerely hope that both these recommendations are given serious consideration, rather than rejected out of hand because they contravene present long-accepted but difficult-to-implement practices.

Queen Victoria Road Mess,
New Delhi.

MAJOR A. N. JATAR, MVC.

THE BATTLE OF MIANI

Sir,—In his article (in your October-December '58 issue) on "The Battle of Miani" Mr. P. N. Khara refers throughout to "the Sind Horse" instead of the Scinde Horse, which is its correct name.

The writer quotes Jackson as calling the regiment "The Scinde Horse, as it was then spelled". As matter of interest, the Regiment has never changed its name from The Scinde Horse, and that how it is spelt today as well.

He also mentions the standard captured by the Scinde Horse as being "surrounded by a silver open hand." I think the word "surrounded" should read "surmounted". This standard of Mir Nuseer Khan is still held by the Scinde Horse as one of its prize trophies.

The Infantry School,
Mhow.
June 30, 1959.

MAJOR C. L. PROUDFOOT

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Rates on application to the Secretary

UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA

KASHMIR HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

DEFENCE SERVICES STAFF COLLEGE ENTRANCE EXAMINATION REVISION COURSE

THE next Revision course for the Defence Services Staff College Examination (1959) will be held from 2nd November to 31st December. The following subjects will be covered:

- (a) Tactics A,
- (b) Tactics B,
- (c) Administration and Morale,
- (d) Military History,
- (e) Military Law,
- (f) Current Affairs.

The course is open to members of the Institution only. The fees for the whole course (six subjects) will be Rs. 100. Members desirous of attending the Course should send their particulars with the required fees in advance to reach the Secretary before 15th October, 1959.

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

The financial year of the Institution is from January to December. It will help the Institution financially if all members who have not yet paid their subscription for the current year please do so immediately.

GOLD MEDAL ESSAY 1958

The winners are as follows:

<i>Quo Vadis</i>	.. Brig. B. S. Bhagat	1st Prize
<i>Koi Hai</i>	.. Maj. S. P. Datta, AOC	2nd Prize
<i>Lovers of Peace are the</i>	.. Sqn. Ldr. Sita Ram Abbott, IAF	} 3rd Prize
<i>True Heroes of War</i>		
<i>Au Fait</i>	.. Lt. Col. B. N. Majumdar, ASC	

The Council is grateful to Lieut.-General J. N. Chaudhuri, OBE, Rear Admiral A. K. Chatterji, IN, and Group Captain H. C. Dewan, IAF for adjudicating the entries.

BRIGADIER C. R. MANGAT-RAI

Brigadier C. R. Mangat-Rai who is the member of the Council and who retired in 1957 is now living in the USA. His address is: 42, Cottage Street, Hingham, Mass. (Telephone No: Riverview 9-0497). He writes to say that he would be delighted to welcome any members of the Institution who are visiting the States and whose travels take them to or near Boston of which Hingham is a suburb.

NEW MEMBERS

From 1st April to 30th June 1959 the following members joined the Institution:

AHLUWALIA, 2|Lieut. S.S., 4 Gorkha Rifles. LAKSHMINARAYANAN, Shri K.A., Ministry of Finance (Defence).

- ATUL DEV, 2[Lieut., *Artillery.*
 BACON, Major D.W.A., *Royal Tank Regiment.*
 BAL, Captain J.S., *The Deccan Horse.*
 BAWA, Captain I.B.S., *Engrs.*
 BERI, 2[Lieut. MANMOHAN, *Artillery.*
 BHAKHRI, 2[Lieut. A.K., *Signals.*
 BHALLA, Captain S.D.S., *Engineers.*
 BHANDULA, Captain B.A., *A.S.C.*
 BIRINDER SINGH, 2[Lieut. *The Grenadiers.*
 CHEEMA, 2[Lieut. IDERBIR SINGH, *The Assam Regiment.*
 CHOPRA, 2[Lieut. D.K., *The Guards.*
 FERRIS, Major R.G., *Engineers.*
 GODBOLE, 2[Lieut. B.N., *The Assam Regiment.*
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 HANDA, 2[Lieut. P.N., *Artillery.*
 HENRY RAJ, 2[Lieut., *The Bihar Regiment.*
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 JASPAL, Captain P.S.
 JASWIR SINGH SIDHU, 2[Lieut., *A.O.C.*
 JOGINDER SINGH DHILLON, 2[Lieut., *Artillery.*
 JOHAR, Captain A.S., *Engineers.*
- KHORANA, 2[Lieut. KRISHEN, *The Sikh Regiment.*
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 MAHENDER JIT SINGH, 2[Lieut., *Artillery.*
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 PAWAR, Captain S.A., *5 Gorkha Rifles (F.F.).*
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 RAY, 2[Lieut. DEBABRATA, *Signals.*
 SAWHNEY, Captain P.N., *A.S.C.*
 SETHANA, Major A.M., *11 Gorkha Rifles.*
 SHARMA, Major HEM RAJ, *11 Gorkha Rifles.*
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 SINGH, Captain K.P., *The Deccan Horse.*
 SINGH, 2[Lieut. SHAMSHER BAHADUR, *1 J & K Infantry.*
 SRIVASTAVA, Captain S.K., *Engineers (Life).*
 TEWARI, 2[Lieut. H.C., *4 Gorkha Rifles.*
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EDITORIAL

The situation on India's northern frontiers was discussed on 13 Aug. in the **Lok Sabha**. The Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, assured the House that everything would be done to safeguard the integrity of Indian territory. He further declared that "..... our frontiers are firm by treaty, firm by usage and right, and firm by geography".

India has a land frontier of over 9000 miles, with Burma, Pakistan, Nepal and the Tibet and Sinkiang regions of China. Of this the Sino-Indian frontier is 2600 miles. The Indo-Burmese frontier is, for the most part, riverine; the Indo-Bhutanese frontier runs along the Himalayan foot-hills, the Indo-Nepalese frontier is also mainly riverine. The Sino-Indian frontier, except for a short stretch of 30 miles in southern Ladakh, runs along major watersheds. The 710-mile frontier of the North-East Frontier Agency is the northern watershed of the Brahmaputra, except where the Lohit, Dihang, Subansiri and Namjang rivers break through. It is also for the greater part the crest of the high Himalayan range. The frontier of Bhutan with Tibet is 300 miles long and runs along the crest of the Himalayan range, while that of Sikkim with Tibet is the northern and eastern watershed of the Teesta. The Uttar Pradesh-Tibet boundary is 220 miles long and follows the Zaskar range forming the watershed of the Ganga and the Sutlej. Six passes on the watershed (Shipki, Mana, Niti, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipu Lekh) have been mentioned in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 as border passes through

which traders of both countries may travel. The Himachal Pradesh-Tibet boundary runs along the watershed of the tributaries of the Sutlej and the Punjab-Tibet boundary is represented by the watershed between the Spiti and Para Chu systems. The Ladakh-Tibet frontier runs along the Kailas range and the Indus and Ang watersheds and, cutting across the Pangong Lake, follows the eastern and southern watershed of the Chang Chenmo and further north the Kuen Lun, Aghil and Mustagh ranges.

The North-East Frontier of India was agreed to between Tibet and India at the Simla Conference 1913-14. The Line thus agreed to was delineated on the map appended to the Tripartite Convention and, although China refused to proceed to formal signature, her objections related to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner and Outer Tibet. The Line agreed to, called the McMahon Line, after the British Plenipotentiary to the Conference, represents the customary boundary between India and Tibet in NEFA area. South of the Line are tribes like Akas, Miris, Mishmis and Abors with whom the British had relations since 1826. The area had been formed into two Indian Frontier Tracts in 1912 and has since been administered by India.

The U.P.-Tibet frontier is customary and has been delineated in Indian revenue records dating from 1826 which followed the boundary of the Kingdom of Garhwal which came under British Indian administration in 1815.

That the Ladakh-Tibet boundary is customary is confirmed by the treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand and Tibet and China on the other. This customary boundary was ascertained by British officers in 1847, the Chinese refusing to cooperate on the ground that the boundary was sufficiently fixed by custom. The area had been surveyed by British Indian officers since 1860 and Indian maps since 1865 show the area as part of India.

Addressing a meeting near Agra, Mr. Nehru again declared that "the Himalayas are the crown of India" and constituted an essential element of India's "culture, blood and veins". He laid stress on the many sacred places of pilgrimage in the Himalayas, revered by Indian people from time immemorial and mentioned in ancient Vedic scriptures.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN MILITARY TRAINING*

By DR. W. T. V. ADISESHIAH, M.A., PH.D.

INTRODUCTION

THE many and varied tasks devolving on personnel serving in the Armed Forces call for a thoughtfully planned and intelligently coordinated system of training which will enable officers and men to work in harmony, even under conditions of acute combat stress. It is no exaggeration to say that problems of control and discipline cannot possibly arise in the case of men who are properly trained. On the other hand inadequately trained personnel, by the very nature of their inherent incompetence, will not fail to create problems for those under whose control and direction they have to function. Training is thus the key to military efficiency. It is the process of developing human potentialities and of establishing them in the form of requisite military skills. Since serviceability in combat depends upon the appropriate application of skills which will meet and forestall all possible emergencies, there can be no gainsaying the fact that the degree of success achieved in combat is directly proportional to the level of efficiency attained during training.

During the past few decades or more, a large volume of research has centred around the question as to the nature of the psychological factors which enable an individual to learn new patterns of action. Many psychological theories have been advanced on the basis of experiments with rats, cats, monkeys, children and grown up human beings. These theories have thrown much light on the problem of the acquisition of skills, the physiological basis of the learning process; and the conditions under which one kind of learned behaviour helps or hinders the learning of another kind of behaviour. Some of these findings have important military applications. It would, therefore, be appropriate to discuss a few select points of psychological theory in connection with some of the problems of military training.

One of the earliest explorers in the field of human and animal learning was the American Psychologist, Thorndyke. Prof. Thorndyke observed the behaviour of cats in puzzle boxes, of rats in mazes and of little children in play situations. He came to the conclusion that the primary characteristic of the learning process is trial and error. By doing a thing over and over again, one learns to eliminate the incorrect response and to fixate the correct one. Quite a different approach to the learning process emerged from the laboratory studies of the Russian Physiologist, Pavlov, who maintained that the learning process is basically a change occurring in the central nervous system. Prof. Pavlov called this process "Conditioning." He showed that dogs could be trained to salivate to the sound of

* Lecture delivered at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Nilgiris.

a bell or a buzzer instead of food, which is the natural stimulus for salivation. Pavlov's theory of 'Conditioning' sought to account for the different forms of learning in terms of changes which occur in the nervous system. Yet another approach to the psychology of the learning process was formulated by the German Professor, Wolfgang Kohler, who demonstrated that chimpanzees can be trained to pick up bananas beyond their reach by joining sticks and using the jointed stick as a convenient device to get hold of the banana. Prof. Kohler held that a mental factor called "Insight" accounts for the change from state of uncertainty to one of assured mastery. Where "Insight" operates, the tedious business of trial and error learning is rendered unnecessary. Such then are the general psychological theories underlying the process of learning. It is of interest to us here to apply some of the notions developed as a result of recent psychological research to the many problems of military training.

Broadly speaking, there are two aspects of military training.

First, there is the training of individuals in specific skills pertaining to their respective military occupations. For example the Infantry soldier has to learn the use of the rifle, the machine gun and other Infantry weapons. Or again, the Signaller has to learn the Morse code, he has to learn how to operate a Morse Key, to send and receive messages. The primary object in individual training is to enable a man to gain proficiency in some operation or operations having a definite military use.

Secondly, there is the training of groups of persons to operate as a team. An Infantry platoon, advancing on the field for instance has to follow a certain pattern of action in which the different sections help each other to move ahead. Even in a section, every soldier has a specific role which he must perform satisfactorily. Much the same holds true of members of aircrew team, where each man has a unique part to play in contributing to the success of the sortie. The Navigator has to keep the Captain informed of the position of the aircraft. The Signaller has to maintain contact with the ground. The second pilot has to assist the Captain in the cock-pit—to carry out various checks for him. It will thus be seen that the object of collective training is to enable a group of persons to work as a team. Since each of these two aspects of training involves certain psychological factors, it will be necessary to consider the main factors relevant to individual and collective training respectively.

INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Quite obviously it would be impossible in this lecture to go into each of the several problems which arise in connection with the training of individuals in military tasks. It is well known that certain standards have been laid down for every conceivable type of military training, and it is stipulated that the required standard of proficiency can be achieved within a certain time limit. When an individual undergoing some form of military training fails to attain the expected standard of proficiency he is rejected, and these rejections contribute to what is technically known as training wastage. One of the practical problems of any organization responsible for the training of individuals is to keep training wastage at the

lowest possible level. There can be two ways of keeping wastage down. One is by screening personnel prior to their admission to training; so that those who are obviously incapable of being trained or who cannot be expected to attain the requisite standard of proficiency within the given time limit, are not accepted for training. This is achieved by a system of scientific selection. The other approach is to subject the system of training to various kinds of checks and to build within that system, features which will make it possible for individuals to learn quickly and with the least amount of strain to themselves and to their trainers. It is in this connection that some of the contributions of psychological research can be of immense practical value. We may therefore consider in this lecture a few salient questions which have a bearing on individual training.

First, there is the question of acquisition of skills. What is a skill? Under what conditions of training is it capable of being established and how may it be maintained at a consistently high level of efficiency?

Secondly, there is the problem of time and effort involved in learning some new pattern of action. How is it possible to save unnecessary waste of energy and valuable time and yet bring up the performance of the trainee to a desirable level of proficiency? This raises the important question of the usefulness of training aids and synthetic training devices.

Thirdly, since the key to success in training lies in adopting the best method of work or study, there is the question how to improve the effectiveness of learning by adopting the most satisfactory methods of study. This is particularly relevant in the case of those who are required to assimilate a large volume of technical information within a limited period of time.

Fourthly, since different forms of training influence or interact on each other, there is the question of what is technically known as transfer of training. This is a vital consideration in the planning of training programmes.

There are many other important psychological issues arising in connection with training, but in view of the limited time available for this discussion, it will not be possible to go beyond a cursory discussion of these main issues

The Acquisition of Skills: It is commonly supposed that a skill is nothing more than a chain of habits so organised that they become a fixed or standardised set of actions, performed under given conditions of work. Although it may be true that habit systems feature prominently in several forms of human skill, there is a fundamental difference between habit and skill. Habitual actions occur with a uniformity and mechanical rigidity which make them more or less automatic. Even such simple acts as fastening one's necktie, slipping on a pair of socks or buttoning one's trousers are performed day by day in a neat but unvarying sequences. In a skill, on the other hand, there is considerable flexibility and adaptiveness. This is so because basically, there are three psychological factors in a skill. First, there is the intention of the operator. The driver of a car for instance starts up his engine and moves towards a particular goal or objective. Secondly, the surroundings in which the skilled operator executes his pat-

terms of action incorporate certain random or unexpected features such as an obstacle of some kind. The aircraft pilot for instance may suddenly encounter atmospheric turbulence; or the motor cyclist may unexpectedly run into a bad and bumpy road surface. This has a disturbing effect on the performance of the operator and may even be a threat to his safety. Thirdly, whilst on his job, the skilled operator is constantly receiving information which he uses in order to correct his performance and achieve his aim. The aircraft pilot for instance has before him a complete array of instruments which indicate the height, speed, heading etc. of the aircraft, by interpreting which, he makes necessary adjustments, on the controls which he manipulates. It will thus be seen, that far from being a mechanical sequence of movements, a skill is a delicately graded series of actions by which the operator is able to overcome environmental obstacles and get to his goal. This inter-play between what is evident from the instruments, and his adjustive actions on the controls is at the optimum level of efficiency when the operator's mind is fresh, alert, active, and responsive to small changes which are humanly capable of being detected. It is at its worst when one is tired, indifferent, lethargic, and will not therefore, respond to or detect changes unless they are of a comparatively higher magnitude.

Economy in learning: It is customary to represent progress in learning by plotting a curve in which the abscissa shows units of time or number of trials, and the ordinate represents attainment either in terms of an estimate of efficiency or percentage of error. Progress in learning would be evident when there appears to be either a reduction of error or an increase in efficiency over a period of time. Learning curves may reveal various peculiarities. Sometimes they are positively accelerated, which would mean that the progress is comparatively faster during the early stages of learning. Sometimes they are negatively accelerated, which would mean that learning is faster during the later stages. Seldom is the path of progress smooth straight and steady. As in every other walk of life, one has ones ups and downs in learning. What does, however, stand out as an unmistakable feature of the learning process is the occurrence of the plateau. A plateau occurs when the curve levels off at some stage in the learning process. Flattening of the curve may be due to a variety of possible factors. A very common cause is motivation. A wise instructor would know when to expect a plateau and to provide additional motivation at that point, thereby forestalling disconcerting feelings in the minds of his pupils. Sometimes plateaus occur when the learner has gone about as far as he can with one way of learning, and has to change over to another better way before he can attain any further progress. In typewriting, for example, there is a transition from a lower order to a higher order of habits. At first one types letter by letter, but later he can type whole words with a single impulse. However, the lower type of habit must become pretty thoroughly ingrained before one is ready to

employ the higher habit. By and large, the proficiency of the learner is an index to the efficiency of the teacher. At the hands of the good teacher, even the most dry and monotonous subject can be made meaningful, interesting, and easy to understand. People generally find lists of numbers to be awfully boring, but no one will deny that the railway time table is the most fascinating document to look into while one is on a long and tedious journey. Audio-visual aids are recognised today as indispensable tools of efficient instruction. Lengthy verbal descriptions inside the lecture hall could often be effectively substituted by short, crisp and trenchant representations of facts in life like form. The practice of being exhaustive, down to the last detail, does not yield as much as presentation of the subject which sets the trainee thinking for a while. It is sometimes desirable to leave gaps in instruction which the pupil has to fill on the basis of his own thinking; for training is a cooperative effort in which the instructor and the pupil alike make their respective contributions. Instructors sometimes fail to realise that not everything which is told to a pupil will of necessity stay in the pupil's mind. Repetition is therefore necessary when something important has to be impressed on the untutored mind. An old Irish person once said that his people invariably took in what he uttered from the pulpit, because he adhered to the maxim; "I tell them what I wish to tell them. I tell them. Then I tell them what I have told them." The point is that not every detail in the content of instruction is equally significant. The trainer must therefore emphasise the key features in the content of training, and this would make for considerable economy of effort in the long run.

Methods of Study: Success in any kind of training effort depends as much on the way the trainee assimilates content of training, as it does on the way the instructor presents his subject matter. Thus it becomes important to consider also the question of the most satisfactory methods of study. This is particularly important in the case of training for technical trades where the student may be required to assimilate a large volume of information in a short space of time. Here we can only touch upon certain basic psychological attitudes which are conducive to efficient study. Many students experience difficulty in concentrating attention on the study material. Attention tends to wander away from the point, and a lot of painful effort has to be exercised in order to keep attention fixed on what is being learned. The fact of the matter is that one's attentive capacity has to be trained slowly and patiently, to resist distractions. Further, the realisation that what one is learning has some practical use in the long run and is not just a way of killing time, is helpful in developing the right motivation towards what is being learnt. Another important point is that the mind which is free from emotional preoccupations and immature attitudes towards instructor will be free from tensions which interfere with effective study. This again, is capable of being cultivated. One has to learn to dissociate distracting emotions

and sentiments from the field of one's ideas and thinking. To the extent of which one has cultivated this capacity for dissociation, one would be able to exercise greater concentration, to apply one's mind better to the subject of study. In this connection it will be of use to consider a few practical hints which may help in making the time spent over study more useful and profitable than it otherwise would be. First of all, self recitation is a valuable aid for efficient learning. If for instance a prose passage about 500 words in length has to be memorised in say 20 minutes, it would be far better to spend some part of the time actively recalling what has been read, than to spend the whole time reading the passage over and over again. Laboratory experiments have shown that as much as 90% of the time could be usefully spent on active recitation. Secondly, where the material happens to be relatively meaningless, as would be the case with formulas or series of numbers it is helpful to discover some meaningful relationship between the items to be remembered, so that thereby the complete cluster of items becomes linked up and easy to memorise. One could, for instance, remember a five digit telephone number such as 32345 if one sees the sequence in the last three digits and the difference in the values of the first two. Thirdly, dispersal or distribution of practice periods is better than continuous practice, because time intervals between periods of practice help in consolidating what has been learnt. In India there is the hideous practice of "taking it easy" during the greater part of the year, and concentrating one's study effort on the eve of an examination. This kind of study is rightly nicknamed "burning the midnight oil." Nothing could be more undesirable from a psychological point of view than this. If a thorough knowledge and intelligent grasp of the subject is to be aimed at, it is imperative that the study effort should be disbursed over the full period of 9 or 18 months, not massed within 2 or 3 months preceding the date of the examination. Fourthly, it is good to gain an idea of the subject as a whole, before going through it in parts. While studying a chapter in some text book, for instance, it is always helpful to take a rapid glance at the whole chapter; or better still, to read up the summary, if one is provided, before trying to grasp each detail one by one. Fifthly, it is always helpful to work in a surrounding which is congenial to study. Factors which are well known but frequently not controlled include freedom from distractions and interruptions, a comfortable and well lighted working place, adequate reference books etc. All these are helpful in providing an atmosphere for study.

Transfer of Training: By transfer of training is meant the influence of learning one type of action on the learning of another. A good example of transfer of training is the laboratory experiment in which practice effects gained as a result of some action performed by the right hand, facilitate the same action by the left. The classical experiment on this subject is the mirror drawing experiment, in which the task is to trace a star pattern

on a sheet of paper, without looking at the paper, but seeing the movement of the hand reflected in a mirror. The person tested is allowed 5 or 6 runs with his right hand, and then he has to do the same with his left hand. It has been found that the saving of time and the reduction of error resulting from practice on the right hand is carried over to the left. In military training, one has often to utilise the human capacity to benefit by some form of training in order to gain proficiency in certain other types of training. Where it is possible to anticipate, for instance, the exact nature of the condition likely to be encountered in a combat situation, the training procedure is so designed as to give the trainee a foretaste of what he will actually encounter later on. Pilots of high performance aircraft, put through the indoctrination course which they receive on the ground, experience stresses of oxygen deficiency, acceleration and vibration, which are simulated in ground training devices such as the decompression chamber, human centrifuge etc. These synthetic training devices enable the pilot not only to know his limitations and to adjust himself to these stresses when he encounters them in flight, but also to watch out for the early signs of deterioration in his performance. The general purpose of synthetic training is, therefore, to place the trainee in a situation as much as possible like the actual operational situation, so that practice effects gained during the stage of synthetic training could be carried over to the stage of operation. In flying, more than in any other kind of military occupation the effects of transfer of training can be utilised to advantage.

Positive and Negative Transfer: Transfer of training is positive when training in one type of activity facilitates training in another type of activity. It is negative when training of one kind hinders progress in training of another kind. It is well known, for instance that workers who have long been accustomed to doing their work in one style cannot easily be trained to adopt a different though better style. Resistance is encountered. As the saying goes, "You cannot teach an old dog new tricks." Recent studies on the transfer of training have shown clearly that positive transfer is greater when the trainee is first put through difficult tasks and then has to learn easy tasks, than when he starts on easy tasks before going on to learn difficult ones. In the U.S. Air Force, for example, flying trainees used to be taught to fly the Harvard, which is a difficult aircraft before passing on to training of comparatively easier aircraft. It was found that wastage at subsequent stages in flying was comparatively low.

COLLECTIVE TRAINING

The main purpose of collective training is to bring individuals together so that they learn to function as a group or team. They have to learn how to support each other, how to canalise their efforts towards a common aim, how to make their respective contributions as individuals to the achievement of the group goal. In military operations, the aim to be achieved by a group of men, is laid down for them by a higher autho-

urity. Even the greater part of the plan of action by which the aim is to be achieved is formulated at the staff level. Nevertheless the execution of the plan and the achievement of the aim require the cooperative effort of the group of men who undertake the operation. The obstacles which will be encountered, the several factors which are likely to hinder the group in the achievement of the aim do not come into full relief at the planning stage. There is an unforeseen element in every operation; and how well a group of men will deal with these unforeseen elements would depend on two major factors first, the internal cohesiveness of the group; and secondly, the quality of leadership. Collective training thus seeks to inculcate these basic psychological characteristics into the personnel who undergo that training.

Group Cohesiveness: The type of group in which, from a military point of view, cohesiveness has to be built up is the Organised Group. Each member has a specific function which is in some ways complementary to the functions of other members. This holds true of the Infantry section and the Naval squadron alike, that is whether we think of a small or a large formation of service personnel. Group cohesiveness exists when the different human components of a group function as one. This pre-supposes first of all a clear awareness in the mind of each member of the group, his specific role in the total pattern of action. When, for instance, an Infantry section is advancing across open country, one soldier's forward movement is covered by another man, so that enemy fire could be countered by the fire power of the section. In this way different men in the section help each other to push ahead. Secondly, it is necessary that every member of the group should have some understanding of the role of the other member. The importance of this would lie in the fact that in the event of a casualty, the gap could be filled. Collective training thus aims not only at achieving proficiency in the respective roles of individuals who form a group, but also in securing flexibility of action within the group under awkward operational conditions. From a functional point of view, therefore, it is essential in collective training to emphasise not only what each individual is expected to do in any given operational setting, but also to make individuals realise how much they could do to help each other in an emergency. The most important psychological factor which contributes towards the establishment of group cohesiveness is the dynamic factor. When a group of people sitting around a table are engaged in a discussion in which one person functions as an initiator, another as a coordinator, another as a compromiser, another as an aggressor and so on, there will be a dynamic interplay of ideas. Discussions around a sand model table or at a TEWT, would of course restrict this dynamic interplay to a specific situation. As training devices, therefore, these are valuable. Nevertheless the main psychological limitation with exercises of this type lies in the simple fact that when two or more persons are engaged in a discussion they contend to perceive differences more readily than they would

perceive similarity. On the other hand in the face of a common threat, there is usually a tendency for people to act on the basis of their agreements rather than their differences. It is only too well known that what a man says he will do if he should suddenly meet a tiger will be very different from what he will do when he actually meets one. Hence the types of situations which are best suited to inculcate cohesiveness in a group are those in which the group is confronted with a real danger. This is the type of situation which needs to be simulated in collective training.

Training in Leadership: Some psychologists think that the leader, like the genius, is born and not made. If this were true, there would be no point in discussing how leaders should be trained. There is, however, some justification in maintaining that the military leader has at least to learn certain techniques of man management, whatever his innate capacity to control or influence other people may be like. Training in leadership serves several useful purposes, some of which may be noted in this connections. First, a leadership training programme aims at providing leaders with certain essential information. A leader needs to know the technical aspects of his job, and how the activities of his group fit into those of larger organization. In a battalion for example, the Company Commander has certain specific functions which are coordinated at a higher level with those of other Company Commanders. The Company Commander should be aware not only of the powers he has over his men, but also the limitations to his powers. He should know how and when he could legitimately exercise those powers. This knowledge cannot come to him by intuition, but by training and experience. Secondly, the leadership training programme aims at inculcating a sense of responsibility in the person trained for a leadership role. The military leader has a responsibility both towards men under his command and towards the superiors whom he is serving. His decisions—particularly his tactical decisions—do not emerge from his fancy, but are made on a realistic appraisal of the situation, with due regard to his capabilities and limitations. The leader is not there to manipulate members of the group, but to help them develop to a level where they can plan effectively and assume responsibility for the execution of their plans. Thirdly, leadership training programmes provide some insight into the nature of group process. Being in an authoritarian group, the leader of a military unit does not need to seek the approval of the group in making a decision or implementing a plan for action. Nevertheless, since the success of any action would depend on the whole-hearted cooperation of every member of the group, even the military leader is of necessity obliged at some stages, to share his ideas with the rest of the group, and to evoke in them the sense of primitive comradeship which will ensure their maximum cooperation. Otherwise it is likely that some member of the group may become an isolate, who prefers to watch while others toil. Fourthly, the programme of leadership training must not stop short of

lectures and arguments, but should aim at covering the practical aspects of leadership by providing, in exercises and workshops, situations into which those who are being trained could enter. The leader under training must have opportunities to observe, analyse and discuss his experiences. One learns a great deal more by making a critical appraisal of one's own experience than by merely watching what others do or hearing what they say.

In any kind of group effort there are two important elements—the task to be accomplished and the people who will do it. Some leaders are inclined to emphasise the task more than the people. They are “task-centred.” They feel more concerned regarding what is to be done and not the least bit bothered about who is to do it. On the other hand some leaders are inclined to emphasise the people more than the task. They are “person-centred.” They feel more concerned regarding who will do what, and do not worry about what has to be done. It will thus be seen that different leaders and different groups vary in how adequately they handle one or both these requirements. Possibly on account of the social structure in which they function, military leaders tend on the whole to be “task-centred.” This is what largely accounts for the ineffectiveness of military leadership in cases where such a thing occurs in critical situations. When disorganization sets in there is large scale confusion and complete chaos, even in formations which have been set up with a great deal of thought and care. The history of World War II, particularly many episodes relating to the German Army, affords numerous illustrations of the ineffectiveness of the task-centred military leader. On the other hand the person-centred military leader does on the whole succeed in making his comrades in arms feel a sense of their participation in a combined effort, because he has cultivated a sensitivity to other people's needs and attitudes. It goes without saying that if we succeed in making others feel secure and worthwhile, they work more effectively and are more cooperative. Being less on the defensive, they become more objective and task orientated. This is a simple fact of human experience.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, military training has two important aspects—first, to equip individuals with the skills necessary for their effectiveness in operation. Technical knowledge has to be reinforced by practical experience. Class room instruction has to be supplemented by outdoor exercise. Training in peace time conditions has to prepare men for combative action in battle conditions. Secondly, military training has to inculcate such attitudes, interests and pre-dispositions as will enable individuals to work together as members of groups, imbued with a sense of responsibility, which is a key feature in effective military leadership.

THE CHINESE WAR POTENTIAL

By MAJOR EDGAR O'BALLANCE

"Let China sleep, when she wakes the world will be sorry."
—Napoleon.

FOR as long as we can remember the Chinese soldier, portrayed carrying a parasol and a singing bird in a cage on the line of march, has been regarded as a figure of fun. Chinese battles were notorious for their noise and few casualties. The rumours of the "Yellow Peril" of the last century were never taken too seriously. China slept on whilst territory, trading rights and extra-territorial privileges were filched from her.

But the signs are that the sleeping giant is at last awakening, and modern China is indeed a giant amongst nations. The People's Republic of China claims to have a population of 650 million, and moreover, we are told that it is increasing by 15 million annually. It is anticipated that the population will be 1,000 million by 1980.

Having digested these huge figures, let us briefly consider China, her army, its background and her war potential.

AREA AND POPULATION

Today, the Peoples' Republic of China, which I will refer to as Red China, includes not only the '18 provinces', that is China proper, but it has extended outwards to include the countries of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang, and covers an area of about 3,877,000 square miles (including Formosa). Although the '18 provinces' have some mountains and forest, especially in the south and west, it is mainly agricultural land. Much of the remainder, apart from Manchuria, is desert, semi-desert or mountainous.

As regards the population, there seems to be little reason to doubt Mao Tse Tung's recent statement to the effect that it is 650 million: if it is not, it very soon will be. This startling increase has been due to improved hygiene, sanitation, flood control and food distribution. Previously, the Chinese people suffered appalling casualties through floods, famine and sometimes disease.

COMMUNICATIONS

Owing to the vast size of Red China, communications are of more importance than ever when trying to assess the military potential. They are very sparse and poor, and there were only 15,000 miles of all-weather roads in 1937. By 1955, this mileage was reported to have been increased to about 125,000. Apart from these roads, the remainder of the routes were rough tracks usually with indifferent surfaces.

Owing to the nature of the country and its poverty, China has always been, and still is, a land where the traditional form of transport

is human labour, and the wheelbarrow and the carrying pole are still commonplace sights. The bicycle is becoming more familiar, but except in the larger towns and certain of the outer provinces, animals and vehicles take second place. A number of strategic roads are planned to criss-cross the country and reach to the borders of India and Russia. There is only a limited mileage of railway, perhaps about 20,000 miles, but construction of strategic lines is underway.

The '18 provinces' are cut by three large rivers, which flow from west to east and they are navigable for many miles of their length. The Chinese have depended upon them for centuries as their chief lines-of-communication. They are the Hwang-Ho (Yellow River), the Yangtse (Middle River) and the Si Kiang (West River). The Yangtse, for example, is navigable for steam ships up to 20,000 miles from its mouth. Small canal systems have been spasmodically developed in a few places.

The overall picture of communications is poor and the planned strategic roads and railways are hardly yet begun, but in 5 years time, taking into account the waterways as well, the picture might well be a different one.

BRIEF MODERN HISTORY

Shortly after the beginning of the century there was a revolution in China which swept away the Manchu dynasty, and a republican regime was established in its place. A little later the Koumintang, the Nationalist Party, became the dominant force. For a time the Communist Party collaborated with it but there was a final split in 1927, when Chiang Kai Shek, who had become the leader of the Koumintang, turned savagely against the Communists, who then established themselves in inaccessible parts of the country.

Active warfare developed between the Nationalists and the Communists, and hundreds of thousands of Chiang's troops were launched against the Reds, generally haphazardly, and with little success. However, Japan came into the picture, first entering Manchuria in 1931, and then moving against the Chinese to occupy large areas of the country.

RISE OF THE RED ARMY

The Chinese Communist Party was established in 1921, and it functioned as a political party until 1927, when Chiang tried to dissolve it by force. The Communists concentrated in certain parts of the country and at once began to form armed forces. By the early 1930, there were at least four large Communist controlled areas, the main one being in and near the province of Kiangsi, where the principal leaders, such as Mao Tse Tung, Chu Teh and Chou En Lai, had established their headquarters.

Five separate campaigns were initiated against the Red Armies by Chiang, the first four of which did not meet with much success. However, the fifth one was more successful and pressed the Communists out of

their main resistance centre at Kiangsi, forcing them to undertake the famous 'Long March'.* By 1935, the remnants of the main Red Army settled in Shensi province in the north-west, where they were joined by the cadres of the other resistance centres. The Red Army consolidated under Mao, taking full advantage of the fact that Chiang was busy fighting the Japanese, and although the strength was only about 30,000 when it arrived in Shensi, by 1940, it had swelled to about half a million.

Several actions were fought both against the Japanese and Chiang, but generally the Red Army conserved its strength, concentrating on organising itself, training and collecting arms and equipment, only going into action when compelled to do so.

Backed by America, Nationalist China's part in the Second World War is well known.

When the Japanese, towards the end of the World War, began to withdraw divisions from the Chinese mainland to reinforce their Pacific islands, the Red Army moved in quickly and gained possession of large tracts of country. Meanwhile, Chiang had seized the towns in east and north China. When the Russians withdrew from Manchuria, the Nationalists were able to occupy it.

With the end of the Second World War, the stage was set for a struggle for power and the Red Army changed over from the guerilla tactics it had been using, taking to the field in large formations against the Nationalists. The Civil War began in 1946 and lasted until 1950. In theory, of course, it still continues. During the years 1946 and 1947, the honours went largely to the Nationalists who managed to hold on to the towns they had moved into, whilst the Communists spread and consolidated their hold on the countryside where they were. In 1948, the tide began to turn against Chiang and during that year, the Nationalist army was turned out of Manchuria and pushed backwards. By the end of this year, the Nationalist forces were in a precarious state.

The Red Army began to advance southwards and in April 1949, took Nanking, in October, Canton and in November, Chungking. Chiang's government fled to Formosa in December, but already in the month of October (1949) the People's Republic of China had been formally established: this was at once recognised by Russia and the satellite countries. In February 1950, a defensive alliance was signed with Russia.

By the end of that year Communist China was taking part in the Korean War, and only the large deliveries of arms, equipment and aircraft sent by Russia saved the Red Army. Tibet was brought back under Chinese domination between October 1950 and May 1951.

Meanwhile, on Formosa, with American support, the Chinese Nationalist fortified the island and glared across the water at the victors.

* For detailed article on 'Long March' please see *USI Journal* Vol. LXXXIX, Jan-March, 1959, pp. 53-70.

THE CHINESE RED ARMY TODAY

The Chinese armed forces are the responsibility of the Minister for Defence, Peng Teh Huai (1958) who was the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea, and is boosted as the general who defeated MacArthur. It is generally accepted that the army is at least 2 million strong, and the country is divided up into about 30 army administrative areas, which presumably control a number of static districts and are responsible for static installations and other line-of-communication units.

It is thought that there are some 70 "armies" in being, but as this term is very loosely used when referring to Chinese formation, it is thought that each would be something similar to a Western army corps in strength and composition. As these are all field formations, fully mobilised, it may be reasonable to assume that each has at least three divisions. This would give a total of about 250 divisions of all sorts: which may be correct.

In addition, to supply these formations there is in existence a service-cum-supply corps which has been estimated to have a strength of at least 2 million. When considering the nature of the country, the vast distances, the lack of communications and of transport, this perhaps is understandable.

At the conclusion of the Civil War the Red Army was a guerilla force, ill-equipped and ill-trained for conventional warfare, but after the Korean War a programme was launched to re-organise and re-equip it on modern lines. Russia supplied arms, technicians and vehicles, and trained Chinese officers. Russian influence was predominant and the Russian pattern was followed. A study of the order of battle of the Russian army, its structure and administration will give a good idea of how the Chinese forces are organised and run. Russian tactics have also been adopted, as well as uniforms and other outward insignia.

It must now be considered that this programme of modernising the Red Army is well underway. There may be about a dozen armoured or mobile divisions and a few artillery divisions, but apart from these and a few other specialised formations, the remainder are all infantry divisions. The Chinese army differs from that of Russia in that it is not mechanised to anything like the same degree.

China has at least two paratroop schools, which lead to the deduction that there must be a few paratroop formations available.

Women do not now serve in the armed forces as combatants, although in civil life they take their place at all jobs equally with men, and it is common to see them driving railway engines, for example. During the Civil War, they fought in the ranks, but this has been changed.

MILITIA

In support of the regular army there is a militia force reputed to be about 12 million strong. There are detachments in every commune

and village. Basic infantry training is given for a short period daily, in drill, rifle exercises, grenade throwing and elementary field work. The militia is armed at the moment with rifles and grenades only, but in spite of photographs showing the militia drilling with wooden rifles, it must be assumed that if there are not enough rifles to go round there very soon will be. The next stage will probably be the 'light machine gun' stage, and as soon as these weapons are available in quantity the militia will be issued with them.

The militia units are static formations, which would be unable to operate far from home, and although they are only lightly armed, should any part of the country be overrun, they could be immediately turned into guerillas. Apart from that role and home defence, the militia has little other military value, except to provide partly-trained material as reinforcements for the regular army, if heavy casualties were suffered.

AIR FORCE

It is estimated that the Red Air Force has at least 2,000 aircraft, of which a large proportion are jets, and the personnel amount to at least 200,000 men. Training schools have been set up, and whilst the instruction was given in the first place by Russians, now the Chinese largely provide their own instructors.

All the aircraft are Russian models which are assembled in China, and the first all-Chinese jet-aircraft has still to be designed and produced. It is thought that this stage will soon be reached, and when it is the production rate will be stepped up and the air strength will increase considerably.

NAVY

The navy is only small as being a land power, China's main efforts have been directed into creating huge land defensive forces. In 1952, it consisted of about 350 ships, mostly small coastal craft, based on Darien, Tsingtao and Canton. This number has increased since and may now be as many as 500 ships. In addition, there are numbers of assault landing craft massed adjacent to Formosa. Red China is also building up a merchant marine.

There is a small marine corps, based on the American model, which has a reputed strength of about 50,000 men.

EQUIPMENT

In the early years of its existence the Red Army was extremely hard up for military equipment, but when the Japanese pulled out large quantities of their arms, ammunition and material were captured or salvaged. It was largely with this Japanese war material that the Red Army defeated the Nationalists.

As soon as China entered the Korean War, Mao appealed to Russia for help, and quantities of arms, tanks and aircraft were sent, perhaps in total enough to equip 25-30 divisions. When the Korean War was over, realising how sadly the Red Army as a whole was equipped, assembly plants and industries were set up and Russian prototypes were produced. This has been going on for about 5 years and some progress must have taken place, but the programme cannot be anywhere nearly complete.

China has ample manpower certainly, but not sufficient war material to fit its army out adequately, nor will she have for some time.

FIGHTING QUALITIES AND MORALE

The Chinese have never been regarded as a first class fighting race, which is probably because they did not put up a serious resistance in the last two centuries. Also, the trend was that a soldier took a low social grading in China. This reputation may not be wondered at when considering the private armies of the war lords or provincial governors, in which soldiers were ill-trained, neglected, usually unpaid and frequently changed sides in battle. Generally, Chinese soldiers of those days scavenged on the peasants.

Occasionally in the past notable soldiers, such as Sir Garnet Wolseley, have remarked that with training and good leadership they would make good soldiers. The men in the Nationalist army in their clashes with the Japanese and the Communists did not give much reason to alter this widely held opinion of the quality and reliability of the Chinese fighting man.

However, the Communists seemed to have worked wonders and brought out all his latent good soldierly qualities. The conduct of the Red Army in the Korean War gave food for thought. Indeed, if proof was still wanting, this war confirmed their new found confidence in themselves in the field.

As regards morale, the Communist indoctrination has imposed a rigid discipline on the nation, and the army in particular: no longer can Chinese formations be regarded as unreliable rabble. The Chinese would certainly fight fiercely for any Communistic ideal, and also for his country. His morale is high.

INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL

Chinese economy rests upon agriculture, but there are deposits of minerals, and the government hopes to develop industrialisation to complement it. The mineral deposits are generally small and consist of such minerals as coal, iron, tin and tingsen. Some petroleum deposits have been located but not in such large quantities as was hoped. The largest oil field is in Kansu province, to the north-west. So far only about 1½ million tons of petrol is being produced annually (as against 353 million

tons produced in America annually), and even with the tiny number of motor vehicles in use in China, over two-thirds of the present oil consumption has to be imported. Unless more petroleum deposits are located and developed the country would not be self-sufficient in this field if there was to be any large increase in motor vehicles. A large mechanised army could not be maintained.

There is low grade coal, especially in Manchuria, which is laboriously mined by manual labour, which produces about 100 tons annually, and which provides most of the power available. This could be increased by mechanisation, but the main untapped source of power perhaps lies in hydro-electric schemes.

China aims to develop industrialisation as fast as she can: a steel and coal complex was taken over in Manchuria, which is now called the 'North-West' Province, but in addition, a host of cottage industries have been started, and many villages and communes have, for example, small rather primitive smelting furnaces, with account for 30% of her output.

Russia has assisted in starting this industrialisation and up to 1958 had established about 120 industrial undertakings, covering such items as oil, radar, electrical engineering, coal and various types of assembly plants, of which over half have been completed and are in production. In February 1959, another trade pact was signed in Moscow, by which Russia agreed to give help to China amounting to about £450 million, to start and equip another 78 industrial plants. This was to be repaid in raw materials.

The deduction must be that whilst China is still very much an agricultural country, the germ of industrialisation has been sown and is beginning to sprout: in a few years time it will be flourishing. Certainly, she will be able to manufacture enough war material for her huge forces—but only provided that there is no large degree of mechanisation.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

In a conventional war against a first class power, the Red Army's capabilities of offensive action seem to be limited, although up to 100 divisions must be in a good state of efficiency and readiness. The chief reasons being lack of mobility and hitting power, and owing to these drawbacks the Red Army might not be too successful operating in unfriendly territory away from its home bases.

Again, unless larger deposits of petroleum are discovered, it is doubtful whether a strong, mobile striking force, such as Russia has and Western Germany is building, is a feasible proposition.

The Red Army's strength lies in defence, in which the size of the country, the lack of communications and the organised militia would be decisive factors. Any attacker would be smothered by distance and man-

power. The militia, in spite of huge numbers, is of doubtful efficiency for modern warfare, and could not operate away from home.

In a struggle against a world power, China would be handicapped by not possessing nuclear weapons.

EXPECTED MILITARY EXPANSION

The first 5 year plan began in 1953 and aimed at developing Manchuria, and on this was imposed a second 5 year plan, aimed at developing industries and resources in the north-west regions. These are progressing well, and accordingly it is to be expected that the armed forces will benefit greatly in the near future. The arms industry should reach a peak within 5 years by which time the 250 divisions should be nearly completely armed and equipped. Heavy armaments should not lag behind either, and the Red Army would also have sufficient artillery.

Although vehicles and tanks will come into full production the number of armoured or mobile divisions China intends to maintain would probably have to be reviewed in the light of the indigenous oil situation, and may be only a comparatively small proportion. There may be a few armoured groups for use in suitable country and for an expeditionary role, but it is thought that the keynote will not be on mobility, but rather on infantry.

An invasion force is assembled ready to seize Formosa and it is expected that this will remain intact to be held ready for any similar operational role should circumstances demand it. For instance, the Communists may have their eye on Japan and other islands in the south and east.

COMMUNIST PROGRESS

The Chinese Communists claim to have eliminated landlords and other 'reactionaries,' broken down traditional family loyalties, put the peasants into communes and weeded out corruption. The world laughed at these claims, pointing out the deep-rooted conservatism of the Chinese people and the difficulties of imposing Communism on such an ancient civilisation in such a short space of time.

Suddenly, we have become aware that there is much in what they have been claiming. Private property was abolished as a first step, and the government began co-operative farms, owned by the state, on Russian lines. But last year they went further than Russia has dared to go, and in April 1958, communes were set up in Honan. The experiment was successful and the latest figures indicate that now about 90% of the population, literally most of those living outside the towns, is herded into about 23,393 communes, where the people are organised into 'work brigades,' which are sub-divided into 'work units,' in which groups of people collectively tackle set tasks. Mainly, these communes are agricultural in character, but the idea seems to be that they should all aim at becoming part-time indus-

trialists as well, and accordingly cottage industries have been started with vigour.

What hold has Communism got on the Chinese and how stable is the government? The Communists admit to having liquidated 2 million, but the true figure is held to be near 14 million, so any overt opposition has been removed. There was a tiny student's revolt in 1956, which was easily disposed of and seems to have been the only concrete sign of unrest in recent years. Rumours of dissatisfaction, suicides and mass escapes from communes filter through but we do not know how much truth they contain—if any. As yet, there is little positive evidence that the Chinese are not making good the majority of their claims, and materially the peasants are better off and more secure than under the older regimes.

It would appear that the indoctrination has been successful, and all the Chinese, at least on the surface, have been 'brain washed' and are in complete agreement with the policies of Mao, and are content to submerge their individuality into that of the commune. The New China is united and Communistic, and is no longer the old China of legend.

FORMOSA

When Chiang was defeated in 1949, about 600,000 Nationalist soldiers and 400,000 others withdrew to Formosa, an island having a population of about 7 million. Now Chiang has an army of about 650,000 men, well trained and equipped by America.

Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist army is as much a political problem as a military one. Formosa is protected by the U.S. 7th Fleet, and is regarded by America more as a symbol of resistance against Communism than a useful strategic base. How far America would be prepared to become involved when the attack from the mainland is launched, remains to be seen. She might be foolish to dissipate her strength so far from home.

As things appear at the moment, Red China can take Formosa any time she chooses, and indeed has an invasion force trained and ready. It seems that Mao is simply waiting for a more opportune time.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

In 1950 Stalin signed a pact with Mao and since then Russia has regarded herself as being the big brother of China—a helpful Communist brother. Relations have been exceptionally cordial, and with bland smiles the Chinese have eagerly accepted all aid, material and technical, industrial and military, from Russia that has been offered.

But China has a mind of her own, and Chinese Communism ("to each according to his need") differs from Russian Communism ("to each according to his work"), and also China does not unthinkingly follow

Russian policy. For some time these differences were not apparent, but of late they have become more obvious.

Russia has become uneasily aware of China's outstanding progress and is not blind to her potential, which has caused a softening in her (Russia's) attitude towards the Western Powers. Russia does not completely trust China, and is not prepared to let her have nuclear weapons or nuclear power. There have been other tiny cracks in the friendly facade, as for instance when the Chinese Defence Council openly complained that Russia insisted on full interest on her loans for the Korean War. There may be something in the possibility sometimes voiced that one day there will be a clash between the two Communist giants.

CONCLUSION

China now has a large, modern army and we must accept the fact that it is more efficient and capable than ever before. At present it is limited basically to home defence and can only find small expeditionary forces of limited strength and mobility. As a whole the Red Army is not a mobile army, and unless the production of oil is boosted up to a fantastic degree it does not look like becoming so, although there is much scope and need to increase the armoured and mobile element.

It would seem that for the next 5 years perhaps, China will have to be content with "creeping" progress into adjacent countries to the south and east, with the accent on political doctrine and propaganda, rather than on military force. But after that length of time, the situation may change as the Red Army will have improved, and then the countries on her fringe may be in danger. The unconcealed aim of Communism is world domination.

Once Red China acquires nuclear weapons she will be able to bargain with any country in the world on equal terms.

TRAINING OF YOUNG INFANTRY OFFICERS

By R. D. PALSOKAR, MC

THERE is now an almost regular inflow of young officers in our infantry battalions. A few years hence these officers will be at the helm of army affairs. It is imperative that the commanding officers and their second-in-command take personal interest in their training and upbringing for on them alone rests the future of the army. These officers join the units from the Military College where they receive their training as cadets. These cadets trained in the Military College environments which are so different to those in an infantry battalion may not react quite equally to all the elements of their new situation. They may ignore some of them whilst others may not impress them at all. Much depends on their previous training, their own temperament, those they come in contact with and how they are handled. Though the commanding officers have no control over their selection and training prior to their commissioning, they can certainly influence them sufficiently in their first few formative years of service to mould them into good officers. Since different commanding officers may have, and are likely to have, different ideas on how to bring up the young officers, it is proposed to examine the subject of their training and handling in the first few years of their service.

Conduct of War states that the first duty of an officer is to lead. Thus the aim of all training and upbringing should be to make these officers good leaders of men. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the nature of present day army leadership before considering the subject proper.

In olden times, armies depended upon 'born leaders'. These leaders made their own position, and by the force of their character and dominating or domineering nature pushed themselves to the front. Belisarius joined Justinian's bodyguard and so distinguished himself in action and showed such military shrewdness on the Persian frontier that he was made Commander-in-chief with the title of General of the East at the early age of 25. Napoleon when only 27 pushed his way up to the command of the Army of Italy in 1796 and said to his soldiers, "Soldiers, you are half starved and half naked. The Government owes you much, but can do nothing for you.....I will lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. There you will find flourishing cities, teeming provincesSoldiers of the Army of Italy, will you be wanting in courage and firmness?" And he kept his promise. He led his men to the flourishing cities. Indian history is equally replete with examples of men of dominating character pushing themselves to the helm of affairs and leading their men to victory and glory. Shivaji showed himself up at the age of 16 and found a kingdom of his own against stiff opposition of powerful

monarchs. Such leaders dominated their followers, commanded and swayed them by virtue of their character, assertiveness, ardent temperament, correct and deep rooted instinct. They made intelligent decisions and were capable of executing independent action. Leadership was in their flesh and blood.

The modern army is a complex social organisation which cannot afford to depend upon leaders showing themselves up in times of stress. The army selects her potential leaders and trains them in the art of leadership. This trained leader maintains his position mainly by virtue of the established social prestige attaching to his office. If he is not a born leader, he relies mostly on the authority he gets with his rank and position. If he falls in battle, his place is taken by another who is equally well obeyed. More often than not, officers who trained their men do not lead them into battle; others who hardly know them lead them and quite successfully. This is achieved by making leadership an institution which takes over some of the functions and authority of the leader as a person. The leader is the symbol of the institution. He is not encouraged to change the sentiments attached to the institute. Devices such as uniforms, badges of rank, odd regimental customs are kept up to help grow the importance of the institute of leadership. Bartlett in his study of 'Psychology and the soldier' asserts that "The institutional leader is and must be punctilious about these things, conservative about them. If he lets them slip, his authority has gone. He must learn how they were acquired and what they are regarded as standing for, and he must attach his followers to them rather than to himself, so that an affront to them will be resisted and a change in them resented. He may be fussy and punctilious to the last degree about details of dress, drill and formal discipline. Others are certain to laugh at him for his rigidity and love of past times. But he is right psychologically.". The insistence of the Guards officers in banging their foot against medical advice, of the Gorkhas in preserving their rifle drill, of the Navy in allowing their personnel to salute without their headgear and in their own inimitable way will now be appreciated.

Since there is an emphasis on rank and authority, the institutional leader has to maintain a certain amount of aloofness. He lives and eats separately, and does not quite mix with his men. He likes to feel he is different from them and is in fact liable to look down upon those who happen to come from the same social class as his men or those joining his cadre from the ranks.

Against this background of the basis of army leadership should be examined the changes that occur in the status of a cadet on commissioning. Overnight he finds himself a person of unquestioned social prestige of authority. He is no longer being ordered constantly to do something or the other; instead it falls to his lot to order others. Not that he

was not trained and prepared for his new role. He was. But the change is sudden and complete. The army training and sense of discipline is such that even senior NCOs and JCOs instinctively look up to him for guidance and orders. It is this power in the hands of one so inexperienced to wield it that is likely to be the corrupting influence. He is likely to be unnecessarily or ignorantly rude to his men, NCOs or JCOs. It would appear very essential, therefore, that the nature of his authority is explained to the young officer on first joining. It would help him to exercise his authority better. He should, at the same time, be advised that he should not so much depend upon the authority given to him by the State. He should get it for himself by winning the respect and loyalty of his men so that they come to trust his judgment.

Since institutional leadership depends so much upon custom and tradition, the young member of the institute must know his regimental history on which are based regimental customs and traditions. He should be brought up to assimilate and respect old customs and be conservative about them. The more conservative he becomes, the more would he identify himself with his regiment.

Officers of a battalion or a regiment belong to a special group of which the commanding officer is the leader. If this group is very easy to get into, it is obvious that the officers are not bound together by any common bond. They are together by virtue of their common interest of serving to further their career. The regiment is not the centre of their interest. If the group is too difficult to get into, the young member will constantly be looked upon suspiciously and kept under vigil by one and all to determine if he is the right sort. In either case, he will be unhappy. It is essential that officers of his new regiment accept him as one of them and not treat him as a foreigner.

It has earlier been said that the primary duty of an officer is to lead his men. For this the young officer must get to know his men first. In many units it is customary to attach the newcomer first to the adjutant for a few weeks, then to the quartermaster, signal officer and so on before posting him to one of the rifle companies. This is done to ensure that the officer gets to know the working of the unit first before going to the men he is to command. In some units he is first put through a cadre with the NCOs before being sent to a rifle company. Doing a cadre with the NCOs helps him to get to know the material he is to command, their capabilities, understanding ability etc. In some cases, however, he is sent straight to a rifle company to work there as a company commander. I asked a number of young officers with service ranging from a few days to about three years as to what in their opinion would be or would have been best for them. Except one who said he would like to be put in charge of a section, everyone seemed of the opinion that an initial attachment with the adjutant, quartermaster etc. is what would

have done them lot of good. In a rifle company they did not learn much. There was hardly anything there to learn!

If an officer is to know his men, he cannot do so in the adjutant's office or the quartermaster's. The proper place for that is the rifle company where he can learn and practice the art of command given some aptitude and motivation. The army selection methods ensure that candidates with necessary aptitude are taken in. Motivation can be given by the commanding officer by stressing the necessity of learning the art of command. It should be noted here that the young officer is initially shy of his men. In the Military College he was used to dealing with brother cadets. He never got an opportunity of commanding real 'men'. So when he first comes in contact with them, he prefers to watch them from the safe precincts of the adjutant's office.

Knowing the men means understanding their thinking, emotions and behaviour. Each individual has his own problems to solve, his own emotions to contend with. He loves, hates, succeeds, fails and reacts to his environments in his own way. His reactions differ depending upon whether he is alone or in a group of which he is a proud member. Psychology studies the activities of an individual in relation to his environment. Sociology studies human activities in terms of the groups and institutions of society. So the young officer who sets out to win over his men, their trust, confidence and affection, has to be familiar with the basic laws of psychology and sociology.

He should know every man of his platoon by name. This way he gives personal recognition and helps to make the men feel important. He will soon learn the value of commending good work, criticizing the job and not blaming the man, being clear and decisive, identifying himself with the men and their needs, being friendly and yet not familiar, being just and kind. His commanding officer or the company commander under whom he is placed can help him to establish correct relations with the men. There are, however, one or two practical difficulties in giving him charge of a platoon. As per our present establishment, the company second-in-command is a Subedar. More often than not the company commander is away on a board, a court of inquiry, presiding over tests, attending or setting exercises, and the command of the company devolves on the senior JCO. This officer has, therefore, to work under him and take orders from him. To avoid embarrassment it should be explained to both the officer and the JCO that the role of the former is that of a pupil and that of the latter, of a teacher. The other snag relates to administrative matters. As our rules are framed, we prefer the signature of an officer to a JCO's and as such this young officer finds himself signing papers for the company commander, or filling in acquittance rolls or conducting courts of inquiries, firing, NPC tests and the like. The commanding officer should, therefore, make it a point not to detail the young

officer on these odd jobs and leave him with his platoon as far as possible. Training camps, or the field are the best places where he can really be with his men.

Getting to know the men is apparently such an easy job and yet so difficult.

A good leader must be competent. The competency expected of a young officer should be in the realm of 'skill at arms'. He must know how to use his arms effectively. A weapon's course at the Infantry School no doubt takes good care of this aspect but a lot can be done in the unit before and after sending the officer on the course. Soldiers handle rifles and bren guns daily almost as a routine. They are generally more adept at their use. A young officer should be equally good if not better at them if he is to win the respect of his men.

He has not only to be good at weapons but has to develop his teaching ability as well. He can teach only if he knows his job thoroughly. When he is serving as a platoon commander, he should be put through a unit weapon cadre and made to conduct one preferably for his own platoon. At the end of a year or so he can judge for himself the difference in the standard of his platoon and the other two in his company commanded by JCOs.

Field Marshal Wavell considers toughness, endurance as the prime requirement of a good soldier. The leader has to be a shade better. Toughening needs continuous training and the young officer should do a unit as well as an army physical training course in the first one or two years of his service.

The army cannot function unless it is disciplined. Discipline, in General Marshall's words, 'is cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team'. An individual does not easily subordinate to the others. Initially he is made to do so. A cadet is disciplined by free use of punishment. In a socially undeveloped society punishment is stiffer than in a developed one. Thus when the cadet is commissioned he joins the ranks of men of prestige and is not punished for trivial lapses. From now on he is expected to be man of integrity and loyalty, ready to accept responsibility, decisive, confident, self-possessed and with the correct attitude towards death. He is expected to know how to obey and what degree of obedience to demand. What was an enforced obedience to external authority prior to commissioning becomes cheerful obedience after commissioning. In actual practice, what may happen is that the youngster, on realising that he is not punished so easily as he used to be, may become frivolous, irresponsible and slack. It is here that the commanding officer can help him by instilling discipline by education and reason, by taking advantage of his position as a person of unquestioned prestige.


Care must be exercised at this stage to ensure that the young officer does not lose his initiative and dash, and acquires a seasoning of devilry. He has to have the qualities of 'a cat burglar, a gunman and a poacher'. Too much of stereotyped training, standard exercises and studying campaigns of steady and cautious generals are likely to kill his initiative. He should be encouraged to read biographies of dashing generals rather than the overcautious ones and preferably to select a hero for himself. One of our young officers while on a course was specifically advised not to read any history but to concentrate on mugging up his pamphlets. When he returned he just gave up all reading—history he was asked not to read and pamphlets made too dull a reading. We would like our young officers to retain and foster their initiative, and develop their reading habit.

An officer not only trains his men for war but has to look after them (and himself) during peace. This becomes more difficult if he does not know administrative rules and regulations. The various Controllers of Defence Accounts teach him his entitlements by refusing payments to apparently correct claims. It would not be incorrect to say that today's army officer is educated more by the Controllers of Defence Accounts and the auditors than by his own superiors. We would not like the young officer to learn our way—the hard way. He should be warned of the various pitfalls and taught his way about regimental accounts and audit. A start should be made with teaching him the correct preparation of acquaintance rolls, familiarising him with the pay entitlements of his men under the new pay code, effect on pay of their qualifying in various map reading and higher Hindi examinations, preparation of warrants and the like. He should be warned that he is not the signing authority on the letters prepared by his clerk. In fact if he administers his platoon for one year, he will gradually become familiar with most of the common rules and regulations. It may not be out of place here to suggest that even our staff college should devote some time in explaining the intricacies of the various regulations pertaining to pay and allowances, military engineering service, barracks, tentage etc. to the staff college students who find themselves later grappling with them and with the auditors due to sheer ignorance. During peace it may not matter if a DAA and QMG does not quite know how to prepare a movement table for the division but should he not know passage regulations, he is liable to learn them through deductions in his pay bill.

In conclusion, it may be said that the army no longer depends upon born leaders but prefers to train her own. Those not born leaders can be trained to be leaders and leadership improves with experience. The army leadership is institutional in nature and is based on authority, punishment and discipline. The young officer gets considerable authority on commissioning and needs guidance for its correct use. He should be helped

to establish correct relationship with his JCOs, NCOs and men. He needs to know regimental history, customs, traditions and needs to be conservative about them. For the first year or so of his service, he should be left in command of a platoon under a senior company commander, put through a cadre with the NCOs, physical training and weapon cadres, and encouraged to coach his platoon. He must get to know his men. Spending his first annual leave in the villages from which his men are recruited will considerably help him to understand them. A basic knowledge of psychology as well as sociology is also essential. The Military College endeavours to toughen the cadets. Unit commanders can further these endeavours. He should be disciplined ensuring concurrently that he does not become a mere yes-man and that he retains his initiative. He should be encouraged to read biographies of dashing generals and select a 'hero' for himself. The command of the platoon should familiarise him with current rules and regulations pertaining to the administration of his men. His brother officers in the battalion can teach him much by setting him a good example.

VIRGINIA AND THE VALLEY



THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR (1861-65)

By 'RAMINOV'

COURSE OF THE WAR

1862

AFTER the First Bull Run both sides realised that the war would be long and bitter. The South's hopes of foreign intervention were very nearly fulfilled in October 1861 when the highhanded action of a Northern naval captain in seizing the British Steamer 'Trent' created serious tension between the Union and Britain. The crisis however blew over, mainly due to the cool and conciliatory attitude adopted by Lincoln and Seward, his Secretary of State.

By November 1861, General Scott left the Army and in his place Lincoln brought in McClellan² to be General-in-Chief. McClellan busied himself with plans for strengthening the defences of Washington and for offensive operations into Virginia, for which Congress and the Northern press were now clamouring.

THE PENINSULA

A strong Southern force under *Joseph Johnston* was facing McClellan near Manassas Junction. Lincoln proposed an offensive to drive *Johnston* back through Virginia. McClellan, realising the difficulties of the terrain, particularly in that part of the year, suggested a better plan—to outflank Virginia from the sea and to attack Richmond from the east with a large force landed at the mouth of the Virginia rivers. After much discussion, and many delays, during which the secrecy of the impending operation was inevitably lost, it was agreed that McClellan could move by sea, provided a sufficiently strong force was left behind for the defence of the capital.

Now began the illfated Peninsula Campaign. For a seaborne expedition there was surprisingly little coordinated planning with the Navy. At the mouth of the James River was Norfolk Navy Yard and a landing here would not only have threatened Richmond from South of the river, but the South could have been deprived of the use of this important ship-building base. Instead McClellan first planned to move via Urbanna on the Rappahannock, but *Johnston* coming to know of this drew back over that river to avoid being outflanked. After further delays and confusion, the expedition finally sailed in mid March 1862 to Fort Monroe at the tip of the Peninsula.

2. George Brinton McClellan was only 39 when he became general-in-chief of the Northern armies in 1861. He had fought with the Engineers in the Mexican War, but had left the army later for a successful career in the railways. On the outbreak of the Civil War he was called back and made one of the first major generals of the Northern Army.

While his initial campaign in W. Virginia was brilliantly conducted, the decline of his career started after he became C-in-C and, later, commander of the Army of the Potomac. The responsibility for this was mainly his own. Temperamentally he could not fit himself into the prevailing atmosphere in Washington, and by his resentment against what he considered undue political interference with the conduct of the war and the unnecessarily crude way in which he treated everyone in authority, including Lincoln, he created powerful enemies for himself.

Militarily, while he was quick to organise and train, when it came to operations he was overcautious and slow, with a fatal tendency of always overestimating his enemy's strength. Finally the strength of his political enemies and the tardiness of his operations combined to eliminate him from the scene of the War.

After his exit from the Army, he opposed Lincoln in the Presidential elections of 1864 and was heavily defeated.

As it sailed, McClellan was removed from his post as General-in-Chief (thus remaining only in command of his Army of the Potomac). The government in Washington also discovered that despite their express instructions, only a skeleton force had been left behind to defend the capital. As a result McDowell's corps of about 35,000 men at Fredericksburg, which was to have been the landward pincer of McClellan's offensive, was held back.

McClellan, embittered by these events, laid siege to Yorktown, but the city was evacuated. His progress towards Richmond was now very slow. At the end of May, Johnston caught McClellan dispersed on either side of the Chickahominy which was in flood, and by concentrating a superior force against his southern wing, defeated it at the battle of Fair Oaks (*Seven Pines*). The weather now turning bad, McClellan stayed put, fortifying his positions and waiting for reinforcements.

What had actually happened to these reinforcements? While McDowell's corps had been held back at first, later one division was sent to McClellan and the Government agreed to the move of the Corps towards Richmond to assist McClellan's main force. Unfortunately at this time occurred 'Stonewall' Jackson's³ famed raid into the Shenandoah Valley, threatening Washington from the western flank.

The location of the Valley has already been described. The Southern commanders, particularly Lee and Jackson, were quick to appreciate the strategic value of maintaining a threat in this area; and even as McClellan invaded the Peninsula and Johnston pulled back to conform, Jackson was ordered to cause maximum havoc in the Valley so that McDowell would not be able to move to the help of McClellan.

With a numerically smaller force, using his cavalry boldly and manoeuvring audaciously, Jackson managed to defeat the Northern troops under Banks, Fremont and McDowell which were not used boldly enough or in unison. Having achieved his primary aim, by creating panic in Washington and holding down a force four times as large as his own, Jackson slipped out of the Valley, unnoticed by the enemy, to join Lee near Richmond for the closing stages of the Peninsula Campaign.

Johnston was badly wounded during the Fair Oaks battle and Lee assumed command. Lee had appreciated the danger to Richmond from McClellan's large

3. Thomas J. ('Stonewall') Jackson, hero of the Confederacy, one of the best military leaders of the Civil War, whose Valley campaigns will always be a fascinating subject for students of military history.

He has been described as Lee's 'right hand', and in many ways, despite the difference in their backgrounds, he was a complement to Lee. A West Virginian of humble origins he had joined the US Army in 1846 from West Point as a gunner at twenty-two. After a rapid rise to major in the Mexican War, he left the army due to ill health in 1851 and devoted himself to the study of war and religion.

Brought back to the army on the outbreak of the War, he was a brigade commander at Bull Run (1861) where his steadiness in defence earned him the name 'Stonewall'.

Unimpressive in appearance, he was imbued with a high sense of duty. His stern measures to enforce discipline into the individualistic Southern troops were at first resented, but when their value in battle was realized, he was accepted as a popular and respected commander.

He was not only staunch in the defensive, and terrible in counter attack, he also believed in achieving surprise by confusing and misleading the enemy as to his real intentions. Perhaps he carried this too far, and on occasions his own subordinate commanders were not 'in the picture.'

His tragic death, by the fire of his own troops, in the battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863 ended a brilliant career.

force encamped within a short distance, and had gained valuable time and delayed Northern reinforcements by *Jackson's* operations in the Valley. When *McClellan* at last resumed his attack on Richmond at the end of June, *Lee* was ready and the Seven Days' battles (June 25th to July 1st) took place, resulting in *McClellan's* defeat. *McClellan* had a large enough force, but due to his overestimation of the opponent's strength he failed to take advantage of it. *Lee's* conduct of this battle too was certainly not brilliant; there was a lack of coordination between his forces, *Lee's* grip over the tactical situation was often ineffective, and *Stonewall Jackson* who was ill at this time was surprisingly slow to arrive at any decisive spot in the battle.

McClellan's forces were reembarked after some weeks' delay. Meanwhile the Army of Virginia was formed under the command of *Pope*, with the forces of *Banks*, *Fremont* and *McDowell*, facing south against *Lee*. Here, with *Lee* between *Pope's* Army along the Rappahannock and *McClellan's* force by the *James*, was a good opportunity to crush him. If the two armies had acted in unison, together they could have brought off a victory: but *Pope* and *McClellan* could not agree, and their government had lost faith in *McClellan*. So this opportunity was allowed to slip and *McClellan's* force was evacuated from the Peninsula.

SECOND BULL RUN AND ANTIETAM


Even before *McClellan* was gone, *Lee* who was now superior in strength vis-a-vis *Pope* took the offensive. His aim was to beat *Pope* before *McClellan's* force joined him, and to advance across the Potomac into Maryland, where he could exploit the sympathies of the local population to gather men and replenish his depleted supplies, and strategically draw the North away from Virginia. By a bold flanking move through the mountain passes, *Jackson* took Manassas Junction behind *Pope's* lines while *Lee* with the main force attacked him frontally. Confused by *Jackson's* presence between him and Washington, *Pope* lost control over the situation, was beaten at the second Bull Run battle, and retired to the safety of Washington. *Halleck*, who had by then become general-in-chief of the Union did nothing to help him, and no attempt was made to employ *McClellan's* force which had arrived by this time.

After the second Bull Run (*Manassas*), *Lee* crossed the Potomac and moved into Maryland. With characteristic overconfidence he detached a sizeable portion of his army to secure the crossing places over the Potomac which were in Union hands. In Maryland, he found none of the warm response he had hoped for, and soon heard that *McClellan*, again in command, was now in pursuit. If the latter, who had come to know of *Lee's* actual plans, had moved with speed he might have caught *Lee* divided, but he was slow again and when the two armies faced each other at Antietam, *Lee* was ready. The ensuing battle (September 17th) was tactically inconclusive, but *Lee* suffered heavy casualties, and withdrew across the Potomac to gather and refit his men, who were in tatters. *McClellan*, still obsessed by *Lee's* numerical superiority, made no attempt to pursue and only crossed the river five weeks after *Lee* did. Lincoln, when he heard that *McClellan's* horses needed rest, is reported to have written "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigue anything?" Having failed to redeem his reputation in this, his last chance, *McClellan* was finally dismissed and *Burnside* replaced him.

FREDERICKSBURG

Burnside advanced with the intention of crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg and marching directly on Richmond. There were the usual delays,

THE WEST



prepared for the attack. In the ensuing battle of Shiloh on April 6th and 7th the Southern attacks were finally held. Grant had again saved the situation by his presence and his firm action.

Johnston was killed at Shiloh and was succeeded in turn by *Beauregard* and *Bragg*. Halleck who had been so far a hindrance rather than a help to Grant in the West was called to Washington. Further operations in the West were now a matter of coordination between Grant's and Buell's forces. Grant's aim was to secure the line of the Mississippi River. From the North a naval force had secured Memphis by the middle of the year: New Orleans to the south had already been secured in April by a combined force. The middle stretch of the river dominated by Vicksburg remained to be conquered.

Buell in East Tennessee aimed to move against Chattanooga. To protect his right flank and to draw away forces opposing him Grant moved forward and took Grand Junction and Holly Springs, establishing at the latter place an administrative base for further moves against Vicksburg. While Buell groped forward slowly in September, to attack Chattanooga, he was forestalled by *Bragg's* invasion of Kentucky. Moving through Buell's open right flank *Bragg* burst into Kentucky, while *Kirby Smith* advanced into Ohio from the Cumberland Gap. Buell withdrew into Ohio to protect his bases. Instead of acting in coordination with *Kirby Smith* to inflict a severe defeat in Buell, *Bragg* wasted this opportunity by seeking the political aim of rousing the Kentuckians on the side of the Southern cause: in this like *Lee* in Maryland he was disappointed. After a minor battle at Perryville he was pushed back, and concentrated in the area of Stone's river (Murfreesboro) to block the next Northern move against Chattanooga. Buell was removed from command and *Rosecrans* who replaced him organised his administrative bases and moved against *Bragg* in December. The battle of Murfreesboro at the turn of the year was tactically a draw; *Rosecrans* received a rough handling at *Bragg's* hands, but held firm, and *Bragg* lost heavily in men and withdrew towards Chattanooga.

To the west Grant's objective was Vicksburg. His plan was for Sherman to move down from Memphis with the support of gunboats, while he (Grant) moved by land from his advanced bases in the area of Grand Junction. Sherman was repulsed just north of Vicksburg at the end of December. Grant's landward advance ran into serious difficulties. *Joseph Johnston* had replaced *Bragg* in overall command of the Southern forces in the West and had received large reinforcements. He now let loose forces of cavalry under *Forrest*, *Pemberton* and *Van Dorn* who raided Grant's communications and destroyed his bases and depots

Grant's early career was chequered. He joined the Infantry from West Point in 1843 at the age of 21, and having served in the Mexican War as subaltern left the Army in the early fifties. After some years of aimless drifting in private life, when the War broke out he returned to the Army, rising in quick succession from the command of a company to the highest wartime command in the Army. It was this grounding in the fundamentals of soldiering and administration which made possible the thoroughness of his planning and conduct of operations.

In the sphere of high command, Grant was ahead of his time. In a war which was marked by a lack of imaginative leadership Grant was the first and the only commander to realize the impact of 'total war'. His clear strategic views on the wider problems of the war as a whole, his organizing of the staffs on more or less modern lines, and his understanding of the need for economic warfare show him in distinct contrast to the older, more conservative *Lee* who could not or was not allowed to 'think beyond' the frontiers of Virginia.

Grant's rise to fame during the War was followed after its end by an ineffectual term as President of the reunified nation, obscurity in private life, and finally a slow and painful death by cancer.

behind him. Grant had to withdraw and went back to Memphis to take personal command of the river column.

1863

VICKSBURG

By the end of January Grant had joined Sherman on the Mississippi a few miles to the west of Vicksburg. Vicksburg was a heavily fortified position, situated on a height, commanding the river to the west and the rough country on the other sides. Its guns dominated the river approaches. A naval force under the daring Admiral Farragut had pushed its way through from the South and reached upto south of Vicksburg.

For two months Grant tried to outflank the batteries of Vicksburg but did not succeed. He was now at the turning point of his career: his enemies in Washington were again active in malingering him and only Lincoln's faith⁵ in him kept him in his command. He could attempt to assault the Vicksburg batteries directly: this, he realized, would be suicidal. He could go back to Memphis and move against Vicksburg from the east with his whole force, now consisting of four corps: this was practicable, but in the prevailing situation Grant could not risk even the semblance of a withdrawal. He had to go ahead and take Vicksburg. He therefore came up with an audacious plan. He would cut himself off from his communications, move down the western side of the river, cross it south of Vicksburg and attack the defences from the south. It was a risky plan, for if things went wrong he would have no base to fall back upon.

Distracting the enemy's attention by sending Sherman to demonstrate above Vicksburg, Grant moved down and crossed the river about thirty miles south of that town by the end of April. Considering the importance of Vicksburg to the South, there was surprisingly little coordination between *Pemberton*, the local commander, and *Johnston* in overall command. Before the latter could come substantially to the aid of *Pemberton*, Grant who had no communications to worry about struck boldly between them and beat them in detail. Then holding off *Johnston* with Sherman's⁶ corps, he surrounded Vicksburg and starved it into submission after a siege lasting seven weeks.

The Mississippi was now in Union hands along its entire length. For the South it was a severe blow. The food producing states of Louisiana, Arkansas

5. When Lincoln was told that Grant was incompetent and had taken to drink, he is supposed to have replied: "If I knew what kind of liquor Grant drinks, I would send a barrel or so to some other generals."
6. *William Tecumseh Sherman*, whose famous 'march to the sea' was a major exploit of the Civil War leading to final victory for the North, was one of the ablest generals of that war. Possessing a clear intellect and forthright views he was not always popular. Nevertheless, his sound appreciation that the war required aggressive measures and vigorous execution, as distinct from half hearted and unrelated efforts, was vindicated by events.

He came into prominence at the battle of Shiloh, where his staunchness in the face of the surprise attack marked him as a leader of merit. From there on his rise was steady until the end of the war, which he did so much to hasten. He and Grant understood each other perfectly and formed a war winning team.

At the age of 20 he had left West Point to join the Artillery in 1840. Like many other generals of the War he left the service in 1853 and tried his luck in business and at law. He had served extensively in the South, thus gaining good knowledge of the country over which he was to fight years later. At the outbreak of the War he was called back to the Army as a colonel.

Sherman stayed on in the US Army after the Civil War, taking an active part in the post-war reorganisation of the Army and rising to be a general and C-in-C during the Presidency of Grant.

and Texas were cut off. The much needed imports from Europe could no longer come in overland through Mexico.

CHATTANOOGA

In the 'middle-west' Rosecrans after the battle of Murfreesboro, kept his army there for six months, training his troops and repairing his communications, and made no attempt to prevent troops from being sent against Grant at Vicksburg.

However he moved late in June, and marching his army through rough country, by September 9th by a clever feint to the north of Chattanooga he crossed the Tennessee River and manoeuvred *Bragg* out of that strategic place. Chattanooga was in Union hands. Elated with his success, Rosecrans then made a rash move. Not knowing that *Bragg* was receiving large reinforcements, and presuming that he was in retreat, Rosecrans pursued him, even sending off one corps ahead to cut *Bragg's* supposed line of retreat. The result was the battle of Chickamauga on September 19th and 20th. Rosecrans was caught with his forces dispersed and suffered a severe defeat. He withdrew into Chattanooga where he was promptly besieged and cut off.

This defeat created alarm and despondency in Washington, and early in October Grant was placed in command of all the armies in the West, a long-overdue step. His immediate task was to raise the siege of Chattanooga. He replaced Rosecrans by Thomas, and hurried forward Sherman and Hooker to Chattanooga. The besieged garrison was overlooked by high hill features on all sides, and the supply position was critical. Grant attacked on November 23rd, and in the ensuing battle Thomas's bold charge on Missionary Ridge broke the Southern ranks, who withdrew. *Bragg* was in retreat and *Longstreet* who had been sent off to besiege Burnside inside Knoxville was also chased off by Sherman.

Chattanooga was now secure, and Grant and Sherman began to plan the next phase of the offensive—against Atlanta, the 'heart of the Confederacy'.

CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG

In the East we left *Lee* and Burnside on either side of the Rappahannock after the battle of Fredericksburg. After his failure Burnside too had to go, and in his place Hooker was appointed. This was a surprise, as Hooker was known to be an intriguer who had openly criticised Burnside and even Lincoln; but he had a reputation as a good fighter and he was given a chance to prove his worth.

His plan of attack was bold, and numerically he was almost twice as strong as *Lee*. His intention was first to send a strong force of cavalry to raid *Lee's* communications and dumps, then follow up with a main attack in which he would feint on his left below Fredericksburg to hold the bulk of *Lee's* army and deliver the main blow on his right, above the town—thus compelling *Lee* to retire. Unfortunately the boldness of the plan was not matched by the boldness of its execution.

In the first place, the river was in floods, and the cavalry crossed a fortnight later than scheduled, and Hooker impatiently crossed with it. So the benefits expected from the cavalry raid did not influence the main battle.

When the main attacking force crossed, *Lee* quickly saw through Hooker's intention and concentrated to his left at Chancellorsville, leaving his right weak. *Stonewall Jackson* marched round the Southern left flank and drove in Hooker's right in a surprise attack. In the densely wooded ground no control was possible.

Hooker's force on the south of the river was hemmed in into two pockets, with no communication between them. Hooker himself was incapacitated, and did nothing to take advantage of Lee's weakness in the centre of his position by mounting a coordinated attack. The battle which started on April 29th ended on May 5th when the Northern army retired. Lee did not follow up, mainly because his losses too had been heavy, and his 'administration' urgently needed looking into. And he had lost his ablest lieutenant, Jackson, who was mortally wounded on May 2nd. So he rested his army for a few weeks.

What should be Lee's next move? Strategically, at this time Grant was threatening Vicksburg, vital to the South. Having stabilised the situation in Virginia, the South could send a large force west to reinforce Johnston and attempt to save Vicksburg. Alternately, a strong force could be moved to invade Kentucky, thus drawing away Northern troops from the West. Neither move was agreeable to Lee and his political masters. Instead, they decided that Lee should advance through the Shenandoah Valley and invade Pennsylvania, cut the North's lateral communications and seek a decisive victory on Northern soil. The South had not given up hopes of foreign recognition, although the Emancipation had ruled out any practical possibility of England or France intervening against the North. Again, the Southern leaders estimated that if Lee could operate in Pennsylvania the resultant panic would strengthen the hands of the 'anti-war' elements in the North and force their government to seek peace. So, while Vicksburg was about to fall, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia set off for Pennsylvania.

Moving through the Valley, Lee crossed the Potomac and by the end of June was thrusting into Pennsylvania. Hooker proposed that he should attack Richmond, now uncovered, and had to be firmly told that his objective was Lee's army and not Richmond. He then moved northwards, parallel to Lee's advance and had crossed the Potomac, when his offer to resign made earlier to Halleck was suddenly accepted and he was relieved by Meade—a deplorable move on the eve of important battles, but evidently caused by political factors. Lee had sent off his cavalry on a vague raid and was unaware of the Northern force's location. Meade was equally in the dark, and both sides groped forward until more or less by accident they met at Gettysburg and closed in battle.

The Battle of Gettysburg lasted three days (July 1—3). The Union forces had four of their seven corps occupying a line of ridges, and the other three corps were moving up. Lee did not have his cavalry with him, to help him to forage or to disengage; while Meade could afford to wait, he could not as Meade's three corps would be up very soon; therefore Lee had no other choice but to accept battle and attack the Union defences.

In the three days' confused fighting, Lee's control over the battle was strangely slack. His orders were misunderstood, and attacks intended to be simultaneous went in piecemeal. Meade's handling of the defence on the other hand was good, with the result that in spite of Pickett's brave charge in the face of the Northern guns, Lee was beaten and began to withdraw. He was not pursued.

Meade too had suffered heavy losses. After the battle ended the weather broke, rendering movement difficult. Yet, granting that Meade's force was disorganised by the long forced marches followed by the three days' fighting, the fact remains that Lee was allowed to slip away unmolested—for the second time—back to the protection of Virginia's rivers and forests, to fight again with renewed ferocity. So while the North had won a battle, a golden chance of ending the war was lost and this fratricidal conflict continued for two more years of blood-

shed and bitterness. The immediate results of Gettysburg, however, were favourable to the North. It gave a tremendous fillip to Northern morale, and strengthened the government's position against the political prophets who were preaching 'peace at any price'.

Lee fell back to his old lines behind the Rappahannock and Meade followed slowly. Both armies now sent away large reinforcements to the West; Halleck restrained Meade from any major offensive move, and Lee with his reduced numbers was not inclined to attack. So a brief period of indecisive fighting followed, before winter brought bad weather and a tactical stalemate. However, the shuttle-race up and down Northern Virginia was now at last over, and there was no more forward movement by Lee.

1864

Before proceeding with the narrative, let us pause to review the progress of the War so far. From Fort Sumter to the end of 1861 both sides were primarily occupied in initial moves to stabilise their respective positions and in raising and organising their forces. The year 1862 was a year of gloom and despair for the North. In the East the ill fated Peninsula campaign was followed by the debacle at Fredericksburg and Lee's dash into Maryland culminating in the battle of Antietam. In the West, though the victories at Donelson, Corinth, Memphis and Pea Ridge had secured Missouri and opened the way to the Mississippi, by the end of that year Bragg's invasion of Kentucky and the destruction of Grant's communications left the latter helpless and unable to strike. The South, on the other hand, had misapplied the favourable strategic situation to the furtherance of political aims, in Maryland and Kentucky, and thus lost its military aim.

The operations during 1863 reversed the position. Despite Chancellorsville and Chickamauga, the military power of the North began to assert itself. Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania had failed. The Mississippi was cleared and Chattanooga was secured. The South had been cut into two, and the Union was firmly in control of the 'strategic centre' of the theatre—Tennessee, Kentucky and the northern part of Alabama.

Apart from the main operations described, a series of subsidiary operations had taken place round the periphery of the South, most of these in combination with naval forces, and the North had secured by this time not only New Orleans, but also Pensacola, Roanoke Island and most of the inland waters of the Carolinas and Florida. All these had helped to make the power of the Northern blockade steadily more effective, thus disrupting the economy of the South.

An entirely unrelated war was also being waged at sea. To overcome its own lack of ship-building resources, the Confederacy adopted every means to have warships built in England and France, using every loophole in international law to overcome the 'neutral' position of these two powers; and inevitably their response was in inverse proportion to the rise and fall of the Union's military fortunes in the field. With their cruisers the Southern Navy ranged far and wide destroying the Union's merchant shipping. The more industrialised North could however maintain itself even without imports, while the South with the decline of its overseas trade grew steadily weaker.

GRANT AS C-IN-C

While the Northern leadership so far had been generally ineffective, often promising but not delivering, planning but not executing, the experience of com-

manding large forces was new and the generals were learning. The leaders of the nation too were learning. The idiocy of carrying too far the hackneyed cliché of 'civil supremacy' had been proved by the cold, hard, hurting facts of war. Five or six sub-theatres of war, with as many armies and commanders; their operations conducted without any single over-all purpose or coordination; their plans vetted by prolonged palavers and Cabinet approval; doubt and hesitation at the seat of the government and confusion in the field: all these, in time, brought forth their lessons, and in March 1864 the Union took a bold step to organize its command set up on saner lines.

Grant was placed in over-all command of all Union armies with authority to plan and conduct the war as a whole. "Old Brains" Halleck stayed on as chief of staff, but Grant was now definitely in control. Since Chattanooga he and Sherman had been thinking about the future course of the War, and after assuming command Grant made his plans.

His main forces were disposed at this time as follows—Meade with his Army of the Potomac was facing *Lee* north of Richmond, at Fort Monroe in the Peninsula was a force under Butler, Sherman had replaced Grant in the West and was facing *Joseph Johnston*, and in the Shenandoah Valley was a force under Sigel. In addition he had Banks' army in Louisiana and Steele's in Arkansas.

Grant's plan was for Meade's army to engage *Lee's* and move upon Richmond, while Sherman in the West was to hold *Johnston*, take Atlanta and manoeuvre boldly against *Lee's* rear. Sigel from the Valley and Butler from the Peninsula would threaten Richmond from the west and east. Grant himself would stay with Meade's army.

The prospects of the South were beginning to be gloomy. The area under its control was being gradually whittled down. Its economy was getting so bad that heavy losses could no longer be easily replaced. Strategically, in contrast to the North, there was no clear conception about the conduct of future operations.

Early in May, the Union armies started their offensive. Meade's Army attacked *Lee* entrenched in the heavily wooded defensive ground behind the Rapidan (the Wilderness). The fighting was close and bloody, and the casualties on both sides very heavy. The two armies now started a step-by-step sidling movement south-eastwards towards Richmond; Spotsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbour—at each place a brief but fierce struggle followed by Grant disengaging and moving on his left flank, only to be met again by *Lee* entrenched and aggressive in defence. Grant was losing many more men in these battles than *Lee*, but the North could afford to lose them while *Lee's* losses were now irreplaceable. By June *Lee* was pushed back on Richmond and Grant, deciding to move across the James River and establish himself behind *Lee*, feinted around Richmond from the east, crossed the river and joined up with Butler whose attack from the Peninsula had been stopped just outside Petersburg. The defences of Petersburg were thin, but Butler and Meade's corps commanders were not fast enough and Petersburg had to be besieged—a long and stubborn siege which was to last for nine months, during which time Grant busied himself destroying *Lee's* railway communications leading into Petersburg.

Pressed in around Richmond and Petersburg and unable to shake off Grant, *Lee* now resorted to the trick which had worked so well before—a move through the Shenandoah Valley to threaten Washington and Maryland. Sigel's advance from the Valley, planned to coincide with Grant's offensive, had never been able to start. Now *Lee* sent a force strong in cavalry under *Early* to raid the Valley, and the latter crossed the Potomac and reached the outskirts of Washington. This

time, however, there was no panic and Grant had detached two corps to fall back on Washington. When *Early* entered Maryland and started destroying the railways, Grant decided that the time had come to close the valley to the South once and for all. He therefore ordered *Sheridan* with a large force of six infantry and three cavalry divisions to smash *Early* and devastate the Valley, so that no Southern force could seek safe passage through it again. *Sheridan* carried out his tasks fully, and although such a large force could have been better employed in the main battle against *Lee*, Grant's action ended the constant threats against the capital and the consequent unsettling of operations.

SHERMAN'S MARCH

Meanwhile *Sherman's* advance had also started early in May. Leaving *Chattanooga* with over 100,000 men he pushed back *Johnston* steadily by a series of outflanking moves, avoiding a pitched battle, and by mid-July reached close to Atlanta. At this critical time *Johnston* was relieved by *Hood*, who tried to attack *Sherman* and turn his flank. These attacks were repulsed and in September *Sherman* occupied the important communication centre of Atlanta, closing the last east-to-west railway link of the South. With each phase of his advance *Sherman* was putting more and more distance between him and his bases; he would have to fight with a long and vulnerable line of communication in hostile country. In October when *Hood* moved forward to attack *Sherman's* communications between *Chattanooga* and Atlanta, *Sherman* decided, with Grant's permission, to shake loose from his bases and march to Savannah on the Atlantic coast. *Thomas* with an adequate force had already been sent back after the fall of Atlanta to protect the bases in Tennessee, and would be able to hold *Hood*.

Sherman reorganised his force for the 'march to the sea', a force of about 60,000 picked men and a few guns, equipped lightly for fast marching. His intention was to reach the coast, where the Northern Fleet would support him administratively, and place his force in S. Carolina, thus catching *Lee* between him and Grant. Leaving Atlanta in mid-November, he marched through Georgia encountering very little opposition and cutting a belt of destruction nearly sixty miles wide in his path. The arts and techniques of foraging, 'living off the land' and destroying railways were developed to a fine point, and the damage caused to the South by this march had a demoralizing effect on the Southern army and government. By the end of December *Sherman* reached and occupied Savannah.

When *Sherman* left Atlanta, *Hood* moved against Tennessee and drove back *Thomas's* force which withdrew on Nashville. *Hood* followed, but in two successive battles at Franklin and Nashville was decisively beaten. The last offensive effort in the West by the Confederates had failed and *Hood* pulled back towards Alabama.


1865

THE FINAL PHASE

The operations during the preceding year had gone excellently for the North and they were in a winning position everywhere. Militarily, *Lee* was being hemmed in between *Sherman* and Grant, *Hood* had been beaten in the West, and the North had control of the entire Confederate coastline except for the port of Wilmington. Politically, the improving military situation had silenced opposition at home and Lincoln was reelected as President. There was a general sense of optimism about the early end of the War.

AREA OF FINAL OPERATIONS — 1864/65

Map 5



The South, on the other hand, was beginning to disintegrate. The states were quarrelling among themselves. The manpower barrel had been scraped to the bottom, and now there were increasing desertions from Southern ranks.

Grant's plan now was for Sherman to march northwards from Savannah through N. Carolina to Raleigh and link up with Schofield's force which would come in through Wilmington, Sheridan from the Valley to move up west of Petersburg and cut the Virginia railway, while Thomas was to block Lee's escape routes to the west.

Early in February Lee was at last made C-in-C of all Southern forces. He put Johnston in command of forces opposing Sherman, and prepared to abandon Richmond and move via Danville to join Johnston. Such a concentration of all the South's major forces could, even then, have forced a stalemate and prolonged the war. But to do this Grant had to be shaken off from Petersburg, Johnston should halt Sherman's relentless advance, and Hood's army should come up quickly to join Johnston instead of arriving in dribbles as it actually did.

From the south Sherman left Savannah on another great march, living on the land and destroying communications as he went. He covered over 400 miles through difficult country in bad weather and in 50 days reached Goldsboro where Schofield joined him. From the north, Sheridan started from the Valley and in a series of brilliant battles utterly defeated Early, cut the Virginia Railway and joined Grant.

In the centre Lee, now in a desperate position, prepared to abandon Richmond and slip away in a south-westerly direction to join Johnston. But first Grant had to be shaken loose; so he attacked Grant but failed to dislodge him, and in the process uncovered his own lines, and Grant promptly took advantage of this to seize them. In the ensuing battle from March 28th to April 3rd, Grant broke into Petersburg and Lee, abandoning Richmond, moved in the direction of Danville. Grant had anticipated this, and moved his columns to head him off and surrounded him. Although his rearguards fought with tenacity and delayed the Northern columns, the pursuit went on till April 9, when Lee finding his way blocked in front and pressed from the rear, surrendered his Army. At the historic surrender at Appomattox Grant's magnanimity pleased Lee greatly and was in accord with Lincoln's firm belief that the end of hostilities must be followed by a just and honourable peace.

To the south, as Sherman closed with Johnston at Raleigh, news of Lee's surrender arrived and after some higgling with Washington Sherman accepted the surrender of Johnston. Sherman who knew the minds of Lincoln and Grant tried to offer generous terms of surrender to his late opponents; but by then Lincoln was dead at the hands of an assassin, so Sherman was rebuked by his political masters for overstepping his authority, and at the height of their glory his army was called back to Washington and disbanded.

The Confederacy had disintegrated: her armies were decisively beaten, her government had fled and her economy was shattered. The American Civil War was over.

CONCLUSION

As 'war is a political act undertaken to achieve a political aim', it logically follows that the main military aim of war, i.e. the basis of national strategy, must be such that it will achieve the nation's main political aim with the least expenditure of time, men and resources. In this respect, as pointed out earlier, both the

North and South went wrong in formulating their strategy. The folly of 'tailoring' strategy to meet immediate, short-term political aims (as distinct from the main national aim) was also shown in such operations as McClellan's Peninsula campaign and Lee's invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania.

The vexed question of politico-military control has been referred to earlier. The ideal is obviously that a nation's political leaders give a clearly expressed aim to the military commander, approve *in principle* his broad strategy, support him with maximum resources and leave him to carry out the military aim in the best possible military way. This ideal has perhaps never been reached in history, but nations have survived or been beaten depending on how close to the ideal their higher organisation conformed. In the Civil War, the problem never arose in the South where the military commanders had surrendered their powers to their political leaders, while in the North we have seen that after the earlier blunders the situation was put right in the last year of the war.

Tactically, the operations were characterised by the use made of the fleet, particularly gunboats, in close support of the army in the riverine and coastal expeditions, and by the use of cavalry 'raids' by both sides. One notable feature of the land battles was the high rate of casualties suffered by both sides, although actual estimates of casualties in each engagement vary. The heavy losses were mainly due to the fact that the lethal power of the rifled musket in comparison to the old smoothbore version was never fully appreciated; wherever an outflanking move by manoeuvre was possible and carried out the casualties were low, and wherever direct assaults were launched against entrenched positions the losses were correspondingly much greater. This lesson was not fully learnt, and unfortunately was not learnt by the other armies of the world for several decades more.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

By PLM

IN the quarter ended September, the Sino-Indian border dispute dominated the scene both at home and abroad, almost to the near-exclusion of anything else. To a lesser extent the culminating point in the recent VIP exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union was the ten-day visit of Prime Minister Nikita S. Khrushchev to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, with a reciprocal visit in sight early next spring. While prospects for a summit meet brightened distinctly in the wake of easing tensions in the cold war, fighting in Laos with the alleged connivance of that country's powerful neighbours, and armed aid from the USA, darkened the horizon considerably. Meanwhile the Tibetan cauldron continued to simmer and the Dalai Lama's decision to refer the dispute to the United Nations, despite advice to the contrary by New Delhi, kept the spotlight squarely focussed on this question. In Malaya the ruling tri-partite Alliance under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Rahman was returned to power with a clear, un-ambiguous verdict by the electorate; in Britain Mr. Macmillan's decision to go to the country was the starting-point for a short, though hitherto a not-very-exciting, electoral campaign. Developments in Indonesia were significant, while a harrowing human tragedy in near-by Ceylon moved down that country's Prime Minister. His indeed was a sad end.

SINO-INDIAN BORDER

Tragic, unhappy developments in Tibet since February-March this year had revealed a wide, yawning chasm in official thinking between New Delhi and Peking. Yet barring some initial exchange of words, and the consequent heat these generated, a hushed, muffled silence, accompanied by a certain coldness in demeanour, descended on the scene. Few could then imagine that the silence was, in fact, extremely deceptive and was to prove only as the portent for a mighty storm that violently shook the two nations. For a correct appraisal, a chronological sum-up may help.

Addressing a crowded news conference in New Delhi, on August 7, Prime Minister Nehru confessed to "a strange silence" on the part of the Chinese Government in regard to India's Notes on the publication of incorrect maps. It seemed to him to be a habit with the Chinese Government, "even from pre-Communist days," to show good chunks of other peoples' territory as their own "and to paint them with the same brush."

A few weeks later feelings had mounted up. Eloquent testimony to this was the series of adjournment motions tabled in the Lok Sabha which maintained that large Chinese forces were concentrated on the Sikkim-Bhutan border and that Tibetans were being exhorted to "liberate" Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA. In his reply, Mr. Nehru conceded that there were large Chinese forces all over Tibet though he didn't think they were massed on the borders. He did, however, assure the House that his Government was "wide awake and alert" and would safeguard the country's integrity. He revealed that Mr. Chou En-lai, while in New Delhi in 1956-57, had given him "the clear impression" that he (Chou) accepted the McMahon Line as the international boundary. As far as India was concerned, the Prime Minister was emphatic, the McMahon Line was "firm by treaty, firm by usage and firm by geography."

The succeeding few days brought out some startling, and hitherto unknown, facts. Thus it was stated in New Delhi on August 20 that at least two instances

of incursions into Indian territory by Chinese army pickets in the Tawang area of NEFA and in Ladakh had occurred during the past few weeks, that more than a year ago the Chinese had built a road across Indian territory in Ladakh—linking Gartok in Western Tibet with Yargand and Kashghar in Sinkiang. Disturbing as these were the climax, however, came on August 28 when the Prime Minister told the Lower House that China had committed "border aggression" at three points in NEFA and eastern Ladakh and that in the latest of these fire was exchanged. This was when the Indian checkpoint at Longju, in the Subansiri division of NEFA, was over-run and three of the eleven Indian personnel there were held by the Chinese. It all came as a bolt from the blue and the temper of the House was no longer in doubt. In measured, deliberate tones Mr. Nehru announced that the border areas were being placed under direct military control and that the Assam Rifles, hitherto gallant custodians of border security, would now pass under Army Command. Pressed by members the Prime Minister agreed to consider the advisability of issuing a White Paper on the subject and asserted, with some emphasis, that any country faced with a situation of this kind had "to stand up to it", that though he could not imagine that these incidents were a precursor to something more serious, "we could not take any risks and had to be prepared for all eventualities."

These were grim words, which echoed far and beyond the walls of Parliament House.

Form and content was lent to them in the White Paper, made public on September 7, which comprised the correspondence exchanged between New Delhi and Peking since the Sino-Indian Treaty of April 28, 1954 down to the latest Chinese incursion into Longju on August 25. Running into some 120 printed pages, the Paper included 60 Notes, Memoranda, Letters and Statements. These related to border issues, Chinese allegations regarding the use of Kalimpong as a base for activity against Tibet and their (Chinese) infringement of the traditional rights and authority of Bhutan in regard to certain (Bhutanese) enclaves in Tibet. For clarity, the salient facts may be briefly alluded to here.

1. *The Paper showed a sequence of border claims and incursions into Indian territory by the Chinese in NEFA, Garhwal (Hoti), Himachal (Shipki), and Ladakh. It was indeed noteworthy that there had been a steady aggravation of Chinese border claims ever since the signing of the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet, in April, 1954.*
2. *On May 23, 1959, the Indian Foreign Secretary told the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi that Peking had treated the Five Principles ("Panch Sheel") not indeed as "matters of basic policy", but of opportunism."*
3. *In a Note dated July 25 (1959) New Delhi expressed serious doubts as to whether the Chinese Government really wished the Indian Trade Agents in the Tibet region to function, for not only were the facilities laid down in the 1954 Agreement not provided for them but even the normal courtesies shown to foreign representatives and missions "are being denied to them."*
4. *The position regarding Chinese maps and more specifically the McMahon Line was set out in an exchange of letters between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai in 1958-59. The Indian Prime Minister's letter, dated December 14 (1958) made this point: "You will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People's Republic came into power, the continued issue of these maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India*

being anything but Indian and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well-known and fixed boundaries." Again, reminding the Chinese Prime Minister in a subsequent letter dated March 22 (1959) that he (Chou) had accepted the McMahon Line in 1954 Mr. Nehru made the point that it "was drawn after full discussion, was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters" and that there was nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way "dissatisfied with the agreed boundary." The Chinese countered by asserting (Mr. Chou En-lai's letter dated June 23, 1959) that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited; that Peking did not raise border issues in 1954 for conditions were "not yet ripe" for its settlement", that the McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China, that "juridically too it could not be considered legal" and finally that the Chinese maps were old which the People's Government have not yet had time to revise.

The exchange of letters in September between New Delhi and Peking did not add anything, by way of elucidation, to the two countries' respective positions, except that the language used was somewhat more blunt and that the previous stand seemed to become somewhat more rigid and inflexible. Thus the Indian Note of September 9 categorically rejected the Chinese charges of violation of China's frontier, maintained that New Delhi stood "firmly" by the McMahon Line and that the continued circulation of Chinese maps was a "standing threat to India's integrity and evidence of unfriendliness towards India."

Peking's considered retort, and in no ambiguous terms either, was contained in Mr. Chou En-lai's letter dated September 8 purporting to reply to the Indian Prime Minister's letter of March 22. "China affirms the fact," her Prime Minister asserted, "that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited:" for that matter Peking "absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon Line." But while (as a measure of goodwill?) actively seeking "a fair and reasonable settlement", it would not try "unilaterally" to change the existing situation on the border. And, in no uncertain terms, China accused India of "unlawfully" occupying the Logju outpost in NEFA. As if the meaning were not clear, three days later the Chinese Prime Minister, addressing a hurriedly-summoned meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress charged New Delhi with employing "pressure", particularly "military strength", in its border dispute with a "peace-loving" neighbour!

The Prime Minister's reply to debates in the two houses of parliament indicated official reaction to the Chinese stand. Thus in the *Rajya Sabha*, on September 10, Mr. Nehru stated that the September 8 Note had added to the gravity of the situation for it highlighted certain aspects which were previously "in the shade." Two days later he was more explicit: the new Chinese claim to 90,000 square kilometers of territory, confined so far to old maps, constituted a "serious development". Again the question of the Bhutan and Sikkim borders fell very much within the scope of the future Sino-Indian border talks, if and when they took place. Recalling Peking's contention that it could not accept a frontier "created by British imperialist aggression against China", the Prime Minister asked how the huge Chinese state itself had been built up. And answering his own question, "It was built up by conquest-violent conquest." Elsewhere he accused the Chinese of arrogance: "I do not wish to use strong words, but it is pride and arrogance of might that is showing in their language, in their behaviour to us, and in so many things that they have done..... Sometimes there is a

paranoia in nations, and one sees that in this matter." Mr. Nehru's words were grim, he spoke indeed more in sorrow than in anger.

BHUTAN

Closely linked with developments on the Sino-Indian border was the Bhutanese Prime Minister's prolonged visit to New Delhi in September. Mr. Jigme Dorji who firmly reiterated his country's adherence to the 1949 Treaty whereby Bhutan was to be guided by India in its external relations, characterised the Chinese Prime Minister's assurance that he would respect Bhutan's "present frontiers" as "cryptic." His visit to Delhi was concerned largely with securing technical and financial assistance to build a system of roads to link the two countries. New Delhi had, in fact, agreed to the construction of five all-weather roads, with preliminary work on the first of these (linking Alipur Duars to Thimbu, the country's summer capital) scheduled to commence in October this year.

On September 17, New Delhi announced an enhanced annual subsidy to Bhutan—from Rs. 5 to Rs. 12 lakhs. The subsidy which dates back to the Treaty of Sinchula in 1865 was originally fixed at Rs. 2 lakhs, but was raised to Rs. 5 lakhs in 1949. A token of the close and cordial relations that have long subsisted between India and Bhutan, the further increase of Rs. 7 lakhs, now contemplated, was earmarked chiefly for the country's developmental progress. As a matter of fact, Mr. Dorji had confirmed (in Calcutta, on August 23) that his country's defence expenditure in recent months had increased ten-fold and that this unexpectedly heavy strain placed an additional burden on the country's slender resources. The net result had been that development projects such as road-building, expansion of the communications system and education were being hampered. The additional subsidy was thus doubly welcome and met a genuine need.

If only in parenthesis a word here about Bhutan's 200-mile long frontier with Tibet may not be out of place. Demarcated on the traditional line along the Himalayan water-shed, the border is clearly defined by convention and usage. As for Sikkim the present frontier with Tibet is governed by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890; the Tibetans had disputed this until 1904 when the Lhasa Convention was concluded between Britain and Tibet.

TIBET AND UNITED NATIONS

From Bhutan and Sikkim we may pass briefly to Tibet itself. Here there were two developments of major importance. One, was the Dalai Lama's decision to appeal to the United Nations despite a clear and unequivocal declaration by New Delhi that this would be a "futile" exercise, drag the issue into the vortex of the cold war and, in the final analysis, recoil on the hapless Tibetan people. The second was the Preliminary Report of the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva entitled "The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law." These apart there were persistent rumours, early in August, that the Panchen Lama was under arrest, a possibility which even the Dalai did not rule out completely. Persistent reports also came in that Indian traders in Tibet were being subjected to a systematic campaign of being squeezed out. This indeed was eloquently demonstrated by trade returns which showed a precipitate fall. Thus while in February, 1959 imports stood at Rs. 15 lakhs, and exports at 10, in June they had dropped down to Rs. 2 and 3 lakhs respectively. Part of this abrupt decline was explained by the Chinese decision to declare the Indian currency as illegal tender, an act which was in violent disregard of the terms of the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement of 1954.

The Dalai Lama's decision to take the Tibetan issue to the UN "for the verdict of the peace-loving and conscientious nations of the world" was announced in New Delhi on August 30. The explanatory text emphasised that since his earlier June 20 statement the picture of Tibet had become "immeasurably darker" and indeed the sufferings of his people were now "beyond description." "In these circumstances," His Holiness confessed, "I have no alternative than to appeal to the United Nations." The Dalai also availed himself of this opportunity "to make a personal appeal to all civilised countries of the world to lend their fullest support to our cause of freedom and justice."

On September 9, the appeal was formally launched in a cablegram to the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld. His Holiness asked for "immediate intervention" by the United Nations and consideration by the General Assembly of the Tibetan issue "on its own initiative." The 1959 appeal was reminiscent of the eloquent language used at the time of the earlier request in 1950—His Holiness highlighted "the sufferings of my people" and the imperative necessity that "this wanton and ruthless murder...should be immediately brought to an end."

Through what ordeal by fire the Tibetans had gone through was more than fully brought out by the Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet appointed by the International Commission of Jurists with whom were associated some of the world's best-known legal minds. In its Preliminary Report, briefly alluded to earlier, the Committee had underlined certain salient features of recent happenings in that unfortunate country. On August 11 the Jurists announced that an 11-member Inquiry Committee, drawn from distinguished jurists from nine countries, was to broaden the base of its investigations and determine whether the Chinese had, in fact, committed acts of genocide in Tibet and violated fundamental human rights.

DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS

Of a piece with developments on the Indian border was the rapidly deteriorating situation in the tiny land-locked kingdom of Laos which, in the last weeks of August, bade fare to erupt from a full-fledged civil war into a conflict with wide international ramifications.

Actually the crisis in the Government's relations with the insurgent Pathet Lao took a serious turn for the worse in the last week of July, 1959 when new disturbances flared up in the recalcitrant north-western province of Sam Neua. It was widely feared that fighting between the Royal forces and the Pathet Lao followers of Prince Souvannaphoung might assume the proportions of a full-scale civil war thereby threatening the peace of the entire peninsula. By July 30 when fierce fighting was reported the Government in Vientiane had rushed heavy reinforcements to its border provinces with North Vietnam. For a better perspective we may do well to go back a little. Here it may be recalled that relations between the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao had been strained since August, 1958 when the present Prime Minister took over from Prince Souvanna Phouma's coalition government with his half-brother Souvannaphoung. Prime Minister Phoui not only rid himself of the Pathet Lao constituent of the old Cabinet but openly repudiated the long-delayed and carefully worked-out November, 1957 agreement with Prince Souvannaphoung's followers. Again, through a vote of confidence from the country's pliable, compliant, elected Assembly which obligingly made itself defunct, he had been vested with supreme powers for a period of one year. Armed with this new authority the Royal Government announced its opposition to the re-convening of the three-member International Supervisory Commission which had adjourned sine die

in July, 1958. Vientiane contended that it had fulfilled all its commitments in terms of the 1954-Geneva Agreements and, therefore, the functioning of the Commission in its territory was tantamount to an infringement of the country's sovereignty. As chances of holding the country-wide general elections for a national parliament, originally scheduled for November this year, distinctly receded, the Pathet Lao took up a markedly intransigent attitude. Matters finally came to a head when one of its two recalcitrant battalions, due for integration into the Royal Army, made good its escape over the difficult jungle-clad mountainous border with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and threatened reprisals.

The fat was in the fire and international repercussions were swift and far-reaching. For considerations of space, however, only the most important may be listed here. First in the field in their strong denunciation of the Royal Lao Government were the People's Republic of China and the DRVN. Both, in fact, claimed that the Royal Lao troops had carried out armed provocations against the North Viet Nam border threatening its security. In the very same breath the two regimes accused the United States for "inciting" Laos. Name-calling, however, was mutual for while the Lao Prime Minister openly accused Peking and Hanoi of supporting the insurgents, Washington charged that the DRVN had acted in "flagrant" disregard of the Indo-China peace settlement and was guilty of directing guerilla attacks on Laos.

The following week saw the situation take on an even graver turn. Thus on August 5, Vientiane Radio pro-claimed a state of emergency in the five northern provinces—Phong Saly, Sam Neua, Khouang, Cammon and Savannakhet. Meantime Bangkok hastened to assure its neighbour that it was "on the alert," should Vientiane appeal for assistance to Seato, while Red Viet Nam's Premier, Pham Von Dong wrote to New Delhi suggesting that India "as the Chairman of the International Supervisory Commission will take immediate measures" to restore its activities "in order to ensure a strict and full implementation of the Geneva Agreements" and of those signed between the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao.

Bad as the situation was, worse was still to come. For on August 8, the Laotian Army reported "a massive concentration" of North Viet-Nameese troops along its difficult and none too well-defined northern border. A fortnight later, on August 24, the Government sought "urgent aid" from the United States to re-inforce its police force and other internal security units. Seventy-two hour later Washington solemnly pledged to air-lift its military supplies—"chiefly small arms, tents and jeeps"—within a few days. Meanwhile the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, were unable to agree on measures to break the deadlock. Thus while on August 17, London formally proposed the dispatch of a UN observer to Vientiane, Moscow on August 28, partially rejecting the British Note urged the re-convening of the International Truce and Supervisory Commission as the only way out of the impasse. On September 4, however, the Royal Lao Government cabled its appeal to the UN Secretary-General requesting the dispatch of an "emergency force" to "halt the aggression of foreign troops and to prevent it from spreading." On Mr. Hammarskjöld's initiative the Security Council convened on September 7—a fact which the Soviet delegate charged was in contravention of the Council's own rules of procedure. The Western powers, however, lost no time in sponsoring in the Council a move for a four-member Fact-finding Committee, maintaining that the resolution did not close any doors, nor, in fact, did it "put anybody against a stone-wall;" it was a constructive way of dealing with a "menacing situation" and "damping down" flames.

Despite M. Arkady Sobolev's negative vote, which the Council refused to regard as a veto, the Western-sponsored resolution was adopted. As September drew to a close, the 4-nation Committee was already in Laos making an 'on-the-spot study of the situation. In this temporary scotching of flames, the Soviet Union's suggestion, on September 14, for a re-convening of the 1954 Geneva Conference found little favour; the State Department characterised the move as likely to encourage "disruptive influences."

INDONESIA

As anticipated in the preceding quarter, President Sukarno proclaimed on July 3 his country's old "revolutionary" constitution of 1945, thereby assuming for himself the dual role of the Head of State as well as Prime Minister. Later he swore in members of his 10-man "working" Cabinet who are non-party members, or those relieved from party affiliations. The new Presidential team set itself a three-fold task; to meet the needs of the people in the shortest possible time, to arrange for the security of the people and the State and to continue the struggle against "economic and political imperialism."

In what appeared to be otherwise a smooth change-over, there was, however, a temporary rift in the lute. This took the shape of the Navy and the Air Force making known their deep resentment over the appointment of the Army Chief of Staff, Lt.-Gen. Abdul Harris Nasution as the new Defence Minister. The crisis which at one time threatened to assume dangerous proportions was tided over with the replacement of the Naval Chief, Vice Admiral Subyakto by a Col. Maradinatta and a categorical assurance held forth to the Air Chief that the President himself would look into the demands of Auri. It was a welcome way out, characteristic of the Indonesian gift for compromise.

Three other developments may be briefly alluded to. The first was in a sense a continuation of, and an inevitable corollary to the promulgation of the 1945 constitution. This related to the formation, on July 30, of a 45-member provisional Supreme Advisory Council with the President himself acting as its Chairman and a 79-member, unwieldy and mostly non-expert, National Planning Board to help in the realisation of "guided democracy." The second was a precipitous devaluation of the Indonesian 'rupiah'—Re. 1000 and Re. 500 currency notes being now valued at Rs. 100 and Rs. 50 respectively, with all major Bank balances being frozen. Resultantly there was a marked confusion in the stock-exchange markets with all trade and business activity coming to a virtual standstill. The President announced that draconian as the Government measure was, it was being followed by a series of others which included:

- a. *Cuts in State expenditure to keep the national budget sound;*
 - b. *Intensification of developmental activities;*
 - c. *Increase in State revenues in the form of taxes which would not affect the lower income earners;*
- and d. *Compulsory savings by Government servants and workers and other groups.*

The third and final development related to an announcement in Djakarta, on September 13, that in his capacity as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Nasution had ordered the arrest of the Republic's Attorney General, Mr. Gatot Tarunmihardja. The latter was accused of undermining army discipline in exercise of the wide powers conferred upon him to rid the country of such economic ills as corruption, illegal barter and smuggling. President Sukarno, away on tour from the capital, was said to have been informed and, on return, ordered his former top aide's "honourable release" from office.

MALAYA

From Indonesia we may turn to the Federation of Malaya, its next-door neighbour. An important event here was the holding of free Malaya's first country-wide elections both in the individual states and later for the Federation's popular House of Representatives. In all the states, excepting two, as also in the Federal legislature the ruling Triple Alliance of the UMNO (United Malaya's National Organisation), the MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) and the MIC (Malayan Indian Congress), under the leadership of Tengku Abdul Rehman was returned to power with overwhelming popular support. The Tengku who in his election manifesto had promised "gigantic efforts" to improve the living standards of the people now pledged his new government, essentially the old team with few if any changes, to seek peace and harmony among different races.

* KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO USA

From what may appear to be a pre-occupation with the Asian scene we may turn, with advantage, to major international developments in the western world. Here it may be recalled that in the last week of June the Big Four Foreign Ministers had adjourned their hitherto somewhat fruitless, interminable, deliberations on Germany and Berlin and to resume again in mid-July. As scheduled the Conference did, in fact re-convene on July 13 and landed itself over again into the old controversies. For hardly a day elapsed when the Western Foreign Ministers accused their Soviet colleague of using "obstructionist" tactics which, they held, were slowing down their (resumed) progress. As if activated suddenly, M. Gromyko, on July 15, proposed the setting up of an all-German Committee, composed of equal representatives from the two Germanies, to study the entire problem of their country's future. This proposal the Western Powers rejected without ceremony. It was now Herter's turn and, on behalf of his western colleagues, he duly proposed, on July 16, that U.N. staff be stationed in Berlin to report on such propaganda activities of the two sides as were deemed to disrupt public order and that the Foreign Ministers' Conference itself may be constituted into a semi-permanent body to deal with the whole German problem. These suggestions, in turn, were thrown out by M. Gromyko on July 20. With no progress in sight, the two sides agreed to exchange their respective plans for ending the Berlin deadlock and then, in a fanfare of mutual self-congratulation, the Conference adjourned indefinitely on August 5. The Foreign Ministers did, however, end on a unanimous note: their talks will be useful for further negotiations which were necessary to reach agreement:

Actually before the adjournment the scene had shifted from Geneva and been transformed in a material sense. For two days earlier, on August 3 to be more exact, it had been simultaneously announced in Washington and Moscow that the American President and the Soviet Prime Minister would exchange visits to each other's country later in the year; Prime Minister Khrushchev was slated to be in Washington in mid-September and President Eisenhower in the Soviet Union later in the fall. In Washington the news was welcomed as symptomatic of a major effort by a protagonist of the cold war to make a sustained attempt to melt a little of the ice which seemed to freeze its relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow, however, was more sanguine for Mr. Khrushchev made it abundantly clear that he did not attach much significance to the form of the talks: what was important to him was that these should help to find a "common language" and arrive at a "common understanding" of the problems that had to be settled. Whatever their eventual outcome, there was no gainsaying the fact that here was a development of epochal importance which had taken the wind out of those prolonged and seemingly-deadlocked parleys at Geneva.

Nor for that matter was it a sudden development, out of the deep blues. For a start had been made in the VIP exchanges earlier in the quarter—the ground-work itself being laid during the visit of M. Anastas Mikoyan, referred to at some length in the January-March issue of the Journal. This quarter's exchanges began with the arrival, towards the fag-end of June, of the First Soviet Deputy Prime Minister—the youthful, and widely rated as number 2 in the hierarchy—M. Frol Kozlov. In contrast to M. Mikoyan's purely "private" visit, M. Kozlov had arrived on an official mission namely, to declare open a Soviet exhibition in New York. Though not quite as informal as M. Mikoyan, his colleague in the Soviet Government did offer on behalf of his country, "in the interests of peace", to withdraw its troops from the whole of Eastern Europe—if the Western Powers did theirs from Western Germany, to ban nuclear weapons, reduce conventional armaments, conclude a non-aggression pact between Nato and the Warsaw Powers and even sign a treaty of "friendship and cooperation" with the United States. The thick, frozen ice of the cold war may not have melted but there were noticeable beginnings of a thaw. In fact what might be called the end of the beginning was distinctly marked during the return visit to the Soviet Union of the American Vice President, Mr. Richard Nixon. Like M. Kozlov, Mr. Nixon's visit was ostensibly to declare open a U.S. exhibition in Moscow. His wordy duel with the Soviet Premier, however explosive it may have appeared in cold print, did not lose him many friends. In fact Mr. Nixon's visit to Leningrad and the "closed" Siberian industrial centres of Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk were very warmly received. Later he was to narrate what he called an unforgettable incident during his visit "through your beautiful Ural Mountains." This was when a group of children on the roadside threw wild flowers into his car and "cried in English the word 'friendship', 'friendship'." The American Vice President confessed that "there could be no more eloquent expression of the attitude of the Soviet people, an attitude which we share in common with you."

The Soviet Prime Minister's 12 days in the United States from September 15 were momentous in more ways than one. Apart from the first two days of preliminaries, he had spent a week outside Washington, followed by two days of down-to-earth, grass-roots talks with the President in the seclusion of Camp David, Mr. Eisenhower's mountain retreat, not far from the American capital. His tour revealed many facets of an amazingly rich personality: in Los Angeles which badgered by a film magnate and the Mayor he showed himself a tougher fighter than either of them, an outraged Puritan who was shocked beyond measure by the pornography of Hollywood's version of the can-can, the universal canvassing politician who, standing bare-headed in the Californian sun, responded delightedly to a cheerful crowd almost with tears in his eyes, a rough peasant munching a sausage in the stink of a slaughter-house in Iowa. He was intransigent and defiant when the chill wind blew at him, but responsive and good-humoured when the earlier strain had yielded place to a little human warmth.

What good did the tour do? In terms of hard facts it gave Mr. Khrushchev a chance to appreciate the reality of America, and Americans the chance to appreciate the reality of Mr. Khrushchev. And yet there was something more to it for while on surface there was not much in that laconically brief communique which summed up the Camp David talks—even the summit had not been categorically promised—it was clear beyond a shadow of doubt that the cold war was breaking up and its long-accumulated ice beginning to crack and drift downstream.

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

BY CRITERION

WHILE the problem number one during the quarter under review was that of India's security and defence along her northern boundaries, internal economic and political problems evoked widespread interest and comment throughout the country and important developments took place in matters pertaining to Food policy and administration, the Third Five Year Plan and Kerala. Economic policies in particular, were once again in the forefront of topics of the quarter as the future plan was being drawn up in its outlines.

THOUGHTS ON THIRD PLAN

Working primarily on the basis of the recommendations of the Ooty Seminar, the Planning Sub Committee of the Congress, presided by U. N. Dhebar, prepared by early September its 72-page report on the broad pattern of the Third Five Year Plan. The Dhebar Committee suggested four principal objects of planning :

- (a) *A sizable increase in the national income so as to raise the level of living.*
- (b) *Rapid industrialisation with particular emphasis on the development of basic and heavy industries.*
- (c) *A large expansion of employment opportunities; and*
- (d) *Reduction of inequalities in income and wealth and a more equitable distribution of economic power.*

Important aspects of the recommendations are as follows : While the public sector must gradually expand, in a balanced and integrated plan there should be enough scope for the private sector also. Steps to prevent concentration of wealth should be taken. Emphasis on agricultural, particularly food production was necessary. There should be simultaneous emphases on all the four aspects of the rural economy—agriculture, animal husbandry, rural industries and marketing. There should be attempts to maintain the price levels. Additional resources must be found through profits of public enterprises, profits of state trading, investment of funds of banks and charitable trusts in Government Securities, economy in government expenditure and heavy taxation of monopolistic and windfall incomes. According to the Committee the ultimate solution of the problem of mass poverty would lie in "transforming our economy into a self-generating and self-reliant progressive economy, which depends for its future growth on its own resources."

An interesting aspect of the Dhebar Committee's report is its view of the Indian road to socialism. Maintaining that in other countries socialism grew as a protest against the evils of an anarchic capitalist system, it held that in our country the goal of a socialist pattern of society has been set in a different historical and economic context. In India we are just commencing our journey on the new road. Industrialisation is coming to India in the wake of freedom and there is a full-fledged democratic constitution with adult suffrage to regulate it and guard against its pitfalls. Of equal interest is the strategy suggested regarding class conflicts: "We do not think in terms of accentuating the conflict of interest between one class and another.... we think in terms of steadily working on positive lines that will enable us to avoid the road to class conflicts."

The Sub Committee's report was discussed and generally approved at a meeting of the A.I.C.C. at Chandigarh later in the month. The Prime Minister made it clear that the Sub Committee's report was only an outline and not the last word on the subject. There will first be a draft prepared by experts, which the Planning Commission would have to approve and submit before the Parliament. The main point was that there was no question of being rigid about the plan: "We will change the plan whenever necessary in the light of experience we gain from time to time." Mr. Nehru emphasised in his speech that even capitalist countries were now controlling free enterprise to prevent men with "sharper claws and fiercer teeth" from preying on the weaker men and he reaffirmed the government's determination to curb exploitative elements in society. It did not however mean that private enterprise would be curbed completely. The primary need of socialism was to create wealth and not distribute poverty. The general debate in the A.I.C.C. proved however to be rambling and somewhat discursive and according to the *Hindu* "so many conflicting and contradictory statements were made that the Planning Commission would be hard put to decide what was the general view."

F.I.C.C.I. PLAN

In the growing debate on the Third Plan, Indian big business participated during the quarter under review when the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry published its own tentative outline of the Plan. Accepting that the total outlay in the Plan should be of the order of Rs. 10,000 crores, the federation considered that this would be feasible only if certain policy alterations were made and the ratio of the public and the private sector changed from 61:39 (as in the Second Plan) to 55:45. Among policy changes suggested are: a lower rate of taxation, fewer curbs on the earning of profits, encouragement of the flow of foreign capital in the country etc. Greater emphasis on industry and agriculture is recommended, at the cost of social services and transport. The broad outlook of India's private sector in regard to the Third Plan is contained in one of the paragraphs of the Federation's report.

"The basic approach should be the creation of wealth, not distribution of poverty. In the industrial as much as in the agricultural field, an attempt is being made in terms of social justice to effect changes in the organizational set up and to emphasise the rights of particular sections of the community without corresponding insistence upon function and performance.... These well-intentioned schemes and even genuine efforts to reconcile incompatibles produce odd results and do not induce the requisite comprehension in the public mind even of the ends of planning. An unfortunate result which must be remedied as early as possible is almost the widespread feeling that industry and business in private hands do not subserve, much less promote, social purpose."

PROSPECTS OF THE SECOND PLAN

The debate on the Third Plan proceeded in the backdrop of a more hopeful outlook about the Second Plan. As the Reserve Bank of India said in its annual report (9 September 1959), a clearer prospect about the Plan had emerged during the course of the year and the prospects of implementing the financial targets of the Second Plan were now more assured. For this, however, increased deficit financing might be required and "while the quantum of deficit financing in the financial year 1958-59 showed a welcome drop, it is estimated to be larger in the current financial year and it is not unlikely that the original estimate of deficit financing of 1,200 crores for the Second Plan period as a whole will be exceeded,

notwithstanding the substantial increase in foreign assistance over and above what was provided for in the Plan and the sizable assistance under PL 480 imports". That the limit of Rs. 1,200 crores in the matter of deficit financing was likely to be exceeded was later confirmed by the Finance Ministry.

Notwithstanding the prospects of deficit financing, one must note now, in reviewing the progress of the Plan, that the strain on the country's balance of payments has been markedly lessened. The improvement, however, has largely been effected by cut in imports and not rise in exports. In a developing economy, as the Reserve Bank has said, "imports cuts do not constitute an effective remedy for balance of payments difficulties in the long run; exports should be stepped up, which in practical terms means that the nation has to restrict consumption and render exports attractive to foreigners".

As regards foreign assistance, the quantum of external assistance had shown a significant increase. However the inflow of private foreign capital continued to remain at a low level and the Reserve Bank recommended as a remedy for this further efforts for creating a better climate for investment, including the simplification of procedures.

Hopes about the Second Plan were expressed by the Finance Minister Mr. Morarji Desai at a meeting in London on 21 September. The Plan, according to him, would be achieved cent percent; the financial aid India was receiving and had been promised was sufficient to enable her complete the Plan on the basis of the revised estimates.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

India's search for foreign assistance, loans and investments continued as Finance Minister Morarji Desai and senior officials of the Government of India toured Europe and the U.S.A. Apart from Governmental loans and grants, there was new emphasis on attracting foreign investors to India and speeches were made on various occasions explaining India's economic policies to reassure the prospective investor.

In the U.S.A. itself an interesting study prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asked Americans to attach special importance to India, which, according to this report, was in an economic competition with China. It was their opinion that within the decade, "the great issue posed by the rival methods of growth in these two Asian countries will be in good part decided by the willingness and ability of industrial nations to assist the Indian effort, compared with that of the Soviet Union to invest large amounts of its capital goods output in China".

On 12 September 1959, India and the USSR signed an agreement in Moscow providing for the grant of a credit of 1,500 million roubles (Rs. 180 crores) for the Third Five Year Plan and for expanding trade between the two countries. The amount would be repaid in terms of goods; an interest of 2½ per cent would be paid. The agreement would particularly increase Indo-Soviet trade and according to one authority India's trade with the USSR would increase from the present annual figure of Rs. 23 crores to Rs. 35 crores.

FOOD AND POLITICS

Food scarcity and rising prices underlined during this period the short term and long term aspects of India's food problem and considerable attention was devoted to the subject. Two events further highlighted the problem: the resignation of the Food Minister and a minor upheaval in Calcutta resulting from an agitation led by West Bengal's leftists against price rise and 'famine'.

Food Minister Ajit Prasad Jain resigned from the Union Cabinet following persistent criticism of his handling of the situation in and outside the Parliament (24 August). In his last speech as the Food Minister made in the *Lok Sabha* on 22 August, Jain wanted the Government, after him, to choose between two paths: if there was to be state trading, effective controls were essential at all levels; if not, controls had to be modified. "Unless we adopt either of these two courses effectively," he said, "it is not possible to succeed". As for rising prices, they were inescapable in a developing economy and the higher price the people paid for food was a price they paid for development.

Mr. Jain was succeeded by Mr. S. K. Patil as the Food Minister. As Mr. Patil was settling down in his new assignment, the National Development Council defined the broad limits within which he had to function at its meeting in New Delhi on 5 and 6 September. There was to be no change in basic policies already decided upon by the Council: State trading in foodgrains was to continue as an important element of food policy. The Council also considered the food situation in detail and some of the points emerging from the discussion were as follows:

- (a) Effective steps should be taken to hold the price line;
- (b) Arrangements concerning food distribution and procurement should be maintained on a continuing basis;
- (c) The problems of deficit areas should be localized;
- (d) The food policy could not be based on the impracticable suggestion of large imports of food grains;
- (e) The food policy had necessarily to be an all-India policy; and
- (f) Surplus states should come to the assistance and rescue of the deficit states.

As the Food Minister, Mr. Patil emphasised the need for urgent attention to production: "we may have to treble our rate of increased production if we are to meet the ever increasing demand" and "food production must have the sponsorship of our top leaders both official and non-official". Subject to this long term need, however, spiralling of food prices posed a different problem—the fear complex of the consumers and the crisis of confidence of the traders. It was not deficit financing which was the important factor in price rise: if the two other factors mentioned above could be eliminated, prices would find their normal levels. It was his idea, as expressed in Madras on 21 September, to build up a 5,000,000-ton buffer stock of rice and wheat to give the government the necessary confidence in attacking the price increase and bringing down prices to normal levels. He also proposed to request the US government to build up on their own account a stock of wheat in India out of which they could sell to the government of India as and when necessary. Another idea of his was to link up food surplus and deficit areas to ward off possible crises. An attempt to link Orissa and West Bengal, however, proved abortive in October due to resistance from the surplus state.

The food problem had a political manifestation in West Bengal where all Left Wing parties (excepting the PSP) which are united in a front against famine and price rise started a statewide agitation for the resignation of the State Food Minister, among other things. To forestall a clash, the Government of the state arrested and detained most of the opposition political leaders; a students' procession, however, was tackled by a lathi charge leading to a series of violent clashes, between the police and the agitators, spread over more than three days. The situation became particularly grave in Howrah and the Army was alerted.

As the city returned to peace, emotional outbursts were displayed in the precincts of the State Assembly by agitated M.L.As. leading at one stage to exchange of shoes within the Assembly Hall. The incident was rightly condemned by all responsible public men. At the A.I.C.C. session at Chandigarh Jawahar Lal Nehru made a particular reference to this incident and said: "While we shall strictly adhere to democratic principles in every way, and we wish to give every opportunity to other parties, we will not tolerate this kind of behaviour. The disruptive tendency has to be rooted out....so far as I am concerned there can be no truce with such people." Mr. Nehru was referring to the Communist Party of India.

PRESIDENT'S RULE IN KERALA

The inevitable in Kerala happened on 31 July when the President issued a proclamation assuming to himself all functions of the government of Kerala and dissolving the Assembly. Thus the first and only Communist Ministry of India was dismissed after twenty eight months of office in the southernmost state of India.

The proclamation mentioned that the report from the Kerala Governor and other information had satisfied the President that the government of that state could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India. Hence, under Article 356 of the Constitution all powers were assumed and President's rule proclaimed.

While the Communist Party of India in a lengthy resolution (8 August) condemned Central intervention in Kerala as a partisan and deliberate act and a triumph of reactionary forces, the Prime Minister told his monthly news conference a day earlier that there was no other alternative in view of the progressive deterioration of the situation in the State and that "everyone concerned, whether he said it or not, wanted this done in the totality of circumstances". Even the Kerala Government, according to the Prime Minister, had made it quite clear that in the circumstances Central intervention was probably necessary.

The action of the Central Government became the subject of a somewhat heated debate in the Indian Parliament in the last half of August. During the debate the Prime Minister and the Home Minister refuted the Communist charge that the Central intervention was the result of a deep laid conspiracy on the part of the Congress. It was the Communist view as expressed by Mr. Dange in the *Lok Sabha* that the contrast between a Congress and a Communist Government scared the Congressmen who feared that the people might start gravitating towards the Communist Party. It was his view that the Central intervention in Kerala had subverted democratic traditions and defeated the Constitution. By blessing "the declaration of rebellion" by the opposition parties in a state the Centre had opened the way for the overthrow of a legally elected government.

As against this, the view of the Praja Socialist Party was that democracy had been saved in Kerala by Central intervention. The communists were subverting the Constitution in Kerala and their lip service to the Constitution was only a veneer for the attempt to undermine democracy in the State. It was the view of the Swatantra Party leader, Mr. M. R. Masani, that the Communists were using democracy in Kerala only to destroy it.

The Central Government's viewpoint as presented by the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, was that there was no alternative left for them but to intervene. The Centre had in the beginning gone out of its way to accommodate the Communist Government. But they had reduced the majesty of law to a

mockery, created mounting bitterness and tension in every nook and corner of the state, and divided the entire community into communist and non-communist blocks by creating a wall of hatred and animosity. It was regretted that the Communist Government had not pursued the course recommended by the Prime Minister viz to resign and hold mid-term elections. The Prime Minister dealt particularly with communist attitudes and approaches and said that everywhere except in India they seemed to be changing their theory to suit altered conditions. A point made by the Prime Minister with some force in the *Lok Sabha* was that if the Centre was really in a conspiracy against the Communist Party or even if it was thinking in political terms it would have waited for a civil war to break out in Kerala.

In the *Rajya Sabha* the Prime Minister repeated his broad criticism of the Indian Communist Party and said that it might not be possible for the C.P.I., in its present outlook, to adjust within the limits of a democratic constitution.

The State is now preparing for a general election and while the Communist Party has failed to align with any group, a broad electoral arrangement has been worked out between the Congress, the P.S.P. and the Muslim League. This electoral alliance became the subject of some controversy at the A.I.C.C. session at Chandigarh. The predominant view, however, was in favour of the alliance.

BOMBAY

One of the important political developments of this period has been the decision taken by the Congress High Command to bifurcate the present State of Bombay. Although a detailed decision would await full consultation—and a high powered Committee has been appointed for this purpose by the Congress President, it was made clear during the Chandigarh session of the A.I.C.C. and during the Prime Minister's subsequent tour of Maharashtra that the two linguistic groups inhabiting the State of Bombay would be given separate States soon. The decision was welcomed by almost all sections of the people in the State, except one in the Vidarbha areas which would prefer the creation of a separate Vidarbha State. One of the specific effects of the decision has been a strain on the unity which the opposition parties maintained in the face of Congress reluctance to divide the State.

PONDICHERRY ELECTIONS

The former French possession of Pondicherry in South India went to the polls during the quarter under review and elected thirty nine members to the Assembly. The Congress secured 21 seats, the People's Front 13, Independents 4 and the P.S.P. one seat only. The first session of the newly elected Assembly was inaugurated on 5 September by Chief Commissioner L. R. S. Singh. On the same day the Congress Party elected V. Venkatasubba Reddiar as its leader. The six-member council of Ministers was announced on 11 September.

The de facto transfer of the State had taken place in 1954 and a Treaty of Cession was signed in 1956. The treaty is yet to be ratified by the French Government. On the day of the inauguration of the new Assembly, however, a French representative declared that such ratification would take place soon.

LANGUAGE POLICY

The difficult problem of language in India was in the limelight in early September 1959 when the two Houses of the Parliament debated the report of the Parliamentary Committee on official languages. The Parliament debated the sub-

ject a month after it had considered a resolution by Mr. Frank Anthony recommending the inclusion of English in the list of national languages of India, appended to the Constitution as its eighth schedule. During this debate the Prime Minister had made an important policy statement (7 August) when he declared that English would remain as "the additional official language of India as long as the non-Hindi speaking people desired to retain it". This promise was repeated by the Prime Minister in the *Lok Sabha* during the later debate. He, however, made it clear that English could never continue in its present status in India. It was not a question of English versus Hindi, it was a question of English versus the regional languages of India. As it is, the next generation would be educated through the medium of Indian languages and English would automatically become a secondary language in this country. It would not, also, be the link between the various Indian languages. During the debate the Home Minister told the *Lok Sabha* that English would continue for so long and for such purposes as the Parliament desired and it was not possible to set any kind of a date line for replacing English. As for Hindi, its development as a composite all India language would depend on the cooperation of the non-Hindi languages and it was essential to offer full scope for development to regional languages, simultaneously, with Hindi. As he told the *Rajya Sabha* later (9 September) Hindi, as visualized in the Constitution, must be a simple language reflecting the composite culture of the country. For that purpose it would have to assimilate the various styles, forms and words of other regional languages.

REACTIONS TO CHINESE INCURSIONS

During the period under review various political parties made clear their reactions to the border violations by China and the "cartographic aggression against India". While all the major parties condemned the Chinese action and called for the withdrawal of Chinese claims for Indian territory, the Communist Party of India adopted a somewhat equivocal resolution on the subject.

A Congress resolution adopted at Chandigarh noted with "grave concern" the recent developments and reaffirmed that the territories claimed by China have been parts of India by treaty and long usage and that no such claim could be allowed. It was also pointed out that any incursions by force into Indian territory must be "resisted". The A.I.C.C. also accused China of ignoring and bypassing the *Panch Sheel* and of thereby putting a strain on the long record of India-China friendship. The A.I.C.C. reiterated that it was India's policy to settle all disputes by peaceful methods and that minor border disputes should always be resolved by negotiations. The claim for extensive areas backed by force could not, however, be entertained under any circumstances.

The National Executive of the Praja Socialist Party, meeting in Delhi on 29 and 30 August 1959, adopted a resolution stating *inter alia*: "The probing claws of China must be twisted back and she should be made to realise that in the ultimate analysis a democratic people would triumph over a monolithic Goliath". The P.S.P. urged upon the government to take firm measures that will make the Chinese vacate the occupied areas of the country.

Of the attitude of the Socialist Party an index was the resolution adopted by its Bengal branch on 8 September 1959, which "viewed with great indignation and sorrow China's large scale invasion into Indian territory".

The Jana Sangh's attitude to the problem created along our northern borders was still more strong. The Party's Working Committee adopted a resolution on the subject on 19 September expressing its deep concern about Chinese

incursions and holding that dual policy was not appropriate to meet the Chinese threat. Appeasement and surrender could not be the basis of enduring friendship.

As against these attitudes was that of the Communist Party of India which stated in a resolution adopted on 25 September 1959 that the deterioration in India-China relations started with Tibet and the activities of the Dalai Lama had aggravated the situation. It warned the people against the attempts to whip up war hysteria and emphasised the need for India-China friendship. As for the crucial issue of borders, the area concerned had never been properly surveyed and the problem could be settled if negotiations started "without either side making prior acceptance of its own claims viz the MacMahon Line in one case and the Chinese maps in the other the precondition of convening negotiations". The Communist Party would defend India's borders, but it was confident that China would never commit aggression against India. The Communist Party's major attack was on those "who magnified these lamentable developments to serve their political ends".

At a Press Conference in October, Jawaharlal Nehru criticised the above resolution in strong terms when he said that he could not understand how an Indian party could adopt that kind of resolution.

INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Hope of friendlier relations with Pakistan improved during the period under review. While an agreement for Canal Waters was reported to be in sight, high level discussions took place on economic and financial relations and above all, the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India found it possible to issue a joint statement after a brief meeting at the New Delhi airport. While trade and border talks took place at the Secretariat levels and yielded some results, the two Finance Ministers met in New Delhi in early August to discuss outstanding disputes of a financial nature. More than the actual agreements arrived at in these discussions what was important was the new spirit in which questions appeared to be tackled. Apparently there was a "thaw" in Indo-Pakistan relations although it was still an open question if it would lead to any real progress towards the achievement of friendlier and more cordial relations.

The greatest single indicator of this was the Nehru-Ayub meeting at the Palam airport on 1 September, 1959. On his way to Dacca the President of Pakistan halted at Palam for an hour and forty minutes, talked with Mr. Nehru and agreed to the following joint statement:

"The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India met informally in a very cordial atmosphere at the Palam airport. Matters of mutual interest were discussed. They agreed that there was need to conduct their relations with each other on a rational and planned basis and not according to day to day exigencies as they arise and that their outstanding issues and other problems should, in mutual interest, be settled in accordance with justice and fairplay and in a spirit of friendliness, cooperation and good neighbourliness. They were glad to have had this opportunity of an informal exchange of views and they agreed to keep in touch with each other to further their common objective".

At the airport, Ayub Khan told newsmen: "I as a military man can foresee one danger, and that is that if we go on squabbling in this way and do not resolve our problems, we shall be defeated on details. History tells us that is how invasion had always come to this sub-continent".

The Prime Minister of India told his monthly Press Conference of September that this meeting had created a healthier atmosphere and it was welcome.

Although the publication in Pakistan newspapers of an article by the President's Secretary of what he had told the Indian Prime Minister created some difficulty—in as much as it attributed to the President words he had never uttered in his talks with the Prime Minister—the trend of improvement continued as was to be evident from the mid October meetings in Delhi on border and economic problems.

FOREIGN VISITORS

Among other distinguished visitors who came to India during this period was the Prime Minister of Outer Mongolia, Mr. Tsedenbal, and the Prime Minister of Burma, Mr. Ne Win. Also important was the visit of the Prime Minister of Bhutan to New Delhi. While the Mongolian Premier's visit resulted in a renewed expression of faith in *Pancha Sheel*, the Burmese Prime Minister's visit confirmed the close and friendly ties between the two countries as well as the identity of their views on several matters. The Prime Minister of Bhutan made it clear that her defence was a responsibility of India. He also stated that Bhutan had voluntarily agreed to be guided by India in her foreign relations.

MR. NEHRU ABROAD

Despite preoccupations in India, the Prime Minister found time to visit the two crucial West Asian countries of Afghanistan and Iran in September, 1959, on a mission of goodwill. At the end of his visit to Afghanistan, where he held talks with the King and the Prime Minister, a joint statement was issued by him and the Afghan Premier, Mohammad Daud Khan. The statement hoped that the existing cordial relations between India and Afghanistan would be sustained and enlarged by increased cultural cooperation and promotion of mutual trade. The two Prime Ministers also expressed their conviction about the policy of non-alignment, wished success for the ensuing Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks, supported the aspirations of the colonial peoples and expressed their belief that all international disputes should in the interest of world peace and humanity be settled by peaceful means alone, and not through resort to arms". Earlier at a banquet both the Prime Ministers spoke of the importance of a policy of non-alignment and wished success of the Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks.

At Tehran Mr. Nehru signed a joint statement which said *inter alia* :

"India and Iran are both in need of peace in order to reconstruct their economy and provide a better standard of living for the masses. The policy of both governments is based on respect for the principles of the U.N. Charter, non-aggression and non-interference in the internal affairs of any country and good neighbourly relations between all countries of the world".

Among Mr. Nehru's various engagements at Tehran was a Press Conference where he elaborated India's basic approach to world affairs and his assessment of the present situation. Asked as to what the impact of the Sino-Indian border problem would be on India's policy, he said :

"Our basic policy has been one of non-alignment that is not joining any military alliances but trying to develop friendliness with all countries. That does not mean surrendering on any important matter because demands are made. That policy would continue exactly as before in spite of what has happened in Tibet or China".

BOOK REVIEWS

GENERAL

Manpower: A Study of Wartime Policy and Administration by H. M. D. Parker, London, 1957, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pages 535, price 40sh.

Labour in the Munitions Industries by P. Inam, London, 1957, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, pages 461, price 35sh.

These two books are of outstanding importance for they help us to understand and appreciate the measures adopted in the United Kingdom for the mobilization of the civilian population of the country in the Second World War. It was a stupendous task and one cannot help paying a noble tribute to the efficiency of the Ministry of Labour in carrying it out—calling up men and women for the services, registering others for civilian employment and attempting from the numbers available to meet the more urgent demands of the war production programme and of essential industries and services. Lessons learnt from the various experimental measures are of inestimable value not only to the planners of war economy in the United Kingdom but also in India. Herein lies the chief significance of these two books.

Not much energy was displayed in tackling these problems during the first eight months of war. The real cause of the frustrations and hesitations that characterised manpower policy in this short period was the lack of a bold and courageous leadership from the Government. All this uncertainty and hesitancy gave place to a vigorous policy when Mr. Winston Churchill formed the national government and appointed Ernest Bevin as Minister of Labour. Bevin brought to bear on the task of administration a freshness of outlook. He was an outstanding trade union leader, whose whole life had been devoted to furthering the interests and welfare of workpeople. His scheme for the mobilization of the civil population of the country shows that he was not only a great trade union leader but also a great Englishman and patriot. His first proposal was that only one department (i.e. Ministry of Labour) should be responsible for the supply of labour. In this connection he proposed the appointment of a Director of Labour Supplies who should be a man with an intimate knowledge and experience of management and production methods. He would be assisted by three or four industrialists drawn from employers and trade-unionists and together they would constitute a Labour Supply Board which would be in permanent session. Its duties would be to survey the total requirements for labour in the war industries and, in the light of information furnished by the Production Council, to consider the measures necessary for providing the requisite labour whether by the transfer of orders, by dilution or other means. But such a centralised authority could not be expected to operate efficiently unless it had the means of devolving its functions to local bodies. This decentralisation should be carried out in two ways. The existing Area Boards of the Ministry of Supply should in future be under the chairmanship of the Ministry of Labour, Divisional Controller. Secondly, at each important centre local labour supply itself should be set up consisting of a chairman and two other members selected from industry and appointed full time members of the Ministry staff. It would be the duty of these committees working with the Ministry of Labour, local offices to organise and foster self-help among firms with labour supply problems and generally to consider such questions as the admission of women to munitions work, dilution and training and welfare of the workers. Lastly, further detailed investigation of the problems of skilled

labour and adequate number of technical officers should be appointed under a Chief Inspector. In addition to his proposals for the organisation of the Ministry of Labour Bevin suggested that a Production Council should be set up and charged with the direction of organisation of production. He also suggested that more establishments, beginning with those in the munitions industries, should be brought under direct Government control. Lastly, he suggested that a Ministry of Works should be set up, charged with the planning and control of all building and civil engineering.

The Ministry of Labour realised the importance of a man-power budget. Man-power Requirements Committee under the chairmanship of Sir William Beveridge submitted its report in December 1940. The Beveridge report is of great importance. The great service which Sir William Beveridge rendered was that for the first time the man-power picture had been looked at as a whole. From his survey he drew some conclusions of outstanding importance. There would be a famine, he emphasised, of male labour for industry and a dearth of recruits for the forces. Drastic remedies were, therefore, necessary. First, a vast number of women must be brought into employment—partly to replace men, partly to do new jobs at which with training they would be no less competent than men. Secondly, the current system of reservation from call-up for the armed forces must be radically altered with the two-fold object of finding more recruits and of ensuring that skilled men who were retained in three civilian occupations were employed only on jobs of genuine importance where their skill would be fully used. These radical recommendations were soon to become accepted aims in man-power policy.

The Production Council ceased to exist at the end of 1940 and was succeeded by a smaller body known as the Production Executive. It was to this body that in the middle of January 1941, the Minister of Labour in a memorandum entitled "Heads of Labour Policy" submitted his plans for dealing with the serious shortages of labour. Firstly, the Minister of Labour might declare any undertaking to be "national work." The following conditions would then apply. No employee would be permitted to leave and no employer to terminate the employment of a worker without the consent of the National Service Officer or, in the event of an appeal against his decision, of an industrial tribunal which would be set up for this purpose. Moreover, if either wished to terminate his contracts, each would be required to give the other a prescribed period of notice. Secondly, the Minister would use his powers of registration and of direction to whatever extent might be necessary to guarantee and adequate supply of labour on national work, subject to his being satisfied that the wages and conditions of employment were suitable and that there were adequate provision for the housing, feeding and transport of the workers concerned. The Heads of Labour Policy memorandum was a landmark in the history of man-power policy. From now onwards the supply and distribution of labour were to be much more firmly controlled. To this end, men and women were to be required to register and, to ensure that labour went where it was required, directions were to be freely used. The new system by which all important production could be designated national work had overcome the scruples which the Minister had felt in directing orders to private employers. What was no less important, it also provided a means of checking what had been a serious deterrent to production, namely, the uncontrolled movement of workers within industry.

In order to implement this policy Government adopted various measures. The most important measure was the Essential Work Order which later became

known as the Principal Order. Essential work (which was the phrase decided upon in preference to national work) was defined as work appearing to the Minister to be essential for the defence of the realm, the efficient prosecution of the war, or the life of the community. Undertakings deemed to be essential work were to be entered in a register to be maintained by the Ministry of Labour. While the employer could not dismiss a worker except for serious misconduct without the permission of the National Service Officer, a worker was similarly debarred from leaving his employment. Workers had to be regular in attendance and put in the prescribed hours of work, but in return they could count on a guaranteed weekly wage and satisfactory arrangements for their comfort and their welfare. The worker thus established mutual obligations between an employer and his workers, and for that reason it was perhaps the most effective and least resented form of compulsion that during the war was imposed upon civilian man-power.

The second important measure was the Registration for Employment Worker. This empowered the Minister of Labour to register men over the call-up age of 41 and women of 18 and upwards by their classes. Public notices were issued of the dates at which the different age classes were required to register at local office of the Ministry, and registrations for men continued until September, 1949, and for women until July 1949. By these dates of age classes up to 1951 had been covered. The main purpose of the Order was to enable a survey to be made of the available man-power in the country with a view to pick out those who might either enter or be transferred to useful employment. To this end registrants were asked to give particulars of their present employment, and women were invited to provide information about their household responsibilities and, if married or widows where they have their children under 14 years of age living with them. The next step after registration was the interview. Men and women were asked to call at the Local Office where they have registered. If the Local Office decided that a registrant could fairly accept to undertake more important work than that on which he was at present employed, he was asked to consider one or two possible jobs selected from a list of vacancies. It was always the aim of Local Offices to make proper use of such skill as a worker possessed and to obtain from him his voluntary acceptance of the job he was offered.

In addition to these two important measures the Scheme of protected work was designed as a means of securing that the only young men reserved in their civilian occupations would be those whose skill was being used upon essential jobs. This could be best done, it was thought, by identifying establishments or branches of establishments engaged on work of particular importance to the war effort and entering their names on a register.

The Concentration of Industry Scheme was designed to prevent a wasteful use of resources in civil industries and to free labour and factory space for war purposes. It would also, it was hoped, safeguard first post-war structure of an industry by keeping a number of nucleus firms in full production and by providing that it was decided to close, should be maintained in readiness to re-open when the war was over.

D.P.

"Guides To Straight Thinking" by Stuart Chase, London (1959) Phoenix House.
223 pages, Price 25 sh.

Many centuries ago the claim was made by an eminent Greek philosopher that man is a rational animal. During the present century, the psycho-analysts have claimed that reasoning is used by man in order to support his prejudices.

This probably makes it all the more evident that without some kind of guide to straight thinking, it is doubtful whether thinking will ever be straight. This book examines the problems of reasoning and raises important points regarding some of the characteristic ways in which every day reasoning often leads the mind of the common man into wrong tracks.

The problem of thinking is capable of being approached from two different angles—Psychological and Logical. The psychological approach is a *naturalistic* approach. The psychologist is concerned with thinking as a phenomenon of mind. From this point of view one is concerned with the various forms of thinking, the activating forces of the mind which under-lie it, and the functions which it serves as part of the natural endowment of human beings. The approach of logic is not naturalistic but *normative*. Logic is concerned with the question of what is right and what is wrong in thinking. The primary business of logic is, therefore, to formulate criteria which will serve to tell the difference between correct and incorrect thinking. The conventional practice has been to distinguish two branches of logic—deductive and inductive. Deductive logic formulates the conditions under which correct inferences can be drawn from propositions which are assumed to be true. It is also sometimes called "Formal logic" because its primary concern is with the formal characteristics of the thought process. Inductive logic, on the other hand, formulates the criteria for the inference of generalised propositions from particular facts. The methods of inductive inference are by and large those which scientific thought employs, and is therefore often called "The logic of modern science." In practice, however, the distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning is not so clear-cut, and the same issue may involve different elements of deductive and inductive reasoning.

The need for logical reasoning is accepted and emphasised in nearly every branch of life today. In the class-room, the market square, the court of law, the busy street, in the cinema hall, as much as in the broadcasting station, it is necessary that the goal of logic should never be lost sight of. The goal of logic is the discovery of truth. Stated negatively, one might say that logic sets itself to dispel or prevent error. Nevertheless, the goal of logic is frequently lost sight of, and one would do well to remind oneself over and over again of the many snags and pitfalls to which human reasoning is liable. Whether one is arguing with somebody else, or is listening to someone else's argument, one should always watch for twists and distortions in reasoning.

"What is truth?" asked jesting Pilate. Pilate, probably never became aware of the truth. Nevertheless, he might have got somewhere near the goal, if he had been conscious of error. The greater part of this book is thus devoted to a discussion of the characteristics of errors in reasoning and is amply illustrated by large variety of common errors occurring in contemporary writings. This is what makes the book significantly different from the conventional text books which contain classical examples of deductive and inductive fallacies. The author in fact departs from the conventional distinction between deductive and inductive inference and plunges straight into a list of 13 fallacies which, in his opinion, are types of error frequently committed now-a-days.

A separate chapter is devoted to the many subtle ways in which truth is capable of being perverted in the court room. The person accused of a crime is convicted when compelling evidence is produced to show that he is guilty, but the way in which the case is argued by the prosecution and defence might often lead to very different pictures regarding the allegations. If, in the battle of wits

between the prosecution and the defence, one of the parties happens to be weak or deficient, goodness alone can tell what the outcome will be. "Many an accused person has been declared guilty with no proof beyond the charge, and then tried for his associations, ideas, suspected intentions, family connections, rather than for his specific acts." The techniques of cross-questioning, when applied in a subtle manner could put the witness in a quandary. For example "Have you stopped beating your wife? Answer Yes or No!" If the answer is 'Yes', there is an admission that the wife has been beaten in the past. If the answer is 'No', the admission is that the wife is still being beaten. Tactics of this kind could easily compel an uncritical mind to admit guilt, even where the accused is not really guilty.

The author has very justifiably devoted two separate chapters to the subject of propaganda which during recent years, has developed into the gentle art of influencing large masses of population by information which may sometimes be utterly misleading. The immense popularity during recent years of illustrative magazines, films, radio broadcasts and television have made these media convenient for the propagation of ideas. People go to the cinema hall, listen to broadcasts, or read fun-magazines in order to divert their minds from the serious preoccupations of every day life. As such, they are mentally disposed to accept many things which they would ordinarily regard with some criticism or mental reservation. This situation, therefore, provides scope for the propagandist to present information in an innocent though distorted form, and to plant wrong notions in the minds of people. Against this mode of sophistication there can be no effective remedy, except possibly the counter-measures taken by individuals not to allow themselves to be misled by what meets the eye. As one thinks over the many queer errors into which human beings in the present century are led, despite all our boast of technical and scientific advancement one might feel tempted to despair that man can never rise above his common failings and mental weaknesses! Nevertheless, the author assures us that "We remain the most logical of the earth's creatures, and have survived more by our wits than our brawn. It is quite possible that the use of one's wits for survival can be extended."

WIVA

The Military And Industrial Revolution Of Our Time by Fritz Sternberg (Stevens & Sons Ltd. London). 359 pages. Price 25 sh.

This forbidding title hides a cogently argued book (translated from the German) by a clear thinking author who has put together the quintessence of modern military and technological philosophy of our time, and who looks forward some years to see their ramification on society in the measurable future.

The Military revolution in terms of weapon systems is fairly obvious; nuclear weapons, and their delivery by means of rockets. But, although less obvious, there are other factors of the military revolution which is taking place during a period when there are no active hostilities in progress and yet it is so radically affecting strategy and tactics of nations. Further, the effects of this revolution are affecting all the countries of the world, although the chief contestants are only two; namely the United States and the Soviet Union, because the types of weapons involved do not respect political boundaries, and the effect of fall-out and radiation can affect the whole human race. The search for improved weapons, and counter-measures against these weapons, has given a spurt to technology, the like of which has never been before seen in peace time. Due to many consi-

derations, the military revolution has brought the State more and more into the field of industry, and even in the USA there is a sizeable "public" sector.

In the industrial field there are three aspects of the revolution: the peaceful use of atomic energy, the phenomenal growth of electronics making automation possible in industry, and electronically controlled calculating machines which radically revolutionise office work. The last field is particularly important sociologically, because it affects a vast army of men and women who had previously been little affected by technological progress. Automation makes for machines minding other machines, speeding up production and doing away with the vast number of workmen and factory hands we are so used to associating with industrialisation. Nuclear power, when available in sufficient quantity, would provide for industrialisation and development in many of the so called "backward" areas of the world at a pace which may permit these areas to catch up with the more advanced countries.

Taking the impact of both these revolutions into consideration, it is argued that a major war is neither profitable nor necessary for either of the two World Powers. The balance of power between them is such that neither side can win such a war. Neither can they, on their own, subdue each other by sheer weight of industrial might. The future development of the countries of Asia, particularly China and India, and later Africa, can, however, affect the balance of power, and the author explains at length the necessity for the United States and countries of the West to divert at least one per cent of their resources for the "construction" of India and other less developed countries, even going to the extent of offering help to China. Besides the purely military angle, such assistance is justified merely to keep production going in the West by reducing the poverty of the world and creating greater demand for goods and services at a time when the epoch of world history is about to begin.

In the Epilogue, the author projects some of his ideas on the demand for humanising of labour, which will have to be treated and schooled differently from the present generation if the military and industrial revolution of our time is not to become a serious threat to democratic political institutions.

All this does appear to be heavy reading, and of little consequence to the average military reader, but to the serious student of military science it is more than important to see the overall philosophy and see the parts fitting into the larger picture. To us in India, who are only on the periphery of both these revolutions, the discussion of the historical evolution is of special interest although we might not wholly agree with lumping together of China and India as two undeveloped countries progressing on parallel courses.

This book is a "must" for those who are interested in the wider implications of world strategy, not only for the Service reader, but possibly even more so for the senior civil servant and politician who bear the responsibility for moulding our future policy.

A.M.S.

The Battle Of Gettysburg by Frank A. Haskell. (Edited by Bruce Catton and with a historical foreword by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller). Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1959). 170. pages. Price 25 sh.

The Battle of Gettysburg, July 1863, is one of the many famous battles of the American Civil War, and Haskell's eye-witness account of it is one of the classics on this battle. However, to those not familiar with the events of the Civil War, and the political and military background of the struggle, Gettysburg is no more than a name. For such readers the publishers have wisely added a Historical Foreword by that well known military historian—Major-General J. F. C. Fuller.

As is well known, the two opposing forces in the Civil War were (i) the Federal (or Union) army and (ii) the Confederate army of the southern states under General Lee. Haskell was a Union Officer on the staff of the divisional commander "who held the precise part of the Federal line against which was directed the most famous military assault in American history, 'Pickett's Charge'." Thus Haskell's narrative, written only a few days after the battle, is of the greatest value for a correct understanding of what happened at Gettysburg. It is this factor which has made Haskell's account a sort of text-book and a 'must' for students of that battle particularly and of the Civil War generally.

It is needless to go into the details of the battle—these must be read, in Haskell's words, to be enjoyed; but two lessons which emerge from Gettysburg may be summarised:—(i) the futility of a frontal attack against numerically superior enemy holding a strong defensive position, as General Lee must have realised, and (ii) the folly of not following up a victory in battle by pursuing a retreating force, as the Federal commander (General Meade in this case) must have or should have realised. Some critics go so far as to say that if Meade had pursued Lee after Gettysburg, the Civil War might have been finished in 1863.

Since Haskell wrote soon after the events described and while the war was still going on, his account is of necessity 'violently partisan' and 'infused with all of the fury of combat'. As Haskell himself wrote, "It is not designed to be a history, but simply *my account* of the battle." This, however, does not make it any the less important; if anything it makes it all the more interesting, especially for the general reader. The book has an Introduction by the editor, six sketch-maps and an index which add immensely to its value.

P.N.K.

The Great Civil War (A military history of the First Civil War 1642-1646) by Lieut.-Colonel Alfred H. Burne and Lieut.-Colonel Peter Young (Eyre Spott is woode, London, 1959). 258 pages. Price 36sh.

In view of the importance of the Civil War in the history of England, it is really surprising that the subject did not attract sufficient attention of the military historians. Of course, we have the invaluable book on "Cromwell's Army" written by two distinguished historians, Sir Charles Firth. But it is this book, written by two distinguished military historians, which really fills in the lacuna. It is undoubtedly an excellent text-book. It is written in a simple lucid style. No important point has been omitted and yet the narrative is not burdened with superfluous details. Without any digression, the authors take up the discussion of the subject—it almost appears as if they are delivering lectures to students of military history. How else can you explain the masterly introduction, which describes, with rare clarity and precision, the military resources of the rival forces. London was in the hands of the Roundheads throughout the war. This was a very great asset. The towns, especially those connected with the sea or the cloth trade, supported the Parliamentary party. The sea was held by the

king's enemies. The Royal Navy revolted to 'King Pym'. The financial resources of the Parliamentary party were great for it could raise loans in the city, and tax the trade of England. Ultimately, the king lost the war for lack of money. The king, however, started with one significant advantage. The Royalist hard-riding squires and their huntsmen and grooms made excellent troopers. This was indeed a great advantage for in the Civil War the cavalry was the Queen of the Battlefield. It was the cavalry which played a decisive role in winning the war. Victory rested with the side which had the best cavalry—Rupert in 1642-3 and Cromwell in 1644-5. It is interesting to note the changes introduced in tactics by this war. The tactics employed by cavalry were to advance at a trot within pistol range of the enemy discharge pistols and then close, and exchange sword thrusts until the enemy gave ground. Gustawus Adolphus, the Swedish king, had already shown the unsoundness of these tactics. He taught his troopers to charge at full gallop, not to pull up or discharge pistols, but to reserve them for in-fighting after penetrating the hostile ranks. Rupert followed these tactics at the battle of Ede hill. The Swedish tactics were in fact adopted by both the armies, notably by Cromwell's Ironsides. The infantry, however, continued to fight in the old formations—in masses six deep. The pikemen were in the centre and the musketeers on the wings. Whether both armies advanced or only one, they each employed musketry fire during the advance, and when they got within pike-reach of the enemy the struggle was decided 'at push of pike'. Not only these details about the fighting methods of the armies but also the tactical studies of the battles are of absorbing interest. The battle of Marston Moor was undoubtedly the most remarkable of the Civil War. It is Lord Goring who emerges as the hero of this battle. When we consider that his cavalry, practically unaided, routed more than half the opposing army, a force more than three times as numerous as itself, we get a fair measure of his achievement. But who remembers the hero of a defeated army? It is Cromwell and Fairfax—the heroes of the victories—who garnered the fruits of victory. The book is of absorbing interest and will be useful to all those interested in the tactical studies of battles.

D.P.

Retreat From Kokoda by Raymond Paull (Heinemann). 319 pages. Price 30 sh.

There is a large, and still growing, amount of literature dealing with the various theatres and campaigns of the Second World War. Most of them deal with the later phase of the War, when the initial defeats were over and the Allies were on the offensive in all theatres till the unconditional surrender, one by one, of the Axis powers. Yet, to the military reader, the earlier campaigns of the War, when the Allies were caught unprepared and unorganised and had to hold on grimly through a succession of strategic setbacks till the tide of war turned, are of greater value.

This highly readable book by Raymond Paul deals with one such campaign—the operations of the Australian forces in New Guinea in 1942 when the wave of Japanese conquest swept over the Pacific dangerously close to Australia, there to be held in check until it was eventually pushed relentlessly back over that ocean.

All the ingredients of a first campaign were here—unpreparedness, initial bungling, political interference, even clashes of personalities—only enlivened by the courage and staunchness of the fighting men. The initial offensive moves, the retreat under Japanese pressure and the slow hard way back on the counter-offensive are all described well and vividly both from the Australian and the Japanese points of view.

A very interesting book, much more so than an official history of comparable scope could possibly be.

N. R.

Second Bureau by Philip John Stead. (Evans Brothers Ltd., London). 212—pages, Price 18 sh.

When France fell in 1940 the Secret Services of the French Army stayed on in France. It continued its struggle against the Secret Service of the enemies of France. A certain amount of "stigma of Vichy" has been attached to the soldiers of this Secret Service, merely because of the fact they remained in occupied France. A certain amount of "stigma of Vichy" has been attached to the soldiers will clarify more effectively the role of the Secret Services of the Armies of the Armistice and of Africa."

The author at the very outset clarifies what exactly the Second Bureau is. The Second Bureau of the French General Staff, he avers, is not the Secret Service, though its most "potent allies" may be termed Secret Services such as "S. R." (*Service de Renseignements*) and "C.E." (*Counter Espionage*) and so on.

The book deals with the activities of the Second Bureau during the pre-1940 days and proceeds to record the work done by this bureau during the Vichy period and then inevitable move over to London when the Germans dissolved these services.

The middle part of the book deals with North Africa and how the Second Bureau again demonstrated its usefulness. In the course of 1943 a new secret organisation was established in this country. In fact the Headquarters of these Special Services of the Armies of the Armistice was transferred to Algiers during 1943.

Counter-Espionage in occupied France is dealt with next. The achievements of this service make interesting reading.

The last part of the book describes the part played by the Special Services in the defeat of the enemy after the Normandy landings in 1944. The liberation of Brittany, Angers and Rennes, to mention a few, clearly proved the effectiveness of this service. The Seventh Army landings in the South of France were ably assisted by the French underground.

The book contains a wealth of detail of great interest to Intelligence Organisations and will be a useful addition to all Intelligence libraries. A detailed index at the end of the book facilitates easy and quick reference.

NAN

Bradman the Great by B. J. Wakley (Nicholas Kaye Limited, London 1959) 317 pages. Price 63 sh.

Sir Donald Bradman has been a legendary figure for over a quarter of a century. Though it is more than a decade since he doffed his flannels and set aside the willow, his hold over public affections has remained undiminished. If anything, it has enhanced—the distance of time lending enchantment to the view. Hence, it is little surprising that he has been the subject of a plethora of books. And to add to this, he himself has written a fascinating autobiography ('Farewell to Cricket') and said the last word on it.

All the ground having been covered, there is very little that a new author can explore in Don's personality. That evidently seems to have been the handicap of Mr. Wakley. His book is neither a biography nor one of memoirs. He does not tell us of any revelations or anecdotes. Nor does he try to assess Sir Donald by giving his estimate of the man in comparison with his contemporaries or giants of yesterday.

So one is baffled—much more than the bowlers who were massacred by Sir Donald—and I must admit completely beaten in finding the provocation for the book. The only ray of light amidst enveloping darkness is Mr. Wakley's admission: "This book was originally compiled for my own spare-time amusement." Perhaps, he should have confined himself to that.

Mr. Wakley, however, deserves praise for his patience, perseverance and industry in maintaining a record of the minutest detail of every match in which Sir Donald figured. This as one, who is afflicted by the same malady, knows is a stupendous task requiring energy, time and patience. Again he has packed the book with all possible statistical data but the value of all this is washed out by the relevant and much more authentic facts given by Sir Donald.

The book suffers from another major drawback. It has no illustrations (barring the sketch by John T. Kenny which is excellent) to relieve the reader's strain. In short to wade through this book is more an ordeal than an opportunity.

KVGR

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ELUSIVE GOALS

World Without War by J. D. Bernal. (Routledge and Kegan Paul). 1958. 308 pages. Price 25 sh.

International Propaganda by L. John Martin. (Oxford University Press). 1958. 284 pages. Price \$5.75.

"A World Transformed" would probably have been a more appropriate title for Prof. Bernal's book, for its central theme is the transformation which science can bring about in the material basis of human society within a single generation, provided war and the threat of war can be eliminated. The proviso obviously is all-important and on this the author has little more to say than to express the hope that the major Powers will realize the fearful danger and futility of a full scale nuclear war and by recognizing the inevitability of co-existence, achieve some measure of disengagement from the cold war. How fragile such hopes can be is shown by his post-script to the book, written in August last year, in which he suggested that the Iraqi revolution may mark a turning point in human affairs and that it had been prevented from spreading into a war, nuclear or conventional, in the Middle East because of the "resolute and at the same time conciliatory attitude of the Soviet Union". Even if the Soviet Union could be said to have played the part it did (and this seems on any view of the matter a doubtful assumption) subsequent events have shown that the Iraqi revolution has spawned conflicts not less upsetting to peace in the Middle East than the cold war. The author oversimplifies the revolution by considering it purely as a revolt against external control (or indirect colonial rule). It was that, of course; at the same time, it was also the result of internal forces combining to produce an explosion but unable afterwards to find a point of stable equilibrium. Undoubtedly the cold war is the central fact of the international situation today and no rapid progress in human well-being is possible so long as it continues. But it would be unrealistic to

assume that the moment the cold war disappears, the way would be cleared for the new world of Prof. Bernal's dreams. For there will be other facts which may prove to be hindrances in varying degree; the barriers created by nationalist sentiment or racial exclusiveness or by the fears aroused by the expansionist ambitions of a country like China. The case for ending the cold war can stand on its own merits and does not have to be supported by arguments such as that, with its disappearance, there will be nothing left for people to do except to make a "rational choice" between rival political systems and live happily ever after.

This simplification of issues leads the author to some strange conclusions. For example, in the chapter entitled *The Time-Table of Transformation*, he says;—"By reducing armaments and stopping the arms race a great deal more capital would be available for export, not only from capitalist but also from socialist countries, and this capital would tend to flow to the less industrialized countries of Asia, Africa and South America. . . . This would give rise to the possibility of an agreed, or at least a competitive, financing of national construction plans, such as the five year plans of India and others, which would grow up rapidly in countries such as Egypt and Indonesia. In this the United States and the Soviet Union would take part together with a number of other countries such as Germany probably coming in on a smaller scale. The conditions would be settled according to the most favourable offer, and the influence of bids from the Soviet Union would tend to make them much easier for the new countries to industrialize." This suggests that a period of "cold peace" would be a desirable sequel to the cold war. The fallacy lies in assuming that this new development will leave its main beneficiaries—the under-developed countries—no choice except that between capitalism of the Western pattern or communism of the Eastern. But the possibility is that they may choose neither. As Mr. Nehru is never tired of insisting, both Marx and the classical economists of the 19th century appear equally irrelevant to an Asia grappling with the problems and opportunities of the mid-20th century. Prof. Bernal contrasts at one point the 300 million U.S. loan to India with the \$4,000 million sanctioned at the same time for the development of rocket missiles. If the implication is that once the rockets were abolished, the whole or part of this \$4,000 million would be available to India, the question will arise whether India would want foreign aid from any single country on this scale. Her attitude of non-alignment, though affirmed in a military context, is not confined to military matters but is an essential part of her idea of independence. It is true that she needs foreign loans but they form a comparatively small part of her total needs most of which are sought to be met by her internal resources. Prof. Bernal is on much firmer ground when he deals with war as a tragic waste of human resources and human intelligence which is holding back the whole development of science itself and blocking its useful application. He gives a fascinating picture of what can be achieved if science could be applied wholly to meeting human needs. He is not unduly alarmed by the rate at which the population of the world is increasing and thinks that the task of providing food for four times the present world population is not a technically insuperable problem.

Mr. John Martin's book on international propaganda is in some respects a corrective to the optimistic forecasts and political simplifications of Prof. Bernal. If the cold war is a major hindrance to a new world order, international propaganda is the major instrument of the cold war. Even before the dictatorships organized propaganda as an instrument for influencing mass thinking, some attempts were made by international organizations including the League of Nations to check its more menacing forms. These were patently unsuccessful and even the resolution condemning propaganda adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1947 left it to each member State to define what propaganda was and what

constituted a threat to peace. In any case the resolution did not indicate what the United Nations would do if any nation violated its directions. The reason was obvious. Propaganda today is too subtle, too often non-political in its quality to be branded unmistakably as propaganda. Also it is on most occasions factually true in so far as it deals with facts. As Mr. Johnson has pointed out, a propagandist usually has a choice of truths and knows that he is on stronger ground when he is telling the truth than when he is telling lies, particularly because any direct lies can be turned against him with damaging effect. No nation will admit that it is carrying on hostile international propaganda nor is there any conclusive means of proving that it is doing so. Even if proof is possible, punishment is not. There is no international law making hostile propaganda a crime and Mr. Johnson shows how jurists have gradually given up the attempt to define in what circumstances it can become one. If one State desists from propaganda against another, it is either due to the hope of reciprocity or the fear of reprisals.

Mr. Johnson has made a careful and well-documented survey of the methods and the agencies through which propaganda has become a formidable means of conditioning the mental and emotional attitudes of large masses of people and has shown how the growing realization of its dangers has, instead of inducing Governments to agree on controlling it, made agreement more and more difficult. As he says: "The tendency since World War I has been to tighten municipal laws designed to protect a State against undesirable propaganda from without or within while at the same time there has been a steady increase in the scientific and organized dissemination of propaganda. While this means that a State has no control over propagandists not within its physical grasp, it can, if it desires, control incoming propaganda at the receiving end through the channels and media of communication.... It is inconceivable that international law will ever control propaganda, no matter what its content, so long as the sovereignty of States is recognized. The control of propaganda will remain in the municipal laws of States and the bargaining power of diplomacy."

K

Russia Explored by John Brown. (Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1959). 222 pages. Price 16 sh.

The volume under review is in the nature of a travelogue which relates the experiences of the author during his visit to the Soviet Union in the thirties and later after World War II. During the thirties when the author visited the Soviet Union, he went with a secure grounding in Marxism but was not impressed by the Socialist experiment. "The country was nothing like the photographs of the propaganda in magazines. I realized that not only a camera can lie, but the presence of a camera is almost a guarantee that truth is being distorted. Russia was shabby, wretchedly poor with a standard of living far below that of Western Europe.... A man in relief in England was much better off in food, clothing and shelter than the Russian worker. There was an abyssmal ignorance among the Russians about the conditions abroad that could be ascribed only to deliberate perversion of facts." But he thought Russia was in the throes of industrialisation of a peasant community through which Britain in the 18th century and Germany in the 19th century had passed.

During his subsequent visit to Russia in the post-war period, the author found that things had not changed much since the thirties. The standard of living was pitifully low again, gadget-mindedness was on the increase, and the Soviet State had been occoutred with all the characteristics of a police state. His obiterdicta on the regime was "Just as the atom power is ending armies, the practice of

socialism is ending Marxism.....socialism will remain as a propaganda weapon and official policy for export but will begin to wither away within the Soviet State." Such wishful thinking will surely be set-aside by any serious student of Russian affairs as also the many other sweeping generalisations which limit the usefulness of the present study.

B

INDIA

Nehru., a political biography. By Michael Brecher. (Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1959). 682 pages. Price 42 sh.

The Prime Minister's personality has a special appeal for the progressive liberal westerner; in his ideas, way of life and values he is not only the nearest prototype of the finest product of present day west, but almost a personification of the ideas and approaches of the average enlightened citizen of the most privileged of all western States—the United Kingdom. Even if in the UK itself there is the new phenomenon of *angry young men*, there is the traditional Englishman living in former British Colonies. Dr. Brecher is one such: Mr. Nehru another. It is no wonder, therefore, that this is a very sympathetic account of Nehru's political career. Notwithstanding an occasional criticism here and there, Brecher's admiration for Nehru is unconcealed. Of this, three evidences can be cited: in one place, Nehru is called 'the first citizen of India', in another 'a giant among pygmies', and in yet another Gandhi is described in contrast as an 'illiberal'.

Dr. Brecher's criticisms of Nehru flow from this admiration and are based on a somewhat wrong assumption viz that Nehru has been omnipotent in the Indian scene and all powerful in Government and politics. The inadequacy of land reforms in India is thus attributed to Nehru's refusal to use his power, his apparent indecision to his desire to please everyone and his compromises to his weakness before pressures. If Brecher had made India and not Nehru the focal point of his study such conclusions would have hardly emerged. Nehru has been only a part of India's leadership before and after independence. The peculiarities of India's national movement were not his own making, the transfer of power was not his own decision and even in the post freedom years he had always to function within the broad limits set by his own party, the apparatus of the Indian State and the invisible compulsions on him arising out of the uncertainty about the political mind of Indians. Of this last factor one evidence was the refusal of Indian Muslims before 1947 to be loyal to the Congress, another the outburst of Hindu communal passions in the days around the partition. In fact, much can be said against Nehru if it is forgotten that for the majority of the people, party-politics in India was irrelevant and incomprehensible and Nehru had to function in an atmosphere of unthinking loyalty from the dumb millions—unthinking and hence uncertain. But what is more important is the possible appeal of extra-economic slogans for the people of India: the support or even the tacit approval of the functioning political elements in India could not be taken for granted. As was to be proved in 1959—after Dr. Brecher had completed his book—a slogan of co-operativisation brought forth opposition and criticism from more quarters than was expected and could, but for a timely retreat, have led to a serious inner-party crisis. In this background what would appear as a tremendous feat and an act of courage is that Nehru even while stabilising India has been able to keep up an element of instability as an essential condition for India's continuous movement towards socialism and progress. In other words, Nehru has functioned as the leader of the Opposition also in India, not allowing the

unconcern of the Indian people to freeze into apathy. By continuously emphasising the economic aspects and our problems, he has succeeded in giving this country's politics a sense of purpose and direction and ensured that politicians will follow the people. It is not that Dr. Brecher has not mentioned or stressed the successes of Nehru: he has credited him with imparting an international perspective to India's national movement and socio-economic content to the struggle for freedom. He has also said that Nehru's integrity had set an example for other Congressmen—a point on which many would primarily credit Mahatma Gandhi. Likewise he has an impressive list of positive items of post-freedom role of Nehru; his role as a unifying force, his foreign policy, his success in establishing a secular state, his contribution towards the making of the Indian constitution etc. Of the several criticisms, one is that he has been a bad judge of men; another that he has not been able to ensure smooth succession! to his position after him. The two together make it interesting: if Nehru was so bad a judge of men he would not find it difficult to decide about succession. But apart from this, to blame Nehru for leaving the question of *After Nehru*, who unanswered is to attribute to Nehru a lack of faith in the democratic process which he fortunately does not have. The answer must essentially be provided by the people of India and the surest way of seeing that a proper successor is found is to let the initiative remain with the people of India. It is, perhaps, Nehru's tremendous faith in the people of India—which he has often been expressing—that has made him ignore this vital problem.

The Canadian professor has brought to bear on the subject of a biography the analytical approach of a competent political scientist and for any political scientist today Nehru is a phenomenon worth careful scrutiny. It is, therefore, no biography only, although Dr. Brecher has shown the biographer's regard for details. It is an interpretation of a man who is trying to evolve a political philosophy for underdeveloped nations. Dr. Brecher has been eminently successful in his task: he is objective in his method and analytical in his approach. In the spate of literature now coming out on Mr. Nehru, this will easily be placed on the top by even those who may not agree with the author on several matters.

Regionalism Versus Provincialism by Joan V. Bondurant (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley) 150 pages, price \$2.00

The problem of India's national unity is largely the problem of devising an institutional framework for the various nationalities to co-exist. It would be an optimist who would say that states reorganisation has solved this problem finally, although it has definitely removed the major cause of friction among the linguistic groups. India shares with many other Asian States, the problem of sub-nationalism which is not altogether rooted out or curbed; in all probability, this exists in various regions as a potential force of reagitating issues. Having said this, however, the great counteracting forces at work in India must be enumerated. Centralised planning, the all India character of the State apparatus and the growing consciousness that the future in the world belongs to giants are some of them. In the ultimate analysis, what would keep India together, apart from the emotional loyalty to the concept of the Indian nation, would be a recognition in each linguistic group that it cannot stand on its own feet and secure a rate of growth individually which centralised planning for India as a whole secures for each of them. This underlines the need for removing any discrimination that exists in favour of any or against any other linguistic group today. The material base for present day linguistic rivalries is provided by the uneven development of regions and the unequal opportunities the various

peoples enjoy. In most cases this sense of being discriminated against exposes itself in relation to the immediate neighbour; Bengal and Bihar cannot co-exist in a Purva Pradesh, nor can Gujrat, and Maharashtra in a bilingual Bombay.

It is the overlooking of this important aspect which makes the approach of Bondurant's study somewhat lopsided: but for this, the wealth of factual material she has collected and the analysis she has made of such specific issues as the Bengal-Bihar merger proposal would make this study useful and very interesting. It is her thesis that regionalism is being deliberately promoted in India to counteract the more dangerous provincialism. From this view point she has examined the zonal councils at length and has, perhaps, overstressed their significance. In India, zonal loyalties cannot grow, because as stated above; linguistic rivalries are more in relation to neighbouring groups than distant ones. The only possibility of zonal loyalty would arise if the Hindi speaking areas were some day to emerge as the Prussia of India. But as it is, the numerical superiority of this region is offset by the privileged position the peripheral states enjoy in the matter of services, industry, professions etc. If at a future date such an eventuality occurs, zonal loyalties would, instead of strengthening India's national unity prove a somewhat formidable threat to it.

SG

Dalai Lama and India. (The Institute of National Affairs, New Delhi 1959.) 162 pages. Price Rs. 5.

A group of young intellectuals who, a couple of years ago, organised the Institute of National Affairs put before themselves the laudable aim of inculcating a spirit of inquiry on national affairs "so as to shape their development in a manner conducive to the growth of healthy democratic traditions." How far the Institute has fulfilled its purpose one is not told but if the publication, under review here, is an index one may be sanguine, though in a cautious way.

The present brochure touches on an extremely important problem namely, to present to the world outside how our people and government reacted to the recent crisis in Tibet. There are six—extremely haphazard and remarkably unequal—divisions: 'Headlines', 'Note on Tibet', the 'Press', 'Prime Minister', 'the Leaders' and 'Dalai Lama'. The 'Headlines' span the period from March 20, when New Delhi first broke the news of the armed rebellion in Lhasa to an astonished world, down to May 22 when His Holiness tucked in his new home, away from home, settled down to the humdrum of daily life. The 'Note on Tibet' is sketchy and as is perhaps inevitable in broad generalisations, at places quite misleading. It does, however, give a broad outline and help furnish a little essential background to an understanding of the Tibetan problem. 'The press' reactions cover a wide range, all the way from the Madras 'Hindu' and the Calcutta—New Delhi 'Statesman' to the 'Pioneer', the 'Indian Express' and the 'Searchlight'. 'Thought' too is there as is no doubt the 'Times of India', the 'Indian Nation', the 'Hindustan Standard', the 'Leader' and the 'Deccan Herald'. The section on the Prime Minister is largely a compendium of official statements made by him either on the floor of the two Houses of Parliament or at his press conferences. They have a familiar ring—Mr. Nehru's anxiety to salvage from the wreckage what he could of his policy of friendship towards China. We know now how hard he tried, how sadly disillusioned he is! The 'Leaders' range from U. N. Dhebar and Asoka Mehta to Pandit Kunzru and S. D. Patil, M. P. The four pages allotted to the 'Dalai Lama' comprise his Tezpur statement on April 18, its re-iteration on April 22 and the Press Conference on June 20.

Two rather serious lacunae. There is no table of contents—a surprising phenomenon which becomes inexcusable when it is noted that there is no index either! Two, important omissions from the 'Leaders' or the parties are the Jan Sangh, the CPI and the Hindu Mahasabha. Surely these too represent, as doubtless the Congress and the Praja Socialists do, a cross-section of Indian public opinion. One would also wish that for a better perspective in such matters the official Hsinhua releases, setting forth Peking's standpoint were given, even though in an appendix.

PLM

Essential Documents And Notes On The Kashmir Dispute by P. L. Lakhanpal
(International Publications, New Delhi) 272 pages, price Rs. 15.

The author in his introduction (as well as in the title of this book) promises "all the essential documents and other references having a bearing on the Kashmir dispute beginning with the Treaty of Lahore of 1846 and concluding with Dr. Graham's latest report" and gives only 272 pages to this entire period of Kashmir's history. The inadequacy of this volume will thus be apparent. In the introductory section, for example, important documents like Jinnah's statement of 17 June, 1947 are omitted. A second deficiency, which a document volume can ill-afford, is that for none of the documents has the author quoted the source. Thirdly, the author hardly lives up to his promise of impartiality: To quote one example, Eisenhower's letter to Nehru of 24 February, 1954 is included but not the Indian Prime Minister's famous statement in the Parliament of 1 March, 1954. Likewise, in one of his comments, he describes G. M. Sadiq as a communist, which Sadiq himself has denied many times; in another place he says that Pakistan's relations with Azad Kashmir are drawn from the standstill Agreement of 1947. The Muslim Conference, among others, had often alleged that *Azad Kashmir* is only a "Puppet" in the hands of the Kashmir Affairs Ministry of the Government of Pakistan.

Mr. Lakhanpal is a partisan in the Kashmir conflict; he should have left this academic task of documentation to those who have no axe to grind in this matter.

SG

SERVICE NOTES

GENERAL

ELECTRONICS RESEARCH IN INDIA

Bangalore was the venue of a five-day convention on defence electronics, the first of its kind to be held in the country. The convention, organised by the Research and Development Organisation of the Ministry of Defence, began on September 25 and over 25 organisations in the country, including the National Laboratories, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Services were represented at it.

DEFENCE PRODUCTION CONFERENCE

Prime Minister Nehru emphasised while addressing the second Defence Production Conference in New Delhi, that the Army, Navy and Air Force could be first-rate Services only if they kept pace with modern technology. It was no good at all if they completely relied on arms, ammunition and other equipment purchased from abroad. It should be an axiom for them that a second-rate or even a third-rate defence equipment manufactured in the country itself was much better than a first-rate weapon imported from a foreign country, which it might be difficult to obtain when it was most needed in an emergency. Though India was still far behind other countries leading in scientific and technological development, still an atmosphere of science and technology was being created in the country and more and more young men were going in for it. India could not go ahead in any direction without taking full advantage of science and technology. A country's economy was one, and the more they produced, the better it was for the prosperity of the nation. The country's resources were not so large as to be wasted, and they had to be availed of to the maximum advantage utilizing them to the utmost, they could gradually arrive at a stage of take-off into an economy to achieve the type of industrial revolution that overtook the western world many years ago. They must, therefore, take advantage of science and technology to develop that mental approach.

OFFICER'S TRAINING UNIT IN THE N.C.C.

Officers' Training Units in the National Cadet Corps, with a total strength of 750 to be built in three years, with an annual intake of 250, are to be raised shortly. Implementation of this proposal would better fit NCC cadets for commissioned ranks and augment the intake of NCC cadets into the Armed Forces. One-third of the cadets recruited each year would be from medical and other technical colleges.

NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE

A National Defence College, to be set up in New Delhi on the pattern of the Imperial Defence College in U.K., is expected to start functioning early next year. Lt.-Gen. K. Bahadur Singh took over as Commandant of this college on October 1.

ARMY

APPOINTMENTS AND PROMOTIONS

Maj.-Gen. Sarda Nand Singh has been given the local rank of Lt.-Gen. with effect from August 15 whilst performing the duties of Director-General of Resettlement in the Defence Ministry. Brig. T. W. Wilson, Commander, Madhya

Pradesh Independent Sub Area, has been appointed Director of Ordnance Services at Army HQ in the rank of Maj.-Gen. He will succeed Maj.-Gen. R. N. Nehra, who has been appointed Deputy Quartermaster-General in an existing vacancy.

Maj.-Gen. B. M. Rao, Director of Medical Services, Army HQ and senior most officer in the Army Medical Corps, has been selected for appointment as Director-General of the Armed Forces Medical Services in the rank of Lt.-General. He succeeds Lt.-Gen. B. Chaudhary, who has retired.

NEW ASHOKA CHAKRA AWARDS

Eight personnel of the Army and the Air Force were awarded the insignia of Ashoka Chakra (Class II and III) for gallantry in the Naga Hills and elsewhere. Among the recipients were three officers, one JCO and four other ranks. Three Ashoka Chakra (Class II) have been *posthumously* awarded to Capt. G. K. Krishna Iyengar, Nk. Lal Singh and Rifleman Madho Singh Neghi. Three awards of the Ashoka Chakra (Class III) have been awarded to 2nd Lt. R. Narasimhan, Hav. Daulet Ram and L/Nk. Renu Gopal.

Sqn Ldr. R. A. Rufus gets the Ashoka Chakra (Class II) for the safe and perfect landing of the Air Force plane carrying the Prime Minister while Warrant Officer G. A. Paddington who was Flight Engineer in the plane, has been awarded Ashoka Chakra (Class III).

NAVY

LAUNCHING OF INS "BETWA"

INS *Betwa*, a new anti-aircraft frigate, now under construction for the Navy in the UK, was launched on September 15 by the wife of Mr. J. C. Kakar, Councillor to the High Commissioner for India in the U.K.

KATEX' NAVAL EXERCISES

The Chief of the Naval Staff inspected the Fleet Divisions on board INS *Delhi* at Cochin on September 20. Flying his flag in INS *Delhi*, the CNS left Cochin on September 22. Under his tactical command, four-day exercises, were held in the Arabian Sea between Cochin and Bombay in which INS *Rajput*, *Rana*, *Ranjit*, *Brahmaputra*, *Khukri*, *Tir*, *Kistna*, *Cauvery*, *Shakti* and *Dharini* participated. Naval aircraft from Garuda and the Canberas and the Hunter Hawks of the Air Force also took part in these exercises.

AIR FORCE

AVRO-748

From July 6, when the agreement for the manufacture of AVRO-748 in India was signed in New Delhi, to practically the end of the monsoon session of Parliament, this public venture engaged the attention of the Lok Sabha more than once. The wisdom of this agreement, since nicknamed the Dakota replacement deal, was as strongly and repeatedly questioned by exponents of public opinion in and outside Parliament, as it was justified with due restraint, by the custodians of public interest. Rebutting the main criticism that the Defence Ministry was going in for an aircraft which was untried and still on the design table, in preference to a tried one, Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, underlined the fact that the Government had not taken any undue risks in the matter. It was not desirable for the Defence Ministry to manufacture planes which were old and out-of-date. If they started manufacturing the tried planes, they would become outdated by the time they were manufactured in the country. Additionally,

the terms offered by the AVRO manufacturers were advantageous, such as the right to sell these aircraft and some spares practically in the whole of Asia.

FIRST WOMAN PARA-TROOPER

A new page was turned in the history of Indian pioneer women when Flt.-Lt. Miss Geeta Chanda, a medical officer at the Air Force Station, Kalaikunda, successfully made her maiden parachute jump at Agra on July 17 to earn the distinction of being the first Indian woman to achieve this feat.

JETS FOR AAF

The addition of Vampire aircraft to the equipment of the No. 51 (Delhi) Squadron of the Auxiliary Air Force, on September 1, was another noteworthy event, for the first time "citizen" pilots would be flying jets—a distinction denied so far even to those associated with civil flying clubs, some of which have been in existence for over 30 years. The initial batch to be converted on jets comprises four auxiliary officers, all pioneers in their own right.

SCHOOL OF LAND-AIR WARFARE

The inauguration of the School of Land-Air Warfare at Secunderabad on September 3 has been justly hailed as a welcome step which underlines the importance given to inter-services and inter-departmental cooperation in the country's defence set-up. The Defence Minister, formally opening the School, described it as a "pioneering institution—the only one of its kind in Asia".



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CORRESPONDENCE

*Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal,
or which are of general interest to the Services.*

To the Editor of the U.S.I. Journal

THE BATTLE OF MIANI

Sir,—In his comment (on page 228 in your April-June, 1959 issue) Major C. L. Proudfoot refers to "The Battle of Miani" instead of The Battle of Meeanee." This gives an incorrect impression to those who have association with the Scinde Horse.

The Scinde Horse celebrates "Meeanee Day" each year in the month of February and whatever the correct spelling of the name of the place where this fateful battle was fought more than a hundred years ago, the traditional touch of spelling it as done then should not be changed.

CAPTAIN K. S. GUPTA

20 Lancers
C/o 56 APO
September 28, 1959.

JOIN

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AND LITERATURE OF THE DEFENCE SERVICES

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KASHMIR HOUSE,
NEW DELHI.

SECRETARY'S NOTES

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

Many members have not yet paid 1959 subscription, which became due on 1st January. If you have not paid yours, would you please do so without delay, and so save the Institution the cost of sending further reminders.

GOLD MEDAL PRIZE ESSAY

The subject for 1959 is as follows:—

Higher defence organization has for many years engaged the attention of statesman and senior service officers of the major military powers. In the recent past there have been, for example, the higher defence reorganizations of the USA, the UK, and FRANCE. Inevitably, all higher defence organizations reflect the national and defence policies of the respective countries. These re-organisations were not directly connected with the problem of whether or not there is to be a merger of two or more of the fighting Services in the future. It is perfectly possible to devise effective machinery even if there are three independent Services.

Discuss the higher defence organization at Governmental level that you consider suitable for our country, in the context of our existing policies, and suggest any reorganization you consider necessary.

Full particulars for this competition appear elsewhere in this issue.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR—PAMPHLET

Articles on the American Civil War in this journal by Raminov have been reprinted as a pamphlet. The pamphlet contains the full text of the two articles with five 'stretch-out' maps. A bibliography has also been added.

A limited number of copies are available for sale. The price is Rs. 1/- including packing and postage. Those requiring the pamphlet may please write to the Secretary at the earliest, giving their name and postal address in block capitals and enclosing the cost in crossed Indian Postal Orders payable at New Delhi.

ADDRESSES

The difficulties of tracing addresses are now very much increased. Members are earnestly requested to keep the Secretary informed of changes in their addresses or if possible give a permanent address which will always find them e.g. a Bank.

LIBRARY BOOKS

There are many instances where members are keeping books for 4 or 5 months inspite of reminders. It would help the Librarian considerably if members are to ensure the return of books to the Library within two months of their receipt or immediately on their recall.

NEW MEMBERS

From 1st July 1959 to 30th September 1959 the following members joined the Institution :

- | | |
|--|---|
| BAHRI, Captain P.N., <i>Artillery.</i> | MASTERS, Major M.S., <i>3rd Gorkha Rifles.</i> |
| BALASUBRAMANIAN, Captain R.K.R.,
R.V.F.C. | MATHUR, Major J.N., <i>A.O.C.</i> |
| BALI, Captain M.M.L., <i>The Dogra
Regiment.</i> | MEHTA, Captain D.K., <i>The Deccan Horse
(Life).</i> |
| BASANT LAL, Major, <i>The Jat Regiment.</i> | MENDIES, Major F.J., <i>Signals.</i> |
| BHATNAGAR, Squadron Leader V.M.,
I.A.F. | MURTHY, Captain M.S., <i>A.O.C.</i> |
| CHANDEL, Captain J.S., <i>1 Gorkha Rifles.</i> | NAG, Major A.K., <i>A.S.C.</i> |
| CHOUDHREE, Captain S.P., <i>Signals.</i> | NARAVANE, Flt. Lieut. M.S., <i>I.A.F.</i> |
| CHOWDHURY, Captain P., <i>The Madras
Regiment.</i> | NEGINHAL, Captain R., <i>A.S.C.</i> |
| DHILLON, Major R.S., <i>The Dogra
Regiment.</i> | NARAYANAN, Major N.A. |
| DHILLON, Major R.S., <i>J&K Militia.</i> | PATHANIA, Captain R.S., <i>J&K Infantry
(Life).</i> |
| DUGAL, Major K.C., <i>The Kumaon
Regiment.</i> | PAUL, Wing Commander G.S., <i>I.A.F.</i> |
| DUGGAL, Major S.L., <i>A.M.C.</i> | PRATAP SINGH, Captain Kanwar,
3 Cavalry. |
| GHOSH, Major S.N., <i>2nd Lancers (G.H.).</i> | PUROHIT, Flt. Lieut. W.C., <i>I.A.F.</i> |
| GILLON, Major K.E.C., <i>Signals.</i> | RAGHUVIR SINGH, Major Kanwar,
61 Cavalry. |
| GURNAM SINGH, Captain. | RAMASWAMY, Major M.A., <i>A.M.C.</i> |
| HELLAS, Captain A.S., <i>A.O.C.</i> | RAMCHAND, Captain S., <i>A.O.C.</i> |
| HOSHING, Captain R.R., <i>A.S.C.</i> | SANDHU, Captain N.S., <i>3 Cavalry (Life).</i> |
| JAJ, Lieut. I.P.S., <i>A.O.C. (Life).</i> | SARKAR, Group Captain D.K., <i>I.A.F.</i> |
| KADYAN, Captain M.S., <i>The Rajputana
Rifles.</i> | SEKHON, Captain J.S., <i>Brigade of the
Guards.</i> |
| KAPUR, Captain K.K., <i>Signals.</i> | SINGH, Major J.N. |
| KHOSLA, Captain G.C., <i>The Dogra
Regiment.</i> | SUBRAMANIAN, Captain H., <i>Signals.</i> |
| KOHLI, Major R.K., <i>Engineers.</i> | SUKHU, Captain R.M., <i>The Rajputana
Rifles.</i> |
| LAMBA, Captain G.S. | TUGNAIT, Captain R.B. <i>(Life).</i> |
| MANN, Captain B.S., <i>A.S.C. (Life).</i> | UPPAL, Captain M.K., <i>A.O.C.</i> |
| MANOHAR LAL, Captain. | VARMA, Major JAI PAUL, <i>A.S.C.</i> |
| | VOHRA, Captain ASHWANI, <i>A.O.C.</i> |

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EDITORIAL

DEFENCE PRODUCTION

Defence production is a vital and extensive subject. The organisations for production have undergone many changes in the U.K. and the U.S.A. during the last World War and since. Such reorganisations are inevitable, as they are indicative of the progress of the country in the scientific and technological fields. Changes in government policies, and in the concepts of warfare consequential to the development of new weapons bring about changes in the organisational set-up of defence production. In our country, where we are more conservative in regard to making changes, certain reorganisations were brought about in the defence production set-up in 1958. Whether new organisations have proved to be successful is a matter for examination. Brigadier A.S. Naravane has attempted in his article on the subject, in the present issue of the Journal, to briefly touch on the various aspects of defence production and suggested an organisation which should meet the requirements in an under-developed country. There is an unfortunate confusion between *pure* research and *applied* research. As we see, our problems in the country are of an applied nature. Therefore, our research effort has to be concentrated more on applied problems and, if so, the entire sequence of research leading on to development, which results in production, has to be co-ordinated by one authority. Otherwise, the waste of effort caused by the duplication of functions of development and production cannot be avoided. Brigadier Naravane has made several good points in his article, and we hope it will provide a stimulant to our readers for thoughts on this very important subject which concerns us all in this country.

GRADUATE RECRUITS FOR ARMY

The British Army has announced a scheme under which university graduates will be able to get direct permanent regular commission. It appears that entry is open to university graduates in the U.K. regardless of the special branch or category into which officers are recruited. Nevertheless, it seems that the bulk of graduates entries are in the technical branches of the Armed Forces. This is quite understandable and also in the interest of efficiency. The problem of attracting good officer material for the army is more or less the same

in the U.K. as it is in India. In India, young men with a distinguished academic record almost invariably prefer to enter commercial firms, because their prospects in terms of career and pay are considerably higher in business occupations compared to the Defence Services. Among those who seek government service, the larger percentage prefer the IAS and the Foreign Service to the Defence Services. By this process of elimination, the Defence Services receive a low priority in the minds of the more distinguished types of our youngmen. Moreover, in trying to take boys after Matriculation for the National Defence Academy and after Intermediate for the Indian Military Academy at a young age, we make ourselves inaccessible to such brighter boys as are anxious to complete their studies before looking round for the best type of employment for themselves. We may get the boys of families who cannot afford higher education or such boys as are not anxious to study any more. Both these types choose the army as their career out of sheer necessity. There can be no doubt that there is a great need at the present time to consider ways and means of attracting talented young men having good academic background into the officer ranks of the Defence Services.

The step taken by the British Army perhaps provides one solution for us in this country. One other remedy could be to raise the minimum educational standard of those who seek entry into the NDA from the present level of Matriculation to that of Intermediate or its equivalent. This would enable those who go through the three-year course at the NDA to attain a standard equivalent to that of the BA/BSc (Pass) degree at a university. If this were to be the case, the Services could then insist on BA/BSc (Pass) instead of Intermediate as the minimum educational qualification of those who seek direct entry. It may also be desirable to provide opportunities for serving officers to better their educational attainments by undergoing a course of training in academics. There is a proposal to set up a Defence Services College of Science in Delhi. The underlying idea is that Service officers would be able to attend regular courses and take university examinations equivalent to BA/BSc Pass or Honours. Plans for such an institution were announced some time ago by the Defence Minister. A third possibility would be to provide within the existing framework of the Defence Services opportunities for all officers, regardless of rank or category of service, to avail themselves of study leave facilities so that they may acquire additional higher academic qualifications. At present, provision exists in the case of officers serving in the Army Medical Corps for study leave facilities and specialised academic training abroad. There seems to be no reason why corresponding facilities should not be accorded to officers serving for that matter in the Infantry. All things considered, the fundamental principle which will undoubtedly find wide acceptance is the provision of facilities for higher academic training. The importance of this principle will not be questioned. The need for it arises out of the fact that one way of compensating for the present shortfall in officers with a higher academic background can be compensated only by enabling the individuals to better their qualifications at some stage in their military career. The setting up of the National Defence College, like the Imperial Defence College in the U.K., is another right step in this direction.

HUMAN RELATIONS IN MILITARY SOCIETIES *

By DR. W. T. V. ADISESHIAH, M.A., Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION

IT being true that the practical aim of psychology lies in discovering how one may be helped to tide over one's difficulties, it would follow that the first concern of the practical psychologist would be to analyse and classify the difficulties commonly experienced by different people, before he offers any advice regarding how to resolve them. Broadly speaking, difficulties emerge from two worlds—the world of material things, and the world of people. The psychological approach is nothing more than a systematic effort to meet situations effectively and to forestall developments which arouse unhappy conditions in the minds of people. In a broad sense, therefore, every one of us has to be something of a psychologist.

The Material Environment : We have all lived long enough in this world to realize how profoundly the climate, the atmosphere, the changes which take place, in the world around us, and even “the acts of God”, which no astrologer can predict, affect our moods and tempers, occasionally making us feel that life is hardly worth living. At the same time, there are days of sunshine, of freshness, of glowing warmth regaled by “the cup that cheers” which put heart into us on our journey through life. The common man may well afford to close in on his troubles either by withdrawing from his environment, or else by abandoning his effort when he finds the strain too hard to bear. The soldier can ill-afford to do this. He has to press on, braving the inclemencies of the weather, advancing against showers of bullets, making the best of a bad bargain, because he would rather win than lose the battle. The will to fight merges with the will to survive, for survival in a perilous environment is the key to victory over the enemy.

The Social Environment: More intricate than the world of matter against which each one of us has to contend, is the world of human beings, whose ambitions and aspirations, domineering tendencies and divergent interests cut against those of the individual. Resentments and rivalries, grudges and grouses, kindle in many an otherwise calm and contented mind, aversions and anxieties, fantasies and fears. When confronted with formidable social problems in the common run of life, people who cannot see a practicable way out of their difficulties tend to detach themselves from others, or else to consult specialists in order to find the cures for their troubles. The soldier cannot, however, afford to be an isolate. He has to live with other people, eat with them, think with them, sleep with them, and even dream with them. That intimate personal inter-relationship which the very structure of a military unit entails, makes it necessary that there should prevail within the unit a “social climate” marked by

* Lecture delivered at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Nilgiris.

unity of purpose, friendly understanding, healthy rivalry, and mutual regard. The problem of human relations in military societies is thus a problem of capital importance.

Human Relations : During recent years, many psychological questions relating to human relations in the fields of education, industry, and public administration, have been widely discussed in the large volume of literature available today. Certain notions regarding what is neatly described as "the gentle art of managing people" have a useful application to military societies. It is, however, necessary to restrict the scope of this lecture to three outstanding problems.

First, *the psychology of Inter-personal Relations*;
Secondly, *the problem of Military Leadership*; and
Thirdly, *the question of Group Morale*.

No one will deny that these are matters of far reaching significance for military commanders at all levels, and as such they merit our serious consideration here.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTER-PERSONAL RELATIONS

Perceiving Our World : It is common knowledge that objects of the material world become meaningful to the perceiver in virtue of their functional characteristics. Thus, a red light seen on the highway, serves as a warning to the motorist, for the avoidance of some danger spot. The national flag, seen fluttering on top of a building brings home to the mind of the Indian citizen, the sovereignty of his country, symbolized by the three colours. Further, several possibilities of utilization might unfold themselves to the eye of the perceiver, as he continues to see an object. Thus, a piece of paper might appear useful for wrapping, for writing a note, or for cutting out a figure, depending on its relation to one's needs and purposes. In other words, material objects acquire a meaning also in virtue of their manipulatory characteristics. Between human beings, on the other hand, the relation of the perceiver to the person perceived is altogether different. Persons have abilities, wishes and sentiments. They can act purposefully, watch us, benefit or harm us intentionally, because they are aware of their surroundings, in much the same way as we are aware of ours. Just as the material environment bears a determinate relationship to the perceiver, there are connections between the constituents of the social environment which partake of the principle of cause and effect. These need to be discussed in some detail here.

Social Perception : It is seldom realized, not even by those who have proved remarkably successful in business administration or personnel management, that the pattern of inter-personal relationship depends to no small extent on what one sees in others and what others see in oneself. Healthy interpersonal relationships depend almost entirely on the extent to which social perception is comprehensive and realistic. Two points

have to be emphasised in this connection. First of all, what psychologists technically call "constancy phenomena", occur not only in the perception of material things, but also of people. For example, an aircraft may appear as a tiny silhouette when it is far off, but as a huge object when seen at close quarters. Yet the apparent difference in size would make no difference to the realization that it is an aircraft. This is so because, notwithstanding the difference in size, there is a general form quality, a pattern, a body outline which remains constant in the two conditions. In much the same way, there is, underlying the apparent differences resulting from situational influences over the same person, a constancy which is capable of becoming unmistakably evident to the perceiver. Between radically different pictures of "Philip drunk" and "Philip sober", there is inevitably a common denominator which issues from Philip himself. This is what ought to be identified in social perception. Secondly, it has been demonstrated under laboratory conditions that, for example, when two dots are presented in rapid succession, the perceiver may get the impression of one dot chasing another, fleeing from another, or attacking. These experiments, carried out by the Belgian Professor, *Baron Albert Michotte*, have been described in his book *La Perception de la Causalite*. Visual patterns representing behavioural withdrawal are, as Professor *Michotte* suggests, seen in such segregative relationships as antipathy or disgust. Stimulus patterns of approach are pictured in integrative relationships such as sympathy and friendship.

Distorting Factors in Social Perception : When a thing is seen from an awkward angle, it appears quite different from what it ordinarily is. Look at yourself in a mirror with a convex surface, and you will wonder what you are looking at. Much the same holds true about the way some people see others. A common distorting factor in social perception is the "ego complex." Underlying this perverse mental disposition is an organisation of false notions regarding oneself, bound together by overpowering sentiments of self regard. A person with an ego complex will tend to see others in small proportions. The prevailing sentiments will impel him to gain control over others, which will result in anything but peaceful relations with other people. Another frequent cause of distorted social perception is imperfect isolation of what is being seen. This is a kind of illusion, rather like what one experiences when one sees a moving train whilst in one which is standing at the platform. One might get the impression that the other train is standing, and one's own train is moving. Sometimes, quite unwittingly, one might allow oneself to believe that the other person is elusive or dilatory, while all the while one may have been deceiving oneself. Such distortions in social perception may, as they often do, lead to feelings of disapproval, disgust, and even aversion towards others, which would be neither just nor fair. Thirdly, distortions in social perception may occur when the person seen bears close resemblance with someone else, more intimately

known. The resemblance may be in facial or in behavioural characteristics, or both. A strained personal relationship is capable of arising, quite without reason, when feelings of dislike or hatred are transferred from A to B. It is indeed curious how some trivial detail such as a hair style or for that matter even the colour of a necktie could set up strong feelings in the mind of the beholder. Fourthly, in the case of persons who readily believe what others say, distortions in social perception may be the result of an accumulated stock of adverse stories, which by constant and varied repetition could produce a bias, vitiating the impartiality of one's social perception. It is inevitable that a soft ear should, in due course, produce a soft brain. Fifthly, a person would be seen in quite the wrong perspective if he is looked upon merely as a means to gain some end. There is the old fable of the monkey who once saw chestnuts roasting on a fire, and prevailed on a believing cat to get hold of the chestnuts. The cat burnt his paw, but the monkey ate the chestnuts. There are many people who, like the monkey, will at every turn try to see how they can make a cat's paw of others and their social perceptions bear ample fruit, where there are people who, like the cat, will pull the chestnuts out of the fire. All in all, it is psychologically desirable to realise that however well one may know another person, there is always some little thing which one may not know, and that might be a matter of the greatest importance.

Practical Implications: What has been said regarding social perception carries several grave implications regarding the administrative responsibility of military commander. Let us consider one important area, namely the Annual Confidential Report. This is highly important on account of its far reaching effects on the career prospects of the young officer. The problem of the commander who initiates the Annual Confidential Report is, without doubt, a difficult one indeed. On the one hand, he has to feel satisfied that due regard has been given to the interests of the service in making his assessments. At the same time, he is obliged to assess the officer or the subordinate under his command in such a way that no injustice is done as a result of false impressions, which would naturally arise if the person has not been seen in the correct perspective. In sizing up the capabilities and limitations of the person assessed, many subjective influences will, without doubt, play a large part. To guard against these influences, especially influences which might lead one to wrong conclusions, and to maintain a strictly objective standard of assessment would be a sheer impossibility in the case of a commander who has not trained his social perception aright. That may be one reason why Personnel Directorates as a rule insist that the same officer should not be assessed by the same commander for more than three years at a stretch. The longer the association, the closer the emotional bond; or if it be the other way, the wider the cleavage. Since individual differences in their capacity to neutralize distorting factors in social perception are considerable, it is not surprising that some ACRs contain quite the wrong picture

of the individuals assessed. Realizing this, the British Admiralty have developed a system of according weightage to ACRs in such a way that no one will suffer unduly on account of an adverse report due to bias, nor will one who receives glowing praise gain much if that praise merely expresses the enthusiasm of the commander.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

The Emergence of Leadership: It is now a widely accepted psychological notion that whatever one may mean by the term 'leadership' the pattern of personal qualities which goes to make up a leader emerges from a social situation. One of the pioneer studies on leadership was undertaken in 1934 by the American Psychologist, Prof. J. L. Morneo, who observed groups of babies of various ages from birth to three years, placed close to each other in a nursery. He found that some babies were *isolates*. They had hardly any interaction with others. Some revealed *horizontal differentiation*. They interacted with their neighbours, but not in a dominant matter. A few revealed *vertical differentiation*, that is they soon began to command disproportionate attention from the group. Morneo came to the conclusion that leadership emerges in a group when vertical structuration develops. Among grown ups also, one may find the emergence of leadership when a group is confronted with a problem situation. When something which the group has to achieve or attain is blocked by an obstacle, the individual who readily sees a practicable way out of the difficulty or formulates a workable solution to a problem emerges as a leader of the group. He gains his position, in other words, through a process of reorganisation in which he is perceived and reacted to by other members of the group as the means to the group goal.

Leadership in Group Test Situations: Group Testing Officers in Selection Boards can, with experience, tell off those who are obviously outstanding from those who are deficient in leadership. There are, however, many "borderline" cases which cannot be assessed easily. It is, therefore, necessary to look for the emergence of leadership in a variety of group test situations. Hence the current technique of group testing at SSBs provides for a basic series of group tasks which show up the difference between the heads and the tails; and this is followed by a confirmatory series of tasks which is necessary in order to sort out the borderline cases. The borderline case is, in fact, a standing problem in military selection, because a very thin line divides success from failure. Yet it is imperative that a reasonable standard of assessment should be maintained. One suggestion put forward in order to improve the efficiency of group testing techniques and to economise selection effort is that instead of putting all candidates through both the basic and confirmatory series, the obviously acceptable candidates and the obvious rejects could be picked off at the end of the basic series, so that the confirmatory series need be applied only to the borderline cases. Thus, if initially 50 candidates

appear in a particular batch, and the basic series show up 5 as obviously acceptable, and 5 as obvious rejects, the idea would be to put only the remaining 40 through the confirmatory series. Although on paper this may look like an economical way of G.T.O. testing, it will not in fact effect a substantial saving, because the same testing time will have to be allowed in schedule, whether 40 or 50 candidates are tested. The only saving would be in the number of groups tested, but this again would be negligible. Further, every candidate at the Selection Board expects to receive full consideration before he is rejected. To earmark a candidate for rejection at the early stages of the selection procedure would be to invite misgivings which, in a democratic country like ours, are capable of being expressed in the form of parliament questions. Thirdly, it must be emphasised that the reorganisation of groups at the end of the basic series, consequent on the exclusion of obviously acceptable persons and obvious rejects, will without doubt have an adverse psychological effect on the minds of candidates put through the confirmatory series. Fourthly, it is conceivable that a candidate who makes a favourable impression at the basic series may, at the command task in the confirmatory series show up his failings. Conversely, the obvious reject at the basic series may very possibly show his mettle while at the individual obstacles or some other task in the confirmatory series. Hence it is the current practice to consider the average performance of the candidate over the entire series of group tests. All things considered, it would appear that the disadvantages of the contemplated change in current group test procedures at Selection Boards outweigh the possible advantages.

Functions of a Military Leader : A large variety of functions fall to the lot of a military leader, whatever the size and composition of the formation may be. First, the leader has to coordinate the activities of the group. He has to ensure that the policies laid down for the group are being implemented. For example, a company commander is responsible for having the orders of the day carried out. Secondly, the leader functions as a planner. When some action has to be taken, it is his responsibility to think out what has to be done, how it is to be done, and assign to members of the group various specific things which they are supposed to do. Thirdly, the leader has to function as the source of readily available information regarding the technical requirements and the skills demanded of the group in the activities which it undertakes. A gunnery officer must, for instance, have at his finger tips all details pertaining to the guns under his control, so that, under his guidance, the men would fire the guns as and when they are called upon to do so. Fourthly, the leader has to function as the official spokesman of the group. He represents the point of view of the group to the higher authorities. Weakness in leadership occurs when members of the group gain independent access to higher levels, by passing the leader. Fifthly, the leader has to maintain control over the internal affairs and activities of the group. He

is in the strategic position where he functions as "censor" of in-group activities. Sixthly, the leader's powers of reward and punishment enable him to exercise strong disciplinary and motivational control over every group member. The strength of leadership would lie in being firm but gentle, taciturn but sympathetic. Seventhly, the leader plays an extremely important psychological role for the individual by relieving him of responsibilities for personal action which he would rather avoid. In return for allegiance, the leader frees the individual from making decisions. It is, however, a desirable practice in military societies that decisions affecting any vital matter concerning an individual should not be made by the leader without giving due consideration to the view point of that individual. Lastly, when things go well, and the group earns praise on account of its meritorious achievement, the leader shares the credit with members of the group. There is in fact the instance of an officer who declined to accept an honour conferred on him because he felt that in his act of gallantry, his comrades in arms also had a share. On the other hand, when blame falls on the group for something which has gone wrong the leader must of necessity accept the lion's share of the blame. Often indeed, he may have to function as a perfect target for the aggressive, frustrated, disappointed and disillusioned group. It will thus be seen that the military leadership role is a very complex one, calling for breadth of vision and insight into the intricacies of human nature.

GROUP MORALE

Criteria of Morale: Field Marshal Montgomery regarded morale as the steadfast determination of a group to achieve a preconceived aim. It is necessary, however, to define morale in terms of certain positive criteria. Since the conditions in which military groups function may vary from the settled, secure and well-established life in a cantonment to the inhospitable, hazardous and unpredictable environments of forward areas, the application of these criteria has necessarily to be made with due regard to the circumstances in which military groups operate. First, morale may be regarded as high when a group of individuals is held together by internal cohesiveness rather than by external pressure. The reason is obvious. The moment external pressure is relaxed, morale would crack up. This is exactly what happened in Germany towards the end of World War II when the German war machine collapsed as the severity of Allied strategic bombing was stepped up. Secondly, in a group where morale is high, internal frictions are at a minimal level. There may, of course be honest differences of opinion between individuals, but these differences would not be such that lead to frictions which actuate individuals to work at cross purposes. All members in a group with high morale will accept a common aim, sink their personal differences and work towards their common aim. Thirdly, within the group, different members exhibit friendly understanding of each other, which is not merely ex-

pressed in words or mutual praise but in a harmonious blending of their respective functions. A military group is not a mutual admiration society, but an organisation of individuals having specific tasks to perform. They cannot possibly achieve any degree of success unless different members see how what each one does fits in with the action pattern of the whole group. Fourthly, the ability of the group to adapt itself to changing conditions is a sign of high morale. It may happen, for instance, that a unit stationed in a Cantonment where life is quiet and settled is suddenly ordered off to a forward area. It is to be expected that such a change would have a disquieting effect on some members of the unit; but then, in a unit where morale is high, every one will soon get down to his job, and no one would waste his time trying to produce reasons why the move should be cancelled. Fifthly, where morale is high, there is a keen desire in members of the group to stay in the group, and to make their best contributions to the group. There is a saying in Hindustani that when a ship begins to sink, the rats in the ship are the first to escape. Much the same holds true of military groups. A unit in which desertions are numerous, or cases of sickness plentiful, is showing signs of low morale. Sixthly, it is generally true that the morale of a unit is a reflection of the personality of its commander. Under the command of an officer whose leadership qualities are of a high order, members of the unit will not fail to develop positive attitudes concerning the objectives of the group. It is indeed striking that under difficult conditions, men will make the most unexpected personal sacrifices in the interest of the group. A classical example of high morale is the sacrifice made by Indian sepoy during the siege of Arcot, at the stage when food supplies ran short.

Misleading Indicators of Morale : Sometimes, orderliness has been mistakenly regarded as the indicator of a healthy morale state. One might walk around the company lines in a regimental centre and find everything neatly and tidily laid out, but then it should not be forgotten that in a military unit, a certain standard of orderliness is insisted upon as a matter of discipline. Orderliness and efficiency are symptomatic of high morale, when they are the result not of the mere application of external pressures, nor even the effort to impress some distinguished visitor, but of a spontaneous desire in personnel to be orderly and efficient. Secondly, high productivity is not necessarily an indicator of high morale. In fact it may indicate state of positive despair when it is achieved by stringent measures of regimentation. The reports of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (1946) revealed a remarkable ability of German workers to produce at a high level, even under the desperate hardships of Allied bombing. Yet, it cannot be claimed that the morale of the German industrial worker was anything like what prevailed among Allied forces when they were subjected to German bombing on the shores of Dunkirk in 1940, or even the civilian population of London during the Battle of Britain. There seems little doubt from the data collected by the U.S.


Strategic Bombing Survey that great numbers of the German people were ready to quit long before their leaders permitted them to do so. This, then, was low morale. Thirdly, it is commonly thought that a high level of inter-personal tension within a group is a sign of bad morale. This would be misleading because tension as such cannot differentiate between good and bad morale. Tension between the leader and others; and for that matter tension arising out of conflicting self interests within the group, are dangerous symptoms. But conflicts arising from a concern regarding the achievement of the aim, or tension caused by criticism of the performance of other members may be, as it often is, an indication of high *esprit de corps*.

Negative Determinants of Morale: There are situations in which negative factors contribute to a state of high morale. It is well known for instance that in the face of a common danger, people who are otherwise at loggerheads will unite. Nevertheless, as French has pointed out, "fear and rational expediency are not adequate motives to weld together a people in cooperative effort even in the face of a common danger. If a people has not already some sense of solidarity, then fear is apt to result in panic rather than in common action." This is just what happened in 1940 to France, where the internal forces of disruption were too great. The unifying forces stirred up by hostile external pressure were insufficient to outweigh the internal disruptive forces. It is therefore a matter of prime importance for military commanders to watch the internal disruptive forces which are at work in their units and keep them under restraint, so that in a crisis these forces would not upset the unity which it is desirable to achieve in the group.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the pattern of human relationships within a military unit is unquestionably the most important single factor which contributes to the efficacy of the unit. Three factors which bear on human relations tie up closely with the military strength of any unit. First, the inter-personal relations prevalent between officers and officers, officers and men, and between men and men has much to do with the problems arising out of one individual's dealings with another. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that how one person deals with another will depend largely on how he sees the other man. Problems of inter-personal relations arise largely because others are viewed in the wrong perspective. Secondly, the military leader needs to possess certain essential qualities which enable him to exercise his functions truly and well. The qualities of leadership emerge as the group sets itself to solve some problem, and leadership is indicated in the individual who provides a workable solution to problems as they arise. Thirdly, a healthy morale state is without doubt the essential requirement for the efficacy of any military group. The outstanding fact here that a high level of internal cohesiveness, the absence of divisive frictions, adaptability to change, and steadfastness of purpose are essentials for the spirit of fellow feeling and mutual co-operation, without which no military group can ever hope to achieve its common purposes.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Deputy Minister
Defence Supplies

* May be located side by side with one or the other of the factories.

- Notes:—
1. The organisation for the other commodity divisions will be on similar lines to the ARMAMENTS Division, except for the METALS Division, which is shown in full.
 2. The Dir ARMAMENTS Research is a scientist specialising in armaments and works in closely with the Dir of Design and Development ARMAMENTS.
 3. METALS Division will supply metals to other divisions and the bulk of forgings. Duplication is essential for security reasons.

ORGANISATION FOR PRODUCTION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIALISATION

BY BRIGADIER A. S. NARAVANE

WITH the advent of rapid industrialisation in the 19th century, and the further phenomenal developments that took place in this connection during the first half of the 20th century, the countries in Europe and North America established a definite material lead over other countries of the world. Some other independent countries also succeeded in developing their industries in the wake of the more rapid progress of their neighbours, but the countries of Asia and Africa who were under the political control of European countries were used principally as suppliers of raw materials. The industrial progress of such countries was generally retarded, except where it suited the governing countries to develop certain industries to further their own industrial development. It is these countries which are referred to as under-developed in the general context today.

In so far as underdeveloped countries, which are even now under foreign rule, are concerned, equipping of their armed forces, such as they may be, is controlled by the governing countries, and the armed forces thus developed will generally be found to be designed to meet the requirements of imperial policing. In this paper we are concerned primarily with the countries in the process of industrialisation, which since the last war have achieved their independence.

An independent country needs armed forces for maintaining its territorial integrity and to repel external aggression, should such a development arise. If these countries are underdeveloped at present, they have the choice of importing their requirements if they can find some other foreign power prepared to sell them the necessary equipment, or alternatively they could develop their own industries to the extent necessary to meet their defence services requirements. Where it is not possible to do so in its entirety immediately, the shortfall has to be made up by import. Apart from the question of conserving assets abroad, which is a serious consideration, it is open to question whether an underdeveloped country attempting to obtain arms from abroad is likely to be given the latest that the foreign countries may have developed. The price demanded is also generally high. If an independent country relies to a large extent on imports to meet its armed forces requirements, difficulties are likely to arise if it is attacked by another power which for various reasons has better relations with the nations who are in a position to supply the arms. In fact, its reaction to aggression by its neighbours will to a large extent be governed by the attitude and whims of such

powers. This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs from the point of view of any self-respecting country. Therefore, the answer would appear to lie in developing industries to the maximum extent possible, so that in addition to making available the consumer goods necessary for civilian consumption, such industrial development will also enable its armed forces to be independent of foreign sources of supply for their equipment and stores.

In the case of a country which is in the process of industrialisation there are three major considerations which have to be kept in mind when planning any expansion of capacity or introduction of new items of manufacture. They are the requirements of trained man-power, technical knowhow, and plant and machinery for taking on the added commitments. Unless these problems are tackled with forethought they are liable to hinder rapid industrialisation, and attainment of self-sufficiency in capital and consumers' goods and armed forces requirements.

MANPOWER

The requirement of manpower is a most important factor and ought to be given a little time for consideration. Manpower can be broadly divided into four groups, namely, the top executives, secondly planners, designers, and engineers, thirdly supervisory staff and fourthly the tradesmen. In regard to the first category, there should not be much difficulty in finding this category from the existing industries. In regard to the engineers and planners and the like, these have to come generally from the engineering degree and diploma holders, and it is possible that a country will find it difficult to obtain a sufficient number of this type of personnel with adequate practical experience. Therefore, in planning any expansion, attention should be paid to the establishment of engineering colleges and institutions to boost the output of this category. Thereafter they should be put through an apprenticeship and taught to work with their hands, so that in addition to planning and designing they can also understand the dignity of labour and the problems involved in the manufacturing processes. In regard to the supervisory staff they may be found from experienced tradesmen or possibly from the diploma holders of the second group. The latter should be given such jobs in order to gain working experience before finding their rightful place amongst the planners and designers. In regard to the last category, namely, the tradesmen, it is essential that a drive is undertaken to start institutions for the training of such personnel. It is also a help if personnel of the last three categories could be sent to foreign countries to learn by actually working in factories engaged in the production of items which it is proposed to take up for manufacture. Care should be taken at this stage that these personnel do not become "White Collar" gentry instead of learning to use their hands and brains to learn a specific trade.

TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW

In regard to technical know-how, there are different ways of attaining the desired goal. One is to start with basic research and work through the development processes and thus evolve one's own technique. This, however, is likely to take much time, and keeping in mind the desirability of rapid development it would probably pay handsome dividends to accept the fact that certain countries being technically more advanced could help us out, if we agree to pay them the requisite fees which may be in the form of an initial order and royalty, or alternatively it may be just the question of royalty. So long as the ultimate management does not pass into foreign hands for any length of time and one's own personnel are trained quickly, it is felt that buying the knowhow and technique would possibly be the most satisfactory way of achieving rapid establishment of production of various items.

PLANT AND MACHINERY

In regard to plant and machinery, though a country may have to import its requirements in the first instance any further plant and machinery needed for expansion should be manufactured in the country itself, if necessary by bringing in a few foreign technicians to help out with technical advice. Any continued import of plant and machinery over a period of time without giving scope to one's own people to use their initiative may result in that country being constantly dependent on some other power whenever it wishes to expand production. The acquiring of plant and machinery is a costly process, and the sooner a country achieves success in manufacturing its own requirements the sooner will it become independent of foreign interference in its own progress. This is quite apart from the saving of foreign exchange, which is another important consideration.

Assuming that a country is industrially developed or is in the process of doing so, there are several methods available for the development and manufacture of the equipment and stores required by the armed forces. In brief, these can be stated to be development and manufacture within the defence industries, or manufacture under licence from foreign countries within the same industries, manufacture in public sector industries from developments sponsored in the defence industries, and lastly development and manufacture in the private industries, or only manufacture from design and development carried out within the defence industries. Each of these methods has implications which are set forth in the succeeding paragraphs.

DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE IN THE DEFENCE INDUSTRIES

Development and manufacture within the defence industries represents one of the methods of meeting armed forces requirements. However,

it must be remembered that as the requirements of the armed forces are generally many times greater in war than in peace, it would be uneconomical to develop defence industries in peace to the extent necessary to meet services requirements in full during war. The cost of such a plan would be prohibitive, and the cost of production taking overheads into account would be quite uneconomical. Most countries develop their industries so that the defence installations can meet peace requirements of specialised equipment, and educate the trade at the same time, so that in an emergency the latter can switch over from its normal peacetime activities to the war requirements of the Services, without undue delay or strain. Both working in unison are then in a position to meet services requirements in war in full.

MANUFACTURE UNDER LICENCE FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES

In so far as manufacture under licence within the defence industries is concerned it certainly reduces the research and design problem, but it in no way eases the problem of meeting the total war requirements by the defence industries alone. In some respects it may cause an atrophy of the indigenous research and development potential through lack of experience and practice.

MANUFACTURE IN GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIES

Under this category we consider all government owned industries other than those controlled by the defence ministry. In peace, such industries will normally be encouraged to produce stores required by various government departments and may utilise their spare capacity for the production of equipment required for the general market. An example of such government factories is railway workshops. Other public sector utilities where they exist could also be grouped under this heading. In war these could also switch over to war production.

DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE IN PRIVATE INDUSTRIES

Activity under this head would generally be concerned with the development and manufacture of stores and equipment required by the consumer goods market, and as such they have to survive severe competition. A number of the items required by the armed forces are met from normal production. It will be found that generally for any given job of work they evolve the best and the most economical technique, though the degree of safety factor demanded by the armed forces may not be built into the stores manufactured. The civil industries could change over to the manufacture of one or the other of the multifarious specialised items that are required by the armed forces of a country, provided this is given encouragement in peace. As an example, if a country has a highly developed aircraft industry, it will be found that without placing specific orders for armed forces requirements they will develop aircraft which

could with little modification be adapted for air force requirements. Electronics is another example where trade can supply the armed forces requirements. Other examples can be given where the change over is more radical. For example, a factory engaged in the production of sewing machines could with some modifications change over to the manufacture of components required for certain types of arms and ammunition, or a clothing factory engaged in the manufacture of civilian clothes could quite easily switch over to the production of services uniforms, packaging materials and so on. If the change over represents any special problems then it may be necessary in peace to place orders on selected firms to give them training in specialised production to meet armed forces requirements. This is commonly referred to as placing of educational orders. Instances can also be cited where the private industries could be set a problem, the solution of which will serve a definite military requirement in respect of equipment. The development of radar equipment is an example of such cooperation in the U.K.

PHASES OF DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

From the birth of an idea to the evolution of a product to meet a specific requirement the processes involved are statement of a requirement, research, design, development, production and inspection. Research may consist of adjudgement of the practicability of an idea, scientific considerations, and so on. From there we proceed to design and development up to the stage where a prototype is produced. Thereafter, when technical and 'user' trials have been completed, the final drawings are prepared and we are then ready to proceed to the production of the item in question. In order to ensure that the specified materials have been used and that the specifications as laid down have been adhered to within permissible tolerances we have inspection. This may be at every stage of production, for example, the inspection process for a light machine gun, or it may be an end product inspection as is done in the case of vehicles.

ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS

Pure research is a continuing process and is best left unfettered under an independent head responsible to the head of the organisation or ministry. The pure research wing will investigate such problems as may be referred to it by the user or production agency, and communicate the substance of its findings to the originator. This, of course, is in addition to such research as may be carried out on its initiative.

As stated in the previous paragraph, apart from stating the requirement, there are five elements generally involved in the production of any given item of equipment. It is next for consideration how best these five requirements can be met. For example, should applied research, design and development projects be carried out by one independent organisation, and then production and inspection be made the responsibility of another

entirely separate organisation for all the various commodities that may be required. This has certain advantages such as a possible economy in personnel. It is also contended by some that the best brains are then devoted to the problem of applied research and development without the petty snags that the practical production aspect involves. The applied research and design agency can let its ideas flow in producing a stores to meet a given requirement. It is then up to the production agency to manufacture this item in sufficient quantities and of adequate quality to meet the services requirements. In so far as disadvantages are concerned it would appear that it is like a house divided against itself in that the scientist and the designer may evolve a masterpiece of equipment but which from the practical engineering point of view is not possible to produce in adequate quantity or cheaply enough or with the material indigenously available. Such a state of affairs is not conducive to producing the best results. In the end, it is possible that between the arguments we may have to go without the equipment or accept an equipment which is not ideally suited to our requirement. This can have disastrous consequences in so far as armed forces requirements are concerned.

Another way of tackling the organisational problem is to divide the requirements into groups commodity-wise and then concentrate the research, design, development, production and inspection under a single authority responsible for all aspects of developing the products in that commodity group. The advantages are that there is one person who is looking at a product from the inception of the idea to the delivery of the product to the user and he views it from a purely practical point of view. Should there be a shortfall, then it is possible to trace specifically where the trouble had arisen. The disadvantages are that there is liable to be a certain amount of duplication of staff and that production capacity may not always be utilised to the fullest extent. This system works in private industry where competition is severe, and one can see no reason why it cannot be adapted to warlike equipment production in the defence industries.

A SUGGESTED SET-UP

The remarks above in my opinion quite clearly indicate the type of organisation that is required for making use of the natural ingenuity of a people both from the scientific and production angle and achieve maximum progress and output. Such an organisation would be equally applicable to governmental and private industry. Given on page 330 is a chart of what I feel might be the appearance of a family tree of an organisation engaged in the production of munitions of war in ordnance factories and so on. The nomenclatures and designations may vary from country to country depending on usage, and the size of the organisation will also vary depending on the scope of production.

It is worthwhile looking at the chart with a view to studying the implications. In the first place it will be noticed that at the top of the tree is shown "Ministry of Defence." Some may feel that as the whole business is concerned with the planning, design, development and production of equipment and stores, whether it would not be better to convert the whole organisation into a separate Ministry of Munitions Production. Another alternative is to place the organisation under the Ministry of Industry. If the country is large and the needs are great in volume, it may be worthwhile having a separate ministry. On the other hand, if the needs are very small it may be more economical and satisfactory to place munitions production under the Ministry of Industry.

The second point of interest relates to the positioning of the scientist. The Scientific Adviser as the head of the Scientific Organisation is placed side by side with the production head. This scientist is primarily concerned with scientific operational research from the point of view of production. He should have under him an organisation capable of guiding pure and operational research in their own and national institutions. Scientists given to each commodity production division are more concerned with applied research in respect of the commodity with which they are associated. They should work in closely with their associated design and development element. They could also refer specific problems to the scientific advisers if their own resources are inadequate to find the answer to a particular problem.

It will be seen from the chart that the factories are placed directly under the production section of a particular commodity division. This does not imply that there will not be inter-factory consultation and placing of orders to obtain the specialist products of one required for the finished product of another, but it does imply that the primary responsibility for the satisfactory production of a given item is shouldered by a particular division. It does not also rule out distribution of production to counter enemy air or ground threat. For example, the Metals Division will produce metals, machine tools and gauges, and undertakes forgings of all natures. It will be noticed that in addition to this each commodity division has its own metal and forging establishments as specialists and to aid duplication from the security aspect.

The chart shows certain broad commodity divisions. Depending on the circumstances prevailing in a particular country, it may become necessary to add more divisions, or where the requirements are small, a division could be dropped and the product concerned could be obtained from the trade. The purposes of the Planning and Coordination, Administrative and Financial divisions need little elaboration.

It will be seen therefore that an organisation to produce armed forces requirements set up on the lines indicated will stand up to the

test of flexibility, efficiency and maximum production within the resources available.

A point of view has been advanced that production and inspection should not be under one head. There is much to be said on both sides, but given good-will and a strict observance of the principles of inspection, the set up suggested in the article should give satisfactory results. If, however, it is desired to separate the two functions, then all the directors of inspection could be placed under an inspection division and suballotted to work with the commodity divisions.

CONCLUSION

In brief, a country which finds itself in an industrially underdeveloped state at the time of attaining independence, must strive to build up its industries in such a way as to reduce its dependence on foreign powers for equipping its armed forces. This is necessary in order that such a country may be able to defend its independence and territorial integrity without being over dependent on foreign aid. The problems of ensuring an adequacy of technically trained manpower, obtainment of technical knowhow and the initial supply and subsequent build up of plant and machinery need careful consideration and forethought in planning, if these factors are not to constitute a bottleneck to rapid industrialisation, and attainment of self sufficiency in capital and consumer's goods and armed forces requirements. Generally speaking, the best answer is given by raising the general industrial production in the country, with certain industries being specifically developed to meet the services requirements of specialised stores not produced for general consumption. A close linking of applied research, design, development, production and inspection on a commodity basis appears to hold out prospects of the best results. Whether such industries should be handled by the Defence Ministry or Ministry of Industry will depend on the size of the problem.

The article puts forth certain problems and suggested solutions to them, which it is considered have a bearing on the subject. The requirement of each country is likely to be different and therefore a solution will have to be evolved best suited to the problem and genius of the country concerned.

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA

BY MAJOR EDGAR O'BALLANCE

HOW do the two Communist giants get on together? Are they the best friends, uneasy bedfellows or potential enemies? It is difficult to say with any degree of accuracy. Both countries have much in common, both are secretive and have strict censorship, and both fear and dislike the Western democracies. Some account of relations so far between them may be of help to indicate how matters stand at the moment, and more important still, how they may stand in the future.

Whilst most of us are familiar with many aspects of Russia and Russian foreign policy, we know far less about Red China, a country even more remote and secretive. Until very recently, Red China has never seriously been thought of as a country dangerous to world peace, and the 'Yellow Peril' was regarded as something of a joke. Red China made many boasts, but they were not taken too seriously either. Of late, however, we are suddenly made aware that there might be something in what she has been saying.

Red China has been a fact since 1949, when Mao Tse Tung's armies swept the Nationalists from the mainland, forcing them to take refuge on the island of Formosa, but the Chinese Communist Party dated back farther than that, being established in 1921. It functioned as a purely political party until Chiang Kai Shek tried to dissolve it by force in 1927. He was unsuccessful, and the Communists established themselves in isolated areas where they raised armed forces and managed to thwart Nationalist attempts to eliminate them. Eventually, most of the active Communist elements were driven to take refuge in the north-west of China, where throughout the Sino-Japanese campaigns and World War II, they consolidated, expanded and prepared.

The Chinese civil war, between the Communists and the Nationalists began in earnest in 1946, and by the end of 1949, the Communist leader, Mao Tse Tung, was able to proclaim the official existence of the "People's Republic of China".

How had Russia assisted him, and what was her attitude during these momentous events?

Until 1927, when the Communists were functioning merely as a political party, they drew inspiration from Moscow, and based their doctrine on the teachings of Marx and Lenin, but as far as can be gathered little practical help in any quantity or of any value was forthcoming from Russia. True, Russia herself had huge internal problems and perhaps was not in a position to do much. It is thought that such help as was given was not proportionately more than was given to other Communist parties

in other countries at the time, which when it is all boiled down, did not amount to much that was of any practical use.

After 1927, when the Chinese Communists were isolated in their centres of resistance in the remoter parts of the country, struggling desperately to maintain themselves and keep the Nationalists at bay, Russia does not appear to have given them any help at all worth noting either. Inspiration still came from Moscow, but the Chinese Communists were in fact almost completely cut off from outside sources.

In 1935, when they had established themselves in Shensi province, which bordered on Russian territory, one might have thought what a splendid opportunity presented itself for the Russians to do something for their hard-pressed comrades, but again there is little evidence that practical help was forthcoming. A steady trickle of arms and supplies is alleged to have been sent, but most of the Chinese Communists' arms were those they had captured either from the Nationalists or the Japanese. Russian arms were remarkably rare.

That Russia did not take full advantage of this golden opportunity rather points to the fact that the neglect was deliberate. Whether this was because right from the beginning the Chinese Communists developed their own independent doctrine and were not content to slavishly accept without question the current Russian interpretation, or for some other reason Stalin did not wish to see the rise of another strong, independent Communist state, it is hard to say.

During the last World War, Russia had a good excuse for not aiding the Chinese Communists, as in company with Nationalist China, she was one of the Allies, but even after the termination of these hostilities, when the Chinese civil war began, aid was not forthcoming. Practically everything the Chinese Communists did or achieved they did alone through their own efforts and initiative. Stalin looked on enigmatically at their struggles.

However, once the civil war was over and Red China had become an accomplished fact, the Russian attitude changed. Mao Tse Tung went to Moscow, not as an impoverished, hunted guerilla leader, but as the head of a large, independent state. The Cold War was at its height and this may have influenced Stalin, who, in February 1950, concluded a defensive alliance with Red China. This kept Red China out of the neutral camp, but at this stage it did not appear that Stalin intended to go out of his way to be over helpful.

By the end of 1950, Red China was involved in the Korean War, whereupon Russia's attitude became warmer and arms, aircraft, tanks and other war material were poured in for use in Korea. It was, in fact, only the timely arrival of these large deliveries that saved the Chinese Red Army from defeat.

In this era of warmth, which began in 1950, Russia regarded herself as a helpful Communist friend and trade pacts were concluded. Russia agreed to send technicians, machinery and other aid in return, usually, for raw materials.

China is an agricultural country, but has deposits of minerals which she was anxious to develop. An industrial complex in Manchuria had been inherited, and the government was keen to develop other industries throughout the country to complement the agricultural base. Russian help was asked for and given, for this purpose and within a short period about 120 industrial undertakings were established, covering such items as coal, oil, electrical and other forms of engineering, radar and various types of assembly plants, about half of which were in full production by 1958.

In February 1959, another trade pact was signed by which Russia agreed to give help to Red China amounting to another £450 million, to start and equip another 78 industrial enterprises. This too, to be paid for in raw materials.

After the Korean War, Red China asked Russia to re-organise her army, which has been done on Russian lines, except that there is by no means the same degree of mechanisation. In fact, the bulk of the Red Chinese army (which may be about 4 million strong, with a supporting militia of about 10 million) consists of infantry armed only with small arms: not all the militia is yet armed, but soon will be.

One might think that the policy of mutual support and aid would breed a happier atmosphere and dispell the existing coolness between these two Communist countries. This does not seem to have happened, and during last year (1958) cracks have begun to show on the smooth facade of friendship. The Russian technicians in China keep strictly to themselves, for example, and are tolerated for the importance of the jobs they are doing, but there is an absence of spontaneous warmth, such as one might expect between Communist brothers. It is strictly business, and there seems to be an uneasy under-current of suspicion constantly lurking beneath the surface between them. Mutual confidence is lacking and it is as though neither seems sure that the other is not going to play her false. The traditional Chinese dislike of foreigners lingers on.

At first, Red China, completely absorbed in her own problems for the time being in a restrained sort of way seemed to be willing to accept Russian leadership, although it cannot be said that Mao ever thoughtlessly echoed Russian policy. Mao was polite, but never effusive.

So far, you might remark, there seem to be no differences worth mentioning, only a vague suspicion that all is not well. True, the Red Chinese government loudly complained over the way Russia insisted on the re-payments and interest on her Korean War loans.

However, of late, Mao seems less inclined than ever to fall in with the Russian views, and has made it plain that he is not the 'junior partner'. The reason for this is ideological. The Chinese type of Communism ("to each according to his need") differs from the weaker, existing Russian brand ("to each according to his work"), and the Red Chinese feel that the Russians are backsliders who have baulked short of true Communism.

Red China has boasted that she has eliminated the landlords a statement the world was prepared to accept, especially as she admitted killing some 2 million of them. The correct figure is thought to be much nearer 14 million. In addition, Red China claimed to have eliminated other reactionaries, broken down family loyalties, weeded out corruption and herded the bulk of the population into communes. The world smiled superciliously at these extravagant claims, as did those who knew the old China, and also as did Russia, no doubt.

Recently these smiles have faded. After abolishing all private property, the Red Chinese government established cooperative farms, on Russian lines, owned by the state, but last year it went further than the Russians have dared to go. In April 1958, communes were set up. This experiment was successful and the latest figures indicate that about 90% of the Chinese population is now herded into some 23,393 communes, in which the people are organised into 'work brigades', which are sub-divided into 'work units', each of which perform set tasks for the good of the country.

Russia must eye this extreme step with deep misgivings as it means that she had lost the ideological leadership of the Communist World.

This is not all. From a practical point of view, and Russia is a very practical nation, she sees a greater danger still, that of the rapidly expanding Chinese population. The population of Russia is about 200 million (round figures), and it will not be very much more in 1980, by which time it is estimated that the population of Red China may be about 1000 million. Already, with a population of 600 million (Mao claims it to be 650 million) the Chinese have hardly enough to eat, and so it seems that Chinese territorial expansion may be inevitable.

Where will she expand, and in which direction?

Towards South-East Asia, and then perhaps India is the obvious danger to Western minds, but Russia is immediately concerned about her large, uninhabited spaces adjacent to China, which must seem to beckon temptingly to Mao as he looks outward for living space.

Does Russia completely trust Red China? This is doubtful, and as a guide one may quote the fact that so far she has refused to let her have nuclear power. With nuclear power, Red China indeed would be a world power to reckon with.

These few facts must lead one to the conclusion that relations between Russia and Red China, which were cool, or even stand-offish until 1950, improving from that date without ever becoming really warm and cordial, are now deteriorating. It could be said that the two countries are acquaintances who work together without falling out, but they are not close friends.

It may even be true to say that the focus of the Cold War is changing, as Russia looks uneasily over her shoulder at the waking giant on her back door step.

COORDINATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE PLANNING

BY MAJOR M. R. P. VARMA

THE recent extensive and real threat to the country from the Northern borders by a major power has already led to the total reconsideration at national level of our long term National Defence plans and the short term policies to be adopted.

The size of the threat and the vehemence of the public reaction against it has resulted in a review of the entire gamut of present National Defence arrangements and the re-casting of future requirements. In fact, it is true to say that for the first time in the independent history of the nation our Service Chiefs have been charged with the preparation of a complete and finite plan for the defence of our country against a major power equipped with all the weapons of modern war. Happily, the national economy is also approaching a stage where industrial output makes such planning feasible and something more than a planner's pipe dream.

In the context of a sovereign independent country aiming at self sufficiency in peace and war, the concept of ultimate National Defence is finite. However, perhaps no country is prepared or able to incur the expense of armament in peace since modern weapons are fast depreciating non-productive 'assets' with hardly any civil application—fighter aircraft, submarines, guided missiles.

Prior to 1939 there were two contingencies of which either might form the premise for defence planning: aggressive, expansionist aims as characterised by Germany, Japan and Italy at that time and the determination, while avoiding war as long as possible, to fight for national ideals and conceptions of political freedom should no other course of action remain. The latter policy characterised the United Kingdom and, of course, it characterises our own country today.

But in 1960 the implications involved in defence planning at national level are already infinitely more complex and intricate for us than they were for the British in 1939 due to the pace of technological advancement over the past 20 years. The National Defence Plan, to have any meaning, must be fashioned and guided by experts: it must be dynamic, changing, adjusting and modifying with national industrial output and expansion, the evolution of strategical concepts, tactical developments and the vagaries of the international political situation. It must not grab a lion's share of national output in peace since that would only retard general economic growth and thereby damage the real military potential. But, nevertheless, the National Defence Plan should enable the Government to stand poised and ready to appropriate in the event of war every useful human and material resource that might be useful for the common war effort. It was such a concept and determination that saved the United Kingdom after Dunkirk—but the concept had been taking shape since the

early '30's while its birth is to be traced to the Committee of Imperial Defence formed in 1904 after the debacle of the Boer War and with the lessons of the Crimean War still in living memory.

The quotation—popular in these times—that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty may not be an entirely happy observation on man's philosophical and political state but it reflects the only attitude for National Defence planners. An Army (or Air Force or Navy) has been likened to a chimney in summer and it is a poor house that lacks a chimney when chill wind begins to blow from the North. And so, in the same way as the Planning Commission was established to formulate and regulate the grand design for national development; we now need a permanent agency for coordinated and integrated National Defence planning. This agency should either be an integral part of the Planning Commission or a separate specialised agency. To my mind, the former arrangement is more logical and appropriate. It should be charged with the preparation of a series of National Defence plans to give ultimate self-sufficiency and the making of a shadow 5 Year Plan for application in the event of war.

The first task of this agency would be to collate the progressive needs of the Services in terms of materials, manpower and equipment and to ensure that these are intelligible to industry. This entails a mammoth effort that will yield two immediate results: standardisation and the maximum utilization of existing installed industrial capacity. To take a simple example: a multitude of different firms produce steam valves and similar items for railway, marine and static engines; most of them work far below their installed output capacity and waste time changing jigs and tools for different sizes of products. This may be permissible in peace but for war production there can be no wasting of idle steam and a re-division of labour and re-allocation of contracts must be made so that each factory unit produces the maximum output of a specified size range of steam valves.

The agency will also be responsible for such long term matters as the allocation of basic materials in peace and war for defence purposes; stockpiling of strategic materials whose source of supply is likely to be interrupted, especially if that source be abroad; vital job analysis statistics according to a job analysis related to war production; continuous liaison with the Planning Commission proper and for the coordination needed in the multitude of private and public installations engaged in research, development and production of commodities that have a military application in war.

In the short term sphere, the main task of the agency will be to assess and limit the foreign purchases that involve foreign exchanges in short supply. The agency will itself prefer to establish indigenous production as the preferable alternative but the new conditions of defence may make some purchases 'inescapable'. For example between 1947 and about 1958 we ran our wartime fleet of vehicles literally 'to death' at the expense of an enormous EME effort but the cost was mainly in rupees.

In the meantime, the foreign exchange thus axed went into vehicle jigs, tools and technical 'know-how' with the result that today most of the Services vehicle requirements are met from within the country. We were not able to do this for specialised vehicles, however. But there is unity over the view that, for instance, we should henceforth make do with our fleet of surface naval craft and make our own efforts to design and manufacture submarines that are atomic powered in preference to acquiring further available surface ships from friendly powers.

If it is to succeed, the coordinating and liaison functions of the agency must be drafted in simple, practical terms. These must go deep and reach the very lathes and drawing rooms of factories, laboratories and research institutions in peacetime. The supreme example of this, which we should emulate, is the integration between the British Aircraft Industry and the Royal Air Force in the 1930's which culminated in the crucial victory of the Battle of Britain won, in the balance, by the superiority of the RAF Spitfire over its German counterparts: the Spitfire which was the joint outcome of their Aircraft Industry, RAF test pilots and technical brother officers. This is a lesson of before the last war that we should learn before the next. It is being applied in our own aircraft industry but needs wider application in all spheres: wartime needs are so enormous—in scope as much as quantity—that they will be obtainable only from an industry that has been guided and directed in peacetime according to a prepared plan of the Services' needs in war. We should 'gear up' now.

It will be expedient to charge the agency with specific complex projects such as rockets, space missiles, atomic applications, etc. This will avoid the frittering away of talent and other resources in dissipating multiplication such as beset American Space programmes after the war. Similarly, exclusively 'military' items such as artillery pieces, shells, torpedoes, guided missiles should be entrusted to the agency for development under a professional "user" head.

The nation has shown that it supports the Government to the hilt in the mission of withstanding any foreign threat irrespective of the magnitude or direction of that danger. The Services stand ready and they are equipped and fully prepared to fight: those in the know, affirm that the Services will fight even better than they did in Burma, Africa and Italy. But much of the present equipment that is now turned to guard our frontiers is newly purchased at great cost from abroad. It is neither acceptable to national pride, nor a justifiable military risk, that we should continue to rely on the procurement from abroad of any major item of equipment. The only acceptable thing is that the time lag between importing and establishing our own production should be reduced to the minimum; that our future needs be constantly and accurately assessed, interpreted and coordinated and the implementation of measures needed for war production be planned and perfected in advance. By this means the national economy may be converted to a national defence economy even as the first sentry challenges the first enemy who dares to invade our borders. To this end a National Defence planning agency should be established without delay.

A CAREER IN THE ARMY

BY MAJOR BHARTENDRA SINGH

THE strength of the Indian Officer Cadre of the Indian Army has risen from a handful of KCIOs in 1921, to approximately 12500 KCIOs and ICOs, in 1958. The problems relating to conditions of service and terms of retirement of these officers have, therefore, increased in magnitude in the same proportion as their number. To start with, whatever rules were made for the British Officers of the Indian Army were generally made applicable to their Indian counterparts in a modified form. With the complete nationalisation of our Army, and growing numbers which will be shortly due for retirement, attention has been recently focussed on career planning and retirement. Notwithstanding the basic structure of the service career some effort has been successfully made in raising the retirement age and increasing the substantive cadre of senior ranks. The basic structure with regard to intake, service and retirement, however, remain unchanged. Time has come when we must shed 'Modified for India' outlook, and bring to bear dynamic thinking on this subject. There is need for recasting the entire concept of 'service career' and evolve a system which will make the services more efficient. The aim of this paper is to suggest one such system and consider its pros and cons.

PRESENT SYSTEM

The service career starts at the age of 19-21, and ends for the majority at 48 or early fifties. Throughout this period, the officer serves in the arm or service in which commissioned except for short spells on the staff or extra regimental employment. The Services Selection Boards, select suitable potential officer material for the National Defence Academy. During the stay in the Academy—for a period between 2-4 years—the cadet develops officer like character qualities and in the end is commissioned into an arm or service. In majority of the cases, assignment to a particular arm or service is largely a matter of luck.

An officer commands a platoon or equivalent, till he is 34-36 years of age depending on his age at entry. He commands a company or equivalent in an average age of 38. On average, two third of each year's intake continue to hold this appointment till they retire. The training of officers is the responsibility of their respective arm or corps, but for a greater majority, there are no courses after the age of 38 or so. The employment on various assignments is controlled by the Military Secretary's Branch.

DRAWBACKS

The Company Commander who is likely to lead his company in operations, is almost twice the age of the riflemen under his command, since a rifleman is enrolled at the age of 17. His mental enthusiasm to battle and his physical stamina, cannot be of the same quality as that

of the men he commands. The stress and strain of battle conditions produce varied reactions on mental complexes, and bodies of people of different age and service groups. Although it may be argued with some justification that a matured person is more competent to lead a 'combat team', he cannot have the same dash and 'could not care less' attitude of his fifteen year's junior. A vast majority of company commanders who did well in assaults during World War II were between the ages 20-30 years.

The system of assigning young officers from the Academy to various arms and services, based on the wastage rate and overall deficiencies is not adequate. Studies on 'Job Analyses' and 'Job Summaries' reveal, that the requirement for commanding administrative installations like the units of Army Service Corps or the Ordnance Corps, are quite different to those required of officers in command of the sub-units of armoured corps, artillery and infantry. On the basis of "Job Analyses" it is possible to classify all appointments in the army in two classes viz. Commanders and Administrators.

Neither at the Academy nor at the Services Selection Boards, an individual comes into grip with real situations which he has to face later on during his service. He is not assessed in the correct perspective and therefore the forecast is not likely to be reliable. Perhaps, at the age of 23 an individual is not enough seasoned to show what he is best suited for, as his future depends to a large extent on the environments through which he passes between the ages 23 and 30.

There is no incentive for an officer of the rank of a Major and not considered suitable to be appointed to the selection grade of Lieutenant Colonels. Such officers will be in great majority and will be filling in appointments which otherwise can give valuable experience to future commanders.

The Annual Confidential Report in its present form is inadequate. People handling it in the Military Secretary's Branch cannot handle it without being given specialist training similar to that given to the members of 'Personnel Department' in some industrial concerns in the Western countries.

In the existing system, there is no way to discover outstanding officers with a view to reinforce and readjust their progress. Promotion on basis of seniority alone, as is largely the case now, is likely to kill incentive and blunt interest. Training for higher command and staff, commensurate with IQ and capabilities of an individual must be continuous, progressive, and timely.

A SOLUTION

The aim should be to pick potential officer like material bearing in mind the technical requirements of the services. Train and season in contact with troops, employing him on jobs commensurate with his buoyant

mental and physical make up. Reassess, sift and give him a career up to 55, making fullest use of his experience in a job that suits him most.

All regular officers should be offered a career lasting up to 35 years. Assuming that average age at entry is 20, they should be allowed to serve up to the age of 55 provided they keep themselves medically fit.

Depending on the forecast of vacancies in different arms and services, courses at the Academy should be subscribed on the basis of technical aptitude tests, to be conducted by the Services Selection Boards in addition to the existing tests. The course at the Academy should remain unaltered except that on any course there should be two broad categories of officers viz. the technical and the non-technical. It would then be possible to confirm or modify the aptitude test findings, and also to guide and facilitate development of the mind in that direction.

All young officers from the Academy, except those of technical arms and services such as the Engineers, Signals and Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, should be commissioned in one of the arms viz. armoured corps, artillery and infantry. These officers hereinafter referred to as General Service Officers, should spend first thirteen years of their service with troops in their respective units.

This period of thirteen years should culminate in command of sub-unit of infantry company level, and should be spent as now, except that those showing promise should also do two years on grade 3 staff of an active field formation. This would mean that an officer would be promoted to the rank of a Major on completion of ten years service.

On the basis of performance of the General Service Officers, during the first thirteen years, they would be sorted out in one of the following categories :—

- (a) Commanders
- (b) Administrators

They would spend the rest 22 years and get further advancements up to and inclusive of Lieutenant Colonels level in these branches only. Beyond this rank, and at each stage of further promotion, categories (a) could be converted to (b).

'Job Analyses' will be necessary to ascertain what exact mental and physical make up is required for each job in the army. Possible grouping might be as under :—

- (a) Commanders

Commanding Officers and Second-in-Command of arms, first and second grade staffs of active formations up to corps only; commanders of all formations of brigade and higher; PSOs and some directors at Army Headquarters.

- (b) Administrators

Commanding Officers and Second-in-Command of services and service units, Adjutants and Quartermasters of all units, all staffs and EREs not covered in (a) above e.g. record officers.

Pay and rank structure for service after 13 years will have to be revised. Officers in category (a) above should be given command allowance while those under (b) should get a regular increment up to a certain time and also an allowance compatible with the responsibility a job carries.

The technical officers will follow a course similar to above in their respective branches only. The exact details can only be worked out when the statistics are available.

SOME PROS AND CONS

The proposed scheme by catering for employment upto a retiring age comparable with the civil services, will attract as good material as is available for the civil services. It will also ensure that those who join the army do not suffer from a fear for looking for a job to substantiate their pension at a age when they need the finances most for the education of their children and such other exigencies. It is ridiculous to offer a Police Sub-Inspector job in the Railway Police, to a retired officer.

The scheme ensures fullest exploitation of the trained man-power potential of the army. It ensures, that younger people full of enthusiasm and vigour are available to command subunits needing such vigorous leadership. The more matured are delegated responsibility on the staff and concerning handling of property, stores and so on. Because all administrators would have spent first thirteen years of their life in command of troops of sub-units of arms, they would be in better position to appreciate what goes on at the receiving end.

In appointing people to jobs, after assessing the requirements of a job through 'Job Analyses', the plan tailors a suit to fit the customer, rather than undertaking mass production on the basis of averages.

On the debit side, there could be lot of opposition from diehard conservatives. The 'diehards' because being used to a system they do not wish to change, even if the change is for the better. Some people may not think about the proposal because it is too late in their life to be benefited by it. The extra expenditure on pays will be offset in the long run by lesser expenditure on pensions.

CONCLUSION

For a voluntary army, if we have to obtain officers in numbers and of the quality which we require, we have to offer conditions comparable with the civil services. The general atmosphere of intellectual sterility, the dull routine of army life, rigours of living conditions mostly away from families, and the slow promotion by seniority where mediocrity succeeds no less surely than brilliant attainments, are some of the deterrents to production of first class officers. The scheme suggested above, will help to make the army career, reasonably attractive without putting the country to greater expense. It may be regarded as somewhat sweeping, but in the interest of efficiency it should get the support, even if it entails considerable initial spade work.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN PEACE

BY MAJOR SUSHIL BHATTACHARYYA, EME, psc.

THIS paper is intended to discuss the various ways and means by which the present system of peace-time administration and procedure can be modified in order to allow more time for training for war.

It is generally accepted in the Army that, in peace time, the efficiency of a field unit as a fighting force is assessed by the standard of its administration. A unit/sub-unit commander spends considerable time for safeguarding administrative reputation at the expense of time for training. At the same time, staffs are evolving almost everyday, new methods for carrying out army routine. These instructions ultimately reach sub-unit commanders, requiring them to carry out more checking, to prepare more ledgers and documents. The accounting procedure is complicated and laborious. Paper work is enormous. The number of administrative inspections of units have reached beyond logical sense. The establishment of units has not increased and the junior commanders in close contact with troops are involved in clerical work. Consequently, an infantry battalion/company commander can utilise only 30 per cent of the total annual officers-hours available for the purpose of training troops for combat preparedness.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

One of the most accepted requirements of a system of command is that a sub-unit commander should not be required to carry out orders other than those of his own immediate commander. The system of command, as it exists today, is mostly a divided responsibility. Let us consider the command and control exercised on the College of Military Engineering, Poona, a premier training establishment. It is responsible to the Director of Military Training in the matters of training and allied subjects. The college is also responsible to the Engineer-in-Chief, Army Headquarters; Chief Engineer, Southern Command; Poona sub-area; Station Commander, Kirkee and the three Engineer Centres for certain matters. Thus the College is often confronted with confusing and at times, conflicting orders from two or more headquarters.

Therefore, we should try to simplify and define our system of command at all levels. Taking the above example, it will be quite rational to make the College (Commandant is a Brigadier) responsible for allotting its own accommodation, using transport, auditing own regimental accounts and thus eliminating the intermediaries like Kirkee Station, Poona Sub-Area.

FINANCIAL POWER

Considerable time is spent on investigations to write off losses. With the constant rapid changes of men in all units and inadequate method of

storage which exists in many places, it is inevitable that there will be these losses from time to time. The powers of commanders to deal with them summarily are absolutely inadequate. An officer commanding with more than 12 years of service has powers up to Rs. 20, but even these are circumscribed and curtailed in various ways through hundreds of orders. The result of this lack of trust is constant reference, of what should be minor matters, to higher authorities. The need to refer to distant authority involves the reduction of all relevant factors to writing and often a court of enquiry.

Therefore, unit commanders must be given greater powers and allowed to exercise them as a result of verbal enquiries and without reference to anyone. The man-hours saved would be very considerable indeed.

EXPENDITURE CONTROL

It is appreciated that the country's economy demands strict control over the resources placed at the disposal of the armed forces and that the armed forces are built-up within a framework of economic realities. But this idea has been extended too far. Let us take the policy on expenditure of training grant. Of the money voted by the Parliament for training, a unit may get a sub-allotment of the order of Rs. 1,500. It sounds good on paper, yet the spending of this money is so controlled by nice distinctions between what is permissible and what is not, that it takes a great deal of time to understand the rules and considerable ingenuity to apply them. If one is making a sand model, one may buy tapes locally to represent roads and boundaries but not the papers with which to designate them.

If the unit commanders could be given less money but a reasonably a free hand in spending, it would result more value and reduce paper work at all levels.

STORES ACCOUNTING

Ordnance Stores: The accounting of ordnance stores is also a very complicated business. There is enough scope for its simplification. For example, in the field, accounting is done on the bin-card system. It is an extremely simple procedure and can be easily adopted by field units with equal effectiveness by making certain changes on the present bin-card. This will save enormous time spent in maintaining ledgers.

Petrol, Oil and Lubricants: Lack of educational standard of mechanical transport staff coupled with inadequacy of such staff make it very difficult to maintain accurate accounting of such stores as laid down in numerous instructions. Besides, there are considerable duplications of entries; take for instance, the vehicle daily running account ledger (VDRA), vehicle log book, duty slip, census return 'A' and 'B' vehicles (IAFZ-3020), vehicle return. Many of these details, say vehicle log book (incidentally, it has been recently revised) are absolutely unnecessary and

not practically possible to keep up-to-date. The IAFZ-3020 is more or less a copy of the VDRA and has at least 7 different staff demands mostly for statistical purposes. IAFZ-3020 is a very big return (31 column) and not much of importance to staff as auditors scrutinise the VDRA.

Therefore, these documents must be revised to avoid duplication as far as possible; the vehicle log book entries must be reduced by at least 50 per cent and the IAFZ-3020 is substituted by a much simpler one, if not discontinued. Moreover, in any accounting, the principle of check, re-check and counter-check make accounting cumbersome, lengthy and increases work around. It should be the rule with exceptions that where auditors check, staff should not impose its own weight.

PAPER WORK

Field-Marshal Montgomery once remarked "the amount of paper that is required to produce even a quite small result is terrific". Typewriters and duplicators have become as important as machine guns.

The remedies are as old as earth. Even in peace time a sense of urgency should pervade military preparations. In peace, the factor of time is often forgotten. The trouble is that the men at the higher formations do not take decisions. Changes nowadays must be brought about not by violent upheavals but from inner conviction and action by all. What the Army seems to require is a single reiterated exhortation. Whatever you have to do, 'make it quick and make it simple'. The commanders at all levels must convince all officers and men that enforcement of this injunction is the necessity of all other necessities. The touchstone: 'Is it simple? Is it quick?' infused diligently throughout the Army would soon spell death to all kinds of redundancy.

PROMULGATION OF ORDERS AND STAFF DUTIES

In the old days, Queens Regulations, Regulations for Army in India Rules and Instructions, Financial Regulations, Equipment Regulations, Clothing Regulations, Tentage Regulations, Mechanical Vehicle Running Instructions contained almost all one could want to know. Nowadays these books have been so modified by various amendments, orders and instructions that one can no longer safely use them as authority. In fact, the understanding of administrative regulations has become a black art known only to a few.

What obviously needed are new editions of regulations and instructions. Even a new edition of a manual will not help matters for long if we continue the system of constantly altering and multiplying portions of them. This great disadvantage can be avoided by publishing these new editions in loose leaf form on the lines of Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Regulations (EMER). The advantages are obviously plenty.

REPORTS AND RETURNS

There is no denying the fact that the reports and returns are far

too many. Some are of statistical value for answering parliamentary questions, others are for executive actions and the rest are purely of information value. Each headquarters must insist that its component branches co-ordinate their activities, initially by a complete review of returns required and subsequently by frequent liaison. Moreover, do we really need to have information delivered on the first seven days only? Each headquarters must co-ordinate the timings for submission of information by its subordinate so that the work load can be spread evenly over each month. This would reduce the effort of clerks and typists and would make it more likely that the answers would be forwarded accurately and on time.

ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS OF UNITS

The number of administrative inspections of a unit in a year may range from 15 to 30. Considerable effort is wasted in preparing for some of these inspections.

Some of the inspections can be eliminated or reduced to once in two years. Also, Army Headquarters should issue a directive prohibiting efforts which do not directly contribute towards administrative and fighting efficiency and inspecting officers will be called upon to take units to tasks for unnecessary waste of time, money and energy.

STANDARDISATION

Much is heard in military circles today of the need of standardisation of equipments, procedures, staff-work, tactics, drills and skills. Due to lack of standardisation, not only is paper work increasing but a vast amount of time is spent in training of personnel. If in an infantry battalion, there are five makes of rifles, the result will be increased number of pages in ledgers, entries and periods for training. The following suggestions are made in respect of equipments and documents:

(a) Equipments

In the category of military equipments, there is much scope for standardisation. Soviet Russia has made considerable progress in this direction. Even civilian manufacturers are encouraged to produce equipments for civil use on military specifications. In India, to give impetus to our indigenous production, we should forego quality in favour of uniformity.

- (b) In peace-administration, documentation plays a very important part in efficient unit administration. Consequently, there are a number of standard and non-standard forms in use. A number of standard forms (for example, the various demand forms in use for stores) can be further standardised and a number of non-standard forms (for example, unit weekly training programme) can be standardised. Standard forms facilitate compilation, typing and accuracy. Even in cash and stores procedures, accounting is standardised. This is not a difficult job but we are still continuing with these procedural variations.

MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENTS

Maintenance of equipments should be based on 'once a week' instead

of 'task a day'. Let us consider the maintenance task systems of vehicles. One task is carried out on each day of a week. We know, practically it is not possible as drivers and supervisory personnel are not always available. In every week, here is a dry day|maintenance day allotted to each vehicle. All the maintenance tasks should be carried out on this day leaving the drivers free on the other days for driving duties, training and miscellaneous jobs. At present, the tendency of units, is to produce proof of maintenance by documents. This tendency can be checked if the present documentation is reduced by at least 50 per cent and maintenance of equipments is judged by the inspecting officers mainly on the merit of the equipments.

MAKING DECISIONS

One of the essential requirements for an army officer is to be able to make decisions. A close look at the Army of today would dispel any such illusions. The normal procedure today is that before any decision is made, the relevant piece of paper asking for the decision must be viewed by several different people in succession, each of whom appends comments, until eventually it reaches the person who is authorised to say 'yes' or 'no'. Until the decision is made, it is unusual to find people who will even take preparatory action to implement the decision. This is a cumbersome business and causes delays and inconvenience—in short it is inefficient administration. This was Mr. Appleby's greatest criticism on Indian administration. He found that the agreed projects were executed after a long time owing to too many people commenting in the chain.

The solution is obvious. Delegate responsibility to officers and if an officer does not learn by his mistakes, he must make way for another officer who is more competent. To put this into effect, formation commanders will need more power than at present. In addition, the mechanics of making decisions involving the opinions of or action by several people should be organised on the concurrent rather than on consecutive basis.

CONCLUSION

The suggestions made above would obviously necessitate considerable reorganisation of the present administrative procedure in the Army. But this is of urgent necessity if the Army is to fight efficiently in this scientific age. A committee should be appointed to study the present procedures to make detailed recommendations. The present inefficiency due to overwork is only leading to more inefficiency. There is nothing new in the suggestions made. They are based on the age old principles of administration, namely, *Foresight, Economy, Flexibility, Simplicity* and *Co-operation* but commonly forgotten in the application and method of the present peacetime administration.

CLEARANCE OF CASUALTIES IN SNOW WARFARE

BY COLONEL VISHWANATH P. GUPTA, M.S., F.R.C.S. (ENG) F.I.C.S.

GENERAL

ANY country whose borders are adorned with snow-capped mountains should be prepared to face the problems of snow warfare. Clearance of casualties from these regions poses new problems which are interlinked with those of the execution of operations over snow. For India these problems have just arisen because of the Chinese incursions over her Himalayan border.

TERRAIN

In studying the terrain, as one goes due north over India's frontiers it becomes obvious that valleys alternate with passes and that both of these rise higher and higher in altitude till the highest peaks are reached. For example, if one proceeds from Kashmir Valley towards Leh and beyond, then, starting from Srinagar at a height of 5,200 ft. above sea level one has to cross Zozila Pass at a height of 11,578 ft., then descend to the valley on the other side in which are located Dras (10,660 ft.) and Kargil (8,780 ft.) and then proceed on to cross the Fatula Pass at an altitudes of 13,432 ft. and then descend to Leh which is at a height of 11,554 ft. The pass beyond Leh is that of Khardungla with altitude of 18,380 ft.

During winter months snow falls over both the passes and the valleys in varying degrees, depending upon their altitude and their location in the snow belt. For example, Leh gets no snow fall although its height is 11,500 ft. and it gets intensely cold so much so that ponds freeze. For about 40 days the snow fall is very heavy, its peak period being in January. Later on, the snow begins to clear up from the valleys while it persists over the passes for much longer periods.

NATURE OF OPERATIONS

The aim of operations in snow bound areas will be to mount assault on the snow covered passes for the purpose of capturing the valley beyond which will be in enemy hands. Alternatively, the passes will have to be defended against the enemy. The time of commencement of these operations will be sometime after March when the valleys become clear of snow either completely or partially while the passes still remain covered. The scope of operation will normally be limited to assault by Bn/Bde groups only as no large scale operations are possible because of the nature of the terrain and the administrative problems. Sheltered accommodation in the nature of wooden hutments/bunkers would naturally have been built in the valley, where a base would be formed, as also on the reverse slopes, prior to the commencement of the operations on the passes.

Rearward communication from the valley would be by air during clear weather and by hilly roads which may not be open always except during summer for varying periods.

PASSAGE OVER SNOW

For reconnaissance and patrolling over soft snow Ski trained troops are essential. The main body of troops, however, can march over what is known as the beaten track. The beaten track is made by walking over soft snow after fixing snow shoe-trugers to the arctic boots. The snow shoe-trugers are shaped like broad soles and have spikes, and when fixed to the arctic boots do not let the feet sink too far into the soft snow. After a body of men with snow shoe-trugers fixed to their boots have marched ahead the track so trodden over gets hardened and is known as the 'beaten track'. On well beaten tracks hill ponies can be employed and also, the snow sledges can be drawn over it. In place of snow shoe-trugers the local porters use large flat soled string shoes for walking over soft snow which can be utilised for making a beaten track. Thus while the recce and the patrol troops go on skis, the rest of the troops march on beaten track and the equipment, stores and guns can be carried on porters, ponies and transporter sledges respectively.

TYPES OF CASUALTIES

Besides battle casualties, the other types of casualties would be those due to effects of cold such as Chillblain, frost-bite, snow blindness and those due to accidents by avalanches. When bizards blow then the casualties due to effects of cold become heavy.

MEANS OF CARRIAGE OF CASUALTIES OVER SNOW

Casualty Clearing Equipment

This equipment is used for constructing Ski-sledge out of casualty's own pair of skis. It consists in main of two clamps, a canvas piece of stretcher size 5' 4" long, some small wooden pieces, a screw-driver and a few rope lengths. The two clamps fix the two skis of the casualty and over them the canvas piece is spread. The canvas piece is supported by a few small flat wooden pieces which are fixed transversely underneath the canvas piece in order to provide clearance over snow. The two skis of the casualty when so fixed by the clamps and spread over with the canvas piece give the appearance of a ski-sledge. The two ski-sticks of the casualty are fixed in front of the ski sledge to provide a handle to which a length of rope is tied for pulling the sledge. Similarly a pair of ski sticks and a length of rope is fixed behind the ski sledge for the purpose of steadying it when going down a slope. The casualty is laid over the ski sledge and tied. When going up a slope, two skiers pull the ski sledge in front while a third skier steadies the ski sledge from behind;

when going down a slope the position is reversed. Climbing skins are fixed underneath the skis in order to reduce the speed of gliding.

The casualty clearing equipment weighs only 8 lbs. and is carried by all patrol|recce parties in a ruck sack which is slung on the back of one of the men. The fitting of the casualty clearing equipment over the ski-runners takes 20-25 minutes. Casualty's own rifle can be used for splinting his leg in case there be a fracture.

Snow Sledges

Snow sledges designed for carriage of casualties are of three types;

- (i) Snow sledge one man
- (ii) Snow sledge metal 3-4 men
- (iii) Snow sledge I.P. 8-10 men

Snow sledge one man.—This is a half boat shaped light sledge which glides directly over snow without any clearance. It is pulled by one man in front and steadied by another man behind. It has a breaking devise at its back to reduce its speed. The patients are carried on this sledge in a reclining position and as such it is not suitable for carrying unconscious and seriously wounded patients as also those with broken back. Being light this sledge is very good for garrison duties. It weighs 54 lbs.

3-4 men metal sledge.—This is the best sledge for carrying patients. It is light and comfortable and can be carried over long distances by 4 to 6 men. It has a good clearance. It weighs 72 lbs.

8-10 men wooden sledge.—This sledge is much too heavy and requires 8-10 men to pull it. Patients can travel over it comfortably for long distances. It has got adequate clearance. This sledge can also be used for carrying stores. It weighs 108 lbs.

Wesel.—These are tracked armoured vehicles which climb up over snow easily provided the gradient is not too steep. Three sitting cases or 2 lying cases can be carried on it.

Snow Tractors.—These are light vehicles with tracks, and the front portion rests on a sledge. These vehicles are used in foreign countries for travelling and carriage of stores and can be utilised for carriage of casualties as well. These vehicles can climb over soft snow provided the gradient is not steep.

Logistical Cargo Carrier or Snow train.—This is an American innovation. It consists of a control and power generating car and three powered cargo trailers. The vehicle travels on extremely low pressure tubeless tyres of very large size. Besides cargo, the vehicle can carry seriously wounded casualties.

Hill ponies.—Hill ponies can go on the beaten track and can carry sitting casualties. Hamilton saddles if fitted to these ponies would make the patient's journey comfortable.

Carrier Manpack.—This equipment is normally meant for carrying signal sets on the back of signalmen. The equipment, however, can be utilised for carrying a patient on the back for very short distances i.e. 100 yards or so.

MEDICAL POSTS

R. A. P. (Regimental Aid Post).—This will be established in small arctic tents as far forward as possible along the beaten track on which the main body of troops will be marching. All the casualties occurring amidst patrol|recce parties will be brought here on the improvised ski-sledge with the help of the casualty clearing equipment, by the ski-troops of the patrol|recce party themselves. From here the casualties after resuscitation and treatment will be evacuated to ADS on sledges 3-4 men metal. Sitting cases may be sent on ponies fitted with Hamilton Saddle provided the track is so well beaten that ponies can travel on it. The small arctic tents used for the RAP can accommodate 2 lying cases and need no heating devices as the tents soon get warmed up inside by the patients body radiation and breath.

A.D.S. (ADVANCE DRESSING SECTION)

A.D.S. will be established along the beaten track, some distance behind the R.A.P. in large field arctic tents (medical). Inside such tents, resuscitation and surgical operation can be carried out or 5 to 6 lying cases kept on stretchers. These tents need heating by a kerosene oil stove (Stove heating type D), popularly known as 'Kerosene Oil Bukhari'. From the A.D.S., the casualties will be evacuated to M.D.S. on sledges and ponies. Wesels|snow tractors may be used if available and if they can operate on that gradient.

M.D.S.

M.D.S. should preferably be in wooden hutments|bunkers where patients can be kept for a few days and surgical operations performed. From M.D.S. the patients will be evacuated to jeep head by sledges|wesels|snow tractors|ponies and thence to C.C.S.|hospitals. Air evacuation to base hospitals will be carried out if such facilities are available and if weather permits it.

SUMMARY


The means of carriage of casualties over snow are :—

- 1 Casualty Clearing equipment— for making improvised ski-sledge.

- 2 Snow sledges
 - (i) One man sledge
 - (ii) 3-4 men metal sledge
 - (iii) 8-10 men sledge I.P.
- 3 Carrier man-back — for short distances only.
- 4 Ponies preferably fitted with Hamilton saddle—for sitting cases only.
- 5 Wesel.
- 6 Snow-tractors.
- 7 Logistical Cargo Carrier (snow-train).

Diagrammatic representation of medical posts and means of evacuation over snow.

Beaten Track



HIMALAYAN MOUNTAINEERING

(THE GAME AND ITS DEMANDS)

BY AIR COMMODORE S. N. GOYAL

MOUNTAINEERING has generally been associated with some kind of exploration or survey work. It has in recent decades assumed importance as a sport, a sport in which physical capability and love of adventure run hand in hand. The Himalayan adventure has attracted a host of explorers and climbers during this century. This 1,500 miles long range that has been for centuries the backbone of our culture and development, provides unique opportunity for the most strenuous sport that demands acceptance of unknown hazards in regions far removed from habitation.

An expedition on the mountains is like a ship at sea where success or otherwise lies as much with team work and spirit as with the moods of the elements. In this, one thing is the sum total of judgement, authority and experience of the leader. And the other, the complete and continuous harmony of thought and actions among all its members with voluntary subordination to leadership as an essential part of that spirit. The total strength of the team lies in its weakest link expressed in the worst of moments, not so much in the outstanding experience of the exponent. Fitness in health and resoluteness in mind are "musts", with a spirit of unselfishness that demands real appreciation of need of the moment.

No amount of training or briefing can replace mountain experience. The art and craft of body balance, foot work, belaying, roping down, crevasse rescue, of intelligent uses of gadgets like crampons, pitons and karabiners, require special aptitude. Such basic demands of high mountaineering every aspirant must be prepared to accept before trodding up the slopes.

At high altitudes, the rarefied air conditions give rise to headaches and sleeplessness. Some may get mountain sickness, or diarrhoea and even temporary solar blindness because of momentary carelessness with goggles. One has to get used to the altitude rations to avoid under nourishment. Improper use of drugs as also of alcohol can cause uncomfortable reactions. Certain degree of medical knowledge is necessary to recognize and understand physiological factors. There are no absolute standards of efficiency or, judgement, in mountaineering. Every member is an absolute judge of his own capability and limitations in the face of what lies ahead.

Equipment comes next in importance to the human being. Boot is an important item. It has to be strong and damp-proof. Crampons or claws are necessary appendages for slippery ice and rock surfaces. At least two pairs of thick woollen socks or stockings with spare insoles are required to be worn. Hands and fingers have to be suitably protected

with woollen double-knit gloves/mittens. Fingers and toes are so much more easily liable to chilblain and frost bite. The ice axe is to the climber what a gun is to the hunter. It needs experience to manipulate an axe when in use as a stick or for anchoring, step-cutting etc., and when not in use, to avoid losing it when it is needed most at difficult climbs and descents. It is a climber's souvenir possession which works as a staff for the flag on the peak of ascent. The mountaineers' tent is light enough to be carried on the back and must be able to stand gales. In the case of difficult terrain the rope is also used. Generally speaking, ropes and crampons are always carried whenever snow/ice terrain is to be encountered. In the use of such aids on the mountains it is taken for granted that each individual is an expert in their use and maintenance. Basically they do not require long training, only certain degree of aptitude for the technique involved.

In climbing technique, rope work is perhaps the most intricate of all. It requires a good knowledge of Scout's knots, the double knotted bow lines, the butterfly, the rover noose, the fisherman's knot, sennit and so on. There are a variety of methods to maintain balance and the rythm of ascent or descent, all demanding a perfect co-ordination between feet, hands and the eyes. Above all every climber regardless of whether he is an expert or the beginner, has to assume equal responsibility for the safety of the adjacent member(s): he may have to ever so neatly swivel the rope for "an anchor" or "a belay", and provide a flashary moment support that might make all the difference to success or even survival. It is for this reason that stress is laid on the quality of equipment. The rope has to be up to the requisite standard; capable of withstanding the strain of 12 stone weight falling freely down 12 feet of space, at least. Nylon rope is now standard equipment. Early manufacture in India of such equipment is a pressing requirement for all kinds of altitude work.

Whether rock snow or ice, its quality texture grain and "underlying strength" have to be appreciated by the climber. There are different techniques for foot work in frozen snow, glacier ice, the bluish solid ice (called neve) and the harder or black ice. The crampons assert themselves differently on different textures. One cannot ignore the members directly behind or below. In step cutting on ice one has to be careful or not spoiling the field by cutting them too much or by stepping carelessly about them. Glacier faces are often treacherous because of crevasses. The process of "mine sounding" of the ground with axe has to be resorted to avoid a plunge into the deep vacuum. Then there are open seracs, overhanging cornices, steep smooth couloirs or gullies of ice and snow and smooth or unstable rock, most of which a prospective mountaineer must be able to appreciate.

Navigation calls for intelligent use of maps which more often than not can be inaccurate or vague. A pocket or wrist compass is necessary

for general sense of direction. The dazzling white surface makes the eye immune to recognition of land marks unless stratagems are employed e.g., colour paper, flags or rocks markers. But all the experience and stratagem go by the board when a blizzard starts or fog reduces visibility to five yards. This has been the main reason for prolonged hardships and fatalities on higher mountains where night descends so unexpectedly. The experienced Sherpa guides are well versed with the terrain and the complexities of fore-casting the connected difficulties. Many a disaster of mountaineering history might possibly have been avoided but for poor planning and guidance and also foolhardiness in some cases.

All these things about experience, guidance, equipment technique and navigation come into play in the first task of each expedition, the reconnaissance. Having established the base camp near known routes and habitation for co-ordination of activities and maintenance of supplies the climbers proceed to establish forward camps most suitable for approach and climbs towards their agreed aim. From here the plans of forward reconnaissance and climb are drawn up. A "time plan" has to be made to ensure adequacy of safe return to base keeping in mind the probabilities of local weather. Porter relay plan is to be made for regular deliveries of supplies, mainly rations.

An assault plan may take this form: the specified members and guides leave the camp early with pack lunch, ropes crampons and all the gadgets necessary. Three to five is a good number for a recce party. One looks for the lie of the land, the passes/cols, ridges and glaciers, identifies the rock snow and ice, notes the avalanche zones and areas infested with seracs and crevasses. On return of the recce parties, stock is taken of the recommendations and the next plan made for the morrow.

For mountaineers a good aim is what they are capable of achieving. A recce might indicate that an alternative peak or aim might be preferred to avoid undue risk, or time and weather may be the deciding factors in favour of a lesser aim. Above all, this game demands single unanimous tone when the leader after due thought and discussion sounds a decision. Then it is all a matter of steady progress, each member towing the others line. Delay in going forward may as it often does, occur due to weather or ill-disposition, but a day unaccountably wasted invites failure to say the least.

Two or more camps may have to be established above the base depending on the heights, distances, weather and resources. Each new camp thus established becomes a vital link in the line of successful progress and safe return. Above certain altitudes ordinary porters are incapable of productive effort and sherpas carry loads which cannot be carried by climbers in their own rucksacks. On the lower slopes, the adminis-

trative staff should operate efficiently enough for the reinforcements of porters, SOS supplies, medicines and so on to reach destinations without a hitch. Walkie talkie sets if good enough for 5 to 10 mile range in hilly terrain, can be most handy. Emergency demands cannot be met satisfactorily between camps separated by long distance at higher altitudes without some such contrivances.

Mountaineering is a grand and simple enough game for the enthusiast provided he accepts the requirements of voluntary discipline and team spirit. If he cannot, for any reason whatsoever, be it for lack of will, he must quit at the first opportunity or stay back at the base allowing the others in trim and in tune to go ahead.

In all mountaineering success is a bonus. There is no failure since every bit of experience gained is a contribution, contribution by way of approaches reconnoitred or new areas and subjects surveyed. In other words exploration and experience are the basis of this game in which a successful climb on the top is a matter of great luck as indeed it is of honour. In such a game success is justified only if risks taken are calculated and lives are not unduly endangered: foolhardiness is never permitted. On the individual plane, a mountaineer is always rewarded by the breathtaking charm of nature's highways, a vista that lifts the soul out of its humdrum lowly existence.

For this Himalayan game to be followed not so much out of necessity but for sheer adventure, it will have to be adopted as a sport, a recognised sport specially suited to our country. And our industrialists would have to invest a little bit in developing tents, sleeping bags and clothing on the basis of experience gained by Alpine and other countries. If only our travelling public realised that a sleeping bag weighs far less, lasts longer and keeps much warmer than a quilt, the typical outsized bedroll will soon make room enough for more useful things.

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THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE

By PLM

THE last quarter has been the busiest, in any case the most-event-packed, of the whole year. Inevitably, viewed from Delhi, the border dispute with China, acutely exacerbated by the Ladakh incident and Peking's continued intransigence in deed if not in word, cast a deep, dismal shadow over the international scene. Another threatening storm-cloud appeared in the shape of the Peking-Djakarta exchanges over the question of the overseas Chinese—and they tended to be increasingly bitter as the weeks sped by. Tibet, dragooned under China's heavy heels successfully roused the world's collective conscience as echoes of its debates reverberated through the imposing colonnade of the General Assembly in New York. Elsewhere tension seemed to lessen. In Laos, the UN Fact-Finding Committee was not able to adduce any conclusive evidence of direct intervention across the country's borders and the mounting fever of impending hostilities gradually died down. At the United Nations, an 82-nation unanimous verdict was recorded in favour of disarmament; in Algiers, President De Gaulle offered that war-devastated land the right of self-determination which, for a time, seemed to offer a glow of hope out of the present impasse. President Eisenhower's 11-nation, 21-day world tour which embraced three continents in its gambit helped to focus increasing attention on the positive objective of attaining peace and lifting the shadow of war and fear. The quarter also witnessed general elections in the U.K. and Israel which helped to confirm the mandate of the ruling party, in both with augmented popular support. Rumbblings of a troubled world were heard in Ceylon and the Middle East: in the former, dissolution of Parliament came as a welcome relief in a situation marked by growing political uncertainty and confusion, in the latter tension on the Iraqi-Iranian border seriously threatened peace at one time while a dastardly attempt on the life of General Kassem underlined once again the lack of political stability in the region. In the scientific world breath-taking advance in Outer Space was registered by the success of the Soviet cosmic rocket which hit the Moon, while growing recognition of international cooperation was underlined both by the 12-nation Antarctica Conference for peaceful experimentation on the 'frozen continent' and the projected 11-nation Indian Ocean venture.

INDIAN-CHINESE BORDER

An already difficult, if not indeed increasingly explosive, situation on the Indian-Chinese border became considerably inflamed by what came to be called the Ladakh incident. Briefly, on October 21, an Indian police patrol party, equipped with rifles, was fired upon and overwhelmed by a superior Chinese force using machine-gun and mortar fire, at a place located well within Indian territory, in Ladakh. Nine Indians were mowed down and ten taken prisoner by the Chinese. The locale was the Chang-chenmo valley, at a point 48 miles west of Lanak-la, the border pass in the region.

Indian public opinion was outraged, as well it might. New Delhi, reiterating its "firm" policy to endeavour to resolve all disputes by peaceful methods, did, however, affirm that it would resist aggression "by all means at its disposal." It called upon Peking to remove all its forces from Indian territory, categorically repudiated its version of the incident-spelt out at some length in its Memorandum of October 22 and its Note and official statement of October 25 which indubitably sought to prove that the Indians were aggressors and had indeed intruded in what was palpably Chinese domain—which it dubbed as "completely at variance

with facts" and indeed "a travesty of truth." The Prime Minister himself appeared to be rudely shaken and, in his press conference on November 5, confessed a feeling of "deep disappointment" and conceded that his "China policy" had suffered a set-back.

In his letter of November 7, Mr. Chou En-lai suggested to the Indian Prime Minister demilitarisation of the Sino-Indian border along the McMahon Line to a depth of 20 kilometres on either side, a principle which may be extended to the de facto frontier in the Ladakh area. He also urged a meeting with Mr. Nehru "in the immediate future", further to discuss the boundary question and "other questions in the relations between the two countries." A week or so later New Delhi wrote back and, calling the Chinese demilitarisation plan "impractical", advanced its own "alternative proposals." These included, inter alia,

- a) withdrawal by each side in Ladakh beyond territorial areas claimed by the other,
- b) stopping by both sides dispatch of armed patrols from their checkposts,
- c) Chinese withdrawal from the Indian post of Longju in NEFA and
- d) holding out the assurance that Indian troops would refrain from re-occupying the post (Longju).

The epistolary flow was maintained at a high pitch in the weeks that followed. Replying to the Prime Minister's letter of November 16, Mr. Chou En-lai wrote back on December 17 to suggest a meeting between the two of them, in any place in China or Rangoon, to work out "some agreement on principles as a guidance to concrete discussion of the boundary question by the two sides." Peking claimed that its original proposal of November 7—suggesting a 20-kilometre withdrawal of forces—would create "a favourable atmosphere" for the talks. It undertook to apply New Delhi's Ladakh proposal to other disputed places as well and listed ten such, ranging from Khinzemane in NEFA and Shipki in the Punjab to eight others in U.P. and Ladakh. In sum, Peking's rejoinder was an outright rejection of New Delhi's proposals. In his reply, dated December 21, Prime Minister Nehru expressed deep regret that his own "reasonable and practical" suggestions for lessening tension had been rejected, that the Chinese had "merely reiterated claims to extensive areas in Indian territory" and that Indians taken prisoner in Ladakh had been subjected to a most "deplorable treatment." Mr. Nehru refused to be a party to Mr. Chou's peremptorily-summoned "Little Summit" meet in Rangoon and asked his Chinese counterpart "how can we reach agreement on principle, when there is such a complete disagreement about facts?" Synchronising with this communication, it was announced in New Delhi that the Indian Ambassador in Peking had been called home "for consultations."

Meantime in the course of what came to be called the "Great Debate" in Parliament, towards the fag-end of November, Mr. Nehru made explicit what had always been implied: that any aggression against Nepal "will be considered by us as aggression on India." Subsequently, the subject was debated, with some animation, both in New Delhi and Kathmandu—and the world outside, though knowledgeable circles pointed out that even as far back as March 17, 1950, Mr. Nehru had expressed exactly the same view:

"It is not possible for the Indian Government to tolerate an invasion of Nepal from anywhere, even though there is no military alliance between the two countries. Any possible invasion of Nepal, of which incidentally I haven't the slightest apprehension, would inevitably involve the safety of India."

TIBET

From China we may slide into Tibet. It had been noticed already that, despite advice to the contrary from New Delhi, His Holiness the Dalai Lama had decided to refer the issue to the United Nations. Here, after a great deal of feverish backstage diplomatic activity, the representatives of Ireland and Malaya officially wrote to the Secretary General that there was, *prima facie* evidence of "an attempt to destroy the traditional way of life of the Tibetan people," by China and that the world body had a moral obligation and a legal right to discuss the situation. On October 9, the 21-nation Steering Committee, in the teeth of sharp opposition by the Soviet Union, voted in favour of inscription of the item. The Russian delegate had indeed charged that the "non-existent Tibetan question" had been "fabricated" in order to worsen the international atmosphere in the General Assembly. The British were circumspect about the legal niceties, but had no doubt that "a terrible human tragedy of historic proportions" had unfolded itself in that country. New Delhi did not participate in the voting.

The General Assembly began its debate on Tibet on October 20 with a keynote declaration by the sponsoring Malayan delegation that the UN had "a moral obligation" to record its judgment on "the ruthless violation of human rights in Tibet." The co-sponsoring Irish representative called on Peking to contribute to ending the 'cold war' by restoring to the Tibetan people "their traditional liberty." The Soviet opposition, however, was unrelented and Mr. Kuznetsov affirmed that the raising of this question was "a clumsy manoeuvre" to bring the UN back to "the dark period of the 'cold war'." His chief political adversary, Washington's Henry Cabot Lodge felt convinced that the enormity of the crimes being known, as also the standards of the Charter by which these were to be judged, the General Assembly—"the world's most influential body to give expression to the opinions of civilised men"—must place on record its untrammelled verdict. The leader of the Indian delegation expressed the hope that "the plight of the Tibetan people" would be resolved by "processes of reconciliation" and, although he was abstaining in the vote this did not imply any "lack of concern or lack of feeling" in regard to the Tibetan people.

A day later the conscience of the world was officially recorded in the vote that concluded the debate: 45:9, with 26 abstentions—two member-states, Guinea and Costa Rica, were absent. The operative part of the Assembly's verdict, while affirming its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter, and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was essential for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law, called for "respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinct cultural and religious life." A few days later, the Dalai Lama expressed his thanks to "all the peace-loving people of the world" for their support to the Tibetan people and expressed his hope that they would all continue to take interest in finding a suitable solution for the restoration of normal conditions in his country. Meantime Peking officially denounced the resolution as "slandereous", charged that the question had been discussed "unlawfully" and expressed the view that here was "another criminal act of the United States Government of press-ganging the United Nations to interfere crudely in China's internal affairs." Actually, in October, the Chinese had claimed that "great victories" had been obtained in the induction of "democratic reforms" in Tibet and that 36,000 serfs and 20,000 slaves had been freed in that country. Later, in the last week of December, the Chinese had inaugurated in Lhasa the Tibetan chapter of the Chinese Peoples' Political Consultative Conference, an organisa-

tion charged with the task of uniting all nationalities, classes, political parties, mass organisations, notable public figures and overseas Chinese. Significantly enough the Acting Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region and Tibet's 'ruler', the Panchen Lama did not find a place in the new Committee, nor did his close associate and an hitherto favourite Chinese protege—Ngabou Ngawang Jigme.

CHINESE MINORITY IN INDONESIA

Not basically different in its connotation with our border dispute, though certainly in content, has been the growing Indonesian trouble with Peking over the treatment of its sizeable Chinese minority which has, over a period of time, held its dread stranglehold over the country's economy, particularly far out in the rural areas. To tide a visibly wide gulf in its outlook with Peking, over the solution of this problem which has been viewed in Djakarta with considerable apprehension, Dr. Subandrio planned a brief visit to China, early in October. It would seem that his exchanges with the Chinese leaders were far from cordial, nor for that matter was the official communique very helpful. It had barely expressed the hope that "the proper rights and interests" of the Chinese nationals would be respected and that the community would still play a useful role in the economic development of the land of their adoption.

That these pious platitudes meant nothing was borne out by the fact that Dr. Subandrio's return proved to be the starting-point of a controversy which showed increasing acerbity as the quarter drew to a close. To safeguard the country's economic integrity, Djakarta had ordered that Chinese traders in rural areas should quit their businesses and repair to urban centres. It appeared that the administrative fiat was wilfully flouted and when the Army took a hand, as in West Java, in enforcing it, the Chinese Embassy officials came out openly in support of the recalcitrants and, in defiance of normal diplomatic procedure and decorum, instigated their co-nationals. Djakarta was visibly incensed. As if to add fuel to the fire, Marshal Chen Yi wrote a long letter to the Indonesian Foreign Minister on December 9, strongly protesting against what he described as an "intolerable situation" in Indonesia, where the rights and interests of the Overseas Chinese were impaired and their personal safety infringed. Four days later Peking's official mouthpiece, Hsinhua, put out a lengthy item accusing Indonesia of committing "atrocities" against Chinese residents and charging that it had used "ruthless and violent" methods in the "frantic, extensive and forcible removal" of Chinese residents in the whole of West Java.

The Indonesian authorities reacted violently. In his letter of December 13, Dr. Subandrio maintained that Peking's accusations were "false", that Chinese traders had been guilty of "capitalistic and monopolistic behaviour", coupled with all kinds of manipulations and speculations and that the community constituted "a danger to the well-being of the State and the people of Indonesia." In its rejoinder, a week or so later, Peking dutifully stuck to the line that the ban had been "utilised to make a concentrated attack on Overseas Chinese", that it had resulted in "tens of thousands" of its nationals losing their homes and properties and being landed "in a desperate situation". On the constructive plane, Marshal Chen Yi suggested that the two Governments hold "immediate talks" on the question and ratify the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Nationality signed way back in 1955 at the time of the Bandung Conference. As December drew to a close the situation appeared pretty explosive, nor did New Delhi now alone have the distinction of having trouble with its powerful and sprawling neighbour to the north—a vicarious satisfaction, at best.

LAOS

Before turning away from the Asian scene one may tarry awhile over recent developments in Laos, and nearer home, in Ceylon. It would be recalled that a 4-nation UN Fact-Finding Sub-Committee had been set up in September and that its visit to Laos had helped ease earlier tensions. In its report to the Security Council, early in November, the Committee was categorical that it could not muster any clear evidence of direct intervention by neighbouring countries; later the UN Secretary General paid a brief visit to Vientiane in his "personal" capacity. Developments now followed in quick succession. Thus it was officially stated on December 5 that the earlier-postponed general elections would now be held, throughout the Kingdom, on April 3, 1960. It will be recalled in this context that the last "supplementary" elections had taken place in May, 1958 and that of the 21 seats for which polling took place, 9 were won by the Neo Lao Haksat, the Parliamentary wing of the Pathet Lao and another 4 by its close allies.

Announcement of the elections was followed by a major Cabinet reshuffle on December 19. Prime Minister Phoui dropped six of his Ministers and eight Secretaries of State, all of whom belonged to his Coalition-partner, the extreme Rightist Committee for the Defence of National Interest (CDIN). The chief among those dropped were the CDIN President and Defence Minister General S. Patmnnavong, the Foreign Minister Khanpan Panya and the Secretary of State for Defence, Colonel Phoui Nosavan. It was widely believed that the changes signified a more elastic policy towards the Pathet Lao rebels and that the reshuffle was largely an aftermath of the UN Fact-Finding Sub-Committee's Report which had not fully backed charges of Communist aggression. As the year drew to a close a nerve-racking event was the sudden death in Vientiane of Laos' Deputy Prime Minister and elder statesman, Katay Don Sasorith, a tower of strength to his country and to the Phoui Saninkone government.

CEYLON

From Laos one may turn to Ceylon. Here since the death of its Prime Minister, late in September, an era of instability, and even political confusion, had persisted. On October 30, it will be recalled, the barely five-week old government of Prime Minister Dahanayake was challenged in Parliament and despite the support of six nominated members, survived by a margin of five votes, the voting figures being 48:43. Hardly a month later came another trial of strength and on this occasion the Government was sustained in power by a solitary vote, the breakdown being 46:45. The second challenge was the more serious for three of the Government's own members had openly defied the Party Whip and voted with the Opposition. In this state of political uncertainty, dissolution of Parliament was certain. This came on December 4 when on the advice of his Prime Minister the Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke decreed that general elections were to take place on March 19 and that a new Parliament was to convene 11 days later.

WEST ASIA

From troubled South East Asia and the Far East one may turn with advantage, and for a better perspective, to the disturbed state of affairs in the West Asia. That since his induction into power, in July, 1958, General Kassem's in Iraq has been a disquieting legacy, calls for no comment. Actually, apart from that perpetual eye-sore to all Arab States, the physically tiny Jewish state of Israel, a marked feature of West Asian politics in the past year or so has been a noisy wordy duel between Cairo and Baghdad, unhappily often interspers-

ed by violent incidents instigated at each other's behest. For a better understanding, two facts may be constantly kept in view. One, that in the initial stages of the July revolution in Iraq there was a remarkable degree of fraternisation with Cairo, a fact eloquently testified by the conclusion of a mutual defence pact on the morrow of the revolution. Two, that of late there has been an ill-concealed attempt by powerful Iraqi leaders to revive the scheme for a 'fertile crescent'. This, it needs hardly be emphasised, strikes at the very root of UAR's territorial integrity for it envisages some kind of a union between Iraq and Syria.

A recent addition to the West Asia ailments has been eruption of the Iranian-Iraqi border dispute over the Sharett-el-Arab. Here tension mounted up with a claim made by the Iraqi Prime Minister to a 3-mile strip of territory near the oil-centre of Abadan. In its wake, jet fighters of the Iranian Air Force were moved to the Iraqi frontier on December 23, to re-inforce tanks and heavy artillery transferred there earlier. Actually, the Sharett-el-Arab, near Abadan, forms the mouth of the Tigris and the Euphrates and Iran has preferred its claims for two-thirds of the waters flow from Iran and the usage of centuries has set its seal on its sovereign rights. Baghdad Radio, on the other hand, claimed that the "imperialists" had incited Iran to commit aggression and openly implied that it will crush "both Iran and the inciter." Luckily, thanks to friendly advice from outside, tension soon eased and hope was expressed that differences would be resolved by peaceful negotiations.

Another unhappy symptom of a deeper inner malady, briefly averred to earlier, was the spurt of violence that broke out in Baghdad in October. General Kassem was shot at and wounded in the shoulder while proceeding through the capital's main thoroughfare, Rashid Ali Street. Happily, the Prime Minister was not seriously hurt and, after a spate of rumours which continued to bedevil West Asian capitals, left his hospital bed on December 3, to resume his full quota of duties.

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN U.K.

A few of the more important events of the quarter may now be summed up. We may start with general elections in the United Kingdom where the campaign proved to be none too lively. Mr. Macmillan's return to power was never seriously in doubt by keen observers of the scene, although the near landslide victory which doubled his party's majority (from 56 to 102) came as a surprise to many. Labour's subsequent post-mortem of its third successive defeat at the hustings enlivened political controversy as did the fact of the Liberals' nearly doubling their popular vote. Was the traditionally British bi-party system yielding place to a multi-party rule? The election results, by themselves, competent political pundits were emphatic, provided no clear-cut answer.

ISRAEL

In Israel too the ruling Mapai (Labour) Party of Mr. David Ben Gurion was voted back into power with enhanced popular support (from 32 to 38.5 per cent). Interestingly enough its chief challenger, the ultra-nationalist Heruth too registered a small increase (about 1.4) in its voting percentage.

JAPAN

Tokyo too was in the news. Here a Supreme Court verdict set at rest the controversy which attracted world-wide attention as a result of a District Court decision that the presence of the United States forces in Japan was illegal. The Supreme Court held that American forces did not constitute a "war potential"

and that in the context of the constitution's "no war" declaration, their presence was intra-vires.

ALGERIA

Two other developments may be briefly touched upon. The former relates to Algeria. Here, it will be recalled, that President Charles De Gaulle had made a momentous "political offer" to the Algerian nationalists on September 16. Paris now gave its plighted word that the Algerians would be free to choose integration with France, or secession from France, or even internal autonomy within the French community. Should the Algerians choose secession, France would have to endorse the arrangement. Self-determination, however, could not take place until there was peace in the land and the French Foreign Minister indicated, in New York on October 11, that his country was willing to discuss a cease-fire with the Algerian Nationalist leaders. Response came none too immediately, though it was widely believed that a way out would be possible and the gruesome toll of human life in the four-year old ding-dong battle brought to a close. On November 20, the Algerian Provisional Government of Mr. Ferhat Abbas announced in Tunis its nomination of five Nationalist leaders—Mohammed Ben Bella, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Mohammed Boudiaef, Mohammed Khider and Ribah Bitat—to start talks with France for effecting an end to hostilities. The French Government, however, was distinctly cool. Part of the explanation lay in the fact that the provisional government's nominees were persona non grata with Paris—the first four having been captured in October, 1956 when their aircraft was intercepted while on its way from Morocco to Tunis, the fifth in a separate encounter. Apparently, the gap was yet too wide and needed narrowing down.

LUNIK II

Though not strictly falling within the quarter's strait-jacket, the Soviet Union's cosmic rocket deserves a mention here, however sketchy. The rocket, christened Lunik II, hit the surface of the Moon on September 14. This was a great achievement in the world of outer space and underlined the Soviet Union's proud distinction of being the first to launch a space vehicle from one planet to another.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Concluding the July-September survey, it was noted that the Camp David talks between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev were likely to lead, "beyond a shadow of doubt", to a lessening of the cold war whose "long-accumulated ice was beginning to crack up and drift down-stream." The quarter under review here, it is pleasant to record, kept up the trend. Symptomatic of the change was the absence of the former acerbity or rancour in debates at the United Nations which had often, in the past, been no better than passionate wordy duels and sometimes even ill-concealed name-calling by the cold war's principal protagonists, across the (United Nations) none-too-wide horse-shoe tables. Actually, the 14th session of the world body this year (September 15-December 14, 1959) was witness to a remarkable phenomenon—an 82-nation sponsored, and unanimously adopted, without a formal vote, resolution on disarmament. This made history in the annals of the United Nations and seemed to epitomise the universal desire for lessening of the burden of arms. Indeed, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge described the scope of the resolution as comprehensive: "disarmament right across the board, involving all types of weapons, covering every means of warfare."

Another field in which former rivalries now yielded place to growing toleration, sometimes even intimate cooperation, was the scientific. Thus, after seven weeks of intensive negotiations, a 12-nation Conference in Washington concluded on December 1, a formal treaty to preserve the vast spaces of the frozen continent of Antarctica for peaceful, scientific research. Among the signatories were the Soviet Union and the United States and the treaty, apart from specifically banning all military weapons from the 5-million square mile continent, helped to set up the world's first international inspection system to ensure that the Antarctica would be used only for peaceful purposes. Another project lately mapped out in Washington is an 11-nation Indian Ocean Survey in which, apart from the Soviet Union and the United States, New Delhi is an active participant. The expedition, which is to function under the Special Committee on Oceanic Research, is to study "the least-known waters of the world" in the fields of physical and chemical oceanography, meteorology, marine biology, geo-physics and sub-marine biology.

EISENHOWER'S ELEVEN NATION TOUR

A recent event of great import which lifted men's hearts in varied places around the globe, was President Eisenhower's 21-day, 11-nation tour. On the US President's busy, extremely tight, schedule were Rome, Ankara, Karachi, Kabul, New Delhi, Tehran, Athens, Tunis, Paris, Madrid and Casablanca. On his unique "mission of peace and goodwill", Mr. Eisenhower exuded warmth and friendliness. He underlined his country's basic philosophy: "We are not aggressors, we seek nobody else's territories or possessions, we don't seek to violate anybody else's rights. We are simply trying to be a good partner in this business of searching out for peace, which means in the long run, searching also methods in which we the nations, independent nations, together cooperating can find a better life for all of us. And that means politically and materially." Barely a couple of months earlier, Mr. Nikita Khrushchev had asked his listeners in the United Nations, in New York to beware "the clouds of a new war danger, which at times become storm clouds and loom over a world which hasn't yet forgotten the horrors of World War II." Was tortured humanity, powerfully portrayed by a masterly mind at a current exhibition in the capital, one faintly wondered, going at last to heave a sigh of relief?

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

THE YEAR IN RETROSPECT

BY CRITERION

THE year 1959 was in many ways of more than usual interest and importance, so far as the Indian domestic scene was concerned. While changes and momentous developments in various spheres are but natural in the transitional period of history through which the nation is now passing, the outgoing year can be said to have been witnessing new stresses and strains as well as new achievements in the spheres of internal and external policies. Some unexpected events along India's northern borders added urgency to the question of the country's security and led to some concern in the nation as a whole. Foreign policy, as a consequence, became a matter of debate and attitudes inside the country to problems of foreign relations showed signs of readjustment to suit the changing realities. In the field of economic policy and development, the year opened with the great debate on the future agrarian structure of India and ended with a degree of consensus of opinion in regard to the essential aims and objects of the next Five Year Plan. By the middle of the year, the country's politics took a significant turn, following the agitation in Kerala, and although internal problems were overshadowed by external issues towards the end of the year, some intensification of party rivalries was apparent. The year also witnessed some rethinking in the country in regard to its structure of politics and Government, and administrative questions, in particular, became matters of controversy. Finally, the problem of students indiscipline came to the forefront with the closure of some universities and repeated manifestation of turbulence and indiscipline among the students of the country. The year 1960 thus begins with an underlining of our national problems and the enunciation of our national tasks.

FOREIGN POLICY

The year ended with further strengthening of India's friendly ties with the important nations of the world and strong confirmation of the correctness of India's approach to world politics. The unmistakable relaxation in world tension, the progress towards a Summit Conference, the increased possibility of reduction in armaments and the universal acceptance of the need for peaceful co-existence were important gains for India, in as much India's foreign policy had been directed towards the achievement of these aims. The refreshing changes in world climate were largely due to the efforts of the leaders of the two Big Powers of the World, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., supplemented and complemented by countries like the United Kingdom and India. As a result of this trend, India's overall relations with the two Big Powers were further strengthened, as was evident from the visit of the Heads of these two states to the Indian Capital in December 1959 and January 1960. India's foreign policy was for the first time appreciated and understood in many important quarters. What is more, the great urgency of aiding and assisting India in facing her problems of development was now recognised in all quarters. While Vice-President Nixon of the USA described India's future as of even greater importance than the future of a Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva, the USSR stepped up its programme of assistance to India and made promises of vital aid in course of the Third Five Year Plan. In more senses than one, the two developments—relaxation of tension and increasing interest in India's development—were inter-related and together they opened new avenues of success for the country.

EISENHOWER'S VISIT

The visit of President Eisenhower to Delhi in the second week of December 1959 was undoubtedly an event of great significance. Arriving in India on 9 December, the American President attended a number of official functions and made important statements of policy. A tumultuous welcome on his arrival set the pace for a hectic period of six days in which President Eisenhower addressed Members of Parliament, inaugurated the American section of the World Agriculture Fair, attended a civic reception, visited Agra and some adjoining villages, received an honorary degree at the University of Delhi and discussed generally the problems of world politics with Indian leaders. A brief joint communique issued at the end of the president's visit said *inter alia*: "The President was impressed by the vitality of India's democratic institutions, of Parliament, Press and University, and by India's strength of spirit combined with practical idealism. He saw how India like USA, has created national strength out of diversity, neither country boasting that theirs is the only way. He confirmed the bond of shared ideals between India and USA, their identity of objectives and their common quest for just and lasting peace.... To the people of India, this visit which had been long hoped for, has given the opportunity for the demonstration of the sincere friendship, goodwill and sympathy which they feel for the people of the USA".

Among the important statements the President made during his stay in India a few were specially noted by the Indian Press. He told the Members of Parliament (10 Dec.): "Historically and by instinct, the United States has always repudiated and still repudiates the settlement by force, of international issues and quarrels". And this about India: "Today, India speaks to the other nations of the world with greatness of conviction and is heard with greatness of respect. The near conclusion of her second Five Year Plan is proof that the difficulty of a problem is only measure of its challenge to men and women of determined will. India is a triumph that offsets any world failure of the past decade—a triumph that, as men read our history a century from now, may offset them all". And finally, here is the appeal for peace: "In the name of humanity, can we not join in a five year or fifty year plan against mistrust and misgiving and fixation on the wrongs of the past? Can we not apply ourselves to the removal or reduction of the causes of tension that exists in the world? All these are the creations of Governments cherished and nourished by governments. Nations would never feel them if they were given freedom from propaganda and presence." At the civic reception (13 December), he said: "One thing I assure you from now on. I shall be quick to speak out on every possible occasion that India is becoming one of the greatest investment opportunities in the strengthening of freedom, in the prosperity of the world".

In the tremendous welcome the President received in India there were many elements but the primary factor was that the American President was now being regarded in India as one who has dedicated himself to the cause of world peace. Prime Minister Nehru repeatedly referred to this aspect of the visit: "The US President was out on a mission of peace and it was natural that the people of India should demonstrate such warm regard for him".

The improvement in India—America relations and the strengthening of their mutual ties did not in any way create problems for India's relations with the USSR. On the other hand, two important guests—President Voroshilov and Prime Minister Khrushchev were scheduled to visit India in early 1960.

DISTINGUISHED VISITORS

During 1959, India was the host to many visiting dignitaries from various parts of the world. As the year began, India was having the privilege of receiving

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the Premier of Ghana, whose 15-day visit to this country ended on 8 January. A joint statement issued at the end of the visit revealed identity of outlook and approach between India and Ghana. On 12 January, the East German Premier arrived in India for a 8-day visit to this country. In a statement issued on 16 January he noted that the economic and cultural relations between his country and India were developing. On 14 January, President Tito of Yugoslavia arrived in New Delhi and left India on 19 January. Of his various engagements, the most important was his talk with Mr. Nehru, which, according to a *communiqué* issued on 15 January showed the two leaders' determination to remain non-aligned. On 21 January, the Duke of Edinburgh arrived in India for a fortnight's visit to this country; during his stay he had a busy programme, among the various items being a civic reception in Delhi. The Prime Minister of Afghanistan arrived in New Delhi on 5 February for a week's visit: On 7 February, a joint *communiqué* issued in New Delhi noted the firm rejection by both India and Afghanistan, of military agreements. From 24 February to 19 March, 1959, a Soviet delegation, consisting of important leaders of the USSR including A. A. Andreyev and N. A. Mukhutdinov were in India: a joint *communiqué* on this visit, issued on 19 March, expressed the hope that Soviet-Indian co-operation in the economic, cultural, scientific fields would further develop and that the two countries will co-operate in the task of ensuring world peace. On 18 March, the U.N. Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld arrived in New Delhi for a four-day visit; he flew to Kashmir on 20 March and met the State Chief Minister during his stay there. Another important visit was that by Dr. Ehrlander of Sweden. Last but not the least, was the stay of about two hours at the Palam airport by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan for talks with the Prime Minister.

Also important in this connection were the visits by the Indian President to countries of South East Asia and by the Indian Prime Minister to Nepal, Afghanistan and Iran.

RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

Of the many hopeful developments in our external relations during the year, the greatest significance must be attached to the unmistakable improvement of our relations with Pakistan. While the Canal Water talks being held under the auspices of the World Bank, are reported to have made progress, several problems and disputes between the two countries were resolved during the year and a new climate of normal friendly relations was brought about. Although the year began with the usual bitterness and recriminations and the relations perceptibly deteriorated for a time by the wanton act of aggression by Pakistan in the form of shooting down an IAF Canberra (10 April), as the year progressed, a general improvement was noticeable. The visit of President Ayub Khan (1 September) was an indication of the new trend: his statements and the brief joint *communiqué* issued after the Nehru-Ayub talks confirmed the feeling that a refreshing breeze was now blowing. Earlier, an agreement had been reached in Calcutta on checking border incidents (19 August). Earlier still, on 2 August, an Indo-Pakistan Finance Ministers' Conference had ended successfully in Delhi. Before this, on 27 July an understanding on trade was reached between the two countries. On 15 October, an official Conference on financial talks began in Karachi and proceeded well. The most important of the agreements, however, was the one on the eastern borders, disputes regarding which threatened to vitiate relations between India and Pakistan. The talks between two high power delegations in this regard concluded on 22 October. It was also hoped that the Western border would likewise be agreed upon by the two countries.

The problem of Kashmir, of course, remained the Gordian Knot of Indo-Pakistan relations and there was no evidence of any change of attitudes in Pakistan towards this problem. The wide divergence in foreign policy also continued and this made it difficult for a suggestion of joint defence which emanated from the President and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, to be considered seriously. Nevertheless, the trend in Indo-Pakistan relation had by the year become one of progressive improvement in the general atmosphere and the gradual elimination of the items of dispute.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Almost offsetting the entire success in all other spheres was the serious setback in relations with the People's Republic of China. The first evidence of a prolonged difference of approach was available in March, when the Government of China took recourse to methods of force to quell disturbances in Tibet, ended the autonomy of this region (with which India had deep cultural and historical ties) which was earlier assured by the leaders of China and forced the Dalai Lama to flee. When the Dalai Lama entered India on 31 March, he was readily granted asylum in this country. Even earlier the Chinese had named Kalimpong as commanding centre of the revolt in Tibet; the asylum given to Dalai Lama further disturbed their equanimity and wild charges of expansionism began to be levelled against India from Peking. Faced with these unexpected developments, the Government of India enunciated their policy in regard to Tibet as being one governed by three basic considerations: (a) security of India (b) friendship with China and (c) autonomy for the people of Tibet. The importance of the first item above was that with the end of Tibet's autonomy and the rights of the Tibetan people to govern themselves, the two mighty nations of Asia, India and China, faced each other directly and when one of them displayed what Mr. Nehru has been describing as the arrogance of might, the other had to think of her security.

Almost to confirm India's fears, certain developments followed along the India-China borders in the next few months. All these years, maps were being published in China showing wide portions of Indian territory as Chinese: all Indian notes of protest in this regard were met with strange silence. By 20 August, incursions into Indian territory by Chinese troops, concentrated in Tibet in great numbers, were reported; by 25 August, it was known in Delhi that the Chinese had constructed a road across Indian territory in Ladakh. On 28 August, the fact of Chinese aggression was confirmed by the Prime Minister in the *Lok Sabha*. Longju in NEFA had been overrun; and at three more points incursions had taken place. On 9 September Premier Chou En-lai sent a letter to Mr. Nehru; China would never "recognize the so-called McMahon Line"; about 40,000 square miles of Indian territory were actually Chinese; it was India, not China, which had committed aggression! Apparently, this came as a shock for India. It was our Prime Minister's view that the border was clear; it was confirmed by treaty, usage and law and there was no question of any adjustments, except minor ones, being made. The greatest and severest shock for India was administered by the Chinese when on 23 October members of an Indian police party were killed and the rest taken prisoners about forty eight miles within the Indian territory by well-armed Chinese troops. To add insult to injury, imprisoned policemen of the Indian party were subjected to inhuman torture and third degree methods of extorting confessions from them.

Although such incidents have not been repeated since then, it has lent further urgency to the problem of India's border security and underlined the need for strong defence measures.

As the year ended, tensions were subsiding and it was no longer impossible that the two Prime Ministers would meet to discuss the border problem. The Chinese have always been suggesting such a meeting, although on the condition that India would accept the undefined character of the border. India, on the other hand, made it clear that discussions without vacation of aggression might be useless; secondly, they must relate only to minor adjustments and not major exchanges of territory. The facts, as Mr. Nehru said, were different as they were being stated by the two sides. Their approach, likewise, was different. On the specific problem of avoiding border problems for example, the Indian and Chinese suggestions varied considerably, the latter being designed to perpetuate aggression.

The most important question in the whole issue was whether the problem of borders was but a genuine misunderstanding or the mere manifestation of a yawning political gulf between India and China, arising out of their attitude, in general, to questions of peace and war. If the Chinese thrusts against India were but thrusts against neutralism and all that India stands for internally and externally, apparently the problem could not be easily solved or friendship re-established through any short cut.

In conclusion, the interesting fact must be noted that the creation of an India-China problem has not affected the relations between Indian and other communist countries.

INDIAN POLITICS

THE SWATANTRA PARTY

The birth of a new party—the Swatantra Party—in the middle of the year was one of the important political events of 1959. The conservative forces and elements in the country had been progressively isolated from national politics, as a result of the acceptance of radical programmes and socialist ideas by the Indian National Congress. The major opposition to the country's ruling party came from the communist and the socialist parties. The only parties which would not call themselves socialist were the communal parties, whose appeal and efficacy could be limited. Some of the conservative politicians had been functioning as individuals; others had become defunct; and there were some potentially conservative individuals and groups who had not been attracted to politics. There was therefore, always the possibility of the formation of such a party.

What provided the immediate provocation for them to group together was the Nagpur session of the Congress which adopted a radical programme of agrarian reconstruction. Ceiling on holdings, cooperative joint farming and cooperative servicing of agriculture would together change the structure of rural India and establish State Control in some form over this vital sector of the economy. To this, protests came from various quarters but the organised opposition to it was in the form of the Swatantra Party. The veteran Indian statesman, C. Rajagopalachari, decided to lead this party among whose members were former Congressmen like N. G. Ranga and K. M. Munshi, former Socialists like M. R. Masani and ex-civil servants like V. P. Menon.

From the party's manifesto and programme, it was clear that it aspired to be a real conservative party of India, emphasis on individual freedom in the economic sphere and private enterprise being its major plank of policy. In agriculture, the peasant cultivator with his own farm would, according to them, need to be helped and strengthened; in industry, state control would be the least, so that the best could be derived out of the entrepreneur. The Congress

in their view, would eventually lead to collectivisation and hence political dictatorship.

Among the many undefined aspects of the party's policies was that of foreign policy and confusion became somewhat worse confounded as the party leaders made divergent statements on vital national issues.

THE PARTY IN POWER

For the Indian National Congress, the year began with a very controversial formulation in regard to agrarian policy in the form of the Nagpur resolution and the initial months were largely devoted to explanation and clarification of this. While even within the party, attitudes seemed to be uncertain in this matter, opposition to cooperative farming mounted, on the assumption that it was but another name for collective farming. The controversy, however, became diluted as it was clarified by party dignitaries that the emphasis, for the present, would be on cooperative servicing (creation of half a million cooperative societies in three years was the goal) and that there was no question of imposing cooperative farming against the wishes of the individual farmer. The belief, however, was expressed that in the ultimate analysis cooperative farming remains an essential precondition for the reconstruction of Indian agriculture. Organisationally, the party began with the bold experiment of electing young Mrs. Indira Gandhi as its President, as a symbolic shift of emphasis from old to new blood. When the new Congress President declined to be re-elected at the end of the year, the party unanimously chose the Andhra leader, Sanjiva Reddy, as its President. The emphasis on "new blood" apparently continued.

Inner party problems became acute in some states. In Punjab, in particular, the organisation appeared divided and charges against the State Chief Minister were freely levelled. In Uttar Pradesh, internal problems continued to cause concern and demand the attention of the national leadership. Charges and counter charges by conflicting groups were climaxed by a statement made in the Assembly on behalf of a number of Congress M.L.A.s that they had no confidence in the State Cabinet. In Orissa, the party formed a coalition with a party in opposition—the Ganatantra Parishad—to lend stability to the state government. In Assam, a crucial bye-election to the State Assembly was lost; in Rajasthan and West Bengal, disunity in party ranks did not remain hidden. In short the organisational problems remained serious causes of concern. Committees were set up to investigate into these problems.

The Congress decided during the year to undo the bilingual arrangement in Bombay State, thus removing one of the important causes of the party's unpopularity in the western region of India. The present state of Bombay would now be divided into two, Gujrat and Bombay, that is the Marathi speaking districts of the erstwhile State.

Much of the party's attention was devoted during the year towards evolving the broad approach and setting the outlines of the Third Five Year Plan. While a Conference at Ooty at the middle of the year discussed the problem in its various aspects, a sub-committee of the party went into the question in greater details and submitted its report. The A.I.C.C., meeting at Chandigarh endorsed their recommendations.

THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

The year began after the rift in the Socialist Party of India and the formation of the Socialist unity faction had made yet another dent in the solidarity of

the Indian Socialists. Throughout the year, factional groups in some states tried to evolve as political parties. In Andhra, an attempt by the socialists to unite with a section of Congressmen to form a broad opposition party crumbled and socialist leader P. V. G. Raju ultimately decided to join the Congress party and became a member of the Andhra Cabinet. There was no further move, this year, to unite the P.S.P. and S.P.

The P.S.P.'s main concern during the year was two-fold: to lend punch and weight to the agitation against the Communist Ministry of Kerala and to agitate on the issue of Chinese incursions. The foreign policy of India was most vigorously criticised by Praja Socialists in the Parliament and outside.

The possibility of P.S.P.-Congress cooperation remained a live question in Indian politics. Early in the year, Acharya Kripalani appealed for the formation of a national government; towards the close, party Chairman Asoka Mehta welcomed a thesis by the Congress Socialist Forum (Ginger Group) which envisaged such cooperation. On both occasions, however, the Prime Minister rejected the suggestions as impracticable.

During the year, the party held its Silver Jubilee Session in Bombay. The Session, however, was not marked by any fundamental change of policies or programmes and was mainly devoted to an assessment of the last twenty five years of Indian Socialism.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

For the Communist Party of India, 1959 was a year of particular stress and strain. The Government in Kerala faced a 'mass upsurge' and was dismissed by the President, who took over the administration of the State, after law and order had failed and there were threats of massive conflicts in the state. The party decided to roundly condemn the central action, as a violence of the Constitution, and as a wanton disregard of democratic practices by the party in power to serve its own ends. While it was officially stated that this would not in any way affect the overall policies of the Communist Party of India, the sullen mood was evident in course of the Parliament debates on Kerala. In West Bengal Assembly, the party members demonstrated anger in the unprecedented form of hurling shoes at the treasury benches. Apparently, the rivalry between the ruling party and the Communists had intensified!

Hardly, however, had the party reacted to Kerala when it was facing a serious internal crisis, resulting from the Chinese aggression in India. Several important members of the party openly criticised the official party stand and declared their disapproval of Chinese action. The leader of the Communist Party in the Parliament, S. A. Dange, spoke at a public meeting in Bombay criticising the Chinese and the failure of his party to frankly state its opposition to China. Likewise the former Kerala Chief Minister stated that his Party's stand on China might affect its future in Kerala. On the other hand, the Communist Party of West Bengal took out processions urging the Indian Prime Minister to meet the Chinese Premier without conditions! Unity, however, was restored after a session of the Party's 101-member National Executive at Meerut, where an agreed resolution regarding the China issue was accepted. Mr. Dange was censured and no change in party leadership asked for. As the year was ending, party differences ceased to agitate the minds of communists so much and their united attention was on the forthcoming state-wide elections in Kerala.

KERALA: PRESIDENT'S RULE

Among the important political events of the period was the agitation against and the fall of the Government in Kerala. All the opposition parties of the state together started the agitation against the government on 12 June. Besides the political parties the leaders of the Christian and Nair communities were behind the agitation. Within weeks the situation in the state deteriorated seriously and mass arrests and demonstrations occurred every day. While both the government and the opposition proclaimed that the overwhelming majority of the state's people were behind them, incidents increased in number and there arose the threat of a total breakdown of law and order. The agitators demanded resignation of the Ministry and as the Ministry decided to disregard this demand as well as the advice of Mr. Nehru to this effect, the agitation intensified and the demand now was for Central intervention. On 31 July, the President assumed to himself all functions of the government and dismissed the Assembly.

It was made clear that the state would soon be called upon to reelect an Assembly and brisk preparations started soon after for that. The date for the re-election was fixed as 1 February 1960.

On 11 September 1959 it was announced in Ernakulam that the Congress, P.S.P. and Muslim League had reached complete agreement on electoral arrangements to present a united front to the Communist Party. Both the united front and the Communist Party tried to enlist the support of the only remaining group in state politics—the R.S.P.—but they refused to enter into any arrangement with other political parties on their terms. Feverish election campaigns marked the closing days of the year. With the stakes regarded as very high by the two contending groups, the state elections in Kerala would be of more than usual interest.

RETHINKING ON THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS

Two important documents, appearing towards the end of the year, highlighted the rethinking in some circles in regard to the structure of politics in the country. The Congress Socialist Forum—the Ginger Group—published a 10,000-word thesis entitled 'Nehru must give the lead', suggesting recasting of politics to suit the changing needs of the times. The former socialist leader Jaya Prakash Narayan, also prepared a draft thesis of suggestions for reconstruction of the Indian Polity. The Forum's view was that the country was now passing through a critical and transitional phase of its history and the task was to facilitate an economic take off; for this a political take off was needed and this would imply neutralisation of the opposition, or as much of it as possible, and a degree of cooperation among like minded parties. In concrete terms this would mean the formation of a Congress-PSP—Sarvodaya coalition and the setting up of a coalition governments at all levels. Normally, the Forum said, such a coalition should embrace all parties; but there were parties in the country which did not believe in planning and which owed loyalty to external forces. Applying this criterion, the Swatantra Party and the Communist Party were ruled out. The Forum thesis stated *inter alia* that party rivalries "can permit nothing more than a pale and anaemic programme of industrialisation and a moderate rate of economic growth."

The broad outlines of his thesis (which is yet to be published) were set out by Jayaprakash Narayan in a speech in New Delhi on 28 December 1959. He envisaged a four-tier state structure—the village community (as the base), the District Councils, State Councils and the Union. Elections would be by "general unanimity" to the village councils. The election to the other three tiers could be indirect. According to Mr. Narayan, "democracy from above is failing and we

are not building up democracy from below". A majority of Indians, according to him, did not understand the system of Parliamentary democracy well.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

During 1959, thought and attention was largely concentrated on the size, scope and approach of the Third Five Year Plan. The discussion proceeded in the backdrop of two essential factors: the success in the implementation of the Second Five Year Plan and the recognition of the urgency to accelerate the pace of development. While this inevitably led to the search for ways and means to finance a substantially bigger Third Five Year Plan, questions of structural and institutional changes also arose. Also fundamental in the thinking on the Third Plan was the increased expectation of foreign assistance in various forms.

THE SECOND PLAN

With the acute foreign exchange crisis of the early years of the Plan showing signs of abatement, the outlook for the Second Five Year Plan considerably improved. There was an overall rise of reserves by Rs. 12 crores in the first half of 1959 as against a decline of Rs. 28 crores in the preceding half year and of Rs. 77 crores during the first six months of 1958. While foreign assistance made the bulk of the difference, the trade gap itself was reduced from Rs. 265 crores in the first half of 1958 to 212 crores in the first half of 1959.

Assurances came during the year that the Second Plan would be fulfilled in essentials. During the year food production touched the record height of 73.5 million tons. Agricultural production in general showed appreciable increase, the index having risen from 114.6 to 131. Industrial production also showed steady increase during the year. Except bicycles, sewing machines and automobiles the production in all industries increased considerably. Engineering goods in particular, have shown a steady upward trend: taking 1951 as the base year, industrial machinery production has gone up to 430 points in 1959, while general engineering is up to 310 points and chemical engineering up to 297. The rate of growth of per capita income in 1958-59 has been the highest since national income computation started. In 1948-49 the national income was Rs. 8,650 crores; in 1958-59 it went up to Rs. 11,570 crores—a rise of 3.4 per cent per annum. Nearly half this increase however, was eaten up by increase of population and the per capita income increased only by 1.8 per cent. Per capita income today is Rs. 294, as against the 1960-61 target of Rs. 325. "It follows therefore" according to the *Economic Review* that "both agricultural and industrial production must leap forward in the remaining period of the Second Plan in order that the national and per capita income targets may be reached."

RUPEE VALUE

The fall in the value of the Indian rupee in the open markets abroad has caused a degree of concern, although it has been pointed out that it is no reflection on the intrinsic value of the rupee. The fluctuation in the rates of exchange in the free markets do not affect legal trade and other transactions which constitute the majority of our foreign exchange dealings. The strengthening of the Indian economy is the surest guarantee of strengthening the rupee; and the decline in the internal value of the rupee has not been more than the decline on the internal value of the U.S. dollar.

Inflation, however, looms large on the Indian economy and complacency can be dangerous. It is necessary here to briefly deal with price trends in India. The annual average, according to the *Eastern Economist*, of food prices rose from 112

in 1958 to 118.2 in 1959*—showing a 5.54 per cent increase. Tobacco price indices rose from 91.0 to 99.3 by 8.05 per cent. The prices of fuel, power etc. rose from 114.9 to 116.0—by .96 per cent. Industrial Raw Material increased from 114.7 to 119.7—by 4.36 per cent. Manufactures also showed a rising trend; from 109.4 the price index rose to 111.0. The general index (for all commodities) rose from 111.0 to 115.5 by 4.05 per cent. And it was the official view that deficit financing would vastly expand during the Second Plan period.

THOUGHTS ON THE THIRD PLAN

Considerable thought and deliberation was devoted during 1959 to various aspects of the Third Five Year Plan. The official draft of the Plan—frame is yet to be published and the Plan—nucleus may be finalised only in 1960. Valuable guidance in this task was available during the year from public discussions on this subject.

The lead in the matter was taken by the Indian National Congress which appointed a sub-committee to go into the entire question. A meeting of the National Development Council early in the year (April 3 & 4) expressed the opinion that increased production and mobilization of resources should be the watchwords of the Third Plan and that great emphasis should be laid on the production of machine making plants. The A.I.C.C. meeting in Delhi in May (10, 11 and 12) threw more light: in a note on the subject, prepared by the Chairman of the Planning Sub Committee, emphasis was laid on the wider angle of social justice and it was recommended that definite range of income should be prescribed, income not related to work curtailed, profits should be linked to productivity, price mechanism used for allocation of resources, and maximum income should be limited by curtailing the opportunities for such income.

At a seminar at Ooty (30 May-5 June), the A.I.C.C. accepted an annual six per cent increase and a 14 per cent saving in the national income as the goals of the Third Plan. The essential aim would be to create a "self generating" and "self accelerating" economy. The capital base would have to be expanded with special emphasis on machine building, heavy chemical and electrical industries as well as power. It would be necessary to simultaneously strengthen the agricultural base and develop rural industries. Socialism was reiterated as the national objective and it was declared that it could be achieved through Gandhian means. It was the seminar's hope that it would be possible to mobilise resources for a 10,000 crore plan through public savings, taxation, surpluses of public enterprises, private savings, and a reasonable measure of external borrowings. The public sector, according to the seminar ought to continuously expand and expansion in the private sector must be regulated in accordance with the aim of a socialist society.

On the basis of the Ooty discussions as well as the subsequent deliberations on the subject, the A.I.C.C. Planning Sub Committee brought out on 6 September its 72-page report on the broad pattern of the Third Plan. Four principal objectives for the Plan were suggested: (a) a sizable increase in the national income so as to raise the level of living (b) rapid industrialisation with particular emphasis on basic and heavy industries (c) a large expansion of employment opportunities and (d) reduction of inequalities in income and wealth and a more equitable distribution of economic power. As against the trend of Ooty discussions, the Sub-Committee report felt that in a balanced and integrated national plan there should be enough scope for the private sector also. One important aspect of the

* Base 1952-53.

Committee's recommendation was in regard to the use of new financial techniques. Emphasis was in this context, laid on profits of public enterprises, profits from State trading, bank investment in Government Securities, economy in expenditure and heavy taxation of monopolistic and windfall incomes.

Among other discussions on the subject should be noted the views expressed by organised labour and industry on the problem. The INTUC wanted emphasis on the rural sector and the assurance of a minimum standard for all; employment also had been inadequately tackled in earlier plans and needed special emphasis. The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry organised a seminar on this (28 November) and it was their view that a 10,000 crore plan was possible if a substantial improvement in the internal economic climate could be achieved. By this it meant that the Government's taxation and other policies which adversely affect the private sector should be given up. The development of the country could suffer in the welter of public-private sector controversy.

In short, there was a consensus of opinion in the country that the Third Plan should, as Mr. Nehru says, pave the ground for the country's economic "take-off".

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

To a considerable extent, the prospect of development in the Third Plan period would depend on the quantity of foreign loans, grants and investments we are able to attract. There are hopeful trends visible in this regard and if the tension relaxes in the world and arms production is lessened, the prospects of external assistance might considerably improve. As it is, the Government of USSR has made important promises of foreign aid in course of the Third Plan. Credit worth Rs. 180 crores has already been agreed upon; and there is the possibility of substantial expansion of Soviet assistance in our task of industrialising the country. The United States, likewise, has been showing increasing interest in our development plans and there is the likelihood of stepping up aid from various funds. Countries of Western Europe, particularly Germany, have also been developing their capacity to export surplus capital and it is possible that larger assistance will flow in.

Foreign private capital is likely to take increasing interest in India. The U.S. President indicated his anxiety to see such investments in India during his visit. Indian delegations to the U.S.A. also felt hopeful about this. The visit to India of Lord Chandos and the Chief of the Krupps would in this connection appear specially interesting. What impact this would have on the private—public sector ratio in the Third Plan would be a matter of great interest.

MAN OF THE YEAR

The various developments of the outgoing year—social, economic and political—combined to underline the importance for this country of the continued leadership of Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru. And much as Mr. Nehru decided to have a quiet birthday, the entire country thought of him more than ever before on 14 November, this year. India's foreign policy was now undergoing its severest test and the need for a master mind was never greater; to avoid the scylla of alignment and the charybdis of violation of our borders is largely the function of one who understands the nuances of foreign politics well. The external crisis also necessitated a degree of internal mobilisation and unity which implied the existence of a leader who is acceptable to all sections in the country. Lastly, for India to play her due role in the hopeful changes now taking place in the world scene, the architect of

our foreign policy is essential. In the sphere of internal politics, the Prime Minister remained the symbol of a truce among our political parties and although rivalries tended to increase, the fundamentals of our policies remained unchanged. At a time when the country's political structure is to increasingly bear the strain generated by a forced pace of economic development the importance of a Nehru is indeed inestimable. Finally, the magnitude of our economic tasks and the burden of financing a larger plan also involve the existence of a stable political leadership. It also involves the continued guidance of our fundamental thinking on economics by one whose intense desire for institutional changes can be matched only by his own capacity for realistic assessment of facts. In the backdrop of continued evidence of the weakness of our party set-up, the importance of the individual increases. In 1960, as in 1959, the man of the year will be Jawaharlal Nehru.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Unofficial History by Field Marshal Sir William Slim. (Cassell & Co. Ltd., London, 1959). 242 pages. Price 21 sh.

Every writer, I suppose, wants to exert some positive effect on his readers—instruct, persuade, shock, thrill, inspire, subdue, bamboozle, arouse, amuse, ridicule, entertain, put to sleep. In short, he wants to dominate them, to influence their hearts or minds, if only for a few moments. Not many writers have the gift of captivating instead of dominating, of securing our willing participation more than merely our attention, of delighting and pleasing us without having any special axe to grind; not trying to approve or condemn but inviting us to share in something very personal and intimate; and using for this purpose a remarkably fine style. Some names of such writers come to mind—Lamb, Hazlitt, Addison, Wendell Holmes, Sterne, Landor, Belloc, Chesterton, Stevenson, Kinglake, Doughty; in our own time, people like Laurie Lee, Laurence Durrell, Rose Macaulay, Norman Douglas, the less intense D. H. Lawrence. But the list is short, and contains only professional authors. One can hardly expect a soldier, even a very eminent soldier, to gain a place in such a company. Yet this is just what Sir William Slim has contrived to do. His "Unofficial History" is a book which is so woefully rare among soldiers' books—a book of literature.

Official histories are useful only to scholars and to optimistic officers seeking a field-marshal's baton by way of a staff college entrance examination. To ordinary men these histories are a painful infliction, a drudgery to the mind and a weariness to the soul. Sir William is obviously dissatisfied with official histories also. So he has proceeded to transform some chosen passages from them, and has succeeded in his undertaking. Nine episodes from official military history in which he has personally played a part, each immortalized by a few insipid lines in a British Government document, a Government of India communique, or a B.B.C. news broadcast, form the dead and buried stuff from which he resurrects and fashions nine superb tales not unworthy to stand beside Kipling himself in power of narrative, control of tempo, crisp and sure character drawing, and quality of style. In them he brings to life a procession of vivid characters: "Chuck" the beefy uninhibited Irish rogue conscripted into a reserve battalion, who seemed a fool but displayed in Mesopotamia a drive, resourcefulness and *sang froid* which would have done credit to a pirate captain; the small bearded Austrian doctor, deserted by his Turkish friends, forced to run across the desert without his trousers while a group of Arab horsemen made sport by chasing him like hounds pursuing a fox; Cornwall, deputy commissioner at Gurampur, infinitely useful to the Government of his province in clearing up other D.C.'s messes, and handling with calm efficiency a serious threat to the civil power; Mother Angela; Ratanbahadur and Bombahadur of the Gurkhas; Slim's own A.D.C. at Deir-ez-zor, "whose refined diction had never been corrupted by the rude language of those with whom war had compelled him to associate." Through each story strides Slim himself, at once commander and reporter, officer and observer. His style is always good, sometimes memorable. A sample: "Reserve battalions were like those reservoirs that haunted the arithmetic of our youth—the sort that were filled by two streams and emptied by one." Another: "A rather notorious general, whose language was as florid as his complexion, once told the somewhat sceptical remains of a battalion that had been shot to bits in an attack that 'the offensive spirit is the British infantryman's brightest jewel'. It would have required a clear eye to discern any sparkle about us when late afternoon found us trudging across that interminable flatness." And a final one: "As a junior officer in the first World War, I had been presumptuous enough sometimes to hope that if I survived

and were not found out, I might with tremendous luck, by the time the next great war arrived, be a general. Then, I fondly imagined my headquarters would move from chateau to chateau, from which I would occasionally emerge, fortified by good wine and French cooking, to wish the troops the best of luck in their next attack. Alas, when the time did come and, by good fortune in the game of military snakes and ladders, I found myself a general, I was so inept in my choice of theatres that no chateau were available. More often than not, I had to make do with a plot of desert sand, a tree in the African bush, or a patch of jungle, while my cuisine was based on bully beef and the vintages of my imagination were replaced by over-chlorinated water."

This is not a book for fools, morons, or examinees seeking short cuts to success. But it is decidedly a book for those who are looking for pleasure and delight, for good fare excellently served, and for that precious commodity of which the supply is getting shorter and shorter as the days move on—insight, the capacity to see and understand the pulsing heart of a badly recorded event, the insight that makes true history.

P.T.C.S.

The Only Enemy : An Autobiography by Brigadier Sir John Smyth, Bt. V.C., M.C., M.P. (Hutchinsons, London, 1959). 352 pages. Price 30 sh.

This interesting book is the autobiography of Brigadier Sir John Smyth, who has had a rich and varied experience of life. He had the proud distinction of winning the Victoria Cross while he was hardly twenty-one years of age. Luck, however, deserted him for the disastrous battle of the river Sittang in Burma led to his premature retirement from the Service. He met the challenge of adverse circumstances with courage and boldness and soon made a mark as a Journalist and Member of Parliament. His unique and varied career thus provides good material to the author for his autobiography. Some of his comments on men and events are quite interesting. This is how he writes about his mother: "Right to the end of her life she hardly knew how to boil an egg, make a cup of tea or answer the telephone; but that didn't matter in the least; there were always plenty of people eager to do it all for her, and her greatest friends and supporters were her three adoring sons." The highlight of the story is of course the military exploit which gained for the author the Victoria Cross. Smyth at the head of a gallant band of Sikhs (15th Sikhs) performed a remarkable feat of bravery in Flanders during World War I, carrying boxes of ammunition to an isolated post, in spite of heavy rifle, machine-gun and shell-fire. The author rightly pays high tribute to the Sikh soldier. "Given leaders who understood him and whom he respected, there was no class in the Indian Army which rose to greater heights of courage, endurance and loyalty than the Sikh." The disastrous battle of the river Sittang, which led to Smyth's premature retirement from service, figures prominently in the story. Smyth tries to fix the responsibility for this disastrous battle on the shoulders of General Hutton and General Wavell. He says that Wavell made a mistake in uprooting Hutton, an extremely capable Staff Officer, from his job as C.G.S. Delhi and sending him out as an army Commander to Burma. "It is very rare that a good Staff Officer makes a good battle Commander." His premature retirement from Service made him very angry but luckily he did not let his anger corrode his mind. "I felt very angry about it myself for a time. But it is no use being angry about what is past. And anger only corrodes the mind of the person who feels it if the anger is allowed to fester and become a habit. So I dropped it from my mind as one would drop a hot coal from one's hand. Tomorrow is always another day." It is these shrewd philosophic comments which make the autobiography of this remarkable man really so fascinating.

D.P.

Not In The Limelight by Sir Ronald Wingate. (Hutchinsons, London). 232 pages. Price 25 sh.

Sir Ronald writes his autobiography with a simple, humorous tolerance which makes effortless and most enjoyable reading. The title modestly disclaims the author's wide range of professional and other interests which enabled him to live and work among people and in places where the candles burnt with remarkable brightness.

The reader will find that he is taken through Kipling's Simla, the Punjab, Mesopotamia before the First World War; and Kashmir, Rajputana and Baluchistan—where the author served in one capacity or the other in the Political Service.

His memories of these places is not of politics or achievements or failures, but of interesting personal episodes, fishing, shooting and a vast collection of amusing and absorbing anecdotes. His account in particular, of sea fishing off Muscat is a little gem of naturalist reporting.

The author's experiences in World War II were no less remarkable. He accompanied General de Gaulle and the Free French Expedition to Dakar, was a member of the planning staff of the Chiefs of Staff; and after the war, was Alternate Delegate of the United Kingdom for Reparations, and then Joint British Commissioner for the Restitution of Monetary Gold.

He devotes almost the whole of one chapter to the art of deception in war and would seem to be one of those who was very much in the know about those two classic deception plans: The False Montgomery and The Man Who Never Was.

This thoroughly delightful book deals with a vast number of big moments of history in a small good-humoured way, without any of the commonly fashionable revelations or startling disclosures to mar the story of his eventful life.

E.V.

A Pearl to India—The Life of Roberto De Nobili by Vincent Cronin. (Rupert Hart-Davis, London, 1959). 297 pages. Price 25 sh.

Roberto De Nobili was born of a princely family in Rome, late in the 16th century. When he was barely 20 years of age, he was seized with a burning passion to visit India. He entered the novitiate of the Society of Jesus at Naples, and in 1603, he set out for Portugal, where he spent a year preparing himself for his life work in the country which he loved so dearly. He reached Goa in May 1605. Like his celebrated predecessor Francis Xavier, his first reaction to the country was against the corrupt practices of the Portuguese administration. "Everywhere and at all times," he complained, "it is rapine, hoarding and robbery." He was disappointed with the way people who had absolutely no understanding of the Christian faith were being converted, like so many sheep. From Goa Father De Nobili proceeded to Cochin, and moved inland to Madurai, where he spent the greater part of his active life.

As is well known, Madurai, which even today is in the heart of Tamilnad, was at that time the great centre of Tamil culture. Here, there flourished the famous "Tamil Sangam", which attracted the great poets and authors of Tamil literature. De Nobili's first task was to gain proficiency in Tamil, which he did. He took to the language, habits, and cultural practices of the people as a duck takes to water. "A rush mat served as bed, chair and table. A few earthen and metal pots, round as a cannon ball, and a box for clothes and jewels formed the whole of the furniture". The orthodox Hindus of South India

garded Christians as outcaste and untouchables, calling them "Parangis". Not so with De Nobili. He came to be accepted as a "Pandit" and treated with great reverence, not only because he showed unmistakable signs of rare wisdom but also a supernatural gift with which he seemed to be overflowing. His approach lay not in denouncing Hindu beliefs as primitive superstition, but in endeavouring to gain a knowledge of them and developing a love and friendly understanding of the people who cherished them. In fact, as he developed an intimate knowledge of the people in whose midst he lived and worked, De Nobili came to realise the need for giving up his western style of dress and his leather shoes. With the approval of the Jesuit authorities, he adopted the saffron robe, as his garment, and walked about bare footed like the common man. He even adopted the dietary practices of the Brahmin, preferring vegetarian food to flesh meats. Even so, he never did lose sight of the fact that underlying all that he believed and practised, there was a body of Christian doctrine which could on no account be compromised. He would not for instance, accord his approval to such practices as Sati or Idol worship. In his effort to understand the philosophical foundation of Hinduism, De Nobili was naturally led to the study of the Vedas. He soon mastered the texts of the Rig, Yajur, Sama and Atharva Vedas. He claimed to possess knowledge of a fifth Veda which he believed had been lost and which it was his mission to restore to the people with whom he had made himself one. This led him into a series of religious discussions and controversies from which he emerged as a veritable saint. He acquired fame as "Tattva Bodhikar"—teacher of reality— a title by which he was known for the rest of his life.

The growing influence and popularity of Father De Nobili, particularly the high esteem in which he was held by the people of India was not looked upon with favour by certain ecclesiastical authorities. In 1611 he was unexpectedly summoned to Cochin where he appeared as a "wandering sannyasi in red ochre cotton and wooden clogs, his brow marked with sandal, guru of 150 converts in a great university city". But the Goa theologians were not impressed. The charge of schism was on everybody's mind. Nevertheless De Nobili took his solemn vows as a professed father in the Society of Jesus, thereby gaining for his work the double approbation of the Catholic church and the religious order which he had entered.

In 1619 there was a religious conference in Goa where again De Nobili came in for criticism. His religious approach was subjected to bitter criticism and the Archbishop of Goa questioned the propriety of De Nobili's presentation of the Christian way of life. The spirited defence put up by De Nobili was not, however, accepted. The matter was referred to Pope Gregory XV, who issued an Apostolic Constitution, *Romanae Sedis Antistites*, justifying the religious position taken up by De Nobili. The reason in support of De Nobili was provided by a text from St. Augustine's *City of God*: "It is a matter of no moment in the City of God, whether he who adopts the faith that brings men to God, adopts it in one dress and manner of life or another, so long as he lives in conformity with the commandments of God, and hence, when philosophers themselves become Christians, they are compelled indeed to abandon their erroneous doctrines, but not their dress and mode of life, which are no obstacle to religion."

In 1614, with the death of Emperor of Vijayanagar, and the shifting of the capital of the Nayak from Madurai to Tiruchirappalli, De Nobili was confronted with several difficulties in his work. He spent most of his time as an itinerant preacher, visiting various towns in South India. On the 22nd July, 1639, De Nobili was put under arrest on a charge of rousing hostile feelings in the minds of the people towards their traditional religious beliefs. He remained in a prison for about a year and was eventually set free. For the next few years he continued

his teaching and preaching as in the past. The staple of his life continued to be theological discussion. He died on the 16th January, 1656 and was buried at Madras in the same Basilica which contains the mortal remains of the Apostle St. Thomas. Today, a Theological Training College at Poona, named after Roberto De Nobili stands as a mark of respect to the memory of this great Italian Jesuit Priest.

The book is an inspiring account of the life of renowned scholar of the Catholic Church, whose main purpose was to interpret his faith by making himself one with the Indian people and entering into the deepest recesses of their hearts.

W.T.V.A.

An Occupation For Gentlemen by Frederic Warburg. (Hutchinsons, London, 1959). 287 pages. Price 21 sh.

I wonder how many of us bother to see as to who is the publisher of a particular book when we read it? I, for one, had not done it till recently when the question of publishing regiment histories cropped up. Even then I did not realise what a fascinating profession publishing is till I read "An Occupation for Gentlemen".

The author describes his early life before, as he puts it, blundering into publishing. In this part of the book the author gives his experiences as a young Gunner Officer during World War I. Then goes on to describe his career at Oxford.

When the author came down from Oxford he found that he was fit for practically nothing or, perhaps more accurately, for nothing practical. After many family conferences, through the help of his brother-in-law he found himself as an apprentice at Routledge in 1922. The senior Managing Director of that firm was William Swan Stallybrass. The author describes how under Mr. Stallybrass, whom he calls his Master, he learnt about publishing, for the day he joined the firm he had no idea what publishing was or what publishers did. In 7 years the author became a Managing Director of the firm and after serving for another 6 years was sacked for his efforts in getting new ideas into the working of the firm. One of the reasons for this sudden dismissal was the powerful personality of author's second wife to whom the author has dedicated this book. In a very frank and forthright manner the author has described the tremendous influence which his wife wielded over him during those years and one cannot get away from the impression that but for his wife the firm of Martin Secker & Warburg Limited would never have been formed.

The author introduces us to some fascinating character studies of W. S. Stallybrass, Rogers Senhouse his first partner, H. G. Wells in his final years, George Orwell and Jomo Kenyatta. We get a good idea of the political forces working behind the war in Spain and how difficult it was in those days to see what was right and wrong.

The author's ability to write clearly and with sense of humour will make this book interesting reading for all.

A.N.J.

Shoot To Kill by Richard Miers. (Faber & Faber, London, 1959). 216 pages. Price 18 sh.

A Race Of Green Ginger by Averil Mackenzie-Grieve. (Putnam, London, 1959). 194 pages. Price 21 sh.

"Professional Studies" has become somewhat suspect amongst many of us in the Services and in spite of a large amount of lip service paid to it, little

seems to be achieved in this direction by the vast majority of our military readers. A possible cause for this may perhaps be found if we survey at random the bookshelves of our regimental libraries as well as the private collection of books found in any officer's room. Too often will we find "prescribed reading" for promotion and other examinations, and too seldom any others.

The art of soldiering encompasses a vast field, with the minute of individual training on the one hand, and on the other we may place general knowledge so diffuse that we may include in it the arts and philosophy of peoples and countries. "Professional Studies" can seldom be rammed down an officer's throat with any long-range benefits. The only way is to create an atmosphere of interest, and of sustaining it is to serve up fare most suitable not only to sustain but to stimulate appetite for more.

"Shoot to Kill" is exceptionally well suited for this purpose. This is a story of the experiences of 1st Battalion, the South West Wales Borders fighting Communist Terrorists in Malaya during the period of that battalion's tenure there from 1955 to 1958. The author explains the aim of the Book as that of putting over to the general reader the life led by men, mostly national servicemen in their early twenties, while serving as a part of a force employed to end the Malayan "Emergency". The story is well told and makes easy reading. There is almost no effort at political propaganda and the whole effect is that of intelligent "mess conversation" full of the basic ingredients of the infantryman's art when employed in aid of civil power to hunt the "terrorists" in the jungles and swamps of Malaya. The quarry is indeed illusive. The author gives his assessment of the Communist Terrorists, almost all Chinese, and brings out their characteristics as soldiers (men and women) with fairness and a sense of humour.

During the last ten years many of us in India have had to go through similar conditions nearer home. Ambushes and patrols, searches and screening operations have been commonplace routine with many. But how well Lt.-Col. (now Brig.) Miers puts over the subject—what enthusiasm and ingenuity are exhibited how thoroughly plans are made, and attending to in the minutest of detail, and at times, many of us may well envy the free hand he has been allowed to put over his plans into practice. There is an aroma of an efficient and keen battalion. This indeed is a book for every battalion library.

In putting down the book we may wonder why we cannot produce such works ourselves. Can we not ourselves produce the quintessence of our variegated experience gained during the last twelve years and help build up the foundations of the profession for our own younger officers, with a stamp of home-grown freshness about it.

"A Race of Green Ginger" is also about the Chinese, as seen in their own environments in South China by a talented lady in the nineteen-twenties, who went there to study the Chinese language, art, philosophy and their way of life and who has written up her impressions "recollected in tranquility" in 1955-57, after spending a lifetime with the Chinese in South East Asia.

Although this book deals with her day to day experiences, she is dealing primarily with men and women, European and Chinese. Not far off from this domesticity is the possibility of warfare and violence, of pirates and warlords, of strikes and boycotts, and we hear of Chang Kai Shek in his younger days, and the Kau Min Tang as the "revolutionary" new "movement" to rid China of all its ills. The Western Powers are still in the "gun boat" diplomacy stage but their more enlightened representatives are beginning to doubt its efficacy. The author points out time and again the immutability of the Chinese scene. Had not the

Mings and the Sungs been through similar troubles in their own generations, and had not the great calligrapher painters of the distant past captured just the same nuances of the landscape. The scholar is still shown as the highest form of man with his pious, but rather piteous plea that "the unlettered can't rule", and "Good iron's not for nails, good sons are not for soldiers."

Written in a chatty but somewhat disjointed style, the author analyses the Chinese character and interpretation of life with sympathy and understanding, which may be summed up in the quotation from John Smith of 1628—"I would know whether.....A Race of Green Ginger.....be not better than.....biscuits, butter, cheese or oatmeal pottage."

Here then, are a brace of books—the first giving a soldier's story with the Chinese terrorist for an adversary, and the second a long range view of the same people, giving us their basic make-up.

A.M.S.

The March Of Conquest by Telford Taylor. (Edward Hutton, London, 1959). 460 pages. Price 42 sh.

Telford Taylor, widely considered an authority on Nazi Germany, especially after the publication of his remarkable book called *The Sword and Swastika* in 1952, has maintained and enhanced that reputation by bringing out this delightfully well-written and well-documented book, *The March of Conquest*, being an account of the German victories in Western Europe in the first year of World War II. It is worthwhile to remember that Telford Taylor, a lawyer by profession, is the same man who became internationally celebrated as the Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials after the fall of Germany. *The Sword and Swastika* and the present book were both written from his war and post-war experience as an officer in the American Army Intelligence Service and as Chief Counsel for the prosecution at Nuremberg. Thus, being so eminently qualified to write on the subject, he has been able to present in this book an interesting and convincing narrative of the astonishing German victories in the spring of 1940, enriched as it is with new information from captured documents and other sources.

In the very first chapter of the book entitled 'The Wehrmacht in 1940', the author discusses with such clarity the relations between the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) and Hitler, and the various crises between Hitler and his generals from 1936 to 1940 and the various changes and reorganisations which resulted ultimately in making the Wehrmacht a perfect instrument of Hitler's will.

In the chapter on 'The Not-So-Phony War', he explains why the German armies did not attack in the West for six months after the conquest of Poland. The inside story of how Hitler wanted an immediate attack in the autumn and winter of 1939 and how he was thwarted by his generals is told with a clarity perhaps unequalled by any other book on the subject. Hitler thought that time was working for the Allies, and his desire to bring the war to an end before the Allies could build up resistance and make use of their potential resources is quite understandable in view of the fact that Germany had not planned for a long war. But he was opposed by his generals who (especially General Leeb) thought that an attack in winter, owing to the unsuitability of foggy weather for aerial and tank operations, might lead to trench warfare in Belgium or before the French fortifications. Other reasons given for postponing the attack were lack of reserves, need for more training and repairs of equipment. The political argument put forth was that if Britain and France were induced by German inactivity to take the offensive, they would lose all sympathy of the neutral powers.

tries like Belgium and Holland, through whose territory they will have to pass in order to attack Germany. Hitler, however, was firm and snubbed Brauchitsch who was sent by the generals to persuade him to give up the project. Some generals (like Halder) even considered the possibility or rather desirability of overthrowing Hitler, who, however, clung obstinately to the idea of an early attack. Even the A Day was fixed but had to be postponed several times on account of bad-weather reports, and the desire of the generals was thus fulfilled.

When the attack was finally launched in the spring, it met with unexpected success. The strategic and tactical details are graphically described and there are numerous sketch maps to illustrate the operations. Where Taylor however excels is in bringing out the opinions and characters of the German generals and in the discussion of controversial matters.

One of such controversies centres round the question of the 'stop order' halting the attack of the German armoured forces on the Canal Line on 24 May 1940 which enabled the British commander in Belgium (General Gort) to withdraw to the coast and redeploy his forces and plan and commence the concentration at Dunkirk so essential for the evacuation project. Although the order was countermanded after two or three days, this short respite enabled the British and French forces to so arrange their defences around Dunkirk as to prevent German forces from effecting a break through to the area where feverish evacuation activity was going on. The Germans finally reached there on 4 June, but by that time about 350,000 men had escaped to England on ships; smaller vessels, coastal steamers, ferry steamers, fishing trawlers, drifters, etc. etc. in fact on "anything that floats." There is no greater miracle of this war than the mass evacuation of such a large number of men under such difficult conditions, and although "whipped and stripped of all their arms", they lived to fight another day.

So many questions centre round this 'stop order' which made the miracle possible: Who issued this order and why? Rundstedt or Hitler? Or was it Hitler on the initiative of Rundstedt? Why were Commander-in-Chief Brauchitsch's protests not heard? Where was the Luftwaffe and why did it miss such a nice opportunity of destroying the British Expeditionary Force? Is it correct that Hitler wanted to let off the British cheaply so that they might make peace the more willingly? All these and other relevant questions are answered authoritatively and convincingly by the author.

The book has 460 pages of extremely readable matter, 26 sketch maps, 47 illustrations, an introduction, appendices, bibliography and an index, and is a "must" for all interested in the kaleidoscopic events of the first year of the war.

P.N.K.

Australia In The War Of 1939-1945, Series One—Army. Volume V (South-West Pacific Area—First Year)—Kokoda to Wau by Dudley McCarthy. (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1959). 656 pages. Price 30 sh.

This volume describes the fighting on land in the South-West Pacific from mid-1942 to April 1943. It is concerned mainly with the operations of the Australian army in Papua and New Guinea (except those in New Britain and New Ireland already described in another volume in the series). It also describes briefly the operations of the American ground forces in that area and also around Guadalcanal. The main theme of the story is, however, concerned with the fighting along the Kokoda Track, at Milne Bay, in the coastal swamps of the Buna-Sanananda-Gona area, and around Wau. An interesting feature of the book is

the discussions of the major lessons of the operations. Thus the major lessons of the Battle of the Kokoda Track are well brought out. "First it was clear that bush warfare in difficult mountains demanded physical endurance and courage of the highest order, and an individual adaptability, skill and speed in offensive and defensive reaction, both to the enemy and the country, of a very special kind; and that, even among soldiers who developed these qualities to a high degree, the drain on mental and physical strength, and on numbers, was enormous. Second, the problem of supply had assumed a completely new guise. As petrol is to an internal combustion engine so is supply to any army in the field. But here the difficulties it could impose had to be realised afresh; and with that knowledge came a new emphasis on air power, for only through the air could supply be maintained and victory on the ground achieved." At another place the author discusses the question as to whether the Japanese garrison in the Buna-Sanananda-Gona area could have been left to "wither on the vine" as some island garrisons were left later in the war. It is these discussions of important problems connected with the operations which add considerably to the value of the book.

D.P.

Napoleon's Russian Campaign by Count Philippe—Paul De Segur. Translated from the French by J. David Townsend. (Michael Joseph, London, 1959). 284 pages. Price 21 sh.

No military campaign has stirred the imagination and interest of succeeding generations more than Napoleon's disastrous invasion of, and return from, Russia in 1812. The interest in the campaign has been still further increased by Hitler's disastrous Russian campaign. It was Tolstoy, who in his famous book *War and Peace*, gave a vivid and graphic account of Napoleon's Russian campaign. But for the source material he was indebted to Comte de Segur, who served as an aide-camp to Napoleon in the Russian campaign. Herein lies the chief value of this book for it contains an authentic and vivid account of the campaign. To this day it remains not only one of the most readable but also one of the most reliable narratives of Napoleon's ill-starred adventure. The campaign began with an ill omen. When the Grand Army was poised on the banks of the Niemen ready for the invasion of Russian soil, Napoleon reconnoitred this frontier at night. As he reached the river bank his horse suddenly fell, throwing him to the sand. A voice exclaimed, "This is an ill omen! A Roman would turn back". It was too late, however, to turn back. In crossing the Niemen an incident occurred which shows the loyalty of the soldiers to Napoleon. Napoleon was annoyed to find that a bridge which had been destroyed by the Cossacks prevented Oudinot from crossing. He ordered a squadron of Poles to ford the river. These picked troops obeyed without a moment's hesitation. They were swept away by the swift current. "As they were about to go down, they turned towards Napoleon and shouted, 'Vive l'Empereur!' We noticed three in particular who, their mouths still above water, repeated the cheer and immediately sank. The army was gripped with horror and admiration." It is these incidents which make the story so exciting and touching. Segur's vivid and stirring account of the battle of Borodino and the burning of Moscow leave a terrible impression on the mind. One is awestruck by the audacious plan of governor Rostopchin to reduce Moscow to ruins so that the French army might starve. This is how Segur describes the audacity and patriotism of the governor. "One man alone in the midst of an empire now almost overthrown, faced the danger without faltering. He measured it, estimated it, and dared to evaluate the public and private interests he must sacrifice to it. A mere subject, he decided the fate of the state without the approval of his sovereign. A nobleman, he pronounced the destruction of the palace."

nobles, without their consent. By virtue of his office the protector of a whole population, a multitude of rich merchants, and one of the greatest capitals of Europe, he sacrificed its fortunes, its industries, the city itself. He gave to the flames the finest of his own palaces; and proud, satisfied, and calm he stood in the midst of all those shocked and devastated interests." On the other hand the picture that Segur gives of Napoleon is entirely different. Driven on by fate, Napoleon seemed to be at times irresolute and at critical moments weighed down by sickness. Although an admirer of Napoleon, Segur could nevertheless see that the spark of Austerlitz and Marengo was no longer alive in 1812. This interesting book easily ranks among the classics of military narratives and deserves an honoured place on the shelves of the libraries.

D.P.

The Military Legacy Of The Civil War: The European Inheritance by Jay Luvaas. (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 252 pages. Price \$5.95.

Like love, the American Civil War is a subject on which the last word will never be written. The book under review is the first of a trilogy planned by the author dealing with the military legacy of the Civil War in its three aspects—foreign, American, and naval.

Starting with an account of the foreign military observers, mainly English, French and German, who visited America during the hostilities, the author proceeds to analyse their contemporary reports and the subsequent course of European military interest in the Civil War.

It is interesting to see the phases through which this European legacy has passed. During the hostilities the Europeans were primarily interested in the large citizen armies raised by the two contestants, in the American technical and industrial methods of producing newer weapons, in fortifications, and in the then controversial issue of the use of cavalry—'shock troops' vis-a-vis mounted infantry. Indeed, very limited spheres of interest which were restricted by what the observers and their colleagues at home wanted particularly to know.

After the Civil War was over European military thinkers began to assess and write about the tactical issues of that war. Cavalry, the use of railways, entrenchments—these were still controversial issues, but the general scope of study was unfortunately restricted to the details of battles in the Eastern theatre, and this phase was notable for its undue concentration on and near deification of Lee and Stonewall Jackson and their achievements.

It took the shock and mud and military quagmire of World War I to stimulate a new generation of modern European military thinkers into putting the Civil War as a whole in proper perspective, and against the background of modern conditions many intelligent analyses and assessments of the main course and personalities of that war began to emerge.

Much painstaking research has gone into the writing of this book. If the other two volumes are equally good this trilogy should be a useful modern addition to the bibliography of the Civil War.

N.R.

The Great Invasion by Leonard Cottrell. (Evens Brothers, Ltd., London, 1953). 219 pages. Price 21 sh.

This is the story of the great Roman invasion of Britain by Julius Caesar and his legions and later by other Roman generals, and the resulting conquest of

the island—a conquest which took the Romans forty years to complete though only after bitter fighting and many setbacks. Once the fighting was over, the Romans made every effort during their long occupation of nearly 400 years, to create conditions of settled and peaceful life by good laws and benevolent government in Britain, which was the northernmost frontier of their empire and which they no doubt considered their prize possession. Those who still believe that the Romans were tyrants, holding down by force of arms a sullen and captive nation should read carefully what Sir Winston Churchill has to say about it. According to him, Britain under the Roman rule “enjoyed in many respects the happiest, most comfortable and most enlightened times its inhabitants have had.”

This book is, however, not an account of the Roman occupation, but merely of the forty and odd years of the process of conquest, during which much bloodshed and fighting naturally occurred. From bits of evidence, collected from various sources and from an exhaustive study of the archaeological finds, the author has been able to reconstruct as complete a picture of the Britain of those times and of the conquest as one could hope for. There are, of course, Caesar's own “Commentaries”—a more authentic source than which cannot be imagined—but all written accounts are fragmentary and incomplete. By making use of archaeological evidence, and fitting all the bits of information and knowledge in their proper places, the author has composed a pattern which is at once astonishing in its completeness and pleasant to behold.

A part of the book describes Britain as it might have looked before the coming of the Romans, and in another Mr. Cottrell deals with the long campaign ultimately resulting in the subjugation of all Britain south of Tay. Agricola's inroads into Scotland, Frontinus' into Wales, the Hadrian's Wall and the system of military training imparted to Britons are all described vividly, as also the military system, weapons etc. of the Romans. The book is thus essentially one of war-history and is a typical example of the success of modern methods of historical research in presenting intelligible and readable accounts of events till now considered semi-obscure. It has forty-eight illustrations, an epilogue and an index, and makes enjoyable reading.

P.N.K.

Brazen Chariots by Robert Crisp, DSO, MC. (Frederic Muller Ltd., London, 1959). 223 pages. Price 15 sh.

Robert Crisp in *Brazen Chariots* has given a graphic first hand account of tank warfare during Operation “Crusador” which lasted for 28 days in November-December 1941.

During this period the author served as a troop leader and for some time as squadron commander in ‘C’ Squadron, 3 RTR, which formed part of 4 Armoured Brigade. It has always been known that Operation “Crusador” was one of the most fantastic phase of the desert campaign, but one cannot get any idea of its chaotic course, the breakdown in command, the confusion of information and disposition that left whole brigades and divisions without orders or purpose, without reading this book.

Just before Operation “Crusador”, 3 RTR were equipped with Stuart tanks. The author describes how without any directive from superior authority he trained his troop in the most basic step in tank warfare, i.e. fire and movement. Then we are launched in operations which from the start had a great disadvantage in that German tanks both Mark III and to a lesser extent Mark II and the most dreaded 88 were far superior to the British tanks. In spite of this disadvantage

the author shows how through sheer courage, audacity and initiative, almost defeat was turned into victory.

Throughout the book the author describes the day to day existence of a tank commander, CO's orders, breaking harbour, hours of waiting in terret down positions or movement in search of the enemy, a sharp engagement, move back to harbour, maintenance and replenishment, trying to get some sleep, orders again. Many have the idea that as tankmen are mounted they do not have to undergo the same physical strain as the PBI. For those who have these doubts, reading this book will give them a very good idea as to what a tankman has to go through.

At times one is left with the feeling that what the author narrates cannot be true. How can a state of affairs be ever reached when a regiment completely loses all control of its squadron and a troop leader with only one tank has to carry on a war against the might of the German army? However, all doubts can be put aside, for this is what Field Marshal Lord Harding says in his Foreword "Knowing the men and the conditions in which he and his comrades fought—and won—this story rings true to me".

The author also describes one of the most romantic episodes of the desert campaign in which Brigadier Campbell won his VC.

This book may not be considered as a Bible for Staff College aspirants but, I feel, is a must for all young officers specially those in the Armoured Corps. We may have to face the same conditions under which Robert Crisp fought. This book shows how to fight even when one is at a great disadvantage.

Fireside Fusilier by The Earl of Wicklow. (Hollis & Carter, London, 1958). 145 pages. Price 15 sh.

Fireside Fusilier gives a humane and modest account of the way in which more than half the armed forces spent their years of service during World War II. The author describes how he joined the army before being called up and in spite of advice received from many well wishers, found himself posted to "The Bloody Infantry". The book does not describe any great battles fought, however, gives a very graphic account of the blitz and the damage caused by it to the docks of the Port of London.

To a young officer the value of the book lies in its clear enunciation of man-management, which is a great factor in winning wars. The author describes how he fought boredom which at times is at the root of low morale. The author has made this rather a dull subject into a most fascinating reading. This is not strange, as the author was for a period the editor of the famous quarterly *The Dublin Review*. I only wish, however, that author could have kept the religious aspect out of this very neat book, although I must confess that it does not in any way detract from its value.

A.N.J.

The History of the Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment) 1919-1957. By Brigadier C. N. Barclay. (William Clowes and Sons Ltd., London 1959). 182 pages. Price £1.5.0

A Regimental history can either be written in great detail or it can be a modest book "giving only the 'meat' of events, with a few good illustrations and simple maps." This book belongs to the latter category. With these limitations, however, Brigadier C. N. Barclay has really done a fine job. The greater part of the history deals naturally with events in World War II. The Regiment was,

however, unlucky for the 1st, 5th and 8th Battalions after gallant fights all went into activity. Their fortitude in adversity excites our admiration. The greater part of the actual fighting fell to the 2nd, 2/5 and 14th Battalions. They certainly proved their worth in all the many operations in Europe and North Africa. "For the Sherwood Foresters Italy was the main battleground in the 1939-45 war, and it was there that the three most battle-scarred Battalions of the Regiment served with the greatest distinction. Salerno, Anzio, the Gothic Line, and many lesser battles and engagements, are names which will not be forgotten by the men of the Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire—and some others from further afield—who fought with the 2nd, 5th and 14th Foresters." The book is indeed a notable addition to the regimental histories of the British Army.

D.P.

ARMY

Soldier & Soldiering in India by Brigadier Rajendra Singh, Army Educational Stores. Ambala Cantt., Second Edition 1959. 192 pages. Price Rs. 6.50.

The author of this book hardly needs any introduction to the Defence Services; certainly not to the readers of the U.S.I. Journal. He has a well established reputation for versatility in writing and his fame as a writer on a variety of Military subjects has been voiced in India and abroad.

The Second Edition of his book "Soldier and Soldiering in India", which has been brought out recently contains a collection of 12 essays on the Army and its functions as a vital element of the Defence Services. The book is laid out in two parts. The first six chapters give a birds-eye view of the Army. It contains several little anecdotes, full of humour and indicative of the authors' insight into the many-facets of Indian Army life. One of these chapters, entitled "Our Officers" contains an interesting analysis of the minimum financial requirements of married officers with a small family. He is certainly not telling a hard luck story when he presents a financial picture of the typical Army officer who, in virtue of his rank and status, is more or less compelled to exceed his salary level in spite of the fact that he may be practising "planned parenthood" in a "cheap station". This family budget does not, however, provide for conveyance higher than bus fares or tonga hire. It does seem rather hard to expect a Major in the Army to find his way around a town by depending on public conveyance. He certainly cannot be expected to transport his children on the cross bar of his bicycle, with his wife sitting on the carrier.

The second part of the book delves into the wider field of Defence and the kind of organization necessary in order to undertake it effectively. This is of course a very wide field and there are as many opinions on the subject as there are persons who wish to talk about it. The chapter entitled "New Inventions for War" contains a considerable variety of charts and diagrams, with many of which personnel working in the Defence Services ought to be familiar. One would have, however expected the writer of the book to have made at least a passing reference to the existing organizations recently set up by the Ministry of Defence in this country. There is the Defence Research and Development Organization, under the Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence. This Organization has under it a large number of technical and development establishments, engaged in research on weapons, food, communications, Military explosives, aeronautics and personnel research. There is a Chief Controller of Research & Development who coordinates the undertak-

ings of various research and development establishments. There is further a Defence Production Organization, which undertakes production of essential materials for use by the three Services. This Organization functions under the direction of the Controller General of Defence Production. One would have expected the author of this book to have made some mention of the important work done by these two organizations. The chapter entitled "New Defence Organization" appears to be somewhat abstract, when its contents are considered in relation to the existing set up under the Indian Ministry of Defence. There is, nevertheless, much food for thought provided by the Brigadier in what he has put in his little book, which he has written with considerable zeal and a genuine concern for the lot of the soldier in India.

W.T.V.A.

Brave Men and Great Captains by R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy (Harper, New York). 378 pages. Price \$5.95.

This book, written by a unique father-and-son combination of military writers, sets out to review the development of American military leadership, its achievements and failures. It is no dull technical assessment of the ingredients of leadership, but an analysis of the personalities and fighting qualities of various American military leaders studied in relation to the actual conditions and backgrounds of campaigns beginning with the American War of Independence and ending with the operations in Korea.

Written in an easy style the book can be read with interest both by the professional reader and the layman. Most of the sketch maps used to illustrate the text are excellent. In places, there are some sweeping oversimplifications of tactical aims and achievements, but in a book of this scope these are perhaps excusable.

This is the kind of book which young officers should be given to read: not too early, though—after they have had the first few years of basic experience with the men and weapons of their sub-units, and before they are launched into the study of tactics, principles of war, military history and so on.

N.R.

AIR

British Civil Aircraft (1919-59) by A. J. Jackson. Vol. I. (Putnam, London 1959). 576 pages. Price 63sh.

It was after the end of the First World War, in 1919, that aeroplanes first came into use for purposes of transportation. This year the fortieth anniversary has been celebrated. The book under review is the commemoration volume issued on the occasion.

Naturally enough the first aircraft used were surplus military aircraft hastily converted. But these were gradually replaced by commercial and light aeroplanes. This volume tells us of all civilian British aircraft that were used during the twenty years between 1919 and the start of the Second World War. It lists in all 110 important types and gives description, development and operational history of each type. The narrative is greatly helped by the excellent illustrations. Many of the aircraft described have become legendary, and many stories about them have been handed down.

Chapters in the book are arranged alphabetically according to the names of the manufacturers, and within each section aircraft are listed logically by designation. A book for the specialist.

D.R.S.

Heavenly Adventurer by Basil Collier (Secker & Warburg, London, 1959). 242 pages. Price 25sh.

This book has a nostalgic flavour. It is not only the life story of a pioneer of military and civil aviation—Sir Sefton Brancker, but also describes the birth-pangs, the teething troubles and the slow and gradual growth of the Royal Air Force and the fore-runners of B.O.A.C. As such it is extremely interesting.

The story opens in Calcutta, towards the end of 1910, where Captain W. Sefton Brancker was Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quarter-Master General of the Presidency Brigade. News was brought to him one fine morning that a man by the name of Furnall Thurston had come to Calcutta with a few aeroplanes to demonstrate their practical use. His romantic spirit was aroused at once and he lost no time in contacting Thurston and wangling a flight in the new contraption. Brancker thus became the first man in India to fly as a passenger. He became a convert and a very zealous one.

Brancker returned to England a couple of years later and was posted to a field artillery battery near Aldershot a few miles from Farmborough, home of the Royal Aircraft Factory. He found many opportunities to indulge his new passion and flew often as a passenger or observer. He became convinced that flying had a future. The Royal Flying Corps had just come into existence and needed officers. Brancker tried to get in at the ground floor but was rejected due to his short sight.

A year later when war clouds were gathering over Europe he was appointed assistant to the Director of Military Training, responsible for the training of the Royal Flying Corps. This was the first step on the ladder of fame. When the war broke out Brancker remained in London and did good service in training pilots and getting machines to form reserve squadrons. He had only a short spell of active service. When the air force became a separate service as the Royal Air Force, Brancker was promoted to Major-General and appointed Controller-General of Equipment and Master-General of Personnel on the Air Council.

The end of the war saw Brancker in an unenviable position. He had made some friends but many more enemies. He had no future prospects. So he left the air force. He started the first commercial air-line in Britain to fly between London and Paris. But his high hopes were not fulfilled and he was once again 'outside looking for a job'. In his private capacity he did much to popularise civil aviation by writing articles and delivering lectures. He was a familiar figure at international air conventions. A new turn of the wheel made him Director of Civilian Aviation. He perished in the tragic crash of the airship R. 101. He thus died as he had lived, dangerously.

A fascinating story told in a fascinating manner.

D.R.S.

ARMY

GORKHA—The Story of the Gurkhas of Nepal by Sir Francis Tuka. (Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1957). 319 pages. Price 45 sh.

Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Tuka obviously loves the gallant people about whom he has written. The book is a well documented and illustrated history of Nepal from the humble origins of the Himalayan village of Gorkha to the state of Nepal as it exists today.

The account of the earlier period upto the Second World War is most readable and provides answers to many questions which are of interest, both to the officer now serving with Gorkhas, as well as the general reader.

The author deals with historical facts, the origin of the various tribes, political intrigue between the clans and the wars with the British, providing a wealth of facts, comments and interesting information which will absorb the reader.

The three later chapters, which deal with Nepal after the war, the eclipse of the Ranas and the introduction of democratic rule in Nepal, however, seem to lack the tolerance so prevalent in the chapters which precede these events.

The author himself perhaps provides an answer for this noticeable disparity when he says "we are too close to the disarray of events and the mingled and uncertain motives to make a proper assessment of their relative importance."

Sir Francis cannot resist expressing his strong personal likes and dislikes whilst commending on this chapter of Nepal's history. His views, however, make the book no less readable, provided one remembers that it is difficult for a historian to see one's own time in proper perspective.

The book has a reference map and is well illustrated with photographs which cover a wide range of Nepali scenes, clans and ex-rulers. Here again, the absence of any photographs of the modern rulers of Nepal does seem an avoidable omission.

A most readable and well written account of Nepal by an author who loves his Gorkhas and is not afraid to express his likes and dislikes. The book is a must for those who serve with Gorkha troops. The information on mountain passes, routes and past relations with China and Tibet, will be of much topical interest to those concerned with present day affairs on India's Northern borders.

E.V.

The Land of Midian by H. St. John Philby (Ernest Benn Limited, London). 1957; 286 pages. Price 36sh.

The author of this travel book having been a member of the Indian Civil Service, possesses an excellent background regarding every day conditions of life in countries East of the Suez. He has given a composite picture of his travels over the deserts of Western Arabia, or the land of Midian, as he calls it. One of these expeditions was performed by him with only Arabic companions. The other three were undertaken in collaboration with European travel mates.

Starting with Madina—a place associated with the Prophet Mohammad—Philby proceeded North to Khaibar and then slightly North West to Taima and Tabuk, traversing vast tracts of the Arabian desert. He then leads the reader to Rawafa and Harra which are places lying South West of Tabuk, in the direction of the Red Sea. This interesting travel account concludes with a lively description of the Midian Valley and the sea-board of Midian.

As one reads his account of that country, which would be obscure to those who have never visited that part of the world, one gets the feeling that when all is said and done, Arabia is not altogether an arid, barren and sandy expanse, devoid of human population. The chapter on the Tabuk Oasis presents the romantic picture of a green spot in the desert, complete with a Sultan in his castle. Tabuk not only carries memories for the historically minded, but even kindles pious sentiments in those who revered the Prophet Mohammad.

Another spot, of interest to those who are conversant with Biblical traditions—mentioned in his descriptions of the Midian valley—is the place where Moses wooed the daughters of Jethro. The historic "well of Moses", believed to be situated near the Modern police post of Bad'a recalls to the mind of the reader the chivalrous act which the Hebrew Stalwart performed, by rolling the huge

stone covering that well, in order to enable the shepherd lasses to provide water for their flocks of sheep. He was rewarded for chivalry by the love of one of the maidens.

The book concludes with a description of the seaboard of Midian which lies at the eastern edge of the Red Sea. Those who have sailed up or down the Red Sea on the voyage between the Suez and Aden will have no doubt seen the bleak, barren and rugged coast line of Arabia, often wondering what lay on the surface of the land. The stifling heat and oppressive humidity of that region would undoubtedly have made it appear forbidding and uninhabitable. Curiously enough, some of the coastal towns and villages on the Midian seaboard provide one with a variety of creature comforts which relieve the grimness of the desert setting. The writer claims that he enjoyed the luxury of a warm bath and a complete change of clothes when he arrived at Wajah, where he was entertained in princely style by the Amir. Even a police control post on the dusty road in that region seemed capable of rising to the occasion by offering him a cup of coffee!

The book is illustrated with a series of photographs which give the reader a miscellany of the views of the country which the author has so well described. There is also a map of the country which the reader will find extremely useful in the effort to gain some idea of the exact location of the places described.

W.T.V.A.

Berber Village by Brian Clarke (Longmans, London, 1959). 160 pages. Price 18 sh.

Most travel stories make interesting reading. *Berber Village* by Brian Clarke, the leader of an expedition to the Moroccan Atlas, sponsored by the Oxford University is an account of life in that remote region at a time when it was in the throws of political upheaval. The Party consisted of five undergraduates, each a specialist in his subject. However, it is not the scientific data obtained but the lucid account of their adventure that grips ones attention. There are many exciting situations, amongst the recalcitrant but likeable Berbers but nothing deters the under-graduates. The gravity of any problem is instantly dissolved in the brimming cauldron of uninhibited rumour of the type "The Chameleon, now known as George, stayed happily in the cool dark interior of the Pressure Cooker."

There is much useful information about the ways and customs of the population. At the end the author gives an account of the expenditure incurred. The total cost came to a little more than a thousand pounds. Young officers contemplating an expedition of their own could get some good hints for planning. The Book makes a significant contribution to travel literature.

S.S.

A Handbook of Flags by Preben Kannik (Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1958). 203 pages. Price 16sh.

A country's national flag has now become an honoured symbol. Its colours are regarded as national colours and it is treated with love and veneration by the country's inhabitants. A comprehensive book on flags at a reasonable price has long been needed. The publishers have fulfilled this long felt need. Here is a book which includes reproductions and descriptions of nearly 800 official present-day flags, some 80 national coats of arms, a number of older flags of historical interest, and such supernatural flags as those of the United Nations, NATO, etc.

SERVICES NOTES

GENERAL

DURING the debate on the Sino-Indian relations, Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister told the *Lok Sabha* that necessary troops movements consistent with India's resources had taken place for the defending the borders. Mr. Menon added that the morale of our forces has never been higher than what it was now. The Defence Minister said that while India was opposed to taking military aid from other countries, she was obtaining whatever defence equipment the country required from other countries by paying. Further, any military aid taken was subject to international legislation of the country from which it was obtained. It was not India's policy to deploy troops on the international frontiers whether it was the frontier of Pakistan or Burma or China as the case may be.

EX-SERVICEMEN'S CONFERENCE

Shri V. K. Krishna Menon, Union Minister of Defence, inaugurated the first two-day ex-Servicemen's Welfare Conference of States representatives and employing Central Ministries of the Government of India on December 15. He urged the need for tightening the existing organisation to make it a more effective and efficient instrument to solve the issue facing the country. The Minister pointed out that there were in this land nearly three million ex-Servicemen to which about 25 to 30 thousands were being added every year. Unless the men who joined the Armed Forces were given reasonable hopes of a bright future, he felt, they were not likely to prove themselves very useful to the country. The Prime Minister who addressed the conference on December 16 emphasised the need to take advantage of the vast resources of human power available in the form of talent, experience and knowledge of the ex-Servicemen and utilise them in the many new industrial undertakings coming up in the country.

SCIENTIFIC SYMPOSIUM

A three-day Symposium on Instruments was held early in November in Dehra Dun under the auspices of the Defence Research and Development Organisation. This symposium attended by over 300 eminent scientists, technologists, executive heads and policy makers, achieved its aim of creating a keen sense of awareness in the minds of all concerned to the manifold problems connected with the promotion and development of indigenous instrument industry. The subjects for discussion included a survey of the industrial potential for instrument manufacture in the country, research design and development with associated problems of production and inspection of instruments, rationalisation and standardisation of instruments and their components and materials, tropic proofing and tropicalisation, packing and packaging, storage and preservation, repair and maintenance of Instruments.

THE NEW CARDIOGRAPH

The Armed Forces Medical Services have been successful in developing some very complicated medical equipment during the past one year or so. The most important item designed and developed by the A.F.M.S. is a battery-operated electro-cardiograph, a prototype of which has been made at its Medical Stores Depot in Poona for the first time in India. The entire machine has been fabricated by the technicians of the Depot, and with the exception of the galvanometer, electronic valves and minor components, the other parts have been produced by it from locally available material, thus making the instrument 80 per cent indigenous.

FELLOWSHIP SCHEME

In order to make it worthwhile for young persons of ability and aptitude in research to take up a career in defence science the Defence Ministry has from 1959 offered a maximum of 50 fellowships annually to holders of doctorate, master's degree in science and/or bachelor's degree in engineering/metallurgy. Nearly two dozen research fellows, out of the 40 who qualified from among a large number of applicants, have already joined. The training of this batch has started at the Defence Science Laboratory.

THE PAY COMMISSION REPORT

A departmental committee under the chairmanship of Shri K. Raghuramaiah, Deputy Defence Minister, has been appointed to examine the impact on combatants and enrolled non-combatants of the Defence Services of the recommendations of the Pay Commission (1957). Its terms of reference are to consider the application of the Commission's recommendations to Defence Services personnel, taking into account the historical background to their present pay structure and other conditions of service, the peculiarity of service in the Armed Forces and other relevant factors.

NATIONAL CADET CORPS

Sixteen Officers Training Units are to be raised in the N.C.C. in the various States in the country to provide a higher standard of training to those NCC cadets who have agreed to choose a career in the Armed Forces. This decision of the Government follows the steadily increasing trend in the intake of the NCC-trained personnel into the Army. To augment this intake it has now been decided to raise the percentage for allotment to NCC cadets' entry into the commissioned ranks of the Arms from 10 to 15 per cent. The first O.T.U. has been raised in U.P. and preliminary selections are in progress. The Units will consist of Armoured Corps, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Infantry, Medical and Electrical and Mechanical Engineering.

The Corps celebrated its eleventh anniversary on December 6, 1960 with great aplomb. The strength of the organisation stood at 2,35,411 at the end of December this year.

ARMY

Promotions: Maj.-Gen. Kumarmangalam, Commandant Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, is promoted to the acting rank of Lt.-Gen. and posted as Adjutant General, Army HQ. Brigadier N. K. D. Nanavati, Commander of 168 Infantry Brigade, has been appointed as the Commandant of the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun.

NEW ASHOKA CHAKRA AWARDS

The posthumous award of two Ashoka Chakra decorations, one to a civilian and the other to a serviceman for gallantry, by the President was announced in the last week of October. Shri Makhimong Sangtam, a Dobashi of village Longkhim (Naga Hills) has been awarded Ashoka Chakra Class II (Posthumous) for gallant action in Naga Hills and Jemadar S. Rajamanickam of the 12th LSS Training Team awarded Ashoka Chakra Class III (Posthumous) for his selfless devotion to duty.

REGULAR RESERVE OF OFFICERS IN THE ARMY

To meet manpower requirements in an emergency, the Army proposes to maintain a regular Army Reserve of Officers. Released Short Service Regular

Emergency and Temporary Commissioned Officers as well as former State Forces' officers, cadets of the senior Division of the N.C.C. with certificate 'C' and other civilians within prescribed age limits are eligible for being commissioned in the Reserve.

ARMY COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE

At a Conference of the Army Commanders held in Delhi from November 20, General K. S. Thimayya, Chief of Army Staff, detailed the various defence commitments that had to be undertaken to protect India's frontiers, particularly the northern border. In this connection, the Army Chief referred to the stupendous engineering effort that was required to be put in to solve logistic problems, one of them being the construction of an elaborate network of roads in the difficult terrains of NEFA and other northern regions.

NAVY

INDIAN BUILT "DARSHAK"

India's first survey ship INS DARSHAK was launched by Mrs. Katari at the Hindustan Shipyard, Visakhapatnam on November 2, 1959. This is a new and significant phase in building up Naval ships in India.

INS KIRPAN & KUTHAR

The ships arrived in Bombay on November 20. A day earlier INS DELHI and INS RANJIT went out to sea to welcome the new ships.

NAVAL OFFICERS' CONFERENCE

The 14th senior naval officers conference was held in Delhi towards the end of November. The Defence Minister, who inaugurated the conference, stressed the importance of proper administration of the service especially in its scientific and technical aspects. The Chief of Naval Staff surveyed the important naval activities of the past year and said that with more ships and the aircraft career expected to join by 1961, the present construction programme of new ships undertaken in the U.K. would be completed.

NAVY DAY

The Navy Day was celebrated throughout the country on December 15. Ceremonial parades, route marches, flag marches and illumination of ships formed part of Navy Day celebrations. At a reception held in New Delhi the President, the Vice-President and the Prime Minister were present.

AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE MOUNTAINEERING EXPEDITION

An Air Force mountaineering expedition led by Air Commodore S. N. Goyal successfully climbed the 23,420-ft. high Chowkhamba peak and established a new record in climbing.

FOREIGN VISITOR

Air Chief Marshal Sir Thomas G. Pike, Chief of the Air Staff designate of the Royal Air Force paid a three-day visit to India in November.

AUXILIARY AIR FORCE

The Central Advisory Committee for the Auxiliary Air Force met in Delhi on December 18, 1959. It was announced that eight more Auxiliary Squadrons are to be raised shortly. A squadron each at Bhuvaneshwar and Chandigarh have been formed.

CORRESPONDENCE

Correspondence is invited on subjects which have been dealt with in the Journal, or which are of general interest to the Services.

To the Editor of the U.S.I. Journal

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Sir,—I read the U.S.I. Publication of the American Civil War by 'Raminov' and wish to congratulate you for printing this author's articles in pamphlet-form. It is a Godsend for those who have been unable to buy the highly priced and now almost unobtainable official publications of this campaign.

The five maps which have been included are most effective and one might well claim that this condensed version is perhaps the best introduction for students of the American Civil War.

For those who wish to study this war in detail, Raminov has thoughtfully provided a guide for detailed study and a suggested list of books for further reading on the last page.

This publication should be a big help for those who have long awaited professional guidance on the study of this war.

I hope this will not be the last such publication and that there will be many more.

37, Queen Victoria Road Mess,
New Delhi.

MAJOR A. N. JATAR.

DSSC REVISION COURSE

I wish to convey my gratitude for the excellent coaching received from your DSSC revision course run by the Institution. There is a positive need of such coaching classes for those taking such examinations.

May I extend a few suggestions :

(a) At present "Law" is spread over a number of weeks. Instead, I feel that a concentrated dose in one week will be beneficial.

(b) The practice of occasionally bringing the specialist to give lecture should be discontinued—this is most certainly not meant to be any kind of reflection on such experts. But, because they do not know the standard and the scope of the syllabus, their talks tend to be too basic or too detailed which at times amount to irrelevancy.

(c) The emphasis should be more on writing. To avoid burdening of instructors with too many papers for correction, it may be worthwhile to issue out questions (sort of homework) which may be answered by the students in their own time. The papers are then interchanged between students and corrections carried out by them under the guidance of the instructors.

A major suggestion I also wish to extend is—now that the Metropolitan Courses have been discontinued, the United Service Institute should start a correspondence course for such examination. Everyone cannot come to Delhi to attend the courses but everyone most certainly can learn through the post. Once again I wish to emphasise my gratitude.

New Delhi.

CAPT. NIRMAL ROY

SECRETARY'S NOTES

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION

All subscriptions are due on 1st of Jan. in each year. Subscription notices were sent to all members early in July for the current years subscription. It would be of very great assistance and a saving of considerable time and money to the Institute if those members who have not yet paid would please let me have their remittance as soon as possible and without further reminder.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

Articles on the American Civil War in this journal by Raminov have been reprinted as a pamphlet. The pamphlet contains the full text of the two articles with five 'stretch-out maps. A bibliography has also been added.

A limited number of copies are available for sale. The price is Rs. 1/- including packing and postage. Those requiring the pamphlet may please write to the Secretary at the earliest, giving their name and postal address in block capitals and enclosing the cost in crossed Indian Postal Orders payable at New Delhi.

REVISION COURSE—PROMOTION EXAMINATION

The next revision course for officers preparing for Promotion Examination Part 'D' will be conducted under the auspices of the Institution from 7 March to 23 April 1960.

The following subjects will be covered :—

- (a) Tactics
- (b) Administration and Morale
- (c) Military History
- (d) Current Affairs
- (e) Military Law

Instruction will be in the form of lectures|discussions and correction of compulsory written work.

Timings will be as follows :—

- (a) Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays & Fridays—Commencing at 17-30 hrs.
- (b) Wednesdays and Saturdays—Commencing at 14-30 hrs.
- (c) Sundays and holidays—Commencing at 09-30 hrs.

Detailed programme will be issued on 7 March 60 at 17-30 hrs.

A nominal fee of Rs. 15 per subject will be charged from each student. The fees for the whole course (five subjects) will be Rs. 50/-.

The course is open to members of the USI only.

Members desirous of attending the course may please send in their names to the Secretary, USI, Kashmir House, New Delhi-11, indicating the subjects they wish to take and enclosing the required fees in advance.

Applications must reach the Secretary by 27 February '60.

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DA59/344

NEW MEMBERS

From 1st October 1959 to 31st December 1959 the following members joined the Institution :

- | | |
|---|--|
| AHLUWALIA, 2 Lieut. D.J.S., <i>The Dogra Regiment.</i> | KAUL, Captain H., <i>2nd Lancers.</i> |
| BAHL, Captain D. S. | KHOSLA, Captain J.L., <i>Skinner's Horse.</i> |
| BHATIA, Major K.C., <i>E.M.E.</i> | MAHANDROO, 2 Lieut. V.K., <i>4 J. & K. Infantry.</i> |
| CHAWLA, Captain S.K., <i>E.M.E.</i> | MAZUMDER, Flt. Lieut. A., <i>I.A.F.</i> |
| DA GAMA-ROSE, Lieut.-Colonel F.A. | MUKHERJEE, Captain B.K., <i>62 Cavalry.</i> |
| DEPINDER SINGH, Captain, <i>8 Gorkha Rifles (Life).</i> | MURTI, Captain B.N.S., <i>Signals.</i> |
| DEY, Captain S.K., <i>2nd Lancers.</i> | NANAYYA, Captain K.A., <i>A.O.C.</i> |
| DOSANJH, Captain C.S. | PITRE, Captain M.G., <i>The Madras Regiment.</i> |
| GHOSH, Lieut. Arindam, <i>I.N.</i> | RANGANATHAN, Major Rajagopala, <i>Engineers.</i> |
| GULATI, Major K.L. | ROY, Captain N., <i>The Punjab Regiment.</i> |
| HARBANS SINGH, Captain, <i>Artillery.</i> | SAHNI, Lieut. A.L., <i>Indian Navy.</i> |
| HARNAM SINGH, Captain. | SARMA, Lieut. P.S.P., <i>E.M.E. (Life)</i> |
| IRANI, Captain Baman. S., <i>7th Light Cavalry.</i> | SCUDDER, Captain S.G. |
| JANARDANAN, Captain C., <i>Artillery.</i> | TIPNIS, 2 Lieut. A.Y., <i>The Dogra Regiment (Life).</i> |
| KAPUR, Captain S., <i>The Assam Rifles.</i> | VIRMANI, Lieut.-Colonel G. K., <i>E.M.E.</i> |

SUBSCRIBING MEMBERS

Four Officers Messes and institutions were enrolled as subscribing members during this period.

ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY

OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1959

Title	Author	Year of Pub.
Anecdotes of Aurangzib	Jadunath Sarkar	1949
An approach to sanity	Field Marshal Montgomery	1959
Auchinleck	John Connell	1959
Berber Village	Bryan Clarke	1959
Brazen Chariots	Robert Crisp	1959
British Civil Aircraft 1919-59, Vol. I	A. J. Jackson	1959
The Crowded Sky	Neville Duke and Edward Lanchbery, ed.	1959
Danger spots of the World	Bernard Newman	1959
The Desert and the Jungle	Sir Geoffrey Evans	1959
A digest of new developments in Army Weapons, tactics, organization and equipment	Marvin L. Worley	1959
Essential documents and notes on Kashmir dispute	P.L. Lakhanpal	1958
Fireside Fusilier	The Earl of Wicklow	1958
The Great Civil War	Lieut. Col. Alfred H. Burne and Peter Young	1959
A Handbook of Flags	Preben Kannik	1958
Heavenly adventurer	Basil Collier	1959
The History of Sherwood Foresters	Brig. C.N. Barclay	1959
House of Shivaji	Jadunath Sarkar	1955
India—a reference annual 1959.	India—Ministry of Information & Broadcasting	1959
India through the ages	Jadunath Sarkar	1951
India wins freedom	Maulana Abul Kalam Azad	1959
Inner Circle-memoirs	Ivone Kirk Patrick	1959
International propaganda—its legal diplomatic control	John L. Martin	1958
Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. Vols 2 & 3	India—Ministry of Information and Broadcasting	1957 1958
The March of Conquest	Telford Taylor	1959
Military system of the Mughals	Lt. Col. B.N. Majumdar	1959
Mughal administration	Jadunath Sarkar	1952
Napoleon's Russian Campaign	Count Philippe Paul De Segur	1959
Nehru—a Political Biography	Michael Breecher	1959
New horizons	Col. Narendrapal Singh	1959
Not in the lime light	Sir Ronald Wingate	1959
Nuclear weapons and International Law	Nagendra Singh	1959
Occupation for gentlemen	Frederick Warburg	1959
The only enemy—an Autobiography	Sir John Smyth	1959
Passage of Arms	Eric Ambler	1959
A Pearl to India—the Life of Robert de Nobili	Vincent Cronin	1959
Practical guide to weapon training and good shooting	Lt. Col. Gurbans Singh	1959
Prophet unarmed ; Trotsky. 1921-1929	Isaac Deutscher	1959
A Race of green ginger	Averil MacKenzie-Grieve	1959
Red River and the blue Hill	Hem Barua	1956

Title	Author	Year of Pub.
Regionalism Versus Provincialism	John V. Bondurant	1958
Second Bureau	Philip John Stead	1959
Shoot to Kill	Richard Miers	1959
The Singapore Story	Kenneth Attiwall	1959
Soldier and Soldiering in India	Brig. Rajendra Singh	1959
South-West Pacific area—first year ; Kokoda to Wau	Dudley McCarthy	1959
Tragic destiny	George N. Patterson	1959
Unofficial history	Field Marshal Sir William Slim	1959
The War Lover	John Hersey	1959
What's happening in China ?	Boyd Orr and Peter Townsend	1959
Window on Nepal	Tibor Sekelj	1959
World without war	J.D. Bernal	1958

SUGGESTED READING

(From Journals available in USI Library)

China's policy towards minorities by Subhash Chandra Sarkar.	The World Today October '59
Chinese expansion	The Round Table December '59
Chinese secret societies —a brief review of their origin and history and their role in the Far East today by Staff-Sergeant P.G. Gittins.	Australian Army Journal October '59
The International status of Tibet by His Holiness the Dalai Lama.	India Quarterly July-Sept '59
Tibet and Afghanistan —an appreciation of the situation on India's Northern Frontier by Lt. Col. H.E. Crocker.	The Army Quarterly October '59
Bhutan and Sikkim: two buffer States by Werner Levi.	The World Today December '59
Self-determination in Algeria.	The Round Table December '59
The British Army in the Nuclear age by Richard Gould-Adams for the Army League.	Survival November-December '59
Evolution of United States military strategic thought by Colonel Charles H. Donnelly.	Military Review October '59
Soviet military education —a source of Communist power by Colonel Virgil Ney.	Military Review December '59
Soviet unconventional warfare capabilities by Slavko N. Bjelajac.	Military Review November '59
Unity in Defence and disarmament by Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard.	Journal of the Royal United Service Institution November '59
Strategy of Deterrence by Marshall of the RAF Sir John Slessor.	Air force and Space digest November '59
The paper tiger or integrated deterrence ? by second Lieutenant Thomas E. Carpenter.	Armour September-October '59
Nuclear defence —the fear of retaliation and the danger of "nibbling" by Major G.H. Hoerder.	The Army Quarterly October '59
In defence of a deterrent strategy by Wing Commander N. Cameron.	Journal of the Royal United Service Institution November '59

Fabian tactics and nuclear weapons by Lt. Col. Louis Caudell, and Major Keith C. Nusbbaum.

The fallacy of a dual capability—we must go nuclear by Colonel Francis X. Bradley.

The other side of the Atom by Colonel A.S. Collins, Jr.

Thoughts on strategy in the missile age. A review by Dr. Ellis A. Johnson.

Overseas bases in unlimited war by Maj-Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF.

Is gas a better defence than atomic Weapons ? by Captain B.H. Liddell Hart.

Old hat War ? by Major Charles B. MacDonald.

Problems of future war—the tactical doctrine and Organisation required by land forces. by Major W.W. Pope.

The role of under sea warfare in U.S. Strategic doctrine by Leland C. Allen.

The two tigers by Capt J.O. Furner, B.A.

The Mission of the Civil Affairs Division—G5 by Brig-Gen. Strom Thurmond.

How the Auxiliary territorial Service began by Col. J.M. Cowper.

Military Review
October '59

Army
October '59

Army
November '59

Army
December '59

Air Force and Space Digest
December '59

Survival
Sept-Oct '59

Army
December '59

Australian Army Journal
November '59

Military Affairs
Fall '59

Australian Army Journal
December '59

Army
November '59

The Army Quarterly
October '59

(ARTICLES FROM THE BACK ISSUES OF USI JOURNAL)

Guerrilla Warfare :—

Guerrilla Warfare and its lessons. by Captain J.E. Heels,

1947. Vol. 77. P. 544.

Guerrilla Warfare by Maj. H. Simonds-Gooding

1946. Vol. 76. P. 288.

Jungle Warfare :—

Jungle Craft. by Capt. H. Peacock

1943. Vol. 73. P. 28.

Notes on jungle warfare by Capt. J.W. Young.

1928. Vol. 58. P. 338.

Jungle warfare by Major R.M. Rainey

1897. Vol. 26. P. 117.

Mountain Warfare :—

Mountain Campaigns by Capt. J.D. Mackenzie

1918. Vol. 47. P. 198.

Frontier mountain warfare by Maj. Iean Battye

1917. Vol. 46. P. 91.

Modernized mountain warfare by Maj. L.V.S. Blacker

1931. Vol. 61. P. 89.

Protection on the march in mountain warfare

by Capt. B. Bradshaw-smith.

1925. Vol. 55. P. 50.

Mountain Warfare as applied to India by Maj. G.M. Bullock

1893. Vol. 22. P. 304.

Frontier Warfare :—

Some thoughts on frontier fighting by Col. C. Kirkpatrick.

1924. Vol. 54. P. 326.

Frontier realities by Brig. M.R. Roberts

1946. Vol. 76. P. 53.

Frontier tactics defended by Lt. Col. P.A. Meade.

1944. Vol. 74. P. 61.

Training for frontier warfare by Lt. Col. W.E. Venour

1913. Vol. 42. P. 381.

Safety at night in frontier warfare by Capt. G.R.P. Wheatby

1909. Vol. 38. P. 97.

Frontier Myth by Major W.F.G. Spraight

1945. Vol. 75. P. 314.

Tactical principles and details best suited to warfare on the frontier of India by Col. J.P.C. Neville

1899. Vol. 28. P. 191,
P. 244, P. 329.

Tactical principles and details best suited to warfare on the frontiers of India by Lt. Col. J.G. Ramsay

1900. Vol. 29. P. 85.